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Abstract  
 
 This thesis empirically investigates the stabilization properties and the 
effectiveness of fiscal policy, which is an issue that has been gaining attention in the 
academic literature and among policy-makers in the past two decades, particularly in 
the wake of the Great Recession. The aim of the thesis is to analyse the cyclical 
character and determinants of fiscal policy, as well as the short- to medium-term 
effects of fiscal policy on output and other macroeconomic variables in European 
countries, with particular reference to transition countries. Using an extensive survey 
of the relevant literature and particularly the results of the comprehensive empirical 
investigation, the thesis offers recommendations relevant for policy-makers in 
European countries. The thesis thus deals with issues that lie at the heart of the main 
academic and policy debates in the wake of the European debt crisis. Consequently, 
its findings and recommendations should be useful for current and prospective 
European Union and euro area member states. 
 In order to analyse the cyclical character and determinants of fiscal policy, 
system GMM is used as the most appropriate estimation method for the sample and 
the aim of the study. The main finding in this part is that discretionary fiscal policy is 
pro-cyclical in both groups of transition countries (from Central and Eastern Europe 
and from South-eastern Europe), thus aggravating economic fluctuations, while it is a-
cyclical in old EU member states. These baseline results are robust to various 
extensions and robustness checks. The investigation of a wide range of additional 
factors indicates that various political and institutional factors also have important 
effects on fiscal policy in European countries, with numerous differences among the 
three country groups regarding their particular effect.  
 The extensive analysis of the stabilisation properties of fiscal policy is followed 
by an investigation of the ability of fiscal policy to influence economic movements, as 
well as of the transmission mechanism of fiscal policy. In this part, Panel Vector Auto 
Regression with recursive identification of government spending shocks is used to 
analyse the short- to medium-term effects of fiscal policy on output (fiscal multipliers) 
and other macroeconomic variables. The main results indicate that expansionary 
government spending shocks have a positive, but a relatively low effect on output, 
with the fiscal multiplier around one in the year of the shock and the following year, 
and lower thereinafter. Further, effects of fiscal policy are strongly dependent on 
structural country characteristics. In particular, fiscal multipliers are higher in new 
EU member states, in countries with low public debt and low trade openness.  
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1.1 Aims of the study 
 
The aim of this thesis is to analyse the cyclical character and determinants of 
fiscal policy, as well as the short- to medium-term effects of fiscal policy on output 
and other macroeconomic variables in European countries, with particular reference 
to transition countries.  
 
 
1.2 Context  
 
 One of the main issues that economic policymakers have to face is the 
stabilization of economic fluctuations using monetary and fiscal policy as the main 
tools. Accordingly, this is one of the fields that have attracted considerable attention 
in the academic literature since the start of macroeconomics as a discipline. The 
prevalent view on the role and effectiveness of fiscal and monetary policy has been 
almost constantly evolving. It has moved from considering fiscal policy the only 
stabilization tool in the 1950s to putting all the emphasis on monetary policy in the 
1990s. Fiscal policy was until recently confined to automatic stabilizers, while it was 
recommended that discretionary fiscal policy should be reserved for "abnormal 
circumstances" such as the zero interest rate bound (Blinder, 2004). The primacy of 
monetary policy both reflected and inspired the new neo-classical synthesis 
(Goodfriend and King (1997), Woodford (2009)). It reflects the convergence of 
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macroeconomic theories and methodologies (Mankiw (2006), Goodfriend (2007)) by 
combining Keynesian views of sticky prices and monopolistic competition with the 
neo-classical methodology of general equilibrium analysis of inter-temporal 
optimisation by rational economic agents. This is now the basic theoretical 
framework in the academic and policymaking world, as evidenced by the adoption of 
New Keynesian Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models in central 
banks (Tovar, 2008). The standard formulation of these models reflects the dominant 
view of monetary policy as the most effective tool for inflation and output 
stabilization. On the other hand, most of the early contributions in this literature and 
their applications to policymaking have little space for the role of fiscal policy, 
reflecting the assumption of Ricardian equivalence, although recently considerable 
efforts have been made to incorporate various features of fiscal policy within New 
Keynesian DSGE models.  
Despite the primacy of monetary policy in academic and policy-making circles, 
in practice policy-makers were also using fiscal policy to stabilise macroeconomic 
fluctuations. Moreover, fiscal policy did not disappear from the research agenda. 
Indeed, researchers have been revisiting some of the key issues of fiscal policy, thus 
resurrecting the old debates in macroeconomics. For instance, from the mid-1990s 
there was a proliferation of empirical studies analysing the stabilisation properties of 
fiscal policy, i.e. the reaction of fiscal policy to fluctuations in output (the cyclical 
character of fiscal policy) as well as to a wide range of other factors. In addition, the 
recent crisis and the zero bound for interest rates stressed the importance of fiscal 
policy in fighting the recession. This reignited the interest of the theoretical and 
empirical literature on the effects of fiscal policy on output (fiscal multipliers) and on 
other macroeconomic variables. Indeed, as Romer (2011) notes, between 2009 and 
2011 there have been more studies on the effects of fiscal policy than in the previous 
quarter century.   
On a more personal note, there were two key reasons that motivated the work 
on this particular thesis. First, coming from a transition country that is yet to join the 
European Union and prospectively the euro area, there was an obvious interest to 
learn about the experiences of other European countries regarding fiscal policy. This 
particularly applies to the experiences of transition countries that are already 
members of the European Union and of the euro area. Second, as a researcher 
working in a central bank in a European country, it is perhaps natural that the recent 
European debt crisis would fuel a personal curiosity regarding issues that are related 
to the sources of the crisis and possibilities of preventing its recurrence. Indeed, the 
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issues that are treated in the thesis lie at the core of the current academic and policy 
debates in the European context, and it is therefore hoped that the thesis findings and 
policy implications would be useful for European policy-makers in the future.  
 
 
1.3 Research objectives  
 
This thesis analyses the key issues related to fiscal policy in European 
countries, with a particular reference to transition countries. Therefore, it is directly 
related to the current focus of research in the literature, as well as to a very important 
policy issue. It also fills an important gap in the literature, particularly on transition 
countries. Indeed, while monetary policy in both old EU member countries and 
European transition countries is an extensively researched area (both in the level of 
individual countries and groups of countries), there is still a lack of a comparable 
body of literature on fiscal policy. Therefore, this thesis provides a comprehensive 
study on the issues noted above for the group of European countries, with a 
particular focus on comparisons between old EU member states on the one hand, and 
new and prospective EU member states from Central, Eastern and South-eastern 
Europe (i.e. European transition countries) on the other hand. In particular, this 
thesis investigates the role of fiscal policy in stabilizing economic fluctuations, i.e. 
whether the character of fiscal policy in European countries is counter-, pro- or a-
cyclical. In this part, it also analyses in detail a wide range of possible determinants of 
fiscal policy, encompassing various political, institutional and other factors. Further, 
the thesis also analyses the short- to medium-term effects of fiscal policy on output 
(but does not explore the separate topic of long-term growth) and on other important 
macroeconomic variables such as inflation and interest rates. It also investigates the 
possible influence of various country structural characteristics on the effects of fiscal 
policy as well as the transmission mechanism of fiscal policy. In other words, the 
thesis first analyses the effects of output on fiscal balances (controlling for other 
determinants), and interprets them as the cyclical character of fiscal policy. Then it 
analyses the opposite: the effects of fiscal policy on output, as well as on other 
macroeconomic variables. Therefore, the two empirical parts complement each other 
to provide a comprehensive study of fiscal policy in European countries. Indeed, if 
there are only limited effects of fiscal policy on macroeconomic movements (i.e. fiscal 
multipliers are low), then the issue of the cyclical character looses a great part of its 
importance. If fiscal policy can not affect output movements, it does not matter too 
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much whether it is counter-, a- or pro-cyclical. On the other hand, large fiscal 
multipliers would warrant a more aggressive use of counter-cyclical fiscal policy, 
since in such a case fiscal policy would be effective in stabilising the business cycle.   
The thesis tackles these issues by drawing extensively on the existing 
theoretical and particularly empirical studies, which focus mostly on developed 
countries. It analyses and compares advantages and disadvantages of the application 
of various empirical approaches to the issues being investigated. On the basis of this 
extensive discussion, it then selects and applies the most appropriate methodologies 
bearing on mind the aims of the study, the data and sample at hand, as well as 
recommendations in the relevant literature. Besides providing a genuine contribution 
to knowledge regarding fiscal policy in European countries, it is expected that 
findings and recommendations arising from the thesis will be useful to policymakers 
in European countries in general, and particularly in transition countries. Last but 
not least, bearing on mind that the Republic of Macedonia has yet to undergo most EU 
integration and reform processes that other transition countries have already 
completed, it is expected that findings of the thesis will also be useful to policymakers 
in my home country when designing and implementing fiscal policy in the future.  
 Consequently, the thesis has the following research objectives:  
 To briefly review the main macroeconomic and fiscal policy developments in 
European countries; 
 To review and critically assess the theoretical and empirical literature on the 
cyclical character and determinants of fiscal policy, as well as on the effects of 
fiscal policy on output and other macroeconomic variables; 
 To analyse empirically the cyclical character and determinants of fiscal policy 
in European countries, with a particular focus on transition countries;   
 To analyse empirically the short- to medium-term effects of fiscal policy on 
output and other macroeconomic variables in European countries, with a 
particular focus on transition countries;   
 To draw policy recommendations relevant for transition countries and 
Macedonia in particular. 
 
 
1.4 Stylised facts  
 
 Before proceeding to the empirical analysis in the following chapters, here we 
briefly describe the data and the main macroeconomic and fiscal policy 
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developments in our sample. The empirical analysis in the thesis includes all the 
European countries which have data available for the variables of interest. This 
means that we use a sample of 33 countries between 1995 and 2012. In order to carry 
out comparisons between old EU member states and transition countries, in parts of 
the investigation we split our sample in three groups: old EU member states and two 
groups of transition countries. The first group consists of 15 old EU member states, 
plus Malta and Cyprus (labelled EU171). The second group consists of the more 
advanced transition countries, i.e. the 10 countries from Central, Eastern and South-
eastern Europe that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007 (NMS10). The third group, 
denoted as SEE6, includes 6 transition countries from South-eastern Europe that are 
in various stages of the EU accession process: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia2. It should also be noted that data on 
SEE6 countries are only available from a later date than 1995. In addition, we include 
SEE6 countries in our analysis of the cyclical character of fiscal policy, while we omit 
this group from the analysis of effects of fiscal policy due to lack of relevant data.  
 Fiscal policy in our sample was affected by several important factors. Most 
notably, this applies to the requirements of the Maastricht criteria and of the Stability 
and Growth Pact (SGP). The Maastricht Treaty prohibits countries from exceeding 
reference values for budget deficits and public debts, defined as 3% and 60% of GDP, 
respectively. The literature notes two possibilities for the effects of the Maastricht 
Treaty and the SGP on fiscal policy (e.g. Galí and Perotti (2003) and Fatás and Mihov 
(2009)). On the one hand, the loss of monetary sovereignty means that fiscal policy is 
the only remaining tool for macroeconomic stabilization, so policymakers would use 
it more aggressively in a counter-cyclical manner when faced with crisis or output 
volatility. On the other hand, the limits in the Maastricht Treaty and the SGP could 
prevent such an activist counter-cyclical policy, and consequently fiscal policy would 
become a-cyclical or even pro-cyclical. 
In transition countries, fiscal policy was additionally and heavily affected by 
unprecedented political, economic and structural transformation since the beginning 
of the 1990s. Initially, fiscal policy was constrained because of changes in revenues 
and expenditures due to the restructuring and privatization of state-owned 
enterprises. Government budgets were also affected by the market and price 
liberalization, infrastructure building and institutional reforms. Expensive borrowing 
                                                
1 Cyprus and Malta joined the EU in 2004, but they are grouped with old EU countries because their 
economic structure and history makes them much closer to them than to the transition countries.  
2 Kosovo is omitted due to lack of data on public debt. Croatia became an EU member state in 2013, while 
our analysis ends in 2012. 
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sources and some of the exchange rate regimes were additional constraints. As 
transition advanced, the challenges in transition countries started resembling those of 
their Western European peers, such as issues of counter-cyclical fiscal policy, the 
effectiveness of fiscal policy and the sustainability of public debt. However, these 
countries were still facing some specific challenges. The process of EU-accession 
meant that they had to continue spending on institutional reforms and infrastructure 
modernization in order to meet entrance criteria and reach the development levels of 
Western European countries. Further, as EU members and potential candidates for 
entrance in the euro area, they were also faced with the constraints of the Stability 
and Growth Pact (SGP). Various authors argue that the SGP puts additional 
constraints on transition countries, generally considered undue because of their rapid 
development and their specifics (Nuti, 2006). Coricelli (2004) brings forward three 
arguments why SGP requirements would be more stringent for the new EU member 
states. First, they have a higher potential and more volatile actual GDP growth than 
old EU member states, so the deficit ceiling would be binding more often, even if one 
considers cyclically-adjusted indicators. This would impose a need for frequent fiscal 
adjustments, thus increasing the volatility and the pro-cyclical bias of fiscal policy. 
Second, in the original SGP there is lack of consideration for public investments, 
which are higher in transition countries due to the catching-up process. Third, the 
political element in the Excessive deficit procedure, which was also important in 
some cases of breaches by old EU member states, means that larger transition 
countries could have laxer treatment when breaching the SGP.  
Macroeconomic developments during the period under analysis broadly 
confirm the specific environment for the implementation of fiscal policy in old EU 
member states and in the two groups of European transition countries during the past 
two decades3. According to Figure 1.1, transition countries had a considerably higher 
average GDP growth between 1995 and 2012 than the EU17 countries: average GDP 
growth in NMS10 and SEE6 was 3.6% and 3.2% respectively, compared to only 2.2% in 
the EU17 group4. In line with expectations in Coricelli (2004), GDP growth in 
transition countries was also more volatile, with a standard deviation of 4.4 in NMS10 
and 4.1 in SEE6, considerably higher than the standard deviation of 2.8 in EU17 
countries5. Related to this, GDP growth in most countries in the EU17 group was fairly 
compressed around the group average, with Ireland as a positive and Italy as a 
                                                
3 Besides the figures below, Appendix 3.2 contains additional graphs on output gap movements accross 
countries and groups and also according to different calculation methods.  
4 All group indicators are calculated as simple, non-weighted averages. 
5 Group standard deviations are calculated as averages of country standard deviations.  
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negative outlier. On the other hand, growth in transition countries was much more 
diverse, with very few countries close to their respective group average. For instance, 
in the NMS10 group, Baltic countries, Poland and Slovakia had growth rates 
considerably higher than the group average, whereas the other countries and 
particularly Hungary had significantly lower growth. A similar picture could also be 
noticed in South-eastern European countries, with Albania growing much more 
quickly than the group average, as opposed to the considerably slower average 
growth in Serbia, Macedonia and Croatia.  
 
 
 
Figure 1.1. Average real GDP growth rates by countries and groups, 1995-2012 (in %) 
Source: European Commission AMECO Database for EU17, NMS10 and some 
SEE6 countries. National statistical offices, central banks or finance ministries, 
EBRD, and the IMF WEO Database for some SEE6 countries.  
Note: Group averages are unweighted.  
 
 
 
Differences in GDP growth between the three groups of countries are also 
noticeable if averages are compared across years. According to Figure 1.2, average 
GDP growth in both groups of current EU member states (i.e. EU17 and NMS10) was 
quite similar in almost all years until 2000. On the other hand, growth in SEE6 was 
quite volatile, in good part reflecting the consequences of wars and the post-war 
reconstruction in the region during this period. However, a clear decoupling appears 
between 2000 and 2007, with both groups of transition countries growing more 
quickly than their Western European peers in all years. In this period, growth was 
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highest in the countries in the NMS10 group, which were clearly reaping the benefits 
of the pre- and post-accession convergence. Finally, growth in all countries is 
considerably lower during and after the global crisis. Indeed, real GDP declined in all 
country groups in 2009, with the deepest fall registered in NMS10 countries. However, 
the post-crisis recovery mostly resembles the pre-crisis period, albeit at lower growth 
rates: GDP growth is again higher in transition countries (particularly new EU 
member states) than in the old EU countries.  
 
 
 
Figure 1.2. Average annual real GDP growth rates by country groups (in %) 
Source: European Commission AMECO Database for EU17, NMS10 and some 
SEE6 countries. National statistical offices, central banks or finance ministries, 
EBRD, and the IMF WEO Database for some SEE6 countries.  
Note: Group averages are unweighted.  
   
 
 
There are also considerable differences in fiscal policy among European 
countries that persist even if one analyses cyclically-adjusted budget balances, which 
are expected to correct for differences in economic growth (Figure 1.3). The average 
cyclically-adjusted deficit in NMS10 between 1995 and 2012 was 3.5% of GDP, much 
larger than the deficit of 2.7% in the EU17 group, while the average deficit of 3.1% of 
GDP in SEE6 was somewhere in between. In addition, Figure 1.3 shows that there 
were also relatively large variations among countries. Indeed, most of the "core" EU17 
countries had discretionary surpluses or small deficits, while a few countries from the 
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"periphery" had relatively large deficits. On the other hand, except the marginal 
surplus in Estonia, the average cyclically-adjusted budget balance was in deficit in all 
NMS10 during the period, with the four Visegrad countries having large deficits close 
to or exceeding 5% of GDP. Cyclically-adjusted budget balances were also negative on 
average in all SEE6 countries, and quite large in Croatia and particularly Albania.  
 
 
 
Figure 1.3. Average cyclically-adjusted budget balances by countries and groups, 1995-2012 
(in %) 
Source: European Commission AMECO Database for EU17 and NMS10. Author's 
calculations based on data from national statistical offices, central banks or 
finance ministries, EBRD, and the IMF WEO Database for SEE6 countries. 
Note: Group averages are unweighted. The cyclical adjustment is based on the 
Hodrick-Prescott calculation of trend GDP.  
 
 
 
This divergence in budget balances could be explained by two factors. First, it 
confirms the expectation that fiscal policy in transition countries would be affected 
by the comprehensive political, economic and structural transformation. Therefore, it 
is in line with the arguments in Nuti (2006) and Coricelli (2004) that the fiscal policy 
environment would be heavily affected by the specifics of the transition process. 
Second, transition countries were able to pursue a more expansionary fiscal policy 
for a relatively long period, as indicated by budget deficits analysed above. In 
particular, transition countries started the period with fairly low debt levels, which 
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enabled them to accumulate budget deficits, generally without seriously bringing into 
question the issue of debt sustainability. As Figure 1.4 shows, average debt-to-GDP 
ratios during the period were 31.6% in NMS10 and 47.7% in SEE6. On the other hand, 
in this respect fiscal policy was more constrained in EU17 countries, as they had a 
considerably higher average debt/GDP ratio of 64.6% during this period, with 
significant variations among countries.   
 
 
Figure 1.4. Average public debt/GDP ratios by countries and groups, 1995-2012 (in %) 
Source: European Commission AMECO Database for EU17 and NMS10. Author's 
calculations based on data from national statistical offices, central banks or 
finance ministries, EBRD, and the IMF WEO Database for SEE6 countries. 
Note: Group averages are unweighted. 
 
 
 
1.5 Structure of the thesis  
 
After providing a brief review of macroeconomic and fiscal policy 
developments in European countries, the thesis proceeds as follows in order to meet 
the other research objectives outlined in Section 1.3 above.  
 Chapter 2 provides a critical review of the theoretical and empirical literature 
on the cyclical character of fiscal policy. It starts by reviewing the traditional 
Keynesian and neo-classical views as well as several more recent theories on the 
cyclical character of fiscal policy. Then it provides an extensive discussion on the 
context of fiscal policy design and implementation in European countries, including 
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the effects of the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact, as well as the 
specifics of the transition process in ex-communist countries. Further, it describes the 
measurement and decomposition of fiscal policy to be used in the rest of the thesis, 
and also the measurement of cyclical output movements. The chapter proceeds with a 
critical assessment of the main empirical studies on the cyclical character of fiscal 
policy. The early studies, which use relatively simple methodologies, are surveyed 
first, before moving on to more recent studies which use more advanced estimation 
methods. In addition, studies on the cyclical character of fiscal policy in transition 
countries are surveyed separately. This extensive review not only outlines the 
chronological and methodological progress in this area, but also lays the foundation 
for the choice of the most appropriate estimation method to be used in our empirical 
analysis.  
Chapter 3 provides an empirical investigation of the cyclical character and 
determinants of fiscal policy in European countries, with a particular focus on 
transition countries6. It starts with an extensive discussion of the model specification. 
In line with the absence of an overall theory of the cyclicality of fiscal policy, it 
describes our decision to use a relatively simple, baseline model specification, which 
is then extended with numerous factors related to various theoretical or practical 
considerations. After an assessment of the advantages and disadvantages of various 
estimation methods for our aim and sample (consisting of an unbalanced panel of 33 
European countries between 1995 and 2010), system GMM is chosen as the most 
appropriate method to be used in the empirical analysis. The chapter proceeds by 
presenting results of the baseline specification. It then presents results of the 
extension of the baseline specification with numerous variables capturing voracity 
effects, institutional, political and ideological factors, constraints on fiscal policy and 
effects of fiscal governance. Additional extensions are carried out by analysing 
sources of the cyclicality of fiscal policy, sample splits and possible effects of the crisis 
on results. Throughout the chapter, results are presented both for the entire sample, 
as well as separately for the three groups of countries, thus enabling the comparison 
between old EU member states and the two groups of transition countries. In 
addition, particular attention is paid to the robustness of the indicator on the cyclical 
character of fiscal policy to the numerous extensions. The final robustness check is 
provided by jack-knifing the baseline specification, i.e. removing one country from 
                                                
6 A paper based on this chapter won the 2012 Oesterreichische Nationalbank Olga Radzyner Award for 
scientific work on European economic integration, which is bestowed on young economists from Central, 
Eastern and South-eastern Europe. A shorter version of the paper has been published as Kabashi (2014). 
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the sample at a time and re-estimating in order to analyse whether results are driven 
by any single country. 
Chapter 4 surveys and critically assesses the theoretical and empirical 
literature on the effects of fiscal policy. It first briefly describes traditional classical 
and Keynesian views on the effects of fiscal policy. Then it provides a more detailed 
review of modern, dynamic-optimising versions of traditional theories in the form of 
Real Business Cycle (RBC) and New Keynesian models, as well as of the extensions of 
these models aimed at matching empirical findings on the effects and the 
transmission mechanism of fiscal policy. The chapter then turns to the critical 
assessment of empirical studies on the effects of fiscal policy. In order to systematise 
the discussion of this relatively large body of literature, it first describes the Vector 
Auto Regression (VAR) method as the dominant empirical approach, and then it 
reviews the studies that use five various types of VARs to analyse the effects of fiscal 
policy on output and other macroeconomic variables. This is followed by an extensive 
discussion of the main problems of the five types of VARs in the fiscal policy context, 
as well as of the possible sources of the wide range of results of empirical fiscal policy 
studies. The chapter concludes with a description of the panel VAR method and a 
review of its application in several relatively recent studies of fiscal policy.  
 Chapter 5 provides an empirical analysis on the effects of fiscal policy on 
output and other macroeconomic variables in European countries, with a particular 
reference to transition countries. The empirical analysis in this chapter uses fixed 
effects panel VAR with recursive identification of policy shocks and annual data on 27 
EU countries between 1995 and 2012. Justifications for this estimation method are 
provided both with regard to the aim of our study and the available data, and by 
building onto the extensive discussion of the relevant empirical literature in the 
previous chapter. After a description of our fixed effects panel VAR model, additional 
arguments in support of our choice of estimation method are provided, particularly 
with regard to the possible bias arising from the imposition of slope homogeneity and 
from the dynamic specification with fixed effects. This is followed by the description 
of our baseline model, i.e. the definition of the variables used, the cyclical adjustment 
of fiscal data, the ordering of variables and the lag-length of the VAR. Then we 
present our baseline results and discuss their robustness to various modifications of 
the baseline specification. The chapter proceeds with results from various sample-
splits, which are mostly aimed at analysing the possible influence of various country 
structural characteristics on the effects of fiscal policy, but also at analysing the 
effects of omitting the recent crisis period. Further, several extensions of the baseline 
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specification are provided in order to analyse the transmission mechanism of fiscal 
policy, as well as the effects of fiscal policy when introducing public debt and open 
economy elements in the analysis. In this part, results are presented both for the 
entire sample, as well as separately for old and new EU member states. Final 
robustness checks are provided by jack-knifing the baseline specification in order to 
analyse possible effects of the omission of each country from the sample.  
 Chapter 6 provides conclusions based on the findings of our empirical analysis 
and it also draws policy recommendations. In addition, it summarises the 
contributions of this thesis to the existing knowledge, but also recognises limitations 
of our study and provides some suggestions for future research.   
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2.1 Theoretical background 
  
  The stabilization of economic fluctuations around the trend growth is one of 
the main issues that economic policymakers have to face. Accordingly, it is also one of 
the fields that have attracted considerable attention in the academic literature in 
macroeconomics. Fiscal and monetary policies are commonly perceived to be the 
main tools for the stabilisation of economic fluctuations. However, over the last 
several decades, the dominant view in academia and in the policy-making world 
came to be that monetary policy is the most effective stabilization tool. It became a 
conventional wisdom that fiscal policy should be confined to automatic stabilizers, 
and that discretionary policy should preferably be used in extreme circumstances 
only (Blinder, 2004). The recent crisis and the exposure of many economies to 
extreme circumstances brought fiscal policy back into the spotlight again, including 
some re-consideration of automatic stabilizers and discretionary measures 
(Blanchard et al., 2010). Nevertheless, it must be mentioned that in reality 
policymakers never completely discarded fiscal policy and were continuously using it 
with the aim to stabilize economic fluctuations, albeit with various degrees of 
aggressiveness and success.  
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 Despite the direction of the recent literature, the stabilization role of fiscal 
policy has been one of the central themes in macroeconomics from its beginnings as a 
discipline. Indeed, it has been one of the main tenets of Keynesianism that, in times of 
crisis, the government should counteract the falling output by propping up the 
effective demand, thus compensating the fall in private consumption and investment. 
According to this view, in recessions, the government should reduce tax rates and 
increase its consumption and investment, which would contribute to higher 
aggregate demand. Therefore, the Keynesian tradition has clear views that 
governments are capable to and should actively pursue counter-cyclical fiscal 
policies, and that, if it is implemented boldly, such an intervention would bring the 
economy out of recession7.  
 Neo-classical economists had a more sceptical view on the stabilization role of 
fiscal policy, which was accordingly reflected in the absence of fiscal policy in neo-
classical models. According to the tax-smoothing models initiated by Barro (1979), for 
an exogenously given path of government spending, governments should keep tax 
rates constant over the cycle, which implies that the overall budget balance would 
move in a counter-cyclical manner. On the other hand, prescriptions about 
government consumption in the neoclassical literature are less clear-cut. According to 
Lane (2003), the common neoclassical assumption is that government spending is 
exogenously determined, thus without any apparent prediction in relation to the 
cycle. However, if it is endogenised, the prescriptions on government consumption 
are still ambiguous, since they depend on the existence and the degree of 
substitutability in utility between government and private consumption. Government 
consumption should be counter-cyclical if they are substitutes and pro-cyclical if they 
are complements. Finally, if government and private consumption enter preferences 
separably, the optimal policy would be to smooth government consumption over the 
cycle. Overall, the two traditional theories thus yield opposing prescriptions 
regarding policy reactions to cyclical output movements. The Keynesian view 
prescribes higher tax rates and lower government spending in expansions (and the 
opposite in recessions), whereas the baseline neo-classical view prescribes unchanged 
tax rates and constant government spending in both expansions and recessions.  
 The focus of the academic literature on monetary policy as the main 
stabilization tool during the last two decades of the 20th century created a gap in the 
fiscal policy literature, particularly regarding the theoretical literature on the 
                                                
7 The extent to which counter- or pro-cyclical fiscal policies affect the business cycle (i.e. stabilize or 
amplify economic fluctuations) in reality is also related to the size of the fiscal multiplier, which will be 
discussed and analysed in more detail in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5.  
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cyclicality of fiscal policy. As Strawczynski and Zeira (2009) note, theoretical 
contributions on the cyclical stance of fiscal policy following the neoclassical model in 
Barro (1979) have been quite scarce. This lack of attention on the cyclicality of fiscal 
policy and on fiscal policy in general even led to lamentations that "serious discussion 
of fiscal policy has almost disappeared" and that "fiscal policy is either impossible or 
undesirable or both" (Solow, 2002, p. 1). However, this trend was interrupted in the 
late 1990s, largely as a result of the blossoming of empirical research on the cyclical 
properties of fiscal policy around that period. These empirical studies were yielding 
results that were sometimes difficult to link to the traditional theories regarding the 
cyclical stance of fiscal policy. For instance, none of the traditional theories gave any 
justification for a pro-cyclical fiscal policy, which was typically found to dominate in 
developing countries, starting from the pioneering study by Gavin and Perotti (1997). 
This was in contrast to the counter- or a-cyclical policy usually found in developed 
countries, which had sound theoretical explanations. Therefore, it was sometimes 
noted that the pro-cyclical fiscal policy is a puzzle in search of an explanation (Talvi 
and Végh, 2005). Consequently, authors soon began putting forth various 
explanations for the observed pro-cyclical policy in developing countries. These 
explanations are mostly related to two groups of problems: market failures and the 
common pool problem, which covers various political economy and institutional 
aspects.  
    Gavin and Perotti (1997) were among the first to offer an explanation for the 
observed pro-cyclicality of fiscal policy in Latin America. They argued that this was 
due to the borrowing constraints that these countries faced on international markets 
during recessions. This limits the ability of governments to borrow and, combined 
with the falling revenues, makes them unable to counter the recession, thus forcing 
the policy to be pro-cyclical. On the other hand, these constraints vanish in good 
times, so governments do borrow in international markets and maintain or increase 
spending, thus again running a pro-cyclical policy.  
 One of the first frameworks of the common pool problem in the context of pro-
cyclical fiscal policy is the "voracity effect" described by Lane and Tornell (1998) and 
Tornell and Lane (1999). This effect consists of multiple power blocks competing for a 
higher share in a common pool of resources. This competition intensifies in good 
times, when revenues are higher, which gives rise to a strong "voracity effect". In 
such cases, none of the power groups has an incentive to argue for saving part of the 
increase in revenues. Instead, each group makes pressure to appropriate a higher 
amount for itself, being aware that otherwise some other group will increase its 
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share. Consequently, overall spending increases, which yields a pro-cyclical fiscal 
policy. Therefore, within this framework, the higher dispersion of power will make 
fiscal policy more pro-cyclical than with unitary power. It must be noted that the 
description of power groups in this framework is relatively broad. It can refer to 
various branches of central government, various levels of government (central, 
regional, local), political parties or ministries within the government, labour unions, 
employer confederations or state enterprises.  
Further, Alesina and Tabellini (2005) found the explanation of credit 
constraints by Gavin and Perotti (1997) incomplete, since it does not explain the 
possibility of governments accumulating reserves in good times, or of lenders 
providing funds in expectation of expansions in the future. Therefore, they argue that 
the observed pro-cyclicality reflects a political agency problem in democracies. In 
their model, voters are suspicious of corrupt government officials, and of them 
appropriating the surpluses or channelling them to close interest groups. Therefore, 
voters demand that, in good times and with higher revenues, governments should 
lower taxes and increase public spending. Being threatened with losing office, 
governments duly oblige, but also raise borrowing in the process, which is made 
easier by the fact that voters have imperfect information on government borrowing. 
Therefore, in this context, overall fiscal policy turns out to be myopic and pro-cyclical 
because of voters' demands.  
Talvi and Végh (2005) build a similar model which explains pro-cyclicality with 
political economy factors. Their initial point is the observed higher volatility of output 
and hence of the tax base in developing countries. Under tax-smoothing 
circumstances, this would yield large surpluses in good times and deficits in bad 
times (i.e. counter-cyclical policy). However, they argue that this is not the case 
because of the increased pressures by various interest groups in good times for 
higher spending instead of saving or debt retirement. Because of these pressures, in 
their model it is costly for the governments to stick to tax-smoothing prescriptions 
and run budget surpluses in expansions. Therefore, faced with positive shocks to the 
tax base, the optimal policy for governments will be to lower tax rates and increase 
spending. This then explains the differences between developed and developing 
countries quite well. Indeed, the low variability of the tax base in the first group 
creates little space for pressure by interest groups, unlike the developing countries, 
where high variability of output creates plenty of opportunities for such pressures.  
A related, but distinct body of literature consists of theoretical and empirical 
studies of political economy determinants of fiscal policy. This field, which has been 
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flourishing since 1980s, is not focused on the cyclical character of fiscal policy per se, 
but on various political economy factors behind policy formulation and outcomes8 . 
Hence, it is typically concerned with overall fiscal policy, and particularly the deficit 
bias, and related issues of government short-sightedness and the common pool 
problem (Debrun et al., 2008). Numerous authors provide various explanations for 
fiscal outcomes9, ranging from political and electoral systems to political business 
cycles and ideology. Further, an increasing attention is paid to various institutional 
factors, such as fiscal rules, institutional quality and the budgetary process.  
 
 
2.2 The European context 
  
Besides these theoretical explanations for the cyclical character of fiscal policy 
in developing countries, there are some additional practical constraints which are 
specific for the European countries. The process of European economic and monetary 
integration created a specific environment for the conduct of fiscal policy, including 
some important aspects for the response of fiscal policy to economic fluctuations.  
 The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 provided several conditions that EU member 
states had to fulfil in order to qualify for the adoption of the single currency. The 
main economic argument for the fiscal criteria in the Maastricht Treaty (and 
subsequently for the Stability and Growth Pact) was that fiscal indiscipline can 
become a source of high inflation. Indeed, it is well grounded in theory and practice 
that high deficits and high debts can prevent normal government financing, which 
creates an incentive for governments to resort to monetisation of budget deficits. In 
addition, there was the free-riding risk, according to which a government can engage 
in unlimited borrowing up to the point of default, knowing that it would be bailed out 
by the other members of the monetary union. Wyplosz (2006) relates these two 
arguments to the aim of the EU founding fathers to reverse the previous fiscal 
dominance into monetary dominance. In order to achieve this, the Maastricht Treaty 
explicitly bans central bank financing of budget deficits and bailouts of highly 
indebted countries10. Additional justifications for the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) 
                                                
8 Due to the main aim of our study and in line with the practice in the relevant literature, we do not 
survey this wider literature of political economy aspects of overall fiscal policy, but focus on theoretical 
studies specifically related to the political economy determinants of cyclicality. However, we refer to the 
relevant studies in the former literature during our empirical work in the following chapter. 
9 Alesina and Perotti (1995) and Eslava (2006) provide excellent surveys of the various theories on 
political economy determinants of fiscal policy. 
10 However, in the wake of the European debt crisis, the no-bailout rule was clearly breached in the cases 
of Greece, Ireland and Portugal. The creation of the temporary European Financial Stability Facility and 
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are sometimes offered, such as the desirability of policy coordination, the deficit bias 
of fiscal policy and the externalities to the interest rates in the monetary union. 
However, they are considered to be insufficient or unnecessary for the existence of 
SGP (von Hagen and Wyplosz, 2008). For instance, the deficit bias could be overcome 
by national fiscal rules or stronger institutions and budgetary processes, while the 
effect on interest rates is irrelevant, as they are allowed to differ between countries. 
In addition to these constraints, the Maastricht Treaty prohibits countries from 
exceeding reference values for budget deficits and public debts, defined as 3% and 
60% of GDP, respectively11. Fiscal sustainability defined in this way was also used as 
one of the entry criteria for euro-adoption as the final stage of the European 
Monetary Union (EMU12). With the aim of maintaining fiscal stability, Maastricht 
Treaty laid out the Excessive deficit procedure, later made operational by the Stability 
and Growth Pact (SGP), which was adopted in 1997 and entered into force with the 
introduction of the euro in 1999. The aim of the SGP was to ensure that, once the 
countries had met the entrance criteria and adopted the euro, they would continue to 
abide by the requirements of fiscal discipline.  
Although the Maastricht Treaty defined both the deficit and the debt ceiling, 
the initial design of the SGP (SGP-I13) approached the issue of fiscal sustainability and 
of the credibility of the common currency by focusing mostly on the magnitude of the 
budget deficit. It defined that all member states should aim to reach a medium-term 
objective of a budget that is 'close to balance or in surplus'. The final goal was to avoid 
excessive deficits above 3% of GDP, while at the same time leaving some leeway for a 
response of fiscal policy to cyclical fluctuations. The SGP consists of two parts: "the 
preventive arm", which is concerned with the surveillance of budgetary positions and 
developments in all EU member states; and "the corrective arm", which deals with the 
measures to be taken in case of breach of criteria by euro area members, including 
the imposition of sanctions and fines. According to the preventive arm, each year 
member states submit programmes in which they present plans to reach the medium 
                                                                                                                                                     
its successor the permanent European Stability Mechanism implies that the no-bailout rule has been 
abolished permanently (Wyplosz, 2013). 
11 It is not entirely clear how the numerical values were determined. Buiter and Grafe (2004) put forward 
the explanation that the debt target was very close to the average debt ratio of EU members in 1992. As 
well as some other authors, they claim that the 3% ceiling for the deficit could possibly reflect the 
calculations that it stabilizes the debt ratio to around 60% if nominal GDP growth is 5% (which would 
correspond to estimates of potential real GDP growth of 3% and targeted inflation of 2%). Wyplosz (2013) 
links the deficit rule of 3% of GDP to the accepted estimated size of public investments.  
12 In line with most of the literature, we use EMU as an acronym for the "European Monetary Union", 
which refers to the euro area. Officially, EMU stands for the "Economic and Monetary Union" and 
includes not only members of the euro area but all EU members. 
13 Labels like SGP-I are not official, but we use them here to delineate the main stages of the SGP 
framework.   
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term objective (stability programmes for EMU members, convergence programmes 
for the others). The European Commission assesses country aims, programme, and 
actual developments and can issue early warnings if there is a risk of excessive 
deficits. On the other hand, the "corrective arm" is aimed at enforcing fiscal discipline 
policies in euro area countries. It lays out the details of the Excessive deficit 
procedure which is triggered if planned or actual deficits exceeded the 3% ceiling, 
and includes definitions of exceptional circumstances, deadlines and procedural steps 
such as the imposition of sanctions and fines.  
The implementation of the Maastricht Treaty and later the SGP-I put 
considerable constraints on fiscal policy in EU member states, particularly the ones 
aiming to adopt the common currency. Most countries implemented considerable 
fiscal adjustment in the 1990s in order to qualify for accession in the euro area and 
afterwards to keep themselves within the SGP limits. Accordingly, budget deficits in 
what would later become the euro area fell from 4.5% of GDP in 1991 to 2.6% in 1997 
and later to only 1% in 2000, and cyclically-adjusted balances in the same period fell 
by more than 3 percentage points (Morris et al., 2006). However, the accession to the 
euro area was followed by a period of 'fiscal fatigue' (Fatás and Mihov, 2009), when 
several countries relaxed their policies. In the context of higher actual revenues due 
to the economic expansion and in expectation of favourable future economic 
developments, several countries increased their expenditures and introduced tax 
cuts. However, in early 2000s there was an unexpected economic downturn, which 
resulted in considerably lower budget revenues compared to expectations. The higher 
budget deficits and lower output made several countries breach the deficit ceiling, 
which would have normally initiated corrective action. In fact, the European 
Commission initiated excessive deficit procedures for several countries and in 2003 
recommended to the Economic and Financial Affairs Council of the European Union 
(ECOFIN) that, because of their failures to meet recommendations and take corrective 
measures, "notices" should be issued against Germany and France, which is one step 
before sanctions. However, under intense political pressure, in November 2003 the 
Council failed to accept this recommendation and decided to put these countries "in 
abeyance", effectively suspending the Excessive deficit procedure and the 
enforcement of the SGP. This was later challenged by the Commission and overturned 
by the European Court of Justice in 2004, although the decision was made on 
procedural grounds, as the Court recognised the right of the Council to delay or 
suspend the rules (Filipek and Schreiber, 2010). However, the entire procedure and 
disagreements made clear that the system was not credible enough, as the 
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enforcement of the SGP, which is in the mandate of the European Commission, could 
be blocked by a political body such as the Council, an issue that had been raised since 
the introduction of the SGP. More generally, it was often noted that one of the main 
problems of SGP-I was the weak enforcement mechanism (e.g. de Haan et al. (2004)). 
Another important criticism was related to the fact that the focus of the entire SGP 
framework was on unadjusted deficits, which ignores the endogeneity of business 
cycles and budget movements (as discussed below). The main suggestion at that time 
was to start taking into account cyclical output movements, and therefore to use 
cyclically-adjusted deficits (e.g. Galí and Perotti (2003)). In reality, until 2003 the 
Commission was also looking at cyclically-adjusted balances, but only as analytical 
tools14, whereas compliance with ceilings was formally assessed in terms of 
unadjusted budget indicators (Larch and Turrini, 2010). A related frequent criticism 
was that the ceilings were interpreted in a uniform manner, with little consideration 
for country-specific circumstances such as long-term fiscal movements or public 
investment needs (Morris et al., 2006). Further, even though the aim was to achieve 
balanced budgets over the medium term, the main indicators were defined and 
assessed only on an annual basis, which does not properly capture the medium term 
nature of fiscal discipline (Wyplosz, 2006). Another important property of the SGP 
was its asymmetry, in that it constrained policy reactions in bad times but offered 
little incentives for improvement in good times (Annett, 2006). Related to this, Larch 
et al. (2010) argue that the preventive arm of the SGP was quite ineffective, since it 
did not cure the pro-cyclicality in good-times as one of the main problems of fiscal 
policy. They note that during the 1990s and 2000s, the asymmetry caused episodes 
when member countries relaxed instead of tightening fiscal policies in good times, 
only to find out later on that there were risks of or actual excessive deficits in bad 
times. Finally, the initial design of SGP was generally considered to be quite inflexible, 
although it did have some escape clauses.  
As a result of these criticisms and of the failure to enforce the Excessive deficit 
procedure in 2003, the SGP was reformed in 200515 (SGP-II), generally in the direction 
of increasing the economic rationale and introducing higher flexibility. This followed 
the adoption by the ECOFIN in 2003 of a decision which redefined the 'close to 
balance or in surplus' requirement of SGP in cyclically-adjusted terms (Larch and 
                                                
14  At that time, they were officially mentioned only in two official documents: the 1998 and 2001 Codes 
of Conduct on the content and format of stability and convergence programmes (Larch and Turrini, 
2010).  
15 See Morris et al. (2006) for an excellent review of the initial and reformed SGP and the relevant official 
documents and Fischer et al. (2007) for a comprehensive review of criticisms and numerous proposals 
for reform of the SGP at that time.  
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Turrini, 2010). The 2005 reform left the deficit and debt ceilings at 3% and 60% of 
GDP, and the main focus was still on the deficit. The debt criterion was slightly 
strengthened with the call for application of the Treaty concept of a debt ratio 
'sufficiently diminishing and approaching the reference value at a satisfactory pace'. 
However, the enforcement was left weak, since it was defined that the debt criterion 
would be applied in qualitative terms, reflecting the failure to reach an agreement on 
a quantitative definition of the satisfactory pace of debt reduction (Morris et al., 
2006). Regarding the preventive arm, the SGP-II redefined the medium term 
objectives so that more attention would be paid to country-specific developments and 
circumstances, whereas the uniform 'close to balance or in surplus' requirement was 
abolished. Each country would present its own medium term objective, which takes 
into consideration issues such as public debt and potential growth (EC, 2006). The 
country medium term objectives could diverge from the 'close to balance or in 
surplus' requirement, although euro area and countries in ERM-II are expected to 
have a medium term objective of a budget balance no lower than -1% of GDP, in 
cyclically-adjusted terms and net of one-off measures. In case of failure to meet the 
medium term objective, the fiscal adjustment is also more gradual, and is expected to 
be achieved over the cycle. As a guideline, the euro area and countries in ERM-II 
should make annual adjustments of at least 0.5% of GDP in cyclically-adjusted terms 
and net of one-off measures. The adjustment can also be subject to structural or 
pension reforms, provided that the safety margin to the overall deficit of 3% of GDP is 
maintained. The corrective arm was also significantly modified, mostly by clarifying 
and relaxing the various escape clauses (Morris et al., 2006). The severe economic 
downturn was now defined to be negative GDP growth or accumulated negative 
output gaps. A lot of attention was dedicated to precisely defining what Maastricht 
Treaty refers to as "other relevant factors including the medium term economic and 
budgetary position" related to the Excessive deficit procedure. Now they include a 
wide range of country specific developments such as potential growth, cyclical 
conditions, expenditures related to the Lisbon agenda, public investment, quality of 
public finances, debt sustainability as well as other factors the concerned member 
state deems relevant. There was also an extension of procedural deadlines and an 
extension of deadlines for corrective action, and the possibility was introduced for 
repetition of recommendations and notices. However, these changes are generally not 
considered sufficient to deal effectively with the problem of weak enforcement. On 
the contrary, it is claimed that the numerous exceptions from the rules make them 
meaningless (Feldstein, 2005). Fatás and Mihov (2009) also note that this increased 
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flexibility attracted criticisms that the constraints are so lax that the entire system is 
sometimes deemed irrelevant. Perhaps more notably, the European Central Bank 
(ECB) was also quite critical, as it declared it was "seriously concerned about the 
proposed changes" and warned about the risks that changes in the corrective arm 
could undermine the confidence in the EU fiscal framework and the sustainability of 
public finances (ECB, 2005).  
Until the recent economic and financial crisis, it seemed that SGP is 
functioning well, as countries were generally meeting their medium term objectives 
and budgets were mostly balanced or in surplus (Filipek and Schreiber, 2010). 
However, this was concealing the impact of favourable macroeconomic movements, 
and particularly the effects of asset and housing bubbles on higher revenues (Larch 
et al., 2010). The crisis, particularly the financial problems in some countries and 
generally euro area debt problems, brought the spotlight back on the European 
economic and fiscal governance. The severity of the crisis and the need for immediate 
policy responses effectively meant that the SGP was suspended and was quietly put 
aside (Wyplosz, 2010). Nevertheless, the need to incorporate the lessons of the crisis 
and to prevent future instabilities prompted an effort to redesign the EU economic 
and fiscal governance. Therefore, the SGP framework was considerably modified in 
2011 and 2013 to give rise to what could be labelled SGP-III. The acts that implement 
these reforms of the SGP are known in the EU-parlance as the "six-pack" of 2011 (five 
Regulations and one Directive), the "two-pack" of 2013 (two Regulations) and the 
Fiscal Compact within the inter-governmental Treaty on Stability, Coordination and 
Governance of 2013 (EC, 2014). These changes considerably strengthened both the 
preventive and the corrective arm of the SGP, particularly regarding fiscal and 
economic governance in euro area countries, but also in other EU members (in the 
case of the Fiscal Compact). In addition to fiscal governance, the SGP-III also deals 
with the surveillance and correction of macroeconomic imbalances. Besides the 
importance in its own right, this is also relevant for fiscal governance, as the latest 
crisis proved inaccurate the previous paradigm of the "Great Moderation" that fiscal 
discipline and low inflation will suffice in bringing about macroeconomic stability 
(Buti and Larch, 2010).  
While it maintains the previous focus on country medium term objectives 
(MTO), the SGP-III quantifies "significant deviations" from the MTO or the adjustment 
path towards achieving it. Countries that have accepted the Fiscal Compact are now 
required to meet or converge to their MTO with a lower limit of the cyclically-
adjusted budget balance of -0.5% of GDP, net of one-off measures (or -1% of GDP for 
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countries with public debt significantly below 60% of GDP). Similarly to previous 
stages, SGP-III also allows for exceptions from the rules in case of exceptional 
circumstances. On the other hand, in order to ensure balanced budgets, the 
compliance or the adjustment towards the country-specific MTO is now also linked to 
the expected growth of expenditures, which should be at or below potential GDP 
growth (or alternatively should be matched by appropriate growth of discretionary 
revenues). In order to strengthen enforcement, SGP-III requires that MTOs should be 
incorporated within national legislation, through provisions of "binding force and 
permanent character, preferably constitutional" (EC, 2014), which thus makes fiscal 
discipline a legal obligation for each country (Wyplosz, 2013). Further, equal 
prominence is now given both to the deficit and debt levels. Indeed, the Excessive 
deficit procedure can now be launched not only in cases of excessive deficits, but also 
if the debt ratio exceeds the reference value of 60% of GDP and is not reduced with a 
sufficient pace (defined as average annual reduction over three years equal to 1/20th 
of the gap between the actual debt ratio and the target of 60%). Besides strengthening 
sustainability, the focus on debt levels is also aimed at correcting the previous flaw of 
asymmetry, as countries will now be forced to undertake fiscal adjustments in good 
years as well if their debt levels are high. For cases of breaches of SGP by member 
states, SGP-III clarifies and extends the possible financial sanctions, which may be 
imposed from early stages of the preventive arm to the latest parts of the Excessive 
deficit procedure and may reach up to 0.5% of GDP. Related to this, it is now more 
difficult for a political body such as the Council to block them. Instead, sanctions will 
now be more automatic and will be initiated by the European Commission, and the 
Council will be able to stop them only with a qualified majority. The SGP-III also 
requires that the compliance with the new fiscal rules aimed at meeting the MTO 
should be monitored by independent institutions. Besides the existing requirement 
for the submission of medium-term plans as parts of Stability or Convergence 
Programmes, the SGP-III strengthens surveillance by requiring that euro area 
countries should also submit draft budgets for the following year and macroeconomic 
assumptions to the Commission. If the Commission judges that the draft budget is not 
in compliance with the SGP, it can now require a submission of a revised draft-
budget, thus strengthening the preventive arm of the SGP. However, while both the 
streamlining of sanctions and the monitoring of national budgets by the European 
Commission make the framework more credible, they might in reality reignite 
conflicts between sovereign member states and the Commission (Wyplosz, 2013). In 
addition, the SGP-III also lays down stronger powers for enhanced surveillance by the 
26 
 
Commission if a particular country is receiving precautionary financial assistance 
from the EU or is undergoing or is threatened with severe difficulties related to 
financial stability.   
The constraints of the Maastricht Treaty and the SGP are directly related to the 
ability of governments to conduct stabilizing fiscal policies. Related to this, two 
possibilities are proposed and analysed in the literature (Galí and Perotti (2003), 
Wyplosz (2006), Fatás and Mihov (2009) and Candelon et al. (2010)). On the one hand, 
charging a super-national body with the achievement of the target of price stability 
means that national authorities are left with the pursuit of output stabilisation as the 
remaining macroeconomic policy target. The loss of monetary sovereignty means that 
fiscal policy is the only tool they have left, so policymakers would use it much more 
aggressively to counter economic crisis and output volatility. In other words, this 
would mean a more active counter-cyclical fiscal policy, which would be especially 
pronounced in recessions, when public pressures to act intensify. It is often argued 
that the need for counter-cyclical policy as a response to adverse shocks is even more 
pronounced in the euro area because of the combination of centralised monetary 
policy and decentralised fiscal policy with low labour mobility, quite opposite to the 
US (Feldstein, 2009). On the other hand, as discussed above, the limits of the 
Maastricht Treaty and the SGP would clearly prevent such an activist policy, for the 
very reason that it could threaten the fiscal discipline which is considered essential 
for the entire common currency project. If this was true, there would be a much more 
limited role for counter-cyclical fiscal policy. Therefore, in this scenario, it would be 
expected that fiscal policy would become pro- or a-cyclical in the euro area, or at least 
less counter-cyclical than before accepting the common currency.  
The constraints of the SGP on fiscal policy are also relevant for transition 
countries, further affecting fiscal policy in these countries beyond the specifics of the 
transition process. Indeed, policymakers in transition countries had to face the 
challenges of unprecedented economic, political and structural transformation since 
the beginning of 1990s, which had a considerable effect on fiscal policy. Initially, it 
was constrained because of changes in revenues and expenditures due to the 
restructuring and privatisation of state-owned enterprises. Government budgets were 
also affected by the market and price liberalization, infrastructure building and 
institutional reforms. Expensive borrowing sources and some of the exchange rate 
regimes were additional constraints. As transition advanced, the challenges started 
resembling those of their Western European peers, such as issues of the stabilising 
properties of fiscal policy, financing of budget deficits and the sustainability of public 
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debt. The process of EU-accession implied that the constraints of the SGP on fiscal 
policy became applicable for the new member states (NMS) from Central and Eastern 
Europe as well, both for the ones that are only EU members and particularly for the 
majority of NMS that have joined or aspire to join the single currency as soon as 
possible. In addition, these constraints would also apply to prospective EU member 
states from South-eastern Europe. More precisely, all EU member states are subject to 
the Maastricht criteria and the SGP, including the Excessive deficit procedure, but 
only euro area members can be subject to sanctions. However, as Staehr (2008) notes, 
there is a relatively scarce literature on the effects of the euro area enlargement on 
fiscal policy in the NMS. Nevertheless, most authors agree that the SGP puts some 
additional and specific constraints on NMS, generally considered undue because of 
their rapid development and specific aspects (Nuti, 2006). Besides the criticisms 
applicable for all countries analysed above, Coricelli (2004) brings forward three 
main arguments why SGP requirements would be more stringent for the NMS. First, 
they have a higher potential and more volatile actual GDP growth rate, which means 
that the 3% ceiling on the budget deficit will be binding much more often, even if one 
considers cyclically-adjusted indicators. Subsequently, this will impose a need for 
more frequent fiscal adjustments, thus strengthening the volatility and the pro-
cyclical bias of fiscal policy, as it will have to be tightened during bad times. While 
this argument is similar for the old EU members, it is more relevant in the NMS 
because of the higher output volatility and the consequent need for a stabilizing role 
by fiscal policy. Eller (2009) indicates that, in light of the severity of the latest 
recession and the moderate effect of automatic stabilizers, there is a limited space for 
discretionary fiscal policy in the NMS. Although he does not link this directly to SGP 
constraints, it is exactly the discretionary policy that would be constrained by the SGP 
when these countries become members of the euro area. Related to this, Lewis (2009) 
notes that the worsening of budget balances and the Excessive deficit procedure for 
several transition countries have severely restricted the possibilities for stimulatory 
response with discretionary policy in case of recessions. The second argument 
concerns the lack of consideration for public investments in SGP-I, which are higher 
in NMS as part of the catching-up process with their Western European peers. The 
SGP-II has partially remedied this criticism, as a distinction is made between public 
deficit and public investment expenditure (Nuti, 2006), but there are additional areas 
where the specifics of transition countries and the convergence process require 
higher spending. Third, the political element in the Excessive deficit procedure means 
that larger NMS countries will have a more lax treatment in case of breaches. While 
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the most recent reforms (SGP-III) somewhat ameliorate this concern by putting the 
responsibility for imposing sanctions primarily with the European Commission, for 
the time that it was valid there is some evidence of differences in fiscal behaviour 
between large and small NMS. For instance, Berger et al. (2004) find evidence that the 
larger NMS had a more relaxed fiscal policy once they became NATO members and 
had secured EU membership, and they link this to the higher bargaining power 
compared to smaller NMS. Lewis (2007) finds similar results, although he ascribes 
them to the higher need for an active use of fiscal policy for stabilizing purposes in 
NMS with fixed exchange rates, which are incidentally the smaller NMS.  
 
 
2.3 Measurement and conceptual issues  
  
Before proceeding with the further discussion of studies and with the 
empirical work, a brief description of measurements and conceptual issues of fiscal 
policy and its cyclicality is in order. This is important as the comparison of studies 
and sometimes even the results can be sensitive to the particular definitions used.  
 It is common in most of the literature (e.g. Galí and Perotti (2003) or Fatás and 
Mihov (2009)) and in policymaking to separate overall fiscal policy into two main 
components: automatic stabilizers and discretionary policy (Figure 2.1). Automatic 
stabilizers represent the response of fiscal policy to economic fluctuations that is built 
into the tax code and the overall legislation. Therefore, they act without particular 
actions by policymakers, who at least in the short-run have no control over them. 
Typical examples of automatic stabilizers are the higher tax revenues in expansions 
or the higher spending on unemployment benefits during recessions. Discretionary 
policy on the other hand captures all the deliberate actions by the governments and is 
often measured by the cyclically-adjusted budget balance. However, discretionary 
policy measures are not unique, and they depend on the motivation behind them. If 
they are undertaken by policymakers in response to the cyclical movements in the 
economy, such as lower taxes or higher spending in case of recessions, they can be 
considered as endogenous, or systematic discretionary fiscal policy (Galí and Perotti, 
2003). On the other hand, fiscal measures undertaken without reference to cyclical 
movements are usually labelled exogenous discretionary policy (Figure 2.1). Typical 
examples of the latter would be higher government spending because of political 
motivations, military spending, or policy measures related to the Maastricht Treaty in 
the European context.  
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Figure 2.1. Components of fiscal policy 
  
 
 
Fiscal policy is mostly conducted through automatic stabilizers, and they are 
largely found to be effective during economic fluctuations (Debrun and Kapoor, 
2010). However, since they represent mostly an automatic response, at least in the 
short run, they are not usually the main focus of research. Instead, the majority of 
studies focus mostly or exclusively on the discretionary policy (both components), 
since this is considered to show the actual stance taken by policymakers. Because of 
their importance for policymakers, the measurement of the components of fiscal 
policy is a major concern for governments and international organisations, as well as 
for empirical research. There are two main approaches that are used to measure and 
analyse these components: the elasticities approach and the econometric approach 
(Baunsgaard and Symansky, 2009). However, it must be noted that the separation of 
the automatic stabilizers and the cyclically-adjusted balances is not an easy task and 
is one of the most controversial issues in the literature (Fatás and Mihov, 2009). 
 The elasticities approach to calculating cyclically-adjusted balances as a 
measure of discretionary policy is widely used by international organisations such as 
the OECD, the IMF and the European Commission (EC), which all use similar methods 
of calculation16,17, whereas the ECB uses a different method18. The aim is to calculate 
                                                
16 The cyclical adjustment by OECD and its refinement through the years is described in Giorno et al. 
(1995), van den Noord (2000) and Girouard and André (2005). The procedure by the EC is described in EC 
(2005) and EC (2006). The description here draws on these documents. 
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the fiscal balance that is cleaned of the fiscal effect of cyclical output movements, i.e. 
the balance that would prevail if the output gap was zero and actual output was at the 
level of potential output. As an initial point, the overall budget balance19 could be 
decomposed as in Eq. 1, which is equivalent to the decomposition of overall fiscal 
policy in Figure 2.1, with the cyclical component CC equivalent to automatic 
stabilizers and the cyclically-adjusted balance CAB corresponding to discretionary 
policy. The automatic stabilizers have a direct relationship to the business cycle as 
measured by the output gap. Therefore, in the EU surveillance framework (EC, 2006), 
the cyclically-adjusted balance is calculated by subtracting the cyclical component 
from the overall balance using the budgetary sensitivity parameter µ, i.e. by 
rearranging Eq. 1 into Eq. 2. In other words, Eq. 2 calculates the cyclically-adjusted 
balance as the difference between overall balance and the cyclical component, with 
the later linked to the output gap as a measure of cyclical movements.  
 
 
             Eq. 1 
 
 
    
  
 
   
  
          
Eq. 2 
 
where:  
OB  - overall budget balance, in absolute terms 
CAB - cyclically-adjusted balance, in absolute terms (discretionary 
policy) 
CC - cyclical component of balance, in absolute terms (automatic 
stabilizers) 
µ           - budgetary sensitivity parameter (change in the budget balance to 
GDP ratio with respect to the output gap) 
GAP  - output gap, as a percentage of potential output 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                     
17 Mourre et al. (2013) provide an update on the cyclical adjustment methodology that is used by the EC 
since 2013 reflecting the use of semi-elasticities to measure cyclical components and the use of updated 
weighting parameters associated with individual elasticities. However, the updated methodology is not 
discussed here since the data used in the empirical analysis in the following chapter are calculated based 
on the old methodology (i.e. they were collected and used in our analysis before the data based on the 
updated methodology became available).  
18 The main differences are the use of various macroeconomic variables instead of GDP to describe the 
macroeconomic environment and the inclusion of the composition effects of aggregate demand and of 
national income, as well as the more precise selection of budgetary items subject to cyclical adjustment. 
See Bouthevillain et al. (2001) for a detailed explanation of the ECB 'disaggregated' method and Kiss and 
Vadas (2007) for a critique of the two methods and a proposed improvement.   
19 For simplicity, here we abstract from the interest payments, in line with the discussion in the original 
documents. If the adjustment is made on the primary instead of the overall budget balance, then the 
result is the cyclically-adjusted primary balance (CAPB).  
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This is the crucial part in the entire process, as it requires careful calculation of 
two unobserved components. First, the construction of the output gap (Eq. 3) as a 
measure of the cyclical position of the economy relies on the calculation of trend or 
potential output, which can be done using various statistical and econometric 
techniques (de Brouwer (1998), Guarda (2002)), and is often in itself a 
methodologically difficult process. The European Commission (EC) has used the 
Hodrick-Prescott filter in the past to calculate trend output (EC, 1995), but since 2002 
it has adopted the more sophisticated production function approach to calculate 
potential output20, also used by the OECD (Giorno et al., 1995). Indeed, the EC pays 
considerable attention to continuously advancing the process of potential output 
calculation for its member states (Denis et al. (2002), Denis et al. (2006) and D’Auria 
et al. (2010)).  
 
      
     
 
  
      Eq. 3 
 
where:  
GAP  - output gap, as a percentage of potential output 
Y - actual GDP, in absolute terms 
Y* - trend/potential GDP, in absolute terms  
 
 
 
The second unobserved component that needs to be calculated is the 
budgetary sensitivity parameter µ, which reflects the reaction of revenues and 
expenditures to the output gap, and is calculated by aggregating individual revenue 
and expenditure elasticities. Here, the EC uses the elasticities calculated by the OECD 
(Girouard and André, 2005), and extends the same approach to the EU members that 
are not OECD members (EC, 2006). In this process, the OECD first calculates elasticities 
for four revenue items and for unemployment related expenditures as budget items 
that are assumed to be sensitive to cyclical output movements21. Elasticities of each of 
the revenue items εRi to the output gap are composed of two components: the 
elasticity of the respective item with respect to the particular tax base εRi,TBi and the 
elasticity of the tax base to the output gap εTBi,GAP (Eq. 4 below). A similar approach is 
used for unemployment-related expenditures. The first component is constructed by 
                                                
20 Appendix 3.2 contains a comparison of output gaps using Hodrick-Prescott trend GDP and production 
function potential output for the sample that will be used in the empirical analysis in Chapter 3.  
21 Due to lack of detailed data on particular budget items, the IMF only uses overall revenues and 
expenditures (Fedelino et al., 2009).  
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using information in country tax codes, social security schemes and other legislation, 
as well as fiscal data. The second component, i.e. the elasticity with respect to the 
output gap, is constructed by simple regression analysis (Girouard and André, 2005). 
Next, elasticities for particular revenue and expenditure items are aggregated in 
accordance with their respective share in overall revenues and expenditures, which 
yields weighted elasticities of overall levels of revenues ηR and expenditures ηG with 
respect to the output gap (Eq. 5 and Eq. 6). Further, the sensitivity of overall revenues 
µR and of expenditures µG as a share of GDP with respect to the output gap is 
constructed by using their respective shares in GDP (Eq. 7 and Eq. 8). Finally, the 
difference between them yields the budgetary sensitivity parameter µ (Eq. 9), which 
is then used in Eq. 2 above to remove the effect of cyclical movements (automatic 
stabilizers) from the overall balance in order to calculate the cyclically-adjusted 
balance (discretionary policy).  
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Eq. 8 
 
        Eq. 9 
 
 
where: 
R - overall revenues, in absolute terms 
G - current primary expenditures, in absolute terms 
Ri          - revenue item, in absolute terms (one of four items sensitive to the 
cycle: income tax, corporate tax, indirect taxes, social security 
contributions) 
Gu - unemployment related expenditures, in absolute terms 
εRi - elasticity of revenue item i with respect to the output gap 
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εG,U - elasticity of unemployment expenditures with respect to the output 
gap 
εRi,TBi - elasticity of revenue item i with respect to the relevant tax base 
εTBi,GAP - elasticity of the tax base for revenue item i with respect to the output 
gap 
ηR          - weighted elasticity of overall revenues (change in level of overall 
revenues with respect to the output gap) 
ηG         - overall elasticity of expenditures (change in level of overall 
expenditures with respect to the output gap) 
µR         - sensitivity parameter of revenues (change in the revenues to GDP ratio 
with respect to the output gap) 
µG         - sensitivity parameter of expenditures (change in the expenditures to 
GDP ratio with respect to the output gap) 
µ           - budgetary sensitivity parameter (change in the budget balance to GDP 
ratio with respect to the output gap) 
 
 
 
 
 The advantage of the elasticities approach to the cyclical adjustment of fiscal 
balances is that it takes into account country specifics regarding issues such as tax 
legislation and the impact and size of different taxes. The use of a unified 
methodology is also important, since this facilitates cross-country comparison and 
analysis. Moreover, the detailed calculation of trend/potential output and output gaps 
brings a more careful construction of cyclical output movements, which then enables 
a more accurate cyclical adjustment of fiscal indicators. However, these calculations 
also suffer from several drawbacks. One of them is that they assume invariant 
elasticities, as they are usually constructed for a certain year only, and this therefore 
ignores the possibility that they might be changing, for instance due to asset price 
booms (Jaeger and Schuknecht, 2004). Further, since this exercise is not performed 
frequently, these calculations do not reflect the most recent changes in tax codes and 
tax rates. Related to this, the OECD/EC approach ignores compositional effects, as it 
assumes that each GDP component (i.e. tax base) is at the same cyclical position as the 
output gap (Bouthevillain et al., 2001). Indeed, Mohr and Morris (2009) find that 
appropriate consideration of composition effects would have yielded different 
conclusions for the fiscal stance in some European countries in the 1996-2003 period. 
Further, the approach is quite restrictive on the expenditure side, as it relies only on 
unemployment transfers and does not reflect other items such as age- and health-
related social spending and incapacity and sick benefits, which are sometimes found 
to act in a strongly stabilizing manner (Darby and Melitz, 2008). Besides, Bernoth 
et al. (2008) argue that the cyclical adjustment removes any short-term discretionary 
response to output movements. That is, short-term discretionary measures are 
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wrongly interpreted to be a consequence of the cyclical movements, and therefore 
they are cleaned from the cyclically-adjusted balance in the same manner as 
automatic stabilizers22.  
One of the most serious weaknesses of this approach concerns the calculation 
of trend/potential output and output gaps, as both statistical and econometric 
approaches have their own strengths and weaknesses (D’Auria et al., 2010). The 
results of the cyclical adjustment can be sensitive to the technique chosen for 
calculating trend/potential output and the particular assumptions and constructions 
while employing it, but also to the measurement errors and data revisions for both 
actual and potential output (Mohr and Morris, 2009). The problem is more 
complicated in the context of transition countries because of continuous structural 
changes and limited availability of data, which are often of low quality and include 
methodological changes. For these reasons, the EC uses both a modified production 
function approach and the Hodrick-Prescott filter in the calculation of trend/potential 
output in new member states, unlike the use of potential output based on the 
production function approach for old member states (D’Auria et al., 2010). Another 
serious criticism is related to the fact that the cyclical adjustment procedure focuses 
on extracting the fiscal stance by clearing the fiscal effect only of cyclical output 
movements (i.e. automatic stabilizers) from the overall balance. The resulting 
discretionary policy measure thus ignores other aspects of the macroeconomic 
environment and additional factors which might affect the budget balance. In 
addition, 'structural balances' are sometimes used as a more accurate description of 
the fiscal policy stance, since they remove the effect not only of cyclical movements 
but also of other temporary factors. For instance, Bornhorst et al. (2011) describe a 
method for calculation of structural balances which removes fiscal effects not only of 
cyclical output movements from overall balances, but also effects of changes in asset 
or commodity prices and one-off revenue or expenditure measures23. However, 
structural balances are not widely used for policy purposes and in the literature, 
which could reflect the lack of unified definition and difficulties in classifying the 
items that should be treated as temporary. Last but not least, cyclical adjustments of 
                                                
22 However, no additional details are provided on this particular drawback of the cyclical adjustment 
procedure.   
23 This implies that the structural balance falls within the endogenous discretionary policy in Figure 2.1. 
However, it is a narrower concept than the cyclically-adjusted balance, since from the latter it removes 
the non-structural elements beyond the economic cycle (e.g. asset or commodity price changes and one-
off measures like the sale of telecommunication licences or emergency relief in cases of natural 
disasters). As Bornhorst et al. (2011) argue, cyclically-adjusted and structural balances are complements, 
but the latter go beyond the standard cyclical adjustment in order to provide a fiscal indicator that is 
independent of all macroeconomic fluctuations (i.e. not only the fluctuations reflected in the output gap) 
and independent of temporary measures.  
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fiscal policy indicators are generally available for OECD and EU countries only, so 
their application to studies of other countries is rather limited.  
 The second, econometric approach uses various econometric techniques to 
identify and explain the stance of fiscal policy. One of its biggest strengths is that it 
enables the analysis of the effect of various factors on the properties of fiscal policy, 
beyond the effect of a single indicator such as the output gap. Therefore, the empirical 
literature primarily uses the econometric approach to analyse fiscal policy. However, 
when dealing with discretionary policy, it often also uses measures calculated by 
international organisations with the elasticities approach. Consequently, the two 
approaches are complements, but the econometric approach aims to bring a wider 
perspective on the reasons behind particular movements of fiscal indicators, i.e. to go 
beyond the technical application of the elasticities approach. Generally, the 
econometric approach in the empirical literature is used by regressing fiscal 
indicators (unadjusted or cyclically-adjusted budget balances, revenues or 
expenditures using the elasticities approach) on measures of the business cycle and 
possibly additional control variables, and then interpreting the estimated effect (the 
coefficient on the output variable) as an indicator of the cyclical stance of fiscal 
policy, as discussed below. This interpretation depends on the particular fiscal 
indicator that is used as a dependent variable, leading to some disagreement 
regarding this issue. Some authors use unadjusted fiscal policy indicators as 
dependent variables, such as revenues, expenditures or overall or primary budget 
balances. In such a case, the coefficient on the measure of output movements is a 
reflection of the cyclical stance of overall fiscal policy, and it reflects both automatic 
stabilizers and the endogenous discretionary policy. In addition, it is considered that 
the exogenous discretionary policy is reflected in the residuals (Fatás and Mihov, 
2003). However, there are authors who criticise this approach (e.g. Galí and Perotti 
(2003)), since the focus of analysis should not be on the overall fiscal policy, but on 
discretionary policy, which is under the direct control of policymakers. Therefore, 
these studies use cyclically-adjusted measures (typically calculated by the OECD, the 
EC or the IMF using the elasticities approach) and regress them on output and a set of 
control variables. This approach is generally followed in the more recent literature 
(as discussed below), although there are authors who play down this distinction 
between components, arguing that what is important is the actual response of fiscal 
policy, and not whether it was automatic or discretionary (Ilzetzki and Végh, 2008). 
Related to this, when the cyclically-adjusted balance is used as the dependent 
variable, the coefficient on the output measure reflects the stance of endogenous 
36 
 
discretionary policy, i.e. the reaction of policymakers to economic fluctuations. In 
addition, the residuals again reflect the exogenous discretionary policy to the extent 
that it is not captured by additional control variables (as well as external shocks 
affecting the fiscal indicators). Certainly, the use of cyclically-adjusted indicators 
means that the regression approach is also subject to the weaknesses of the cyclical 
adjustment procedure, including output gap calculation, but this problem is usually 
addressed by robustness checks of various calculation methods. The advantage of the 
econometric approach lies especially in a detailed consideration of the effects of 
additional important variables (e.g. public debt and lagged balances, but also political, 
economic and institutional variables as discussed below), as well as in the separate 
analysis of various components of fiscal policy.   
 Another point that merits explanation is the definition of the cyclicality of 
fiscal policy itself and the particular indicators used to express it. It is commonly 
considered that the cyclical stance is best reflected by some measure of budget 
balance, such as the overall or the primary balance, mostly relative to GDP. However, 
there are some criticisms of this approach, most notably by Kaminsky et al. (2004). 
They argue that the cyclical stance of policy should be defined in terms of policy 
instruments only (tax rates and government spending), and not endogenous 
outcomes, such as tax revenues, spending and balances, in absolute terms or as 
shares of GDP. This argument has a solid theoretical background, as both the 
Keynesian and neo-classical prescriptions are defined in terms of tax rates or 
government consumption only. According to this view, only tax rates24 and 
government spending have an unambiguous relation to the business cycle, whereas 
all other indicators could reflect various actual cyclical movements. However, this 
objection is mostly not followed in the empirical literature, although without any 
particular justification. The vast majority of studies (and policymakers) continue to 
use the share of spending, revenues or government balance in GDP as indicators of 
the cyclical stance of fiscal policy (see Table 2.1 and Table 2.2). There are some studies 
which focus on government consumption only, but this is often done because of 
limited data availability in wide country samples. For these theoretical and practical 
reasons, this study will follow the majority of empirical studies by focusing on budget 
balances and using indicators relative to GDP. In doing so, the interpretation will be 
in line with most empirical studies: in expansions, counter-cyclical policy will be 
taken to consist of higher budget surpluses, lower spending or higher revenues as a 
                                                
24 Generally, the focus is on statutory tax rates, although no explicit distinction is made in the literature 
between statutory and effective tax rates, presumably because of difficulties in calculating the latter.  
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share of GDP; the opposite will be true for pro-cyclicality, while insignificant 
coefficients would point to an a-cyclical reaction (and opposite relations would hold 
in recessions). Last but not least, there is also some disagreement whether the 
cyclically-adjusted budget balance should be viewed in relation to the actual or to the 
potential output. According to Fedelino et al. (2009), who provide an extensive 
discussion and a sensitivity analysis of this issue, the latter is to be conceptually 
preferred, but due to the difficulties in the measurement and interpretation of 
potential output, the more convenient ratio to actual output is widely used in 
empirical studies.  
 
 
2.4 Review of empirical studies  
 
2.4.1 Initial studies and basic specifications 
 
 Nearly all empirical studies analyse the cyclicality of fiscal policy by using 
some form of general fiscal policy reaction function25. They can be divided in two 
groups according to the particular empirical approach they use to analyse cyclicality. 
Earlier studies and some of the studies that cover a wide sample of countries mostly 
follow a two-stage approach (summarised in Table 2.1 below). In the first stage, they 
estimate country-by-country OLS time-series regressions with the fiscal indicator on 
the left hand side, and the contemporaneous cyclical indicator of output on the right 
hand side (Eq. 10). Sometimes the lagged public debt and the first lag of the 
dependent variable are also added as explanatory variables (Eq. 11). Both 
specifications yield β-coefficients as indicators of the cyclical stance of fiscal policy. 
Then, in the second stage, they use cross-section regressions of these indicators – the 
first-stage estimates of β-coefficients – on various variables which are of particular 
interest as possible determinants of cyclicality (Eq. 12).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        
                                                
25 Only the general specifications are presented in this part, but the particular details vary across studies, 
such as the particular fiscal indicator used as dependent variable, the use of ratios to actual or potential 
output, the explanatory variables and the estimation method (see Table 2.1 and Table 2.2).  
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                    Eq. 10 
 
                                    Eq. 11 
 
             Eq. 12 
  
where: 
FI   - fiscal indicator, usually as a share of output (primary or overall budget 
balance; unadjusted or cyclically-adjusted balance; revenues or 
expenditures) 
Cycle - indicator for cyclical movements of the economy (output gap or GDP 
growth) 
Debt  - public debt, usually as a share of GDP 
X  - 1 x m vector of additional explanatory variables (economic, political, 
institutional)   
Θ  - n x 1 vector of coefficients of additional explanatory variables 
 
 
Lane (2003) and Alesina and Tabellini (2005) are among the most widely cited 
studies using this two-stage approach. Badinger (2008) uses a similar approach, 
although its primary focus is the analysis of determinants of output volatility and the 
possible role of discretionary policy. However, this approach suffers from two 
significant shortcomings. The first one is the simultaneity of the output and the fiscal 
indicator, since the main point of the research is the effect of output on fiscal 
outcomes, but in reality fiscal indicators also affect output movements. In an OLS 
context, this gives rise to the endogeneity problem and consequently biased 
coefficients. This point has been made by several researchers, of which Jaimovich and 
Panizza (2007) are among the first who clearly demonstrate its consequences, arguing 
that the observed pro-cyclicality of fiscal policy in some groups of countries is in fact 
a result of reverse causality, and that results differ once this problem is properly 
treated. However, some studies that use such estimations do not appear to treat this 
problem in an appropriate manner. For instance, Lane (2003) and Badinger (2008) 
argue that this can be treated as a reduced form equation, although it is clear and 
generally accepted that government spending also has a contemporaneous effect on 
output movements26. Further, Alesina and Tabellini (2005) do not mention the 
endogeneity problem at all. The second main weakness is that this approach typically 
uses very few additional explanatory variables, and the omission of relevant 
regressors might give rise to biased and inconsistent estimates. Related to this, most 
                                                
26 In the published version, Lane (2003) has only reduced form OLS. He claims the web-appendix has the 
instrumental variable version as well, but attempts to recover it have failed.  
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of these studies do not include public debt and lagged deficits as explanatory 
variables, even though it is generally considered that the budget dynamics does have 
an impact on policy actions, especially with high initial deficit or debt levels. The 
recent crisis and fiscal problems of European countries in particular highlight the 
importance of past fiscal movements for markets and policy-makers. The inclusion of 
a time trend in some studies ameliorates the problem of omitted variables, but it still 
does not allow a deeper analysis of determinants of fiscal policy. An additional 
criticism is that this estimation approach uses data in a relatively inefficient manner, 
as it requires relatively long spans of data to run meaningful country-by-country 
time-series regressions in the first stage (Eq. 10 or Eq. 11 above). For the second stage 
(Eq. 12 above), it also requires wide data samples in order for the cross-section 
regressions to yield meaningful and precise estimates. Last but not least, Égert (2010) 
notes that country-by-country estimations use fiscal indicators with different levels of 
integration as dependent variables. He argues that the use of dependent variables in 
levels in some cases and in differences in others, with cycles usually defined in levels, 
results in limited comparability of cyclicality coefficients across studies.  
In an attempt to respond to some of these criticisms, a few studies use what 
can be labelled an "intermediate" approach, i.e. instrumental variable (IV) estimation 
in the first of a two-stage approach, or panel estimation, often without proper 
accounting for the endogeneity bias (Table 2.1). They still tend to use relatively simple 
specifications and their methods are often less appropriate than the later studies. 
Relatively simple applications of the "intermediate" approach with panel data are 
provided by Gavin and Perotti (1997) in their pioneering empirical study on the 
cyclical character of fiscal policy in Latin America and by Fatás and Mihov (2001a) in 
their study on OECD countries. The same authors use a more careful two-stage 
approach in their well known study of discretionary policy and output volatility, 
although again without any role for the debt or deficit inertia (Fatás and Mihov, 
2003). However, they do include them in a later study of cyclicality of fiscal policy in 
the euro area, which uses country-by-country estimations (Fatás and Mihov, 2009). 
Finally, Lee and Sung (2007) use panel IV estimation, but they do not analyse the 
possible role of public debts or past deficits, or of other additional variables beyond 
the inclusion of a time trend and country and time dummies.  
Table 2.1 summarises the main features of studies on the cyclicality of fiscal 
policy that use a two-stage approach and an intermediate approach. As noted 
previously, these consist mostly of earlier cyclicality studies and some of the studies 
that cover a wide sample of countries.  
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Study Country 
coverage 
Period Method Dependent 
variable 
Output 
cyclicality 
variable 
Control 
for 
debt 
Lagged  
dependent 
variable 
Additional 
control variables 
Other 
comments 
Lane (2003) 22 OECD 
member 
states 
1960-1998 1st  stage: 
country-by-
country time 
series OLS;  
2nd stage: cross-
section WLS  
1st stage: real 
government 
spending 
(various sub-
categories) 
2nd stage: 
cyclicality 
coefficients 
contempora-
neous real 
GDP growth 
rate 
No No 1st stage: none; 
2nd stage: output 
volatility, power 
dispersion, GDP p.c., 
trade openness, size 
of public sector 
 
Alesina 
and 
Tabellini 
(2005) 
 
87 countries 
(of which 23 
OECD 
members) 
1960-1999, 
unbalanced 
1st  stage: 
country-by-
country time 
series OLS;  
2nd stage: cross-
section OLS, 
WLS, probit  
1st stage: change 
in central 
government 
overall surplus 
as share of 
actual GDP (also 
revenues and 
expenditures) 
2nd stage: 
cyclicality 
coefficients 
output gap 
(HP filter) 
No Yes, in 1st stage 
(in levels, not 
changes) 
1st stage: gap in 
terms of trade (HP 
filter); 
2nd stage: control of 
corruption, initial 
GDP p.c., 
government size, 
democracy, 
financial constraints 
(S&P rating, spread) 
 
Badinger 
(2008) 
 
 
88 countries 1960-2004, 
unbalanced 
1st  stage: 
country-by-
country time 
series OLS (to 
get exogenous 
discretionary 
policy);  
2nd stage: cross-
section WLS 
1st stage: change 
in real 
government 
spending 
2nd stage: 
discretionary 
policy (volatility 
of residuals in 1st 
stage) 
contempora-
neous real 
GDP growth 
rate 
No No 1st stage: none; 
2nd stage: GDP per 
capita, openness, 
government size 
(instrumented), 
number of elections, 
political constraints, 
electoral system, 
political system 
Primary focus of 
the study is on 
output volatility  
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Study Country 
coverage 
Period Method Dependent 
variable 
Output 
cyclicality 
variable 
Control 
for 
debt 
Lagged  
dependent 
variable 
Additional 
control variables 
Other 
comments 
Gavin and 
Perotti 
(1997) 
29 countries 
(13 Latin 
American 
countries 
and 16 
OECD 
members) 
1968-1995, 
unbalanced 
panel OLS change in 
general 
government 
surplus as share 
of actual GDP 
(also includes 
various sub-
categories) 
contempora-
neous real 
GDP growth 
rate 
No Yes (in levels, 
not changes) 
Change in terms of 
trade, lagged 
inflation tax rate, 
exchange rate 
regimes, borrowing 
constraints, country 
dummies; 
interaction 
dummies with 
output  for good and 
bad times 
 
Fatás and 
Mihov 
(2001a) 
20 OECD 
members 
1960-1997 pooled 
regressions 
with fixed 
effects (in 
regressions of 
fiscal 
indicators) 
change in real 
revenues and 
spending, but 
also primary 
balance as share 
of GDP 
contempora-
neous real 
GDP growth 
rate 
No No None Primary focus on 
output volatility, 
automatic 
stabilizers and 
discretionary 
policy 
Fatás and 
Mihov 
(2003) 
91 countries 
(of which 25 
OECD 
members) 
1960-1999, 
unbalanced 
1st  stage: 
country-by-
country time 
series IV (to get 
exogenous 
discretionary 
policy);  
2nd stage: cross-
section OLS 
1st stage: change 
in real 
government 
spending 
2nd stage: 
discretionary 
policy (volatility 
of residuals in 1st 
stage) 
contempora-
neous real 
GDP growth 
rate 
No No 1st stage: Time 
trend, inflation and 
inflation squared; 
2nd stage: political 
constraints, 
electoral system, 
political system, 
number of elections; 
Primary focus of 
the study is on 
output volatility; 
instruments for 
GDP in IV: two 
lags, oil prices, 
lagged inflation, 
lagged 
government 
spending growth  
Lee and 
Sung (2007) 
94 countries 
(of which 22 
OECD 
members) 
1972-1998,  
unbalanced 
panel OLS and 
IV (also 
country-by-
country) 
government 
expenditures 
and revenues, 
and sub-
components (HP 
gaps and growth 
rates)  
contempora-
neous real 
GDP (HP gap 
and growth 
rate) 
No No Time trend, country 
and year dummies;  
Weighted GDP of 
neighbouring 
countries as IV 
for GDP; also 
analyses 
asymmetries 
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Study Country 
coverage 
Period Method Dependent 
variable 
Output 
cyclicality 
variable 
Control 
for 
debt 
Lagged  
dependent 
variable 
Additional 
control variables 
Other 
comments 
Fatás and 
Mihov 
(2009) 
22 OECD 
countries 
(with focus 
on euro 
area) 
1970-2007  country-by-
country time 
series OLS and 
IV (to get 
cyclicality 
coefficients); 
also analyse 
automatic 
stabilizers and 
exogenous 
policy 
separately 
cyclically-
adjusted budget 
balance, but also 
spending, 
revenues and 
primary balance 
(shares of 
potential GDP, as 
constructed by 
OECD) 
contempora-
neous output 
gap  
Yes, 
lagged 
debt as 
share of 
GDP 
Yes None; interaction 
dummies with 
output pre- and 
post-1999 (for EMU 
effects) 
Instruments for 
output gap: lag 
and US gap for 
euro area, lag 
and euro area 
gap for US;  
Ballabriga 
and 
Martinez-
Mongay 
(2002) 
13 EU 
member 
states (EU15 
except 
Greece and 
Luxemb.) 
1979-1998, 
unbalanced 
Country-by-
country GMM 
primary budget 
surplus and 
cyclically-
adjusted 
primary budget 
surplus as a 
share of GDP 
contempora-
neous output 
gap (HP filter 
of industrial 
production 
index) 
Yes, 
lagged 
ratio to 
GDP 
Yes Few dummies for 
particular periods 
in some countries 
Also analyses 
monetary policy 
rules 
 
Table 2.1. Summary of studies using the two-stage and intermediate approaches 
(Note: Main or baseline specifications are presented)  
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2.4.2 The single stage approach and extensions 
 
The most comprehensive answer to the drawbacks described above comes by 
more recent studies which follow a single stage approach of analysing the cyclical 
stance of fiscal policy (summarised in Table 2.2 below). They typically use panel data, 
which enables a more efficient use of time and cross-section variation. Here, the fiscal 
indicator is regressed on the output indicator, debt and the lagged dependent variable 
(Eq. 13), usually with IV or GMM estimation. Some studies use an extended 
specification that includes other control variables, which enables a richer analysis of 
fiscal policy determinants (Eq. 14). Therefore, the problem of omitted variables and 
the consequent bias is less of an issue in the latter case. Related to this, fixed effects 
are sometimes used to pick up country-specific circumstances. Further, recent studies 
also tend to analyse explicitly and in more detail the various estimation methods, and 
use the ones which are capable of dealing with some problems of previous studies 
such as biased or inconsistent estimators. Some studies deal more closely with 
possible asymmetries of fiscal policy, which implies different reactions in expansions 
and recessions. Further, several recent studies investigate the issue of policy 
intentions instead of policy outcomes by the use of ex ante or real-time instead of ex 
post data (see below).  
 
                                        Eq. 13 
 
                                             Eq. 14 
  
where: 
FI   - fiscal indicator, usually as a share of output (primary or overall budget 
balance; unadjusted or cyclically-adjusted balance; revenues or 
expenditures) 
Cycle - indicator for cyclical movements of the economy (output gap or GDP 
growth) 
Debt  - public debt, usually as a share of GDP 
X  - 1 x m vector of additional explanatory variables (economic, political, 
institutional)   
Θ - n x 1 vector of coefficients of additional explanatory variables 
 
 One of the first studies to use a panel estimation of fiscal policy response 
function was Galí and Perotti (2003) on the effects of the Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU) on the cyclicality of fiscal policy. Their study remains one of the most 
widely cited ones, and their specification has now become standard in this field, at 
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least as an initial point of research. They insist that, if the aim is to analyse the 
response of fiscal policymakers, cyclically-adjusted balances should be used as the 
dependent variable instead of the unadjusted balances (as in most of the previous 
studies). In addition, they note that fiscal policymakers probably have a strong debt 
stabilization motive, so lagged public debt as a share of GDP should also be included. 
Further, the lagged budget balance should also be included in order to account both 
for the inertia in the budget adjustment and for possible serial correlation in 
exogenous shocks. Their preferred specification consists of panel estimation with 
fixed country effects, which gives rise to inconsistency because of the inclusion of the 
lagged dependent variable. They note the existence of this problem, but argue it is not 
an issue of concern for their aim of comparison of pre- and post- Maastricht periods, 
as long as the inconsistency is similar for the two periods. However, such a similarity 
is only assumed, and this approach is generally not followed in later studies, which 
tend to approach the estimation in a more elaborate manner (see below). Besides, 
they favour the IV estimator arguing that the sample is relatively small and that 
small-sample properties of consistent estimators such as GMM were not yet well 
understood at the time of the research. Their main findings are that discretionary 
policy in EMU has been pro-cyclical before 1992, but has become a-cyclical after 1992. 
However, this coincides with a common movement towards counter-cyclicality for 
other developed countries at the time, and EMU countries still lag behind the strength 
of counter-cyclicality reached in other countries. In a similar sample, Wyplosz (2006) 
reaches similar results that discretionary policy in EMU countries has been pro-
cyclical before 1992 but has become a-cyclical afterwards, interpreting this as 
evidence of the fulfilment of the intention of founding fathers to abandon 
discretionary policy in EMU. However, his specification also pays no attention to 
additional variables, and he simply drops the policy inertia arguing that it is a known 
source of inconsistency in panel estimation. In contrast to the previous two studies, 
Candelon et al. (2010) use not only IV but also GMM methods and extend the sample 
for a few years. They reach fundamentally different results that discretionary policy 
in EMU countries has been pro-cyclical both before and after 1992, and that the pro-
cyclicality has in fact increased in recent years, thus lending some support to the 
criticisms of the constraints of EMU and SGP on the stabilization role of fiscal policy.  
 In their demonstration of the consequences of endogeneity in fiscal policy 
reaction functions, Jaimovich and Panizza (2007) use both OLS and two-stage least 
squares (2SLS) regressions with country fixed effects. The radically different results 
with 2SLS confirm the inaccuracy of simple OLS methods and the importance of 
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proper accounting for the endogeneity problem. They also recognize the bias that 
arises from fixed effects estimation with lagged dependent variables, and claim that 
both difference and system GMM estimations yield similar results. Ilzetzki and Végh 
(2008) use both quarterly and annual data27, and they use 2SLS and GMM panel 
estimation with fixed effects to regress changes in government consumption on 
output growth. While these studies constitute an improvement on earlier simple 
approaches, they still suffer from the inclusion of almost no additional explanatory 
variables, and even ignore the potential role of debt. This also applies to the study by 
Calderón et al. (2010) on the determinants of fiscal policy in a wide sample of 
countries. In accordance with the recent literature, they stress the role of institutional 
variables by including a comprehensive institutional quality indicator, but fail to 
control for public debt and other political and economic factors.  
 Annett (2006) and Afonso and Hauptmeier (2009) analyse the cyclical character 
of fiscal policy in European countries by adding some political and institutional 
variables, and they also include debt and policy inertia in their studies. Annett (2006) 
is particularly interested in the role of elections and the form of fiscal governance, but 
also in possible changes of fiscal policy in old EU members as a result of the 
Maastricht Treaty and the SGP. The model is estimated by both pooled least squares 
and fixed effects with IV, although he recognises the criticisms of fixed effects 
estimation of dynamic panels. Related to this, he argues that this method is to be 
preferred if the sample is reasonably long, since in such cases the bias is not 
substantial and the alternative dynamic estimators can lead to less efficient estimates. 
The study by Afonso and Hauptmeier (2009) is also focused on the European context, 
as it covers the 27 EU member states over the 1990-2005 period. Its main aim is to 
analyse the behaviour of fiscal policy in the light of debt sustainability and 
institutional factors such as fiscal rules and decentralisation, but it does not capture 
other economic and political factors. Unlike the vast majority of studies, they use the 
lagged output gap as an indicator for economic movements. While the endogeneity 
problem is avoided in this case, this approach might not be very accurate, as it does 
not capture the contemporaneous effect of economic movements on fiscal outcomes, 
particularly as they are using unadjusted budget balances as a dependent variable. 
After they recognise the so called Nickell bias of the use of LSDV in short panels with 
dynamic specification (Nickell, 1981), they draw the attention to the drawbacks of IV 
and GMM type estimators in relatively narrow macro panels, most notably their bias. 
                                                
27  This is possibly the only study that compiles and uses a quarterly dataset to analyse the cyclical 
properties of fiscal policy. 
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Therefore, they use the arguments in Judson and Owen (1997) that in such cases bias-
corrected LSDV estimators are preferred, and they use such an estimator proposed by 
Bruno (2005a) for dynamic unbalanced panels. However, for comparison they also 
present some results with standard LSDV and OLS estimations. Further, Égert (2010) 
provides one of the most comprehensive empirical analyses of cyclicality of fiscal 
policy in a sample of OECD countries in terms of the variables included and the 
alternative estimation methods. Besides the standard inclusion of the lagged 
dependent variable and public debt, it also gradually adds a host of other variables, 
mostly economic ones. It also presents results with almost all the alternatives used in 
the literature, by starting with the standard LSDV estimation, and also using the 
difference GMM and the more efficient system GMM estimator. Because of the 
relatively narrow and short dataset, it also presents the results using the LSDV 
correction developed by Kiviet (1995), Bun and Kiviet (2003) and Bun and Carree 
(2006) for balanced panels, which however has the drawback of assuming strictly 
exogenous right hand side variables. His main conclusions are that overall fiscal 
policy in OECD countries has become more counter-cyclical, particularly in 
downturns, and that discretionary policy is counter-cyclical mostly in countries with 
low debts and deficits, and pro-cyclical in others.    
 Balassone and Francese (2004) is among the first studies to extend the research 
of cyclicality of fiscal policy to the possibility of asymmetric reactions of fiscal policy 
over the cycle (i.e. different reactions in expansions and recessions), which would be 
inconsistent with the aims of macroeconomic stabilization and debt sustainability. 
Because of the inclusion of fixed effects, they use difference GMM estimation, but the 
results are similar to the ones with OLS. Balassone et al. (2008) extend this to a more 
detailed analysis of overall and primary balances, as well as revenues and 
expenditures in the EU member states. Again, they discuss the results of both fixed 
effects and difference GMM estimation. Except for the asymmetries and possible 
differences pre- and post-1992, none of these two studies deals with any additional 
explanatory variable. Turrini (2008) has a similar goal to analyse the role of 
government spending and expenditures on the cyclical response of fiscal policy in 
euro area countries over the 1980-2005 period as well as possible asymmetries. It uses 
much the same explanatory variables as the previous studies, expanding them with 
the role of elections and the US output gap for common shocks. The method of 
estimation is by standard LSDV, and it argues that the endogeneity problem is 
accounted for simply by using lags of the output gap instead of contemporaneous 
values, but this is generally not considered a satisfactory solution in the literature as 
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long as there is inertia in the gap. Although the author is aware of this problem, he 
claims that instrumenting the output gap with its own lags and foreign output gaps 
yields qualitatively unchanged results.  
 Another important issue taken up in the recent literature concerns the analysis 
of policymaker intentions. These authors argue that, in order to distinguish 
policymaker intentions and to be able to explain their behaviour, it is necessary to 
use real-time data instead of ex post data, which measure actual outcomes. Real-time 
(or ex ante) data in the context of fiscal policy are the information on cyclical 
economic movements and fiscal movements that policymakers have at the time of 
budget planning and implementation. They might differ quite substantially from ex 
post outcomes, which are finally known only with a considerable delay and which 
normally include the effects of events and information that were unknown at the 
time main decisions were taken and policies were implemented. Therefore, the use of 
real-time data can shed additional light on the common finding of a-cyclicality or 
even pro-cyclicality of fiscal policy with ex post data, including the common 
explanation of myopic behaviour or electoral motivations of policymakers. If policy 
reaction functions using real-time data confirm the findings of pro-cyclicality with ex 
post data, it can be said that there is mal-intention by policymakers, since such a 
policy was in fact pre-planned. However, if instead of pro-cyclicality with ex post 
data, real-time data suggest that policymakers intended to react counter-cyclically to 
output fluctuations, then the problem is not one of mal-intention but of 
misinformation about the contemporaneous cyclical position of the economy and 
about fiscal movements (Bernoth et al., 2008).  
The importance of using real-time data when analysing the behaviour of 
policy-makers was first demonstrated on the case of monetary policy, most notably by 
Orphanides (2001) and Orphanides (2003), and the subsequent literature. However, 
there was a delay in the application of this analysis to fiscal policy, despite the fact 
that its importance was potentially greater than in the context of monetary policy. 
Indeed, fiscal policy-makers are not only confronted with the imprecision of 
understanding output gap movements in real time, but they also face uncertainties 
regarding the real-time movement of budget deficits (particularly as a share of GDP). 
This all makes judgements on the cyclically-adjusted budget deficit even more prone 
to measurement errors. Related to this, Hughes Hallett et al. (2007) show that there 
are substantial revisions of output and fiscal data in OECD countries for many years 
after their initial publication and that real-time estimates of cyclically-adjusted 
balances deviate significantly from ex post ones. Consequently, if the aim of empirical 
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studies is to analyse policy intentions, real-time fiscal indicators should be used as 
dependent variables instead of ex post ones. This reflects the fact that, unlike 
monetary policymakers, fiscal policymakers do not have control over the budget 
balance as their policy instrument, and in fact it may turn out to be quite different 
from their plans (Cimadomo, 2008). On the other hand, the vast majority of the fiscal 
policy literature still uses ex post data, which probably reflects the fact that real-time 
data (i.e. official forecasts of fiscal indicators and of GDP) are not widely available in a 
consistent manner. Indeed, data availability is also the reason why we will use ex post 
and not real-time data in our analysis in the following chapter.  
 Forni and Momigliano (2004) are among the first authors to analyse the fiscal 
policy reaction function in 19 OECD countries with real-time data on cyclical 
conditions and to compare them with estimates using ex post data. The crucial point 
is that instead of using the ex post output gap, they use real-time values of the output 
gap28 (Eq. 15), alongside the standard specification that uses ex post values for all 
variables (reproduced in Eq. 16)29. Estimations are carried out with OLS and IV fixed 
effects, and results are presented and compared both for the specification with real-
time and the one with ex post data on the output gap. Regarding the inconsistency 
problems of fixed effects in dynamic panels, they also argue that this does not matter 
for comparison purposes since there is no reason to believe that the inconsistency 
would differ in the two cases (i.e. real-time and ex post output gap), but they do 
present GMM results as a robustness check.  
 
                                                           Eq. 15 
 
                                                       Eq. 16 
 
where: 
CAPB     - cyclically-adjusted primary balance 
Cycle      -     output gap 
Cyclei,t|t-1 -  output gap at time t expected at time t-1 
Debt       -  public debt 
X            - 1 x m vector of additional explanatory variables (Maastricht 
Treaty, asymmetries)   
Θ           - corresponding n x 1 vector of coefficients of additional 
explanatory variables 
                                                
28 They use two versions of the real-time output gap: the current year gap projected by the OECD in the 
end of the previous year and the OECD estimate of the previous year's gap (i.e. the lagged projection). 
Since the results are largely similar, only the first version is presented in the equations here.   
29 Descriptions in this part represent the general baseline specifications in these studies, although 
particular details may vary, such as the use of ex post data for public debt, the additional explanatory 
variables and the analysis of asymmetries.  
49 
 
An important finding of the study by Forni and Momigliano (2004) is that the 
fit of the equation is higher with real-time data on the output gap (Eq. 15), which 
indicates that they capture reality better. More importantly, the fiscal response to 
contractions is insignificant and hence a-cyclical with ex post data (Eq. 16), but 
strongly and significantly counter-cyclical with real-time data (Eq. 15). This indicates 
that the intentions of policy-makers were to react in a stabilizing matter in response 
to expected contractions (i.e. counter-cyclically), but the actual economic movements 
made their response turn out to be a-cyclical. On the other hand, they find that the 
fiscal response was insignificant in case of positive gaps with both types of data, 
which means that both planned and actual policy were a-cyclical in relation to 
expansions. In addition, they also find that some of the violations of the Stability and 
Growth Pact may have come from inaccurate assessments of cyclical output 
movements in some countries.  
 More recent studies extend this analysis in order to shed more light on the 
reasons of the difference between policy intentions and policy outcomes (e.g. 
Cimadomo (2008) or Golinelli and Momigliano (2009)). For instance, Golinelli and 
Momigliano (2009) augment the standard one-stage specification that uses ex post 
data for all variables with two additional specifications involving real-time data. The 
first one regresses ex post fiscal outcomes on real-time data that were available to 
policy makers at the time of budgetary decisions for all independent variables. The 
second specification uses real-time data not only for independent variables but for 
the dependent variable as well30. Golinelli and Momigliano (2009) note that these two 
specifications focus on two similar but distinct problems. The first specification 
maintains the focus on actual policy outcomes but aims to explain them with real-
time data, thus linking actual outcomes to budget adoption and implementation 
stages, whereas the second specification focuses completely on policy intentions and 
uses real-time data for all variables, including the dependent one.  
In their study of EMU countries, these authors use system GMM, with country 
and time fixed effects, and specifications that also allow for the effect of the 
Maastricht Treaty, elections and asymmetries. Their main finding from the 
specification with real-time data for all variables is that original policy intentions are 
strongly asymmetric – they are counter-cyclical in good times and pro-cyclical in bad 
                                                
30 The study presents in detail the manner in which real-time data are constructed. For ease of 
exposition, we refrain from presenting the equations and the calculations, which are somewhat 
complicated. In addition, the study provides an excellent analysis and comparison of main specification 
choices and modeling approaches in studies of cyclicality of fiscal policy in European countries, 
including their effects on results, which are generally quite significant. 
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times, implying restrictive policies regardless of the sign of the business cycle, which 
is a somewhat unusual result. However, when trying to explain actual, ex post 
outcomes with real-time data, the policy turns out to be symmetrical and only weakly 
counter-cyclical. The different results in the two equations imply a relaxation of fiscal 
policy in the implementation stage compared to original intentions. Golinelli and 
Momigliano (2009) interpret this to reflect pressures for looser policy in bad times 
and less restrictive policy in good times, which is an argument for the establishment 
of budgetary rules that limit discretionary behaviour. Further, when ex post data are 
used for all variables in order to explain actual policy outcomes, fiscal policy is 
unambiguously a-cyclical. Overall, this means that the original counter-cyclical 
intentions are offset by errors made by policy-makers in judging real-time cyclical 
movements, since actual policy turns out to be a-cyclical. They interpret this as an 
argument for a limited use of active fiscal policy only when the cyclical position of the 
economy is clear and unambiguous.   
 Bernoth et al. (2008) also aim to analyse effects of real-time fiscal policy, and 
possible differences with ex post data. However, they argue that the process of 
separating automatic and discretionary policy itself suffers from two crucial 
drawbacks, which later significantly affect the quality of the analysis: the routine but 
inaccurate classification of short-term discretionary measures as automatic 
stabilizers and the problems and uncertainties in measuring potential output and 
output gaps. Therefore, they develop a model that enables testing for real-time 
measurement errors across a wider range of reaction functions31. Second, and more 
importantly, they argue that their model avoids the need for cyclical adjustment by 
exploiting the idea that automatic stabilizers react to the ex post output level, 
whereas discretionary policy as a reflection of policymakers' intentions reacts to the 
ex ante or real-time perceptions about the output gap. They take their model to the 
data consisted of a panel of 14 EU countries over the 1995-2006 period. After a careful 
discussion of estimation possibilities, they decide to use system GMM estimation with 
country fixed effects, and they later add additional control variables such as election 
years and the effect of Maastricht Treaty. They confirm findings in most of the 
literature of a-cyclical fiscal policy with ex post data. However, they also find that 
measurement errors for potential output and output gaps are highly significant, 
which means that the standard ex post specification suffers from omitted variable 
bias. Further, the introduction of real-time data strongly points toward counter-
                                                
31 In the paper, the authors explain the recovery of these errors within their model, as well as the 
derivation of estimated equations.  
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cyclical intentions of policymakers. This means that the problem is mostly of 
misinformation, not mal-intention, although there is some evidence of the latter as 
policy is looser in election years with both types of data. In addition, their results 
indicate a much stronger discretionary reaction and consequently weaker automatic 
stabilizers than most of the literature, which they interpret to be a consequence of 
over-smoothing of discretionary policy in the process of calculating cyclically-
adjusted balances, which are used in most of the empirical literature.  
Table 2.2 summarises the main features of the more recent studies, which 
follow a single stage approach to analysing the cyclical stance of fiscal policy.  
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Study Country 
coverage 
Period Method Dependent 
variable 
Output 
cyclicality 
variable 
Control 
for debt 
 
Lagged  
dependent 
variable 
Additional 
control variables 
Other 
comments 
Galí and 
Perotti 
(2003) 
11 original 
EMU 
members, but 
also 3 EU and 
5 OECD 
countries 
1980-2002 Panel IV 
estimation 
with fixed 
effects (but 
also 
country and 
group time-
series with 
IV) 
cyclically-
adjusted 
primary 
balance as a 
share of 
potential GDP 
(OECD); also 
primary 
spending, 
revenues and 
government 
investment 
shares in 
potential GDP 
contempora-
neous output 
gap (OECD 
calculations 
with 
production 
function) 
Yes, 
lagged 
debt as 
share of 
potential 
GDP 
Yes Country fixed effects in 
panel estimations; 
interaction dummies for 
1992 for changes pre- 
and post-Maastricht; 
Primary focus on 
effects of EMU; 
Instruments for 
output gap: EU15 
gap for US, US 
gap for all other 
countries  
Jaimovich 
and 
Panizza 
(2007) 
118 countries 1970-2003 , 
unbalanced 
Panel OLS 
and IV 
estimation 
with fixed 
effects  
budget balance 
as share of 
actual GDP and 
expenditure 
growth  
contempora-
neous real 
GDP growth 
No Yes, deficit as 
share of GDP 
Country fixed effects; 
change in terms of trade;  
Instrument for 
GDP: weighted 
GDP growth of 
export partners;  
Ilzetzki 
and Végh 
(2008) 
49 countries 
(of which 22 
industrial) 
1960-2006, 
unbalanced 
(quarterly), 
also 1961-
2003 
(annual) 
Panel OLS 
and IV with 
fixed 
effects,  
GMM, OLS 
simulta-
neous 
equations, 
panel VAR 
change of real 
general 
government 
consumption 
(also of real 
central 
government 
spending) 
contempora-
neous real 
GDP growth 
No No Country fixed effects  Instrument for 
GDP: 
contempora-
neous and lagged 
weighted GDP 
growth of export 
partners and 
weighted rate on 
6-month 
Treasuries  
Annett 
(2006) 
14 EU 
members or 
11 EMU 
members 
(EU15  or 
original 
EMU12 
without 
Luxembourg) 
1980-2004 Pooled OLS 
and Panel 
IV, with and 
without 
fixed effects 
Cyclically-
adjusted 
primary 
balance as a 
share of actual 
GDP  
contempora-
neous output 
gap  
Yes Yes Country fixed effects; 
election years, form of 
fiscal governance, 
relative economic size, 
output volatility; 
interaction dummies for 
1992 and 1999 
(Maastricht Treaty and 
EMU);  
Instrument for 
output gap: 
lagged own 
output gap 
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Study Country 
coverage 
Period Method Dependent 
variable 
Output 
cyclicality 
variable 
Control 
for debt 
 
Lagged  
dependent 
variable 
Additional 
control variables 
Other 
comments 
Wyplosz 
(2006) 
EU15 
members or 
10 EMU 
members 
(EMU12 
without 
Greece and 
Luxembourg) 
1980-2005 Panel 
W2SLS and 
3SLS 
cyclically-
adjusted 
primary 
balance and 
cyclical 
balance as a 
share of GDP 
contempora-
neous output 
gap 
Yes, ratio 
to GDP 
No Interaction dummies for 
pre-Maastricht, 
Maastricht years and SGP 
Instruments for 
output gap: 
lagged own gap 
and lagged and 
current US gap  
Afonso and 
Hauptmeier 
(2009) 
27 EU 
members 
1990-2005, 
unbalanced 
Panel LSDV 
and bias 
corrected 
LSDV  
Primary 
balance and 
primary 
spending as a 
share of actual 
output  
lagged output 
gap  
Yes, 
lagged 
ratio to 
GDP 
Yes Country and time fixed 
effects; dummies for 
Maastricht, SGP and 
enlargement; elections, 
fiscal and budget balance 
rules, decentralisation 
and debt thresholds 
 
Égert 
(2010) 
OECD 
countries 
1970-2008, 
unbalanced 
Panel LSDV, 
bias 
corrected 
LSDV, 
difference 
GMM and 
system 
GMM  
Levels and 
changes of 
general 
government 
balances 
(primary and 
overall, 
unadjusted and 
cyclically-
adjusted), also 
analyses 
spending and 
revenues 
contempora-
neous real 
GDP growth 
rate or output 
gap 
(constructed 
by 
production 
function 
approach) 
Yes, 
lagged 
ratio to 
GDP 
Yes Country fixed effects; 
debt servicing, openness, 
population growth, 
lagged public sector size, 
dummies for Maastricht 
Treaty and EMU, 
inflation, output 
volatility, house and 
stock prices, strength of 
government, background 
of head of government, 
timing of general 
elections 
Also analyses 
country specific 
outcomes, 
asymmetries, 
non-linearities 
and fiscal 
projections 
Candelon 
et al. (2010) 
11 EMU 
members 
(EMU12 
without 
Luxembourg) 
1980-2004 Panel IV 
with fixed 
effects and 
system 
GMM; also 
country-by-
country 
time series 
IV 
primary 
balance and 
cyclical 
balance as a 
share of 
potential GDP 
contempora-
neous output 
gap (OECD 
calculations 
with 
production 
function) 
Yes, 
lagged 
ratio 
Yes Country fixed effects; 
Election dummy; 
interaction dummies for 
pre- and post-1992  for 
all variables; 
Instruments for 
output gap: 
lagged own gap 
and lagged US 
gap  
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Study Country 
coverage 
Period Method Dependent 
variable 
Output 
cyclicality 
variable 
Control 
for debt 
 
Lagged  
dependent 
variable 
Additional 
control variables 
Other 
comments 
Calderón 
et al. (2010) 
112 countries 
(21 industrial 
and 89 
developing) 
1984-2008 Pooled 
FGLS and 
Panel 
difference 
GMM 
real 
government 
spending 
changes and 
gap (HP filter)  
contempora-
neous real 
GDP growth 
rate and 
output gap 
(HP filter) 
No Yes Institutional quality 
(interacted with output 
gap) 
Also analyses 
monetary policy 
cyclicality 
Balassone 
and 
Francese 
(2004) 
14 EU 
member 
states (EU15 
except 
Luxemb.), US 
and Japan 
1970-2000 Fixed 
effects 
panel OLS 
and 
Arellano 
Bond with 
first 
differences  
General 
government 
balance as 
share of actual 
GDP 
contempora-
neous output 
gap (HP 
filter)  
Yes, as 
share of 
GDP 
Yes Fixed effects; interaction 
dummies pre- and post-
1992; interaction 
dummies with output for 
good and bad times 
Primary focus on 
asymmetries and 
the effect of EMU 
Balassone 
et al. (2008) 
14 EU 
member 
states (EU15 
except 
Luxembourg) 
1970-2004, 
unbalanced 
Fixed 
effects 
panel OLS 
and 
Arellano 
Bond with 
first 
differences, 
SUR 
Overall and 
primary 
balance, 
revenues, 
spending and 
sub-
components as 
share of actual 
GDP 
contempora-
neous output 
gap (HP 
filter) 
Yes, as 
share of 
GDP 
Yes Fixed effects; interaction 
dummies pre- and post-
1992; interaction 
dummies with output for 
good and bad times; 
interest spending for 
regressions with primary 
variables 
Primary focus on 
asymmetries and 
the effect of EMU 
Turrini 
(2008) 
11 EMU 
members 
(EMU12 
without 
Luxembourg) 
1980-2005, 
unbalanced 
Panel LSDV 
(but also 
probit) 
Change in the 
share of 
cyclically-
adjusted 
primary 
balance/ 
spending/ 
revenues as a 
share of 
potential GDP 
lagged output 
gap 
(constructed 
by 
production 
function 
approach) 
Yes, as 
share of 
potential 
GDP 
Yes, in levels 
(not changes) 
Country fixed effects; 
dummies for 1992 and 
1999 (Maastricht Treaty 
and EMU); lagged US 
output gap; 
parliamentary elections; 
interaction dummies for 
good and bad times 
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Study Country 
coverage 
Period Method Dependent 
variable 
Output 
cyclicality 
variable 
Control 
for debt 
 
Lagged  
dependent 
variable 
Additional 
control variables 
Other 
comments 
Forni and 
Momigliano 
(2004) 
19 OECD 
countries, of 
which 10 
original EMU 
members 
(separate 
results for 
both groups) 
1994-2004 Panel OLS 
and IV with 
fixed 
effects; also 
Arellano-
Bond 
Ex post 
changes of the 
cyclically-
adjusted 
primary 
balance as a 
share of 
potential GDP 
(levels for 
Arellano-Bond) 
Expected 
future output 
gap, expected 
current gap 
or ex post gap 
(production 
function 
approach), 
but also real 
GDP growth 
rate 
Yes, 
lagged 
ratio to 
GDP 
Yes, in levels 
(not changes) 
Variable for Maastricht 
Treaty and SGP; positive 
and negative gaps are 
treated separately 
Primary focus on 
differences 
between actual 
policies and 
outcomes (real 
time vs. ex post); 
IV for GDP: 
estimate for own 
gap and 
weighted gap of 
other countries 
in previous year  
Golinelli 
and 
Momigliano 
(2009) 
11 EMU 
members 
(EMU12 
without 
Luxembourg) 
1994-2008 Panel 
system 
GMM 
expected and 
ex post change 
in the 
cyclically-
adjusted 
primary 
balance as 
share of 
potential GDP 
expected and 
ex post 
lagged output 
gap 
(production 
function and 
HP filter) 
Yes, 
lagged 
ratio to 
potential 
GDP  
Yes, in levels 
(not changes) 
Country and time fixed 
effects; variable for 
Maastricht Treaty and 
SGP; elections; also splits 
the sample for good and 
bad times 
Primary focus on 
differences 
between 
intentions, actual 
policies and 
outcomes; but 
also on effects of 
specifications 
and modelling 
approach 
Bernoth 
et al. (2008) 
14 EU 
member 
states (EU15 
except 
Luxembourg) 
1995-2006 Panel 
system 
GMM 
ex post 
primary 
balance as a 
share of 
potential GDP 
ex post 
contemporan
eous output 
gap (with 
production 
function 
approach) 
Yes, 
lagged 
ratio to 
potential 
GDP 
Yes Country fixed effects; 
Variable for Maastricht 
Treaty and SGP; 
elections; error in 
estimating the potential 
output, error in 
estimating the output 
gap 
Primary focus on 
differences 
between 
intentions and 
outcomes and on 
a new approach 
to estimating 
policy responses  
 
 Table 2.2. Summary of studies using the single stage approach and extensions  
(Note: Main or baseline specifications are presented)  
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2.4.3 Studies of fiscal policy in transition countries 
 
Early empirical studies on fiscal policy in transition countries are relatively 
simple compared to other studies, mostly reflecting very limited data availability and 
simple empirical methods used. Although they often deal with determinants of 
overall fiscal policy, the cyclical character of fiscal policy and its determinants are not 
always their main focus. Coricelli and Ercolani (2002) are among the first authors to 
attempt the construction of cyclically-adjusted balances for four transition countries 
alongside the methodology used by the European Commission for EU member states. 
Although their approach to the calculation of elasticities and the cyclical adjustment 
is relatively simple, they conclude that discretionary fiscal policy in the early years of 
transition has been pro-cyclical. In addition, they find that budget deficits do not 
reflect cyclical movements, but are mostly due to discretionary policy, and this is 
particularly linked to public investment in these countries. This, combined with the 
higher output volatility in transition countries, may induce considerable constraints 
on fiscal policy once these countries become EU members and are subject to the SGP. 
However, they do not provide a deeper analysis of the determinants of fiscal policy. 
Such an attempt is made by Berger et al. (2004), who analyse the differences in fiscal 
policy in the eight transition countries that became EU members in 2004 by using 
pooled estimation. They are among the first to include some political variables in 
estimation, and they also build a game theory model which supports the empirical 
results of a more relaxed fiscal policy in the large transition countries as a result of 
higher bargaining power. However, the estimation has several weaknesses, most 
notably the small sample size and short time period, omitted variables (particularly 
debt and lagged deficit) and the endogeneity bias. The empirical analysis of fiscal 
policy reaction functions by Kattai and Lewis (2005) is even simpler, as they estimate 
2SLS time series country-by-country equations with low degrees of freedom and no 
additional explanatory variables. According to their results, fiscal policy in most 
transition countries suffers from deficit bias, and in very few of them has it been used 
for output stabilization purposes. In a study of fiscal policy determinants with a more 
advanced approach of panel random effects with more explanatory variables, 
Schneider and Zápal (2006) confirm the lack of stabilization role for fiscal policy. In 
addition, they find a strong role for finance ministers and external constraints in 
fixed exchange rate regimes, but no role for elections. However, their study also 
suffers from very low sample size, endogeneity and omission of debt and lagged 
balances. Although it is infrequently used in empirical studies, they also use the 
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growth accounting approach proposed by von Hagen et al. (2001) to analyse the 
cyclical character of fiscal policy in transition countries, which is found to be rather 
ambiguous across countries over the 2001-2004 period. Finally, they also deal with 
issues of fiscal consolidation and its sources across various fiscal categories.  
The issue of fiscal adjustment in transition countries is also treated by other 
empirical studies, which however do not deal with cyclicality. For instance, Pirttila 
(2001) analyses the role of various structural reforms, output growth and 
unemployment on fiscal adjustments, but also on budget balances in CEE and CIS 
countries. He finds that price liberalisation has a positive and enterprise 
restructuring has a negative impact on fiscal adjustment. While he uses more 
appropriate empirical methods such as pooled OLS and IV and panel estimation with 
fixed effects, the regressions still suffer from problems of endogeneity and omitted 
variables. Further, Purfield (2003) also analyses fiscal adjustments in transition 
countries, and uses logit regression to estimate the probability of a successful fiscal 
adjustment depending on the size and composition of the adjustment and initial 
macroeconomic conditions. He finds that the size of the adjustment and the reduction 
of spending are among the most important factors for a successful and durable 
reduction of the primary budget balance.  
The improved estimation methods and wider specifications used in studies for 
other countries have begun to be applied to transition countries as well, although the 
number of these studies is still surprisingly small. A few studies include all or some 
transition countries as part of their wider samples, e.g. Ilzetzki and Végh (2008), 
Afonso and Hauptmeier (2009) and Égert (2010). In addition, recently there have been 
a few studies on the determinants of fiscal policy which focus almost completely on 
transition countries. They tend to consider wider arrays of possible determinants 
and/or include more sophisticated econometric techniques, capable of dealing with 
estimation problems involved. Understandably, because of data availability and 
particular interests, their specification and techniques vary considerably, although 
they all share a focus on overall policy, rather than on automatic stabilizers and 
discretionary policy. 
 Fabrizio and Mody (2006) analyse the effect of a variety of political, economic 
and institutional variables on fiscal outcomes. They use panel fixed effects as main 
specification, but also present some results with other techniques. Given their interest 
in institutional determinants, they construct a rather detailed indicator capturing 
budgetary institutions and processes in new member states over the 1997-2003 
period. Their main conclusions are that the quality of institutions is an important 
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determinant of fiscal outcomes, and that the importance of political factors is stronger 
than that of economic factors. However, one of the main drawbacks of this study is 
that it does not involve any indicator for the cyclical economic movements, which 
means that it does not offer any indication on the cyclical character of fiscal policy. 
Since it is expected that output movements would have an impact on fiscal outcomes, 
their omission probably causes bias in other coefficients and might also invalidate the 
conclusion about the stronger effect of political determinants, as the main economic 
determinant is omitted. Other weaknesses include the small sample size of a 
maximum of 63 observations, as well as the omission of inertia in most specifications 
due to its insignificance in some of them, which is at odds with the evidence of fiscal 
policy inertia in most other studies and might in itself be a source of bias (Lewis, 
2009). Further, Lewis (2007) analyses determinants of overall budget balances in eight 
new EU member states over the 1996-2004 period, including the possible effect of EU-
accession, and uses pooled IV estimation with both fixed and random effects. The 
main findings are that fiscal policy is used for stabilization purposes only in the Baltic 
countries, where it is the only tool left because of fixed exchange rates. In addition, it 
finds no disciplining effect of EU-accession on fiscal policy. However, the study 
divides the countries in three groups, thus hugely decreasing the sample size and 
consequently the precision of the results. Besides, it ignores essential variables such 
as policy inertia and public debt, but also does present results on additional political 
or economic determinants, although it claims to have tested some of them and found 
them insignificant.  
Staehr (2008) is one of the first studies to analyse cyclicality in transition 
countries in a manner routinely used in most other studies. It estimates overall fiscal 
policy reaction functions with output growth, debt and inertia as explanatory 
variables in the context of all EU member states over the 1995-2005 period, which 
enables a comparison between old and new member states. Due to the inertia and the 
fixed effects, difference GMM is a preferred technique, although some OLS results are 
also presented. Its main findings are that overall fiscal policy in new member states is 
less inertial and more counter-cyclical than in old EU member states, but that debt 
ratios or interest payments are insignificant in both country groups. The main 
weakness of the study is that it does not include any other explanatory variable, 
which has the previously discussed possible consequences of biased results and the 
lack of possibility for a deeper analysis of the reasons behind its findings. In addition, 
it only uses simple deviations from average GDP as cyclical indicators, assuming that 
potential output is equal to average over the period. This prevents the interpretation 
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of results in terms of counter- or pro-cyclicality of fiscal policy, as the business cycle 
(output gap) in these countries generally differs from GDP growth rates due to the 
volatile trend/potential GDP growth.  
Further, Lewis (2009) is interested not only in fiscal policy determinants in 
new member states, but also in differences in policy intentions and outcomes, so he is 
the first to use real-time data in the context of transition countries. Related to this, he 
also uses GDP growth rates, both due to availability and to the argument that they are 
more important for policymakers than output gaps. He analyses determinants of 
overall budget balances in the new member states over the 1995-2008 period, 
including fiscal policy inertia and GDP growth (but not public debt), some political 
variables and various definitions of EU accession effects. Compared to other studies, 
he provides a somewhat more detailed discussion of estimation choices, and uses 2-
step IV GMM for various specifications, although he gives evidence that the results for 
the main variables are not too sensitive when other IV and GMM techniques are used 
for the baseline specification. His main results are similar to Staehr (2008): fiscal 
policy is more counter-cyclical and less inertial in new than in old EU member states. 
In addition, he finds that most political variables are insignificant, but that the EU-
accession had a loosening effect on fiscal policy, thus confirming conclusions by 
Berger et al. (2004) for a wider country sample. However, this study also has some of 
the potential spaces for improvement common with other studies on transition 
countries. Most notably, it would be important to use output gaps as measures of 
cyclical output movements, whereas GDP growth rates could be used as robustness 
checks, as is common in the literature. While the use of gaps in the context of 
transition countries does have its drawbacks, it should still reflect cyclical economic 
movements better than simple growth rates. Indeed, positive growth rates might 
reflect both above and below potential growth, and this could be more pronounced in 
transition countries where potential growth rates are higher. In addition, both studies 
focus on overall fiscal policy and do not deal with differences between automatic 
stabilizers and discretionary policy, and this distinction might involve possibly 
important issues and recommendations for policymakers. There is also some space 
for a more careful discussion of estimation methods, since this issue might also have 
an impact on results. Last but not least, while some studies make an important 
progress on the issue of model specification, there is still a need to consider in more 
detail the effect of additional factors on the cyclicality of fiscal policy in transition 
countries. 
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3.1 Introduction  
 
 This chapter32 aims to empirically address one of the main questions of the 
thesis – what is the cyclical character and determinants of fiscal policy in European 
countries, with a particular focus on transition countries.   
The two main schools of macroeconomics have different views on the 
appropriate response of fiscal policy to output movements. Keynesianism prescribes 
                                                
32 A paper based on this chapter won the 2012 Oesterreichische Nationalbank Olga Radzyner Award for 
scientific work on European economic integration, which is bestowed on young economists from Central, 
Eastern and South-eastern Europe. A shorter version of the paper has been published as Kabashi (2014). 
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that, in crises, the government should lower taxes and increase public consumption 
and investment, which amounts to counter-cyclical fiscal policy. On the other hand, 
the neo-classical theory has a more sceptical view on the stabilization properties of 
fiscal policy. According to the tax-smoothing models initiated by Barro (1979), for a 
given path of government spending, governments should keep tax rates constant over 
the cycle, which implies that the overall budget balance would move in a counter-
cyclical manner. However, as argued in the previous chapter, none of the main 
theories prescribes pro-cyclical policies, which are sometimes observed in reality, 
particularly in developing countries. Therefore, additional explanations have been 
proposed for this failure of the two main theoretical prescriptions, mostly related to 
market failures or the common pool problem (as discussed in Chapter 2).    
 The empirical investigation will start by looking at the cyclical character of 
fiscal policy in Europe between 1995 and 2010, with a particular focus on transition 
countries. A priori expectations, which are based both on theoretical prescriptions 
and on results in some of the empirical studies, are that fiscal policy has been 
counter-cyclical in old EU member states, but probably pro-cyclical in the European 
transition countries. Therefore, the study will also include the investigation of the 
various explanations that have been proposed for the observed failure of the main 
theoretical prescriptions in practice, i.e. the observed pro-cyclical fiscal policy, most 
notably in developing countries. As surveyed in Section 2.1 of the previous chapter, 
there is a relatively large body of literature that links these failures of theoretical 
prescriptions to variations of the common pool problem. In particular, the common 
pool problem in the context of the cyclicality of fiscal policy is analysed by several 
authors, who provide similar but distinct explanations for its effects, and which will 
also be investigated in our study. Lane and Tornell (1998) and Tornell and Lane (1999) 
put forward the voracity effect. According to them, and to the empirical investigation 
in Lane (2003), pro-cyclicality increases with higher dispersion of power, or the 
number of power groups, defined in a very broad way. In addition, Talvi and Végh 
(2005) build a model with pressures by various interest groups for higher spending 
and lower savings in good times. Further, Alesina and Tabellini (2005) argue that pro-
cyclicality is a reflection of a political agency problem in democracies, as corruption 
in democratic countries contributes towards myopic and pro-cyclical fiscal policy.         
 The study will also examine the effects of what can be broadly called 'political 
and institutional' factors on fiscal policy. In order to do so, it will draw on the 
relatively wide area of theoretical and empirical studies of political determinants of 
fiscal policy. This field, which has been flourishing since the early 1980s, is not 
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focused on the cyclical character of fiscal policy per se, but on various factors behind 
fiscal policy formulation and outcomes. Hence, it is typically concerned with the 
overall fiscal policy, and particularly the deficit bias, and the related issues of 
government short-sightedness and the common pool problem (Debrun et al., 2008). 
Indeed, numerous authors have provided various theories and explanations for the 
fiscal policy outcomes, ranging from the political and electoral systems to political 
business cycles, effects of ideology or effects of decentralisation33. Further, an 
increasing attention in the literature on fiscal policy is being paid to the effects of 
institutions, such as fiscal rules or institutional quality. While institutional factors 
often lack a clear theoretical background, empirical results and practical 
considerations strongly argue in favour of their inclusion in any study of fiscal policy 
determinants. In addition, we will also include some political economy factors which 
are specific for European countries. Among them, already established in the literature 
is the effect of European economic integration on fiscal policy. We will also analyse 
some factors which are mostly neglected in the literature, but which are expected to 
have played an important role on fiscal policy in this group of countries, such as IMF 
arrangements and the exchange rate regime. Overall, the inclusion of a wide array of 
political and institutional factors in our study of fiscal policy is clearly recommended 
by the theoretical and empirical literature. Besides, the inclusion of these factors also 
has important methodological benefits, as it will enable us to minimise the problem of 
omitted variables. Related to this, it will enable a comprehensive analysis of fiscal 
policy determinants, as well a clear distinction between the effects of macroeconomic 
fluctuations from the effects of other potentially important factors.  
This study will build upon the existing relatively extensive body of knowledge 
on the cyclical character and determinants of fiscal policy in European countries. 
However, its main aim is to expand this body of knowledge in several important 
aspects. First, it will include all the European transition countries, both current and 
prospective EU members. It will provide a comprehensive analysis of discretionary 
and overall fiscal policy in these countries and of possible differences with old EU 
member states, which are also included. Related to this, it will expand the sample by 
several years when most transition countries were EU members and started to enter 
the euro area. Both of these aspects are important extensions of existing empirical 
studies, most of which tend to pay little attention to transition countries or to capture 
mostly years prior to EU accession. To the best of our knowledge, our study will be the 
                                                
33 Alesina and Perotti (1995) and Eslava (2006) provide excellent surveys of the various theories on 
political determinants of fiscal policy. 
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first to shed some light on the cyclical character of fiscal policy in South-eastern 
European countries. Second, it will aim to analyse the effect of a wide array of 
political, institutional and other factors on fiscal policy. The main aim of the inclusion 
of additional factors in the analysis is to check the robustness of the results on 
cyclicality, which are of primary interest. In addition, treating this group of factors in 
a comprehensive manner will address an important gap in the existing literature, 
which mostly ignores these issues or treats only some of the factors, regardless of the 
sample of countries considered. The inclusion of these factors will also enable a 
richer analysis of determinants of fiscal policy outcomes, as well as a clear distinction 
between the effects of economic fluctuations and those of other factors. Third, the 
study will aim to search for and provide an appropriate model specification and 
empirical approach to analysing the cyclicality of fiscal policy. By doing so, it will 
avoid some of the drawbacks which are related to variable definitions, model 
specifications and estimation methods used by some of the existing studies. Overall, 
these improvements are also expected to considerably expand the few pioneering 
studies which focus on the cyclical character of fiscal policy in transition countries 
(e.g. Staehr (2008) and Lewis (2009)). Last but not least, the study will aim to provide 
several robustness checks on the results, both to test their stability and to explore 
additional aspects of fiscal policy in European countries. The final goal of the study 
will be to provide recommendations for policy-makers both in the new EU member 
states, and particularly in the South-eastern European countries, which are currently 
in the early stages of the EU accession process. Hence, it is expected that lessons 
drawn from more advanced transition countries from Central and Eastern Europe 
regarding the stabilisation properties and determinants of fiscal policy will be 
valuable for policymakers in South-eastern Europe.  
This chapter proceeds as follows. The next section discusses the model 
specification, data and the estimation method. Section 3.3 provides baseline results 
on the cyclicality of fiscal policy. Section 3.4 deals with the effects of political, 
institutional and other factors on fiscal policy. The following section provides several 
additional extensions and robustness checks. Section 3.6 concludes.  
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3.2 Model specification, data and estimation methodology  
 
3.2.1 Model specification 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2 and in accordance with the existing literature (e.g. 
Galí and Perotti (2003) or Fatás and Mihov (2009)), we decompose overall fiscal policy 
into two main components: automatic stabilizers and discretionary policy (Figure 
3.1). Automatic stabilizers represent the response of fiscal policy to economic 
fluctuations that is built into the tax code and the overall legislation. Therefore, they 
act without particular actions by policymakers, who at least in the short-run have no 
control over them. Discretionary policy on the other hand captures all the deliberate 
actions by the governments and is often measured by the cyclically-adjusted budget 
balance. However, discretionary policy measures are not unique, and they depend on 
the motivation behind them. If they are undertaken by policymakers in response to 
the cyclical movements in the economy, such as lower taxes or higher spending in 
case of recessions, they can be considered as endogenous, or systematic discretionary 
fiscal policy (Galí and Perotti, 2003). On the other hand, fiscal measures undertaken 
without reference to cyclical movements are usually labelled exogenous discretionary 
policy (Figure 3.1). Typical examples of the latter would be higher government 
spending because of political motivations, military spending, or policy measures 
related to the Maastricht Treaty in the European context34.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
34 In their seminal study of monetary policy in the US, Bernanke and Mihov (1998) note that exogenous 
policy shocks reflect many random factors that affect policy decisions, such as personalities of 
policymakers, political factors, data revisions and various technical issues. They also note that, if there 
are no exogenous shocks, the effects of policy on the economy can not be identified by any economic 
method.  
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Figure 3.1. Components of fiscal policy 
 
The decomposition of fiscal policy in Figure 3.1 can be transformed into a 
general empirical specification of the fiscal policy function (Eq. 17 and Eq. 18), as 
discussed in detail below. The specification in Eq. 17 has become standard in the 
more recent cyclicality studies, which almost invariably use panel estimation, as 
surveyed in the previous chapter. At the least, the standard model specification in Eq. 
17 reflects the dependence of the fiscal policy outcome on current cyclical output 
movements and current debt. Bohn (1998) relates a similar empirical model to the 
seminal tax smoothing model proposed by Barro (1979) where debt and the cyclicality 
of output play a key role in optimal tax setting. In addition, Bohn (1998) emphasises 
an important advantage of this empirical specification in the fact that it represents a 
test of budget sustainability. He shows that a response of the primary balance to the 
debt/GDP ratio that is strictly positive and at least linear is a sufficient condition for 
sustainability.  
 
                              Eq. 17 
  
where: 
Bal   - budget balance (total or primary, unadjusted or cyclically-adjusted) as 
a share of nominal GDP  
Cycle - indicator for cyclical movements of the economy (output gap) 
Debt  - public debt as a share of GDP 
 
 
However, the empirical investigation of fiscal policy hardly ever takes the form 
of Eq. 17 above, but augments it with other variables of theoretical and practical 
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interest. Therefore, following theoretical recommendations and practical 
considerations, we will use a model specification that is represented in Eq. 18 below. 
First, in line with the vast majority of empirical studies (surveyed in Chapter 2), we 
will not include a contemporaneous debt term, but instead split it into past debt and 
past budget balance. The incorporation of the lagged budget balance is to be 
preferred on strong practical reasons. According to Ballabriga and Martinez-Mongay 
(2002), it is realistic to expect high fiscal policy inertia since drastic changes in tax 
rates or reversal of past spending commitments are usually unfeasible. Galí and 
Perotti (2003) also recommend the inclusion of a lagged policy term arguing that any 
adjustment to a target budget balance is only gradual. In addition, this specification 
enables proper consideration of initial conditions, i.e. whether the previous debt level 
and the previous deficit affect current policy-maker decisions. Indeed, besides a 
positive coefficient on the debt variable (in line with recommendations by Bohn 
(1998)), budget sustainability also requires an auto-regressive coefficient between 
zero and one, as the budget balance would otherwise follow an explosive process. 
Further, in line with the recent literature (as discussed in Chapter 2), we will also 
include additional variables in the fiscal policy reaction function. Doing so will enable 
us not only to minimise the omitted variable bias, but also to analyse in more details 
the exogenous fiscal policy35 by testing the various determinants proposed by 
theoretical or practical considerations, which is also one of the main aims of the 
thesis. One additional variable that is separated from the others and will be explicitly 
included in all our specifications is the annual inflation rate. Besides the avoidance of 
the omitted variable bias, we think it is good practice to include inflation in a model 
such as this one where a nominal variable (fiscal outcomes) depends on real variables 
(e.g the output gap). The omission of inflation, which is surprisingly common in most 
cyclicality studies, ignores the fact that budget balances in reality may sometimes not 
reflect real economic movements, but purely the rise of indexed expenditures or 
higher tax revenues because of higher inflation. Therefore, we decided to follow 
Torsten Persson's comment on Gavin and Perotti (1997) that the omission of inflation 
may significantly bias the coefficient on the economic cycle, which is in fact the main 
variable of interest.  
Our specification in Eq. 18 below is in fact another representation of the 
decomposition of fiscal policy in Figure 3.1 above, depending on the particular 
                                                
35 In Eq. 17 above, all exogenous fiscal policy from Figure 3.1 (except debt) appears in the error term, 
alongside external shocks possibly affecting fiscal balances. However, in our work we use the more 
detailed specification in Eq. 18 below, which enables the analysis of exogenous fiscal policy from Figure 
3.1 via the explicit introduction of additional economic, political and institutional variables in Xit.  
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definition of the dependent variable used. If the dependent variable is defined as the 
overall budget balance, then the coefficient on the output gap β shows the combined 
cyclicality of the automatic stabilizers and of the endogenous discretionary policy. On 
the other hand, if the dependent variable is defined as the cyclically-adjusted budget 
balance, then β shows only the cyclical stance of the endogenous discretionary policy. 
In this case, the effect of automatic stabilizers on the fiscal outcome is already 
removed by the calculation and use of the cyclically-adjusted balance. In both cases, 
the exogenous discretionary policy from Figure 3.1 is captured by the additional 
explanatory variables36 and the error term (Xit + εit in Eq. 18). Usually, these variables 
represent political or institutional factors, but economic variables can be added as 
well. As noted before, debt and inflation are added separately in all specifications, 
and we will try to add as many other factors as justified by theoretical or practical 
considerations. In other words, when we introduce additional variables in the 
specification, we remove their effects from the error term εit and bring them into Xit 
in Eq. 18, thus effectively capturing various aspects of exogenous discretionary policy 
in the sense of Figure 3.1. 
 
                                                       Eq. 18 
  
where: 
Bal   - budget balance (total or primary, unadjusted or cyclically-adjusted) as 
a share of nominal GDP  
Cycle - indicator for cyclical movements of the economy (output gap) 
Debt  - public debt as a share of GDP 
Infl      - inflation rate 
X  - 1 x m vector of additional explanatory variables (economic, political, 
institutional)   
Θ - corresponding n x 1 vector of coefficients of additional explanatory 
variables 
 
The interpretation of coefficients in Eq. 18 in terms of cyclicality is relatively 
straightforward. If the coefficient on the cycle β is positive, then fiscal policy is 
counter-cyclical, i.e. it is reacting in a stabilizing manner37 by accumulating budget 
                                                
36 This is in line with the general practice in the literature that uses the same decomposition of fiscal 
policy from Figure 3.1 (e.g. Galí and Perotti (2003) or Fatás and Mihov (2009)), which interprets 
exogenous discretionary policy as consisting of fiscal measures undertaken not in response to cyclical 
movements, but for other motivations (political, military, etc).  
37 The extent to which counter- or pro-cyclical fiscal policies affect the business cycle (i.e. stabilize or 
amplify economic fluctuations) in reality is also related to the size of the fiscal multiplier, which will be 
discussed and analysed in more detail in chapters 4 and 5.  
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surpluses in expansions (through higher revenues and/or lower spending) and 
stimulating demand in recessions. On the other hand, negative β indicates pro-
cyclical policies, i.e. the fiscal policy is acting in a de-stabilizing manner by running 
budget deficits in expansions (through lower revenues and/or higher spending) and 
surpluses in recessions. Finally, insignificance of β points to a-cyclicality, meaning 
policy-makers are not reacting to cyclical economic movements.   
Bearing in mind all of this, we start our estimations with a model specification 
that is based on Eq. 18, but without additional controls Xit, which will be added later 
on. In the next two subsections we will first briefly present the definition of variables 
and then discuss the estimation methodology. After analysing baseline results on the 
cyclicality of fiscal policy in Section 3.3, we will move in Section 3.4 to explore 
political, institutional and other determinants of fiscal policy by including various 
additional variables (Xit in Eq. 18). This will enable us to check the robustness of our 
baseline cyclicality results, but also to explain fiscal policy as much as possible as well 
as to properly distinguish between the effects of economic fluctuations and the effect 
of other factors in fiscal policy outcomes.  
 
3.2.2 Variable and sample description  
 
 We are interested in the cyclical character and determinants of fiscal policy in 
old, new and prospective EU member states. Due to our focus on European countries 
and data availability, our sample consists of a total of 33 countries: the 27 EU member 
states as of 2012 and 6 South-eastern European countries (labelled as EU27 and 
SEE638, respectively). In addition, in the analysis of differences between groups, the 
EU member states will be split in two: the 10 new member states (NMS10) from the 
Central and Eastern Europe enlargement cohorts of 2004 and 2007, and the 15 old EU 
member states plus Cyprus and Malta (labelled EU17 or old member states39). Data 
availability limits our sample to start in 1995 and end in 2010 for the EU member 
states, while data series on most SEE countries are shorter40 (which yields unbalanced 
panels). We will be using this sample in all estimations, unless otherwise noted for 
cases where we miss data for particular variables. Here we present only the 
                                                
38 SEE6 consists of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia. Croatia 
joined the EU in 2013, i.e. it was not an EU member state in the period analysed here.    
39 Cyprus and Malta joined EU in 2004 as well, but they are grouped with old EU member states because 
their economic structure and history makes them much closer to them than to the transition countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe which joined the EU at the same time or in 2007.  
40 Besides for data availability reasons, starting the analysis in 1995 also avoids the high volatility, which 
was typical for the early transition years in most Central, Eastern and South-eastern European countries.  
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definition of the key variables, whereas additional explanations will be provided as 
we introduce new variables in the analysis. In addition, a detailed description of 
sources and calculation for the entire dataset is provided in Appendix 3.1. Due to data 
availability, in all cases we use ex post data (i.e. actual outcomes collected from a 
single vintage of the most recently available data) and not real-time data.    
In line with the dominant practice in the literature, we will mostly focus on 
budget balances, although in some specifications we will also analyse revenues and 
expenditures separately. Since policy-makers have little impact on interest payments, 
which are a result of past borrowing decisions, we will abstract from interest 
payments and we will focus on primary instead of total (headline) budget balances, 
which is also in line with the practice in the literature. Further, we will mostly use the 
cyclically-adjusted primary balance as a fiscal indicator, since we are primarily 
interested in systematic, discretionary responses by policymakers (as described in 
Subsection 3.2.1). However, we will also pay some attention to overall fiscal policy by 
using the overall, unadjusted primary budget balance. The difference between overall 
and cyclically-adjusted balances consists of automatic stabilizers. Therefore the 
comparison of results between the two options (i.e. with the cyclically-adjusted and 
with the overall primary balance as a dependent variable) allows inference on the 
role of automatic stabilizers, which is a priori expected to be counter-cyclical by 
design. In line with other studies and with the Eurostat data reporting used for the 
needs of the SGP, the dependent variable is defined as a share of nominal GDP. Public 
debt is also defined in ratio to nominal GDP. Finally, we also include the annual CPI-
based inflation rate in all our specifications. This means that we will use the fiscal 
policy function from Eq. 18 in the previous subsection. As noted previously, we will 
first omit additional variables Xit , which will be added later on.  
A key issue in cyclicality studies is the definition of the cyclical movements, 
which is in fact at the core of the question being investigated. The consensus in the 
empirical literature is that cyclical movements should be measured by the output gap, 
which is usually calculated as the deviation of actual from potential GDP (typically 
based on production function calculation) or from trend GDP (typically calculated 
with a Hodrick-Prescott filter of real GDP data). These measures of the business cycle 
can pose significant challenges for transition countries because of the numerous 
structural changes during transition years, which may make it difficult to calculate a 
meaningful output gap based on either approach. Therefore, studies focusing on fiscal 
policy in transition countries take different approaches (as discussed in Chapter 2). 
However, we consider that alternatives used in these studies are even more 
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problematic, as they do not allow a clear interpretation of cyclicality movements, 
which is one of our main questions of interest. For instance, in order to capture 
cyclical movements, Staehr (2008) uses simple deviations from average GDP, which is 
constant throughout the period. In this case, the cycle moves identically as actual 
GDP, which is unrealistic with volatile trend/potential GDP typical for the transition 
period. On the other hand, Lewis (2009) uses simple GDP growth, which is generally a 
poor indicator of the economic cycle, since there are cases when GDP growth is 
positive, yet below trend/potential GDP (i.e. the output gap is negative). This might be 
particularly relevant for transition countries, as they generally have a higher 
trend/potential GDP growth (as discussed in Chapter 2). 
In line with the consensus in the literature, we decided to use output gaps as a 
measure of cyclical movements. This is also justified by the fact that considerable 
attention has been paid in recent years by the European Commission and the Eurostat 
to calculate these indicators for all EU member states. In addition, cyclically-adjusted 
fiscal indicators based on these calculations of the output gap are used for decision-
making related to the SGP. While Eurostat provides data on output gap for EU 
member states both using the production function potential GDP and the Hodrick-
Prescott (HP) trend GDP, only the latter can be calculated for SEE6 states. Therefore, 
we decided to use the output gap defined as a percentage deviation of actual real GDP 
from trend GDP calculated from HP-filtering41. This means that we will also use 
cyclically-adjusted fiscal indicators which are based on this method (as discussed in 
Chapter 2 and described in detail for our sample in Appendix 3.1). However, as noted 
below, comparisons of baseline estimates for EU27 indicate that results are robust to 
the method of calculation of the gap. The comparison in Appendix 3.2 in most cases 
indicates similar movements of the output gap, regardless of the method used to 
calculate it.   
 
 
3.2.3 Estimation methodology 
 
 The estimation method is strongly affected by our model specification and 
sample, which restricts estimation to panel techniques. As discussed above, due to 
strong theoretical and practical reasons, the model includes policy inertia and the 
contemporaneous output gap (Eq. 18). This means that we have two important 
                                                
41 A brief discussion of advantages and disadvantages of the two methods of calculating output gaps was 
provided in Chapter 2 and references therein. The calculation of HP trend GDP for SEE6 countries and 
the appropriate cyclical adjustment of fiscal indicators are briefly described in Appendix 3.1.  
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sources of endogeneity in our model that must be properly treated: the dynamic 
specification and the simultaneity between the left-hand side and one of the right-
hand side variables (fiscal outcomes and output gap, respectively). Therefore, the use 
of pooled OLS would be inappropriate, since it is expected that endogeneity would 
yield upward biased estimates of the autoregressive parameter (Roodman, 2009a). 
Random Effects estimation by Generalised Least Squares would also be inappropriate, 
since the dynamic specification would also yield biased results because of the 
correlation of the lagged dependent variable with the random disturbance which 
includes individual effects. In addition, Judson and Owen (1997) note that Random 
Effects models are not appropriate for macroeconomic panels because of the 
correlation between individual effects representing omitted variables and the other 
regressors, as well as the fact that studies typically capture a particular group of 
countries, which do not represent a random sample from a wider population. 
Consequently, we consider in more details the following possible options, which are 
commonly used in the empirical literature in this area and analysed in relevant 
Monte Carlo studies: fixed effects or Least Square Dummy Variables (LSDV); bias-
corrected LSDV; the Anderson-Hsiao estimator; difference GMM; and system GMM. 
 As surveyed in the previous chapter, numerous studies in this area use LSDV 
estimation, which has become common in other areas of economic research as well. 
However, it has long been recognised that standard LSDV in dynamic models with a 
finite time dimension such as ours yields biased coefficients (Nickell, 1981). Indeed, 
Nickell (1981) shows that, in absence of exogenous regressors, the bias declines with 
the time dimension and increases with the size of the true auto-regressive parameter. 
Unlike pooled OLS however, in dynamic LSDV estimation there is typically downward 
bias, which leads to suggestions that the true auto-regressive parameter should lie 
between OLS and LSDV estimates (Roodman, 2009a). 
 The empirical studies on cyclicality have dealt with this "Nickell bias" in 
various manners. A few studies appear to ignore it altogether, despite its serious and 
well known consequences (e.g. Turrini (2008)). Alternatively, there are studies that 
recognise the problem, but nevertheless proceed arguing that they are not interested 
in coefficients per se, but in possible changes across sub-periods while assuming that 
the bias is similar between the sub-periods (e.g. Galí and Perotti (2003)). Other studies 
use LSDV estimation in relatively long macroeconomic datasets (e.g. Annett (2006) 
with 25 years), arguing that the associated bias declines with time and is not severe 
enough to justify alternative estimators. Related to this, in a widely cited pioneering 
Monte Carlo study on panel estimators for macroeconomic data, Judson and Owen 
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(1997) conclude that LSDV yields considerable bias of the auto-regressive parameter 
of up to 28% when the sample consists of 20 periods and up to 20% even when the 
time dimension is increased to 30, while there is also a bias in the parameter on the 
exogenous regressor (although it is relatively small). Therefore, they warn that the 
Nickell bias should not be treated as insignificant by researchers. Overall, this 
approach is not appropriate for our case, since we are dealing with a sample of a 
maximum 16 years, which would be expected to result in considerable bias.   
Several recent studies tend to treat the Nickell bias more seriously by 
employing a bias-corrected LSDV estimator, which was first proposed by Kiviet 
(1995), and extended by Bun and Kiviet (2003) and Bun and Carree (2006). Further, 
Bruno (2005a) and Bruno (2005b) extend it to unbalanced panels as well. According to 
the so-called 'Kiviet correction', the bias is calculated in a two-step procedure which 
also involves the use of a consistent estimator, such as the one proposed by Anderson 
and Hsiao (1981). The calculated bias is then used to correct the original LSDV 
estimates. While certainly a major contribution to dealing with the Nickell bias, there 
are two drawbacks of this procedure. First, Beck and Katz (2009) note that there is no 
direct way to calculate standard errors, which most likely requires some kind of block 
bootstrap while taking care to maintain the proper dynamic structure of the data. 
Second, and most important for our case, the 'Kiviet correction' rests on the crucial 
assumption of strict exogeneity of regressors. Therefore, it is also inapplicable in our 
model with a contemporaneous output gap, which is endogenous to the fiscal 
outcomes. The contemporaneous output gap is an essential feature of the model, so 
the solution by a few authors (e.g. Afonso and Hauptmeier (2009) or Debrun et al. 
(2008)) to side-step this weakness of the 'Kiviet correction' by using bias-corrected 
LSDV with lagged output gap is inappropriate. Indeed, it is reasonable to expect that a 
considerable part of the reaction of fiscal outcomes to cyclical economic movements 
would appear within the same year, while a lower part of the reaction would be 
delayed. The contemporaneous reaction of fiscal outcomes reflects both the response 
to immediate discretionary measures undertaken by policymakers and it particularly 
reflects the response of automatic stabilizers (if overall, unadjusted fiscal outcomes 
are used as the dependent variable), which is mostly contemporaneous by definition.   
In order to address these problems, most researchers turn to some type of 
instrumental variable estimation. A few, mostly earlier studies in this area use a 
variant of the two-stage least squares (2SLS): a fixed effects estimation with external 
instruments for the output gap, (e.g. Galí and Perotti (2003) and Candelon et al. 
(2010)). However, one of the main problems of this approach is that it is often difficult 
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to find or calculate valid exogenous instruments for the endogenous variables, as also 
recognised by Roodman (2009a). In addition, this approach generally does not 
address the bias arising from the dynamic specification.  
This brings us to the General Method of Moments (GMM), which is being 
increasingly used in the empirical economic literature, including cyclicality studies. 
The estimator proposed by Anderson and Hsiao (1981) can be considered an early 
and a restricted type of the GMM estimator. It consists of first differencing the 
equation in order to eliminate unobserved heterogeneity, and then using the second 
lag of the dependent variable (either in levels, or in differences) as an instrument for 
the lagged differenced dependent variable42. However, Monte Carlo studies tend to 
find that, while having a generally low bias, the Anderson-Hsiao estimator is 
relatively inefficient compared to alternatives (Judson and Owen (1997), Beck and 
Katz (2009)). This probably explains its relatively infrequent use in empirical studies, 
as well as the motivation for further developments of GMM.  
Arellano and Bond (1991) propose a GMM estimator which they demonstrate 
to have the lowest bias and highest efficiency among alternative estimators. It 
consists of first differencing the equation, and then using not only the first but also 
deeper lagged levels of the dependent variable as instruments for its lagged 
difference. In addition, this 'difference GMM' estimator exploits additional moment 
restrictions by using as instruments the current and/or lagged values of other 
regressors (depending on whether they are exogenous or not). Therefore, this 
estimator incorporates the Anderson-Hsiao estimator as a special case, but is more 
efficient due to the use of more information available in the dataset, i.e. deeper lags 
as instruments.  
Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) augment the method 
by an additional level equation to be estimated in the system, in which endogenous 
and predetermined variables in levels are instrumented with their differences. 
Effectively, this 'system GMM' utilises a larger subset of instruments, thus increasing 
the information used in estimation, while maintaining other advantages over 
alternative estimators. The initial point for the development of the new estimator is 
the poor performance of difference GMM in cases of near unit root in the dependent 
variable, which is typical particularly in macroeconomic data. In other words, when 
the dependent variable is highly persistent, lagged levels are poor predictors and 
hence weak instruments for first differences, but lagged differences are much better 
                                                
42 Subsequent research shows that the version using level instruments yields more efficient results than 
the one using differences (Arellano (1989), Arellano and Bond (1991), Kiviet (1995)). 
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predictors of future levels. Therefore, the proposed system GMM greatly improves in 
efficiency over difference GMM, particularly with higher persistence in the 
dependent variable and lower time dimension (Blundell and Bond, 1998). The 
improvement in efficiency is enhanced by the ability of system GMM to use more 
information by generating more instruments not only for the lagged dependent 
variable, but also for other regressors, which might themselves exhibit high inertia. 
Further, an advantage of system GMM over difference GMM is that time- invariant 
regressors can be included, since differencing only eliminates them from the 
equation in differences, but they remain in the equation in levels (Roodman, 2009b).  
The increasing use of difference and system GMM reflects the advances in both 
econometric practice and theory and computing in recent years, as well as the 
recognised advantages over the alternative methods. This pertains particularly to the 
two sources of endogeneity in our model discussed above. Indeed, difference and 
system GMM estimators are designed for panel data which may include dynamics and 
other endogenous regressors in the presence of fixed effects (Roodman, 2009b), which 
applies to our model specification as well. Finally, "the great advantage of GMM is 
that ... it does not require distributional assumptions, like normality [and] it can allow 
for heteroskedasticity of unknown form" (Verbeek, 2004, p. 152). Related to this, 
(Roodman, 2009a, p. 99) also notes that difference and system GMM can address cases 
when the "idiosyncratic disturbances...may have individual-specific patterns of 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation".  
However, GMM estimators are not without their problems and necessary 
assumptions that need to be fulfilled. While additional moment conditions are useful 
in incorporating additional information, they do at the same time have the serious 
drawback of a rapid growth of the instrument count with the time dimension, 
sometimes even larger than the sample size itself. This problem of too many 
instruments may over-fit endogenous variables, thus failing to remove their 
endogenous components, which can yield biased coefficient estimates (Roodman, 
2009b). The large number of instruments also increases the number of elements in 
the estimated variance matrix, and in finite samples this can result in dramatic 
decreases in efficiency (Roodman, 2009a). In addition, in both difference and system 
GMM, a high number of instruments can severely weaken the Sargan/Hansen43 test of 
over-identifying restrictions (Bowsher, 2002), i.e. yield under-rejection of the null 
                                                
43 Hereinafter we will refer as 'the Hansen test" to the test of over-identifying restrictions commonly 
associated with Sargan (1958) and Hansen (1982). In testing instrument validity, the Hansen test is to be 
preferred, since the Sargan test, while robust to instrument count, requires homoskedastic errors, which 
is seldom the case in dynamic panels (Roodman, 2009b). 
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hypothesis that instruments are exogenous and thus valid. Consequently, difference-
in-Hansen tests of the validity of sub-sets of instruments may also be weakened, 
which affects the choice between difference and system GMM. Instrument validity 
may also be checked with the Arellano-Bond test for the presence of autocorrelation 
in the idiosyncratic error term. If errors are serially correlated, some lags are invalid 
instruments since in such a case they are also correlated with the error term by 
definition, thus yielding inconsistent estimates (Arellano and Bond, 1991). However, 
this test assumes no cross-sectional error dependence. Indeed, if this assumption is 
violated, Sarafidis et al. (2009) warn that the null of no autocorrelation is likely to be 
rejected under the alternative of cross-sectional error dependence. In addition, 
Sarafidis and Robertson (2009) suggest that the absence of cross-sectional error 
dependence is a crucial assumption for all dynamic panel estimators, and ignoring its 
presence may lead to large rises in bias and inefficiency. Finally, the validity of the 
additional instruments in system GMM depends on the "steady state" assumption, 
which relies on a restriction of the initial condition process (Blundell and Bond, 1998). 
This assumption requires that deviations of the dependent variable from its steady 
state, controlling for covariates, must not be correlated with fixed effects (Roodman, 
2009a). Indeed, Roodman (2009b) warns that this assumption is not trivial and it is 
underappreciated in empirical work. However, when proposing system GMM, 
Blundell and Bond (1998) suggest that this assumption can be maintained if the size of 
the autoregressive coefficient is lower than one, and if the difference-in-Hansen test, 
which appears to have the power to detect the invalidity of this assumption, does not 
reject the validity of the additional instruments for system GMM.  
 Another potential problem of GMM estimators is the fact that they were 
originally designed and are mostly used for typical microeconomic panels with a 
large cross-section and a short time dimension, while their small sample properties 
may be problematic. Indeed, the problems of too many instruments discussed above 
are particularly serious in small samples and/or those with a large time dimension, 
since it is exactly in such cases when the rapid growth of the instrument count is to be 
expected most. Between the two estimators discussed above, this problem is expected 
to be more serious for the system GMM, since it uses more instruments than 
difference GMM (Hayakawa, 2007). Roodman (2009a) notes that in small samples 
there is usually some correlation between the instruments and the endogenous 
components of instrumented variables, which yields biased estimates. Bruno (2005b) 
also notes that the properties of GMM estimators hold in panels with a high number 
of cross-section units, but they can be severely biased and inefficient in 
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macroeconomic panels, which are typically small. This poses a particular problem for 
our sample, which consists of a maximum of 33 countries and 16 years, and hence 
does not fit the original and typical samples where GMM is used. However, several 
recent studies tend to prefer GMM to alternative estimators even in small samples. 
For instance, Bun and Kiviet (2006) apply higher-order asymptotic methods and 
Monte Carlo simulations in analysing the properties of a range of alternative least 
squares and GMM estimators in small samples. They conclude that there are no 
straightforward advices for the estimator to be used in small samples, but system 
GMM is a relatively safe choice with inertia in the dependent variable and effect 
stationarity, which was also recommended by Blundell and Bond (1998) when setting 
out system GMM. Celasun and Kang (2006) also use Monte Carlo simulations to 
investigate the properties of OLS, LSDV and GMM estimators for fiscal policy studies, 
and calibrate the parameters of their simulations to data and sample sizes typically 
available for emerging market countries. They strongly recommend GMM estimators 
for studies whose primary interest is in the cyclical character of fiscal policy, albeit 
preferably with exogenous instruments for the output gap. Further, after a theoretical 
calculation and numerical simulations of the bias in small samples, Hayakawa (2007) 
concludes that system GMM is less biased than both difference and level GMM, even 
though it uses more instruments. He attributes the lower bias of system GMM to the 
fact that it is a weighted sum of the biases of the two other estimators (i.e. of 
difference and level GMM), which have opposite directions. Finally, Soto (2009) 
concludes that, in small samples with high inertia in the dependent variable, system 
GMM outperforms a wide range of alternative estimators in terms of bias and 
efficiency, and that it is highly reliable in terms of the power of statistical significance 
tests. 
Bearing all this on mind, we decided to proceed with system GMM as our 
preferred estimation method, using the xtabond2 syntax for Stata written by 
Roodman (2009a). In doing so, we will be careful to avoid the problems of system 
GMM and follow best practice from the literature, particularly as summarised by 
Roodman (2009a) and Roodman (2009b). We pay particular attention to implementing 
and reporting the comprehensive diagnostic checks related to instrument validity and 
the use of system GMM as the estimation method. Regarding the 'steady state' 
assumption, we follow Blundell and Bond (1998) and check that the size of the 
autoregressive coefficient is lower than one, and that the difference-in-Hansen test 
does not reject the validity of additional instruments for system GMM. In line with the 
dominant practice in the literature using GMM estimation, we use internal 
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instruments for the two endogenous variables (the lagged dependent variable and the 
output gap) in order to utilise one of the main strengths of the method and avoid the 
difficulty of finding valid external instruments. In order to deal with instrument 
proliferation, we follow the advice by Roodman (2009b) for lag limiting and 
collapsing the instruments. Further, we use two-step system GMM, which provides 
standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation within 
cross-sections (Roodman, 2009a). Related to this, we address the downward bias of 
standard errors in two-step GMM by using the correction proposed by Windmeijer 
(2005), which is implemented by the xtabond2 syntax. Finally, since differences 
between country groups are also of interest, we extensively use interaction dummy 
variables for particular country groups. In order to facilitate analysis of results, there 
is no base group and the constant is removed, so the reported coefficient sizes and 
significances for interaction terms have a direct, straightforward interpretation (i.e. 
they are not interpreted relative to an omitted base group).  
Before proceeding to estimations, a word is in order regarding the process of 
investigation. The analysis of baseline results is followed by the investigation of 
numerous additional determinants, which are added one-at-a-time, for two main 
reasons. First, the sample and method we are using imply that we would soon run 
into practical problems with degrees of freedom if we start from a general 
unrestricted model. Second, the bottom-up approach we will be using is dominant in 
cyclicality studies since, apart from the baseline specification on cyclicality, there is 
no overall theory of the determinants of fiscal policy. Instead, there are various 
theories and hypotheses about possible effects of particular factors on fiscal 
outcomes. In addition, there are also factors which may have little theoretical 
underpinning but are expected to have strong effects in practice, and hence need to 
be analysed as well. Although the general-to-specific approach is dominant in the 
empirical literature on other issues, particularly in time series studies, there are 
strong recommendations for the bottom-up approach as well. For instance, Kennedy 
(2002) notes that while the general-to-specific approach has the advantage of 
unbiased results if the general model incorporates the true model generating the 
data, "no such true model can ever be found" (Kennedy, 2002, p. 576). Magnus (1999) 
also notes that the problem with general-to-specific approach is that  
 
"...it does not work. If you try to estimate such a large model, which has 
everything in it you can think of, you get nonsensical results.... In the bottom 
up approach one starts from a simple model and builds up from there. This is 
in fact how scientists in other disciplines work" (Magnus, 1999, pp. 61-62).  
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3.3 Baseline results on cyclicality 
 
As noted previously, we start our investigation with the specification from Eq. 
18 (reproduced below), without the part of additional controls Xit, which are added in 
other sections. By doing so, in this section we analyse in details the cyclical character 
of fiscal policy and the effects of key factors proposed by the common theoretical and 
empirical specification. After concluding on the baseline specification, in other 
sections we introduce additional factors that might affect fiscal policy, i.e. Xit. This will 
enable us to answer two questions: whether the baseline results on cyclicality from 
this section are robust, and what, if any, are the effect of numerous political, 
institutional and other factors on fiscal policy. We use system GMM as our estimation 
method. In line with the previous discussion, we have two endogenous variables in 
our model: the lagged dependent variable and the output gap (which are 
instrumented by their own lags). Further, we always use the lag limiting and the 
'collapse' option in xtabond2, as suggested by Roodman (2009b).    
 
 
                                                       Eq. 18 
  
where: 
Bal   - budget balance (total or primary, unadjusted or cyclically-adjusted) as 
a share of nominal GDP  
Cycle - indicator for cyclical movements of the economy (output gap) 
Debt  - public debt as a share of GDP 
Infl      - inflation rate 
X  - 1 x m vector of additional explanatory variables (economic, political, 
institutional)   
Θ - corresponding n x 1 vector of coefficients of additional explanatory 
variables 
 
 
 
We mostly use the cyclically-adjusted primary budget balance as the 
dependent variable and the output gap based on the HP trend GDP, although we also 
pay attention to overall, unadjusted budget balances (as discussed in the previous 
section). Consequently, the sign and the significance of the coefficient on the output 
gap β will be used to infer the cyclical character of fiscal policy. If the output gap is 
significant and positive, then fiscal policy is counter-cyclical, i.e. it is reacting in a 
stabilizing manner by accumulating budget surpluses in expansions (through higher 
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revenues and/or lower spending) and stimulating demand in recessions. On the other 
hand, a significant and negative output gap indicates pro-cyclical policies: fiscal policy 
is acting in a de-stabilizing manner by running budget deficits in expansions (through 
lower revenues and/or higher spending) and surpluses in recessions. Finally, the 
insignificance of the output gap points to a-cyclicality, meaning policy-makers are not 
reacting to cyclical economic movements.   
Table 3.1 below shows our initial results and the main diagnostics, while 
detailed results with diagnostics for this and all other estimations are shown in 
Appendix 3.3.  What is common to all results in this and other tables in this section is 
that diagnostic tests indicate no serious problem with specification or estimation 
method. Indeed, the Arellano-Bond tests always indicate that there is first-order but 
not second-order autocorrelation. Further, p-values of the Hansen test of over-
identifying restrictions lie within the range suggested by Roodman (2009b) and do not 
approach unity, which would be a warning for instrument proliferation to the point 
where the test becomes too weak to reject the null of exogeneity. In addition, in all 
cases the difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets do not reject 
the validity of GMM instruments for levels, i.e. there is no preference for difference 
GMM over system GMM. The difference-in-Hansen test also indicates that in all cases 
the "steady state" assumption required for system GMM is fulfilled, and that there is 
no problem with error cross-section dependence (Sarafidis et al., 2009).  
In order to account for common shocks affecting fiscal policy in our sample 
and to control for cross-sectional dependence, in column 1 of Table 3.1 we include a 
full set of year dummies, with the first year omitted as the reference category44. 
According to these results, which mostly hold in other specifications, there is a 
relatively high degree of persistence of discretionary policy in our sample, which also 
supports the use of system GMM. Further, the significantly negative coefficient on the 
output gap shows that discretionary policy in the entire sample has been pro-cyclical. 
In other words, when economies were expanding (positive output gap), policy-makers 
were reacting with looser policies, i.e. lower budget surpluses or deeper deficits. In 
particular, an increase in the output gap by 1% results in a cyclically-adjusted 
primary balance-to-GDP ratio that is lower by around 0.2 percentage points. Further, 
there is little indication that policymakers were concerned with public debt 
movements. The coefficient on debt in this option is significant at the 10% level, and it 
moves around that significance level in most future specifications, but in all cases its 
                                                
44 For convenience, coefficients on year dummies are omitted from this and all other tables in the text. 
However, they are shown in the corresponding tables in Appendix 3.3.  
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size is very small. Here, it indicates that a sizable increase of the debt-to-GDP ratio of 
10 percentage points causes an increase of the cyclically-adjusted primary balance-to-
GDP ratio of only 0.1 percentage point. This lack of consideration for debt movements 
when designing and implementing fiscal policy relates well to the recent events, 
when the consequences of the global economic and financial crisis in Europe were 
exacerbated by the high debt levels in several countries and the ensuing uncertainty 
over debt sustainability. Finally, inflation is also significant and has an expected 
positive sign showing that budget balances rise with inflation, but its effect is fairly 
small, and this result holds in all the specifications. Here, it indicates that a sizable 
acceleration of the inflation rate of 10 percentage points causes an increase of the 
cyclically-adjusted primary balance-to-GDP ratio of only 0.2 percentage points. 
Nevertheless, because of strong theoretical recommendations discussed previously, 
we keep both public debt and inflation in all future specifications. 
Column 1 with the inclusion of full year dummies yields 25 instruments in a 
sample of 33 countries, and there is a reasonable risk we will later quickly run into a 
degrees of freedom problem as we extend this initial specification. Therefore, we 
considered dropping some of the year dummy variables. Indeed, most of them are 
individually insignificant, except for some of the latter years when they probably 
reflect the effects of the crisis on fiscal policy. After performing sequential tests by 
dropping one or several year dummies, results indicated that year dummies for 1995-
2001 were both individually and jointly insignificant. Therefore, we decided to drop 
them from further estimations and proceed with year dummies for 2002-2010 
(column 2 of Table 3.1). It should be noted that the significance and size of coefficients 
from column 1 (with full year dummies) are very robust to this modification, and this 
also holds for diagnostics, including the absence of indications for cross-section 
dependence (Sarafidis et al., 2009). Bearing this in mind, column 2 represents our 
preferred initial specification with cyclically-adjusted primary balances based on HP-
trend GDP, output gap based on HP-trend GDP and year dummies for 2002-2010, and 
this option will be analysed and extended further in other tables.   
 Another important issue is the cyclical character of overall fiscal policy and the 
effectiveness of automatic stabilizers. Therefore, we perform the same process with 
the overall, unadjusted primary budget balance as the dependent variable. Column 3 
of Table 3.1 shows results with full year dummies, while Column 4 shows results 
when dropping year dummies for 1995-2001. Again, the omission of year dummies for 
1995-2001 is justified by their individual and joint insignificance, by the virtually 
unchanging results between columns 3 and 4, and by the absence of indications of 
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cross-sectional dependence. Results in column 4 show that overall fiscal policy has 
also been quite persistent, similar to comparable results on discretionary policy in 
column 2 (both with year dummies for 2002-2010 only). However, the most important 
result in column 4 is the insignificant coefficient on the output gap, which shows that 
overall fiscal policy has been a-cyclical. This result resonates very well with the 
previous results: in the entire sample, automatic stabilizers have been exercising 
their expected counter-cyclical effect, thus offsetting pro-cyclical discretionary policy 
from column 2 and resulting in an overall a-cyclical fiscal policy. At the same time, 
while this means that overall fiscal policy was not amplifying cyclical movements, it 
was not acting in a stabilizing manner either, since it was not counter-cyclical.  
Finally, we also check whether the method of calculation of the output gap and 
the corresponding cyclical adjustment of fiscal indicators affect the results. In order 
to do so, we first omit the South-eastern European countries (SEE6) from the sample, 
since potential GDP based on a production function is not available for them. Then, in 
the last two columns of Table 3.1 we show the results on the EU member states only 
(EU27) when using output gaps and cyclical adjustment based on the two alternative 
calculation methods: potential GDP based on a production function; and trend GDP 
based on Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filtering. Despite some minor differences in 
coefficient sizes, the main results do not differ, as discretionary policy is still quite 
persistent and pro-cyclical (significant negative coefficients on the output gap)45. 
Bearing this in mind, and also our intention to analyse South-eastern European 
countries for which data on output gaps based on potential GDP are not available, 
these results justify our decision to use the output gap and cyclically-adjusted 
balances based on HP trend GDP in all future estimations. Before moving to 
additional analyses, it is worth noting that, as we move across specifications in Table 
3.1, results on the main variables are robust and the diagnostics are satisfactory.  
 
 
                                                
45 This is also in line with the comparison in Appendix 3.2, which in most cases indicates similar 
movements of the output gap, regardless of the method used to calculate it. 
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Column: 1 2 3 4 5 6
Dependent variable:
Cyclically-
adjusted primary 
balance (HP 
trend GDP), % of 
nominal GDP 
Cyclically-
adjusted primary 
balance (HP trend 
GDP), % of 
nominal GDP 
Overall, 
unadjusted 
primary 
balance, % of 
nominal GDP
Overall, 
unadjusted 
primary 
balance, % of 
nominal GDP
Cyclically-adjusted 
primary balance 
(production 
function potential 
GDP), % of 
nominal GDP 
Cyclically-
adjusted primary 
balance (HP 
trend GDP), % of 
nominal GDP 
lagged dependent variable 0.71*** 0.71*** 0.77*** 0.73*** 0.83*** 0.70***
(0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.14) (0.09)
output gap, % of HP trend GDP -0.16** -0.16** 0.01 -0.01 -0.16***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05)
output gap, % of potential GDP -0.12**
(0.06)
lagged public debt, % of nom. GDP 0.01* 0.01** 0.01 0.01* 0.01* 0.01**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
inflation rate 0.02* 0.02*** 0.01 0.01 0.02*** 0.02***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
constant -0.42 -0.26 -0.19 -0.14 -0.38 -0.33
(0.66) (0.32) (0.79) (0.39) (0.24) (0.34)
Observations 464 464 467 467 405 414
Number of instruments 25 18 25 18 18 18
Number of countries 33 33 33 33 27 27
Countries included (all=EU27+SEE6) all all all all EU27 EU27
Period (maximum per country) 1995-2010 1995-2010 1995-2010 1995-2010 1995-2010 1995-2010
Year dummies included (not shown) 1995-2010 2002-2010 1995-2010 2002-2010 2002-2010 2002-2010
p-value for F-statistics, joint significance test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in differences 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in differences 0.58 0.51 0.44 0.50 0.14 0.31
Hansen test of overid. restrictions p-value 0.85 0.78 0.24 0.50 0.41 0.52
GMM instruments for levels: Hansen test 
excluding group p-value
0.66 0.54 0.59 0.55 0.23 0.29
GMM instruments for levels: Diff-in-Hansen 
test of exogeneity of instruments p-value
0.77 0.76 0.11 0.33 0.62 0.70
Source: Author's estimations. 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Internal instruments are used for endogenous 
variables (the lagged dependent variable and the output gap). Lag limits are 1/2 for the lagged dependent variable and 2/3 for the output gap. The 'collapse' 
option is always used. 
 
 Table 3.1. Initial estimations of cyclicality of discretionary and overall fiscal policy 
 
 
 
 In Table 3.2 below we move to the analysis of possible differences of results on 
cyclicality across the three country groups: 15 old EU member states plus Cyprus and 
Malta (EU17), 10 new EU member states from Central and Eastern Europe (NMS10) 
and 6 South-eastern European countries (SEE6). In order to do this, we use dummy 
variables for the three country groups and interact them with the particular variable 
of interest. As noted above, there is no base group and the constant is removed, so the 
reported coefficient sizes and significances for interaction terms have a direct, 
straightforward interpretation. Before commenting on the results, it should be noted 
that the diagnostic tests again indicate no serious problem with specification or the 
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estimation method. Hansen tests of over-identifying restrictions do not reject 
instrument validity and also do not approach unity. In addition, in all cases the 
difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets do not reject the 
validity of GMM instruments for levels, i.e. there is no preference for difference GMM 
over system GMM. The difference-in-Hansen test also indicates that in all cases the 
"steady state" assumption required for system GMM is fulfilled, and that there is no 
problem with error cross-section dependence (Sarafidis et al., 2009).  
The results from the preferred initial specification for the entire sample in 
column 2 of Table 3.1 are repeated in the first column of Table 3.2 for easier 
comparison. Then we proceed with the analysis by country groups. Column 2 shows 
differences in the persistence of discretionary policy across country groups. 
According to these results, the autoregressive coefficient is significant in all three 
country groups. However, there are considerable differences in terms of policy 
inertia. Indeed, discretionary policy is quite persistent in the EU17 group, while the 
relatively lower size of this coefficient in both groups of transition countries (i.e. 
NMS10 and SEE6) lends some support to the argument that discretionary policy in 
these countries has been more volatile.   
Column 3 shows differences in the cyclicality of discretionary policy across 
country groups, which is one of our main issues of interest. We find that 
discretionary policy has been a-cyclical in old EU member states (insignificant output 
gap), which lends some support to the thesis in Wyplosz (2006) that the aim of the 
Economic and Monetary Union and of the Stability and Growth Pact was to constrain 
the use of discretionary fiscal policy. On the other hand, discretionary policy was pro-
cyclical in NMS10 and even more so in SEE6, as indicated by the significant negative 
coefficients on the output gap. This means that in these countries fiscal policy was 
exacerbating cyclical economic movements, since expansions were accompanied by 
falling budget surpluses or deeper deficits (while the opposite holds for recessions). 
Indeed, it could be argued that this pro-cyclicality in the two groups of transition 
countries is driving the pro-cyclicality in the entire sample (column 1). In addition, 
these findings are broadly in line with expectations and empirical findings of more 
pro-cyclical policies in less developed countries.  
Next, we move to analyse possible differences in reactions to public debt levels 
(column 4). Somewhat surprisingly, policy-makers in both old and new EU member 
states were not reacting to debt movements, since the coefficient on debt for these 
country groups is insignificant. This finding relates well to the recent developments, 
particularly in the euro area, where the debt levels are relatively high (Chapter 1) and 
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where concerns about fiscal sustainability worsened the effects of the global 
economic and financial crisis. On the other hand, debt was having a small, but a 
statistically significant negative effect on fiscal balances in South-eastern European 
countries. Although this result is counter-intuitive, it can be explained by the 
relatively low debt levels and low cyclically-adjusted budget balances in most of these 
countries (Chapter 1), which probably comforted policymakers that they can 
implement policies without affecting debt sustainability.   
We are also interested in the cyclical character of overall fiscal policy across 
country groups, which could enable us to draw conclusions on the effectiveness of 
automatic stabilizers. Therefore, Column 5 of Table 3.2 reproduces previous results 
on overall policy from Table 3.1, while the last column of Table 3.2 shows differences 
across country groups. Results for the cyclical stance of overall policy in NMS10 and 
SEE6 are in line with expectations and with results on discretionary policy in column 
3. Indeed, overall policy in the two groups of transition countries was a-cyclical 
(insignificant output gap in column 6), which indicates that the counter-cyclical 
effects of automatic stabilizers were offsetting pro-cyclical discretionary policies in 
these countries (from column 3). However, we find no such effect in old EU member 
states, where both overall and discretionary policy were a-cyclical (insignificant 
output gaps in columns 3 and 6). This result indicates that automatic stabilizers in old 
EU member states were ineffective, as they were unable to shift discretionary a-
cyclicality in overall counter-cyclicality. This ineffectiveness of automatic stabilizers 
is counterintuitive, so we return to this puzzle when doing extensions and robustness 
checks in Section 3.5.  
These results mostly differ from findings of previous studies on transition 
countries, which were surveyed in the previous chapter. In particular, Staehr (2008) 
finds that overall fiscal policy has been more counter-cyclical in new EU member 
states, while we reach the opposite conclusion, with overall policy being a-cyclical in 
all three country groups (insignificant output gaps in column 6 of Table 3.2). Lewis 
(2009) also finds that overall policy in new EU member states has been counter-
cyclical, which is not confirmed by our results that indicate a-cyclical overall policy. 
In addition, although he focuses on overall balances, Lewis (2009) indirectly 
calculates that discretionary policy has been a-cyclical in new EU member states, 
while our detailed investigation of this issue suggests that discretionary policy in this 
group has in fact been pro-cyclical (negative output gap for NMS10 in column 3). 
While a more detailed investigation of these divergences in results is out of the scope 
of this study, they probably reflect several differences in our approach compared to 
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Staehr (2008) and Lewis (2009), which were described in detail in the Chapter 2. More 
precisely, unlike these studies, we are using a longer sample, output gap as a cyclical 
indicator and system GMM as an estimation method.  
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Column: 1 2 3 4 5 6
Dependent variable:
lagged dependent variable 0.71*** 0.71*** 0.70*** 0.73*** 0.74***
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08)
lagged dependant variable*EU17 interaction 0.90***
(0.08)
lagged dependant variable*NMS10 interaction 0.46***
(0.10)
lagged dependant variable*SEE6 interaction 0.43**
(0.17)
output gap, % of HP trend GDP -0.16** -0.16*** -0.16** -0.01
(0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06)
output gap*EU17 interaction -0.04 0.10
(0.10) (0.11)
output gap*NMS10 interaction -0.18*** -0.03
(0.04) (0.04)
output gap*SEE6 interaction -0.28*** -0.02
(0.06) (0.06)
lagged public debt, % of nom. GDP 0.01** 0.01 0.00 0.01* 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
lagged public debt*EU17 interaction 0.00
(0.01)
lagged public debt*NMS10 interaction 0.01
(0.01)
lagged public debt*SEE7 interaction -0.03**
(0.02)
inflation rate 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.01 0.01***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
dummy for EU17 -0.15 0.32 0.21 0.58
(0.27) (0.45) (0.44) (0.52)
dummy for NMS10 -0.81** -0.24 -0.67 0.08
(0.30) (0.27) (0.47) (0.33)
dummy for SEE6 -0.33 0.38 1.54** 0.52
(0.59) (0.30) (0.61) (0.35)
constant -0.26 -0.14
(0.32) (0.39)
Observations 464 464 464 464 467 467
Number of instruments 18 26 26 22 18 26
Number of countries 33 33 33 33 33 33
Countries included (all=EU27+SEE6) all all all all all all
Period (maximum per country) 1995-2010 1995-2010 1995-2010 1995-2010 1995-2010 1995-2010
Year dummies included (not shown) 2002-2010 2002-2010 2002-2010 2002-2010 2002-2010 2002-2010
p-value for F-statistics, joint significance test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in differences 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in differences 0.51 0.56 0.61 0.50 0.50 0.57
Hansen test of overid. restrictions p-value 0.78 0.59 0.89 0.78 0.50 0.68
GMM instruments for levels: Hansen test 
excluding group p-value
0.54 0.90 0.68 0.53 0.55 0.37
GMM instruments for levels: Diff-in-Hansen test of 
exogeneity of instruments p-value
0.76 0.24 0.86 0.77 0.33 0.84
Source: Author's estimations. 
Overall, unadjusted 
primary balance, % of 
nominal GDP
Cyclically-adjusted primary balance (HP trend 
GDP), % of nominal GDP 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Internal instruments are used for 
endogenous variables (the lagged dependent variable and the output gap). Lag limits are 1/2 for the lagged dependent variable and 2/3 for the 
output gap. The 'collapse' option is always used. 
 
Table 3.2. Differences in cyclicality among country groups 
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 Before moving to a more detailed analysis of political, institutional and other 
determinants of discretionary fiscal policy in Section 3.4, in Table 3.3 below we 
analyse several additional variables which are almost routinely included in empirical 
studies on European countries: parliamentary elections and the effects of the 
common currency. We do this by successively adding them to column 1, which 
reproduces the previous baseline results on discretionary policy in the entire sample. 
According to column 2, a dummy variable for parliamentary elections has a 
significant negative effect, meaning that in election years the ratio of cyclically-
adjusted primary balances to GDP is considerably lower by around 0.6 percentage 
points, thus pointing towards a political business cycle effect. Introducing country-
group dummies for elections in column 3 indicates that this effect is entirely driven 
by old EU member states, while somewhat surprisingly elections do not affect 
discretionary policy in transition countries.  
 We define the effects of the common currency by two indicators: the 
convergence process to the single currency in the original 11 euro area founding 
countries and the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) requirements, which effectively 
apply after countries enter the euro area. In order to analyse effects of the run-up to 
the euro introduction, in column 4 of Table 3.3 we add Maastricht convergence 
criteria, defined as a dummy that equals one for the original 11 euro area founding 
members between 1995 and 1998 and zero otherwise. In accordance with a priori 
expectations and with findings in most studies surveyed in the previous chapter, our 
result of a positive coefficient on the Maastricht dummy shows that these countries 
implemented considerable fiscal tightening trying to meet the entry criteria, while 
other results are unchanged. We are also interested whether the convergence process 
had any impact on cyclicality, besides its direct effect on better fiscal balances. 
According to column 5, the positive interaction term between output gap and 
Maastricht criteria shows that countries implemented counter-cyclical policies as they 
were preparing to establish the euro area. On the other hand, outside of the 
Maastricht convergence process, discretionary policy maintains its pro-cyclical 
character, as indicated by the significantly negative output gap.  
 We also use a dummy variable to analyse the effects of SGP, which was 
discussed in detail in the previous chapter. Since we also want to capture later 
entrants in the single currency area, the dummy for SGP is one for euro area 
members from 1999 or from the year of euro adoption and zero otherwise. When 
adding the SGP dummy in column 6, we find that SGP requirements have no effect on 
fiscal policy, while other results are unchanged, including the positive effect of 
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Maastricht convergence criteria for original euro area members. In addition, in 
column 7 we fail to find any support for the declared aim of the SGP to limit the scope 
for discretionary policy, since the interaction term of SGP and the output gap is 
insignificant, while other results are unchanged, including the negative output gap 
that indicates pro-cyclical policies. Altogether, these results show that it was much 
more important for the original founding members to meet Maastricht criteria and 
enter the euro area, so they significantly adjusted their fiscal policy during the 1990s. 
On the other hand, once countries enter the euro area, SGP requirements for 
disciplined fiscal policies have no discernible effect on actual outcomes of fiscal 
policy, which is also supported by the several violations of the SGP prior to the crisis 
and the inability of SGP requirements to prevent the European debt crisis (Chapter 2). 
Bearing in mind these results, we decided to remove SGP from further estimations, 
but maintain the dummy for Maastricht criteria. 
 Before proceeding further, in the last column of Table 3.3 we confirm that 
previous results on the cyclicality of discretionary policy by country groups hold after 
the introduction of dummies for parliamentary elections and for Maastricht 
convergence, i.e. discretionary policy is a-cyclical in old EU member states and pro-
cyclical in new EU member states and even more so in South-eastern European 
countries. Besides, the main results in all the options are quite robust, and the 
diagnostic tests again indicate no serious problem with specification or estimation 
method. Hansen tests of over-identifying restrictions do not reject the validity of 
instruments and the difference-in-Hansen tests do not reject the validity of GMM 
instruments for levels, implying there is no preference for difference- over system 
GMM. In all cases the "steady state" assumption required for system GMM is fulfilled, 
and also there is no problem with error cross-section dependence. Therefore, we treat 
columns 4 and 8 as our baseline results for cyclicality in the entire sample and in 
country groups, respectively. In the next sections, we extend these specifications in 
order to analyse political, institutional and other determinants of fiscal policy, as well 
as to further check the robustness of our baseline results.   
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Column: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Dependent variable:
lagged dependent variable 0.71*** 0.71*** 0.72*** 0.69*** 0.67*** 0.69*** 0.70*** 0.70***
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07)
output gap, % of HP trend GDP -0.16** -0.16** -0.17** -0.15** -0.17** -0.15** -0.15**
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
output gap*EU17 interaction 0.02
(0.12)
output gap*NMS10 interaction -0.18***
(0.04)
output gap*SEE6 interaction -0.27***
(0.06)
lagged public debt, % of nom. GDP 0.01** 0.01** 0.00 0.01* 0.01** 0.01 0.01* 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
inflation rate 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
-0.57*** -0.56*** -0.50** -0.56*** -0.54** -0.49**
(0.20) (0.20) (0.21) (0.20) (0.21) (0.19)
dummy for Maastricht criteria (95-98) 0.66*** 1.10*** 0.69*** 0.83**
(0.20) (0.39) (0.22) (0.35)
dummy for SGP (1 from entering euro area) 0.05 -0.20
(0.23) (0.27)
output gap*Maastricht interaction 0.45*
(0.24)
output gap*SGP interaction 0.14
(0.20)
elections*EU17 interaction -0.59**
(0.23)
elections*NMS10 interaction -0.57
(0.49)
elections*SEE6 interaction -0.36
(0.32)
dummy for EU17 0.29 0.21
(0.38) (0.48)
dummy for NMS10 -0.26 -0.17
(0.24) (0.25)
dummy for SEE6 0.04 0.37
(0.27) (0.29)
constant -0.26 -0.11 -0.23 -0.33 -0.23 -0.18
(0.32) (0.29) (0.29) (0.27) (0.29) (0.42)
Observations 464 464 464 464 464 464 464 464
Number of instruments 18 19 23 20 23 21 23 28
Number of countries 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33
Countries included (all=EU27+SEE6) all all all all all all all all
Period (maximum per country) 1995-2010 1995-2010 1995-2010 1995-2010 1995-2010 1995-2010 1995-2010 1995-2010
Year dummies included (not shown) 2002-2010 2002-2010 2002-2010 2002-2010 2002-2010 2002-2010 2002-2010 2002-2010
p-value for F-statistics, joint significance test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in differences 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in differences 0.51 0.36 0.37 0.45 0.67 0.45 0.49 0.63
Hansen test of overid. restrictions p-value 0.78 0.73 0.74 0.69 0.46 0.69 0.67 0.85
GMM instruments for levels: Hansen test excluding 
group p-value
0.54 0.43 0.42 0.42 0.24 0.41 0.51 0.58
GMM instruments for levels: Diff-in-Hansen test of 
exogeneity of instruments p-value
0.76 0.84 0.88 0.78 0.70 0.79 0.62 0.88
Source: Author's estimations. 
Cyclically-adjusted primary balance (HP trend GDP), % of nominal GDP
dummy for parliamentary elections (1 if 
elections held in that year)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Internal instruments are used for endogenous variables 
(the lagged dependent variable and the output gap). Lag limits are 1/2 for the lagged dependent variable and 2/3 for the output gap. The 'collapse' option is always used. 
 
Table 3.3. Baseline specification, including elections and Maastricht run-up 
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3.4 Analysis of political, institutional and other determinants of fiscal 
policy 
 
 In this section46, we add numerous political, institutional and other additional 
controls to the baseline specification from the previous section. In other words, we 
add the control variables Xit in the model in Eq. 18 (reproduced below). By doing so, 
we try to explain as much of the "exogenous" discretionary policy as possible based 
on the various theories of fiscal policy and on practical considerations. This will 
enable us to answer two questions: whether the baseline results on cyclicality from 
the previous section are robust, and what, if any, are the effect of numerous political, 
institutional and other factors on discretionary fiscal policy.  
 
 
                                                       Eq. 18 
  
 
where: 
Bal   - budget balance (total or primary, unadjusted or cyclically-adjusted) as 
a share of nominal GDP  
Cycle - indicator for cyclical movements of the economy (output gap) 
Debt  - public debt as a share of GDP 
Infl      - inflation rate 
X  - 1 x m vector of additional explanatory variables (economic, political, 
institutional)   
Θ - corresponding n x 1 vector of coefficients of additional explanatory 
variables 
 
 
 
It should be emphasised that, regardless of the various additions, the key 
variables from the baseline specifications have very robust coefficients and statistical 
significance: there is considerable inertia in discretionary fiscal policy, it is pro-
cyclical in the entire sample (the output gap coefficient is significant and negative), 
elections worsen fiscal discipline and the run-up to euro introduction improves it. 
The only unstable coefficient is the one on debt, which moves around the significance 
level of 10%, but is in any case very small. In addition, in all the specifications in this 
section, diagnostic tests indicate no serious problem with specification or estimation 
method. Arellano-Bond tests consistently indicate that there is first-order but not 
                                                
46 Similarly to the previous section, in the tables here we do not present year dummies. Detailed results 
(including year dummies) and diagnostics are relegated to Appendix 3.3. 
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second-order autocorrelation. Further, p-values of the Hansen test of over-identifying 
restrictions lie within the range suggested by Roodman (2009b) and do not approach 
unity. In addition, in all cases the difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of 
instrument subsets do not reject the validity of GMM instruments for levels, i.e. there 
is no preference for difference GMM over system GMM. The difference-in-Hansen test 
also indicates that in all cases the "steady state" assumption required for system GMM 
is fulfilled, and that there is no problem with error cross-section error dependence 
(Sarafidis et al., 2009).  
 
 
3.4.1 Voracity effects  
 
 We start this part of the investigation by analysing the voracity effect proposed 
by Lane and Tornell (1998) and Tornell and Lane (1999). According to this theory, pro-
cyclicality of fiscal policy increases with higher dispersion of power, or the number of 
power groups, defined in a broad way. The empirical investigation in Lane (2003) was 
among the first to lend support to this theory. Talvi and Végh (2005) also propose a 
model where pressures by various interest groups for higher spending and lower 
savings in expansions result in pro-cyclical policy. Since there is no clear definition of 
power groups, in Table 3.4 below we analyse various measurements of the number of 
power groups and the dispersion of power using relevant indicators from the World 
Bank Database on Political Institutions 2010 (WB DPI, Beck et al. (2001) and Keefer 
and Stasavage (2003)). In column 1 of Table 3.4 we reproduce baseline results from 
the previous section, while in column 2 we omit Montenegro and Serbia because of 
lack of relevant data in WB DPI, although their omission does not change the results. 
In column 3 we add the number of checks and balances in the political system, which 
is expected to reflect well the idea of multiple power groups. This indicator measures 
the number of checks in the system defined in a very broad way, capturing the effects 
of divided control of executive power, strong presidential systems, second legislative 
chambers, opposition control of parliament or number of parties in cabinet needed to 
maintain the majority. Results from column 2 are unchanged, but we fail to find 
support that the number of checks and balances has any effect on fiscal policy in the 
entire sample. However, column 4 shows that voracity effects are present in the two 
groups of transition countries, where the number of checks in the system tends to 
worsen the cyclically-adjusted primary budget balance.  
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Next we analyse the fragmentation of government seats in parliament as 
another indicator of power dispersion. Government fragmentation is measured by a 
Herfindahl index of government-controlled seats in parliament from the WB DPI, 
which rises if there are a few strong parties making up the government (with the 
maximum being 100 in the case of single party governments as the highest 
concentration). Results are presented in column 5 of Table 3.4, which shows that 
baseline results (from column 2) are unaffected, while government fragmentation has 
no effect on fiscal policy in the entire sample. However, according to column 6, there 
are some indications that government fragmentation is affecting fiscal policy in old 
EU member states, but this coefficient has an unexpected negative sign and a 
relatively small size. It shows that a considerable move towards more concentrated 
governments results in a relatively small worsening of the budget deficit47 in old EU 
member states. While this is not strictly in line with the predictions of the voracity 
theory, a possible explanation would be that these cases also capture moves from 
multiple weak parties towards fewer but stronger parties. Therefore, it can be argued 
that a few strong parties in government are in fact using their position to exert 
stronger pressures for lower fiscal discipline and higher spending.  
Finally, in the last two columns of Table 3.4 we analyse the effects of the 
government majority itself, measured as the share of members of parliament 
supporting the government, regardless of whether they come from a single or 
multiple parties. This indicator ignores the composition of governments and hence is 
not linked directly to voracity effects, but it does offer some interesting insights. 
Column 7 indicates that stronger government majorities implement more disciplined 
policies, while the last column shows that this effect is present both in old and 
particularly in new EU member states, but not in South-eastern European countries. 
The coefficient on NMS10 shows that an increase of government majority by 10 
percentage points results in an improvement of the ratio of cyclically-adjusted 
primary balance to GDP by 0.9 percentage points, indicating that strong governments 
in more advanced transition countries can be an important factor in carrying out 
successful programmes of considerable fiscal adjustment.   
   
                                                
47 For instance, a move from a coalition government consisted of parties controlling 50%, 30% and 20% 
of government seats in parliament respectively to a single-party government worsens the ratio of 
cyclically-adjusted primary balance to GDP by 1.1 percentage points. 
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Column: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Dependent variable:
lagged dependent variable 0.69*** 0.70*** 0.69*** 0.69*** 0.70*** 0.69*** 0.69*** 0.69***
(0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
output gap, % of HP trend GDP -0.15** -0.14* -0.14* -0.15** -0.14* -0.16** -0.13* -0.13*
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
lagged public debt, % of nom. GDP 0.01* 0.01* 0.01 0.00 0.01** 0.00 0.01* 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
inflation rate 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.03***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
dummy for Maastricht criteria (1995-98) 0.66*** 0.67*** 0.77*** 0.53** 0.67*** 0.56** 0.69*** 0.56**
(0.20) (0.20) (0.25) (0.24) (0.20) (0.23) (0.25) (0.23)
-0.56*** -0.59*** -0.59*** -0.59*** -0.58** -0.60*** -0.59** -0.55**
(0.20) (0.21) (0.21) (0.20) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.22)
number of checks in the system -0.15
(0.12)
number of checks*EU17 interaction 0.12
(0.11)
number of checks*NMS10 interaction -0.46*
(0.26)
number of checks*SEE6 interaction -0.68***
(0.12)
-0.00
(0.01)
fragmentation of government seats*EU17 -0.02***
(0.00)
fragmentation of government seats*NMS10 0.02
(0.02)
fragmentation of government seats*SEE6 0.01
(0.01)
0.05**
(0.02)
government majority*EU17 interaction 0.03*
(0.02)
government majority*NMS10 interaction 0.09*
(0.05)
government majority*SEE6 interaction -0.02
(0.03)
dummy for EU17 -0.23 1.28** -1.51
(0.45) (0.54) (1.13)
dummy for NMS10 1.54 -1.38 -5.27*
(1.04) (0.94) (2.63)
dummy for SEE6 2.16*** -0.58 1.26
(0.46) (0.60) (2.18)
constant -0.23 -0.25 0.41 -0.07 -3.12**
(0.29) (0.28) (0.51) (0.43) (1.44)
Observations 464 451 450 450 450 450 449 449
Number of instruments 20 20 21 25 21 25 21 25
Number of countries 33 31 31 31 31 31 31 31
Countries included (all=EU27+SEE6) all
all w/o Serbia, 
Montenegro
all w/o Serbia, 
Montenegro
all w/o Serbia, 
Montenegro
all w/o Serbia, 
Montenegro
all w/o Serbia, 
Montenegro
all w/o Serbia, 
Montenegro
all w/o Serbia, 
Montenegro
Period (maximum per country) 1995-2010 1995-2010 1995-2010 1995-2010 1995-2010 1995-2010 1995-2010 1995-2010
Year dummies included (not shown) 2002-2010 2002-2010 2002-2010 2002-2010 2002-2010 2002-2010 2002-2010 2002-2010
p-value for F-statistics, joint significance test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in differences 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in differences 0.45 0.62 0.64 0.55 0.61 0.52 0.79 0.95
Hansen test of overid. restrictions p-value 0.69 0.71 0.71 0.75 0.73 0.73 0.75 0.76
GMM instruments for levels: Hansen test 
excluding group p-value
0.42 0.45 0.45 0.47 0.46 0.44 0.52 0.51
GMM instruments for levels: Diff-in-Hansen test 
of exogeneity of instruments p-value
0.78 0.78 0.76 0.82 0.79 0.83 0.75 0.78
Source: Author's estimations. 
dummy for parliamentary elections (1 if 
elections held in that year)
fragmentation of government seats in 
parliament (1 party=100)
Cyclically-adjusted primary balance (HP trend GDP), % of nominal GDP
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Internal instruments are used for endogenous 
variables (the lagged dependent variable and the output gap). Lag limits are 1/2 for the lagged dependent variable and 2/3 for the output gap. The 'collapse' option is 
always used. 
government majority in parliament, % of 
seats
    
Table 3.4. Voracity effects  
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3.4.2 Institutional, political and ideological factors 
 
We start this subsection by the analysis of "deeper" systemic factors which 
reflect the design of the political or electoral system and are expected to have an 
impact on fiscal policy. These determinants are based on the relatively broad 
literature on the political economy of fiscal policy, which provides various theories 
and predictions regarding the effects of these factors on fiscal outcomes (e.g. Alesina 
and Perotti (1995) and Eslava (2006)).   
As usual, in Table 3.5 below we start by repeating the baseline results in 
column 1. In the second column we add a dummy variable which equals one if most 
or all members of the legislature are elected by the plurality (majoritarian) electoral 
system and zero otherwise. We find that baseline results from before are robust, and 
the coefficient on the plurality dummy is highly significant, but negative, showing 
that plurality systems yield less disciplined fiscal policies, and column 3 shows that 
this effect is present in both old EU member states and particularly in South-eastern 
European countries. This result contradicts the literature on the political economy of 
budget deficits, which generally predicts that it is proportional electoral systems that 
usually result in less disciplined fiscal policy (Eslava, 2006). Such a prediction is 
explained by the fact that proportional systems usually yield coalition governments, 
where various parties are able to condition their entry or stay in the coalition with 
demands for higher spending. However, we already rejected that hypothesis for the 
entire sample when we controlled directly for the government concentration in the 
previous subsection. In particular, previously we found that higher government 
concentration leads to worse balances in old EU member states, so these results on 
the electoral system lend additional support to those findings of absence of voracity 
effects in EU countries. While we are unable to pinpoint the exact source of these 
results on the electoral system, we suspect they might be due to pork-barrel projects, 
when members of parliament elected by relatively narrow constituencies make 
pressure for higher government spending or lower taxes in their regions, aiming to 
boost their chances for re-election. Pork-barrel projects feature regularly in American 
politics, but these results indicate that the old EU member states and the South-
eastern European countries employing this electoral system might not be entirely 
immune to this phenomenon. 
Next we analyse the possible effects of the political system on fiscal policy by 
using a dummy variable that equals one for countries with presidential systems and 
zero otherwise (also based on WB DPI). In column 4 of Table 3.5 we find that previous 
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baseline results (column 1) are unchanged and that countries with presidential 
systems have lower fiscal discipline. This is somewhat surprising, since it would be 
expected that executive power concentrated in a single person would yield more 
disciplined policies than the typical outcome of governments and parliaments 
consisted of several parties. However, this finding should be taken with caution for 
two reasons. First, in reality power is often not entirely concentrated in the president, 
but divided between the president and the legislature or the government. In those 
cases, the president can be viewed as one more power group, in which case these 
results lend some indirect support to the voracity theory. Second, our sample contains 
very few cases of presidential systems, mostly in new EU member states. This 
explains the result in column 5 that presidential systems are borderline significant 
only in NMS10 at just above 10%. More importantly, the low number of presidential 
systems in the sample cautions against generalisation of this result.  
 Finally, in the last two columns of Table 3.5 we analyse the effects of fiscal 
decentralisation in the 27 EU member states48. We present the results using 
expenditure decentralisation, defined as the share of local, regional and sub-state 
expenditures in total expenditures, whereas revenue decentralisation has no effect on 
fiscal outcomes both in the entire EU27 and in country groups (Appendix 3.4). 
According to results in column 6, expenditure decentralisation has a significantly 
positive effect on fiscal balances, while column 7 shows that this result is wholly 
driven by the old EU member states. However, the effect is relatively small, showing 
that a relatively large increase in the share of local, regional and sub-state 
government expenditures in total expenditures by 10 percentage points results in an 
improvement of the cyclically-adjusted primary budget balance-to-GDP ratio of only 
0.2 percentage points. While there is no clear-cut a priori expectation on the expected 
sign of fiscal decentralisation, since in reality it can take various forms, there are two 
possible explanations for this finding. First, the central government could be 
imposing discipline on local and regional governments by limiting the amounts they 
could spend and borrow, at least in the part that is not defined by law or fixed by 
some other predetermined measure. Second, being held directly accountable by a 
smaller electorate, which can easily observe and pressure their behaviour, it is 
possible that local governments are themselves choosing to behave in a more fiscally 
responsible manner.  
                                                
48 Data on fiscal decentralization in EU27 are taken from Eurostat. There are no comparable data for 
South-eastern European countries.   
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Column: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Dependent variable:
lagged dependent variable 0.69*** 0.68*** 0.69*** 0.69*** 0.71*** 0.70*** 0.70***
(0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09)
output gap, % of HP trend GDP -0.15** -0.15** -0.16** -0.15** -0.17** -0.17*** -0.18***
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06)
lagged public debt, % of nom. GDP 0.01* 0.01** 0.01 0.01* 0.00 0.01** 0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
inflation rate 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
dummy for Maastricht criteria (95-98) 0.66*** 0.66*** 0.53** 0.63*** -0.09 0.39** 0.33*
(0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (1.85) (0.18) (0.18)
-0.56*** -0.56*** -0.55** -0.56*** -0.59** -0.60** -0.59**
(0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.22) (0.25) (0.24)
dummy for electoral system (1 if plurality) -0.51***
(0.18)
dummy for electoral system*EU17 interaction -0.47***
(0.15)
dummy for electoral system*NMS10 interaction -0.21
(0.28)
dummy for electoral system*SEE6 interaction -1.04*
(0.52)
dummy for political system (1 if presidential) -0.35*
(0.19)
dummy for political system*EU17 interaction -10.37
(22.40)
dummy for political system*NMS10 interaction -0.38
(0.23)
dummy for political system*SEE6 interaction -0.03
(0.29)
0.03**
(0.01)
decentralisation of expenditures*EU17 interaction 0.02*
(0.01)
decentralisation of expenditures*NMS10 interaction 0.05
(0.04)
dummy for EU17 0.20 0.89 -0.57
(0.42) (2.21) (0.54)
dummy for NMS10 -0.33 -0.18 -1.73
(0.30) (0.38) (1.16)
dummy for SEE6 0.27 0.09
(0.30) (0.36)
constant -0.23 -0.15 -0.15 -0.91*
(0.29) (0.30) (0.30) (0.46)
Observations 464 464 464 464 464 414 414
Number of instruments 20 21 25 21 25 21 23
Number of countries 33 33 33 33 33 27 27
Countries included (all=EU27+SEE6) all all all all all EU27 EU27
Period (maximum per country) 1995-2010 1995-2010 1995-2010 1995-2010 1995-2010 1995-2010 1995-2010
Year dummies included (not shown) 2002-2010 2002-2010 2002-2010 2002-2010 2002-2010 2002-2010 2002-2010
p-value for F-statistics, joint significance test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in differences 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in differences 0.45 0.41 0.38 0.44 0.35 0.25 0.25
Hansen test of overid. restrictions p-value 0.69 0.68 0.68 0.70 0.74 0.52 0.53
GMM instruments for levels: Hansen test excluding 
group p-value
0.42 0.39 0.37 0.42 0.42 0.23 0.23
GMM instruments for levels: Diff-in-Hansen test of 
exogeneity of instruments p-value
0.78 0.81 0.85 0.80 0.89 0.84 0.88
Source: Author's estimations. 
Cyclically-adjusted primary balance (HP trend GDP), % of nominal GDP
dummy for parliamentary elections (1 if elections 
held in that year)
decentralisation of expenditures (local+regional 
+sub-national as % of total expenditures)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Internal instruments are used for endogenous variables (the 
lagged dependent variable and the output gap). Lag limits are 1/2 for the lagged dependent variable and 2/3 for the output gap. The 'collapse' option is always used. 
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In Table 3.6 below we analyse the effects of the level of democratisation and of 
control of corruption on fiscal outcomes. Although the investigation of their separate 
effects does not have a clear theoretical underpinning, our main goal is to check the 
idea put forward by Alesina and Tabellini (2005) for the existence of less disciplined 
and more pro-cyclical policies in "corrupt democracies" because of more severe 
political agency problems.  After reproducing the previous baseline results in column 
1, in the second column we introduce an indicator for the level of democratisation 
taken from the Polity IV database, which ranges from 0 to 10, rising with higher 
democratisation. We find that previous baseline results still hold, and that countries 
with a higher level of democratisation have more disciplined fiscal policy, while 
column 3 suggests that this result is entirely driven by old EU member states. This 
finding that more democratic countries have lower budget deficits indirectly supports 
the lack of strong voracity effects discussed before. Indeed, if there were voracity 
effects, we would expect them to be even stronger in more democratic countries, 
where power groups can exert more pressure on policies. Instead, we find an 
opposite, positive effect of democratisation. In the absence of any clear theory, we 
believe this is reflecting the impact of what can broadly be labelled "institutional 
quality", particularly the well established and transparent procedures of budget 
planning, adoption and implementation in more democratic countries. Further, we 
also check for the effects of control of corruption, as measured by the World Bank 
Governance Indicators 2010 (Kaufmann et al., 2010), where a higher score means 
lower corruption. Column 4 shows that countries with better control of corruption 
have lower budget deficits, while column 5 shows this effect is present in old EU 
member states and in South-eastern European countries. This finding is in line with a 
priori expectations, since control of corruption generally prevents the abuse of power 
for channelling public expenditures into private uses or for tax avoidance.  
 In the final two columns of Table 3.6 we check whether corrupt democracies 
have more pro-cyclical and less disciplined policies. In column 6 we add both 
measures for the level of democratisation and for control of corruption. However, it 
turns out that only control of corruption matters, while democratisation loses its 
significance when added alongside control of corruption. This change in results 
compared to specifications when they enter separately (columns 2 and 4) is probably 
related to the high positive correlation between them of 61%, reflecting the tendency 
of lower corruption levels in stronger democracies. In the last column we add an 
interaction term between democratisation and corruption, but results indicate lack of 
support for the idea that fiscal policy is less disciplined in "corrupt democracies", 
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since the interaction term and the individual corruption and democratisation 
variables are all insignificant. Moreover, the size and significance of the output gap is 
virtually unchanged and the other coefficients are also quite robust. Altogether, these 
results indicate that both democratisation and the control of corruption improve 
fiscal discipline (when introduced separately), but there is no evidence that "corrupt 
democracies" are affecting the fiscal policy either directly or by changing its cyclical 
character, as originally predicted by Alesina and Tabellini (2005).  
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Column: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Dependent variable:
lagged dependent variable 0.69*** 0.70*** 0.70*** 0.69*** 0.66*** 0.69*** 0.69***
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
output gap, % of HP trend GDP -0.15** -0.15** -0.15** -0.17*** -0.18*** -0.18*** -0.18***
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
lagged public debt, % of nom. GDP 0.01* 0.01 0.00 0.01** 0.02*** 0.01* 0.01*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
inflation rate 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
dummy for Maastricht criteria (95-98) 0.66*** 0.57*** 0.50** 0.57** 0.50** 0.55** 0.55**
(0.20) (0.18) (0.18) (0.26) (0.24) (0.26) (0.26)
-0.56*** -0.59*** -0.60*** -0.61*** -0.59*** -0.63*** -0.63***
(0.20) (0.20) (0.21) (0.21) (0.20) (0.21) (0.22)
democratisation (rise=higher democratisation) 0.29** 0.09 0.08
(0.12) (0.16) (0.16)
democratisation * EU17 interaction 0.32*
(0.17)
democratisation * NMS10 interaction 0.17
(0.14)
democratisation * SEE6 interaction 0.59
(0.36)
control of corruption (higher=less corruption) 0.38*** 0.34* 0.41
(0.14) (0.18) (1.27)
control of corruption * EU17 interaction 0.94***
(0.28)
control of corruption * NMS10 interaction 0.54
(0.39)
control of corruption * SEE6 interaction 1.86*
(0.92)
democratisation * control of corruption interaction -0.01
(0.14)
dummy for EU17 -2.99* -1.95***
(1.58) (0.63)
dummy for NMS10 -1.89 -0.88***
(1.31) (0.28)
dummy for SEE6 -4.81 0.18
(2.99) (0.51)
constant -0.23 -2.86** -0.61** -1.38 -1.33
(0.29) (1.09) (0.23) (1.32) (1.28)
Observations 464 458 458 448 448 442 442
Number of instruments 20 21 25 21 25 22 23
Number of countries 33 32 32 33 33 32 32
Countries included (all=EU27+SEE6) all
all w/o Bosnia 
and Herz.
all w/o Bosnia 
and Herz.
all all
all w/o Bosnia 
and Herz.
all w/o Bosnia 
and Herz.
Period (maximum per country) 1995-2010 1995-2010 1995-2010 1996-2010 1996-2010 1996-2010 1996-2010
Year dummies included (not shown) 2002-2010 2002-2010 2002-2010 2002-2010 2002-2010 2002-2010 2002-2010
p-value for F-statistics, joint significance test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in differences 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in differences 0.45 0.31 0.29 0.63 0.66 0.51 0.52
Hansen test of overid. restrictions p-value 0.69 0.69 0.70 0.58 0.70 0.59 0.59
GMM instruments for levels: Hansen test excluding 
group p-value
0.42 0.40 0.43 0.52 0.53 0.48 0.48
GMM instruments for levels: Diff-in-Hansen test of 
exogeneity of instruments p-value
0.78 0.81 0.77 0.46 0.62 0.52 0.51
Source: Author's estimations. 
Cyclically-adjusted primary balance (HP trend GDP), % of nominal GDP
dummy for parliamentary elections (1 if elections 
held in that year)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Internal instruments are used for endogenous variables (the 
lagged dependent variable and the output gap). Lag limits are 1/2 for the lagged dependent variable and 2/3 for the output gap. The 'collapse' option is always used. 
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 In the last part of this subsection we analyse possible ideological effects on 
fiscal outcomes. In the absence of clear theoretical predictions, we do not have 
particular a priori expectations in this part. This also reflects the blurring of 
ideological divisions in recent years, as well as the constraints that economic 
developments and the crisis impose on policymaker actions, regardless of their 
ideological beliefs. Data for the ideological composition of the government cabinet 
and changes are taken from the Comparative Political Data Set III (Armingeon et al., 
2011), and are available only for the EU27 member states until 2009. Nevertheless, 
baseline results for the entire sample in column 1 of Table 3.7 do not change when we 
restrict the sample to EU27 countries between 1995 and 2009 in column 2. We 
proceed by adding a variable on the ideological composition of the cabinet, ranging 
from 1 for hegemony of right and centre parties to 5 for hegemony of left parties. 
While this factor is insignificant in the entire EU27 in column 3, the next column 
shows that it is important in old EU member states, as higher dominance of left-wing 
parties results in more negative budget balances. In columns 5 and 6 we use a dummy 
variable to check whether changes in the ideological composition of government 
affect fiscal policy, regardless of the direction of change, but we fail to find any effect, 
either for all EU27, or for the two separate groups of member states. However, the 
final two columns show that what is important is precisely the direction of change. In 
column 7 we add the "ideological gap", defined as the difference between the old and 
the new ideological composition of government (positive if moving to the left), and 
find that it is insignificant in the entire sample of EU27 member states. However, the 
interaction of this variable with dummies for country groups in column 8 of Table 3.7 
shows that the direction of ideological change was important in old EU member 
states, as changes to the left yield lower budget balances. This result corresponds to 
the previous findings – in old member states, both the ideological composition of the 
cabinet itself and the direction of change have a significant impact on policy, with 
left-dominated governments and changes to the left resulting in looser fiscal policy. 
On the other hand, the consistent absence of ideological effects in new member states 
can be explained by the fact that ideological definitions are less clear-cut in these 
countries, thus confirming similar findings by Lewis (2009). Certainly, political parties 
in NMS10 do define themselves along ideological lines, but the actual impact this has 
on fiscal policy is more blurred compared to the established democracies with longer 
traditions of ideological definitions of right-, centre- or left-oriented parties. This 
result on NMS10 should also be viewed in the light of economic policies being 
constrained by other factors related to the transition process, which are also 
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discussed in the next subsection. In these circumstances, actual government policies 
often reflected the broad consensus across the political spectrum on key economic 
issues and thus trumped the self-described party ideological divisions. 
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Column: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Dependent variable:
lagged dependent variable 0.69*** 0.68*** 0.68*** 0.68*** 0.68*** 0.68*** 0.68*** 0.69***
(0.07) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12)
output gap, % of HP trend GDP -0.15** -0.17** -0.17** -0.17*** -0.16** -0.17*** -0.17** -0.17***
(0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
lagged public debt, % of nom. GDP 0.01* 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
inflation rate 0.02*** 0.02** 0.02** 0.02*** 0.01** 0.02*** 0.02** 0.03***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
dummy for Maastricht criteria (95-98) 0.66*** 0.48** 0.48** 0.41** 0.48** 0.40** 0.45** 0.49**
(0.20) (0.19) (0.19) (0.20) (0.19) (0.18) (0.18) (0.21)
-0.56*** -0.63** -0.62** -0.63** -0.65** -0.65** -0.62** -0.66***
(0.20) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.24) (0.25) (0.23) (0.21)
ideological composition of cabinet (higher=left) -0.03
(0.07)
ideological composition * EU17 interaction -0.12**
(0.05)
ideological composition * NMS10 interaction 0.26
(0.17)
0.16
(0.26)
dummy for ideological change * EU17 interaction 0.17
(0.21)
dummy for ideological change * NMS10 interaction 0.12
(0.50)
0.05
(0.21)
ideological gap * EU17 interaction -0.27**
(0.11)
ideological gap * NMS10 interaction 0.63
(0.41)
dummy for EU17 0.48 0.10 0.11
(0.58) (0.61) (0.56)
dummy for NMS10 -0.99 -0.32 -0.35
(0.59) (0.39) (0.38)
dummy for SEE6
constant -0.23 -0.20 -0.13 -0.25 -0.20
(0.29) (0.44) (0.50) (0.44) (0.45)
Observations 464 387 386 386 387 387 385 385
Number of instruments 20 19 20 22 20 22 20 22
Number of countries 33 27 27 27 27 27 27 27
Countries included (all=EU27+SEE6) all EU27 EU27 EU27 EU27 EU27 EU27 EU27
Period (maximum per country) 1995-2010 1995-2009 1995-2009 1995-2009 1995-2009 1995-2009 1995-2009 1995-2009
Year dummies included (not shown) 2002-2010 2002-2009 2002-2009 2002-2009 2002-2009 2002-2009 2002-2009 2002-2009
p-value for F-statistics, joint significance test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in differences 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in differences 0.45 0.23 0.24 0.26 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.34
Hansen test of overid. restrictions p-value 0.69 0.47 0.50 0.50 0.47 0.51 0.51 0.47
GMM instruments for levels: Hansen test excluding 
group p-value
0.42 0.24 0.24 0.23 0.25 0.23 0.24 0.24
GMM instruments for levels: Diff-in-Hansen test of 
exogeneity of instruments p-value
0.78 0.71 0.78 0.81 0.67 0.84 0.80 0.70
Source: Author's estimations. 
Cyclically-adjusted primary balance (HP trend GDP), % of nominal GDP
dummy for parliamentary elections (1 if elections 
held in that year)
dummy for change in ideological composition of 
cabinet
ideological gap between new and old cabinet 
(rise=moving left)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Internal instruments are used for endogenous variables (the 
lagged dependent variable and the output gap). Lag limits are 1/2 for the lagged dependent variable and 2/3 for the output gap. The 'collapse' option is always used. 
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3.4.3 Constraints on fiscal policy and effects of fiscal governance 
 
 In this subsection we investigate additional factors which might act as 
constraints on fiscal policy. We start by analysing the effects of IMF arrangements 
and of exchange rate regimes, and then we move to the effects of fiscal rules and 
fiscal governance on fiscal outcomes. 
 Several countries were using IMF arrangements in various years in the period 
analysed in our sample, whether for balance of payment support (IMF programmes) 
or for poverty reduction and other social goals (IMF loans). IMF arrangements 
featured particularly in the early transition years, when they not only supported 
external sustainability but were also used to enhance structural reforms. In addition, 
the recent crisis forced some countries to turn to IMF supported programmes again. 
The IMF imposes several conditions on macroeconomic and structural policies that 
must be met during the course of the arrangement in order for a country to be able to 
withdraw resources that were previously agreed (make a 'purchase' or have a 'loan 
disbursement' in IMF parlance). This is usually done not all at once but in tranches, 
which ensures that the country makes continuous progress in achieving the goals 
agreed.  
  We expected to find a relatively strong effect of relations with the IMF on 
fiscal policy, since most of the arrangements were IMF programmes designed to cope 
with balance of payment problems or external sustainability. This means that they 
regularly imposed relatively strong constraints on fiscal policy as one of the main 
tools of demand management, which was primarily aimed at limiting country's 
imports and foreign borrowing. Therefore, after reproducing previous baseline 
results in column 1 of Table 3.8 below, in the second column we introduce a dummy 
variable that equals 1 if a country had in place an IMF arrangement, and zero 
otherwise (taken from IMF Annual Reports). We fail to find any effect of this factor on 
fiscal policy, and this result obtains across all country groups (column 3).  
This insignificance of IMF arrangements on fiscal outcomes is rather 
surprising bearing on mind the attention paid and constraints imposed on fiscal 
policy during their implementation. We suspected that the insignificance is due to the 
way of measurement of relations with the IMF. Indeed, there have been numerous 
cases when a country did have a programme or a loan arrangement with the IMF, but 
did not use it in reality, mostly because it did not have a need for doing so but chose 
to have an arrangement as a precautionary measure. In addition, there have also 
been cases when a country decided it was no longer willing to fulfil strict IMF 
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requirements, and hence chose to proceed with implementing its own policies and 
foregoing IMF resources. Therefore, in column 4 we check for effects of de facto IMF 
arrangements measured by the actual use of IMF funds by member states by using 
data on purchases and loan disbursements (from the IMF International Financial 
Statistics) as a share of nominal GDP. This measure thus omits cases when countries 
did not need or decided they did not want IMF funds any more, and focuses on cases 
when they actually used IMF funds. In this case, IMF arrangements have the expected 
and statistically significant positive sign, showing that a 'purchase' or a 'loan' from the 
IMF in the amount of 1% of GDP results in an improvement of the cyclically-adjusted 
primary balance to GDP ratio by 0.5 percentage points (column 4). According to 
column 5, where we analyse the effects of actual use of IMF arrangements by country 
groups, this significant effect of actual IMF arrangements is present in all country 
groups and is particularly strong in old EU member states. We suspected that this 
surprising result on the part of old EU member states was driven by the huge use of 
IMF resources by Greece in 2010, which is the only case in our sample when IMF 
funds were actually used by any old EU member state49. Therefore, in column 6 we 
drop Greece in 2010 from our sample. This yields unchanged results from the 
previous column, except for the omission of the interaction term between IMF 
arrangements and the dummy for EU17 because of collinearity50. According to these 
results, the actual use of IMF resources had an important effect on disciplining fiscal 
policy in NMS10, and even more so in SEE6 countries.  
 Further, we were also interested whether the actual use of IMF funds has an 
impact on the cyclicality of fiscal policy. Therefore, a dummy was created to equal 1 if 
a country actually used IMF funds in a particular year (regardless of the amount), and 
zero otherwise. In column 7 of Table 3.8, we interact this dummy with the output gap, 
and again omit Greece in 2010 from the sample. The results show that the actual use 
of IMF resources significantly changed the cyclical character of fiscal policy. Indeed, 
fiscal policy becomes counter-cyclical in years when IMF resources are actually used 
(the interaction term is positive), but remains significantly pro-cyclical otherwise. The 
insignificance of the dummy on IMF resources in itself suggests that the disciplining 
effect of IMF arrangements on fiscal policy was taking place through the imposition of 
counter-cyclical discretionary policies. This is to be expected, since IMF programmes 
were often used in cases of balance of payment problems reflecting excessive 
                                                
49 Ireland also had an IMF programme, but it did not use it in reality, i.e. did not make any 'purchase' in 
the period analysed.  
50 This is to be expected as the interaction variable now equals zero all the time and is thus perfectly 
collinear with the group dummy for EU17. 
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domestic demand. In such circumstances, the fulfilment of IMF arrangements in 
reality required more restrictive fiscal policy in order to dampen cyclical movements 
and consequently the balance of payment pressures.  
 In analysing constraints on fiscal policy, we were also interested on the 
possible effect of the exchange rate regime. Therefore, in column 8 of Table 3.8 we 
introduce the IMF regime classification from IMF Annual Reports and von Hagen and 
Zhou (2005), while column 9 shows results of across country groups. However, we fail 
to find any effect of the exchange rate regime on fiscal policy outcomes, since the 
regime is insignificant both when analysing the entire sample and when analysing 
particular country groups.  
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Column: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Dependent variable:
lagged dependent variable 0.69*** 0.70*** 0.71*** 0.69*** 0.70*** 0.70*** 0.72*** 0.71*** 0.72***
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07)
output gap, % of HP trend GDP -0.15** -0.16** -0.15** -0.14* -0.15* -0.14* -0.32** -0.16** -0.16**
(0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.12) (0.07) (0.07)
0.62**
(0.23)
lagged public debt, % of nom. GDP 0.01* 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
inflation rate 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.01*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02 0.02*** 0.02***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
dummy for Maastricht criteria (95-98) 0.66*** 0.63*** 0.57*** 0.66*** 0.52** 0.51** 0.36 0.68*** 0.44
(0.20) (0.19) (0.20) (0.22) (0.23) (0.24) (0.31) (0.19) (0.27)
-0.56*** -0.56*** -0.58*** -0.51** -0.48** -0.48** -0.48* -0.57** -0.57**
(0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.22) (0.23) (0.23) (0.25) (0.21) (0.21)
dummy for program or loan with IMF -0.21
(0.47)
-7.46
(14.33)
-0.09
(0.66)
-0.49
(0.48)
0.48**
(0.18)
1.13***
(0.30)
0.30* 0.29*
(0.16) (0.17)
0.66*** 0.64***
(0.18) (0.19)
0.12
(0.87)
-0.02
(0.05)
exchange rate regime * EU17 interaction 0.05
(0.08)
exchange rate regime * NMS10 interaction -0.05
(0.07)
exchange rate regime * SEE6 interaction -0.05
(0.04)
dummy for EU17 -0.03 0.27 0.18 -0.09
(0.50) (0.48) (0.47) (0.46)
dummy for NMS10 -0.42 -0.37 -0.44 -0.15
(0.40) (0.35) (0.35) (0.44)
dummy for SEE6 0.09 -0.02 -0.14 0.15
(0.46) (0.40) (0.41) (0.27)
constant -0.23 -0.15 -0.23 0.00 -0.14
(0.29) (0.31) (0.33) (0.37) (0.36)
Observations 464 464 464 464 464 463 463 464 464
Number of instruments 20 21 25 21 25 24 24 21 25
Number of countries 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33
Countries included (all=EU27+SEE6) all all all all all all all
Period (maximum per country) 1995-2010 1995-2010 1995-2010 1995-2010 1995-2010 1995-2010 1995-2010 1995-2010 1995-2010
Year dummies included (not shown) 2002-2010 2002-2010 2002-2010 2002-2010 2002-2010 2002-2010 2002-2010 2002-2010 2002-2010
p-value for F-statistics, joint significance test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in differences 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in differences 0.45 0.45 0.54 0.50 0.47 0.45 0.19 0.53 0.53
Hansen test of overid. restrictions p-value 0.69 0.71 0.76 0.43 0.35 0.30 0.31 0.70 0.70
GMM instruments for levels: Hansen test 
excluding group p-value
0.42 0.45 0.49 0.32 0.31 0.31 0.16 0.39 0.40
GMM instruments for levels: Diff-in-Hansen 
test of exogeneity of instruments p-value
0.78 0.76 0.80 0.46 0.35 0.27 0.56 0.84 0.85
Source: Author's estimations. 
Cyclically-adjusted primary balance (HP trend GDP), % of nominal GDP
output gap * dummy for actual purchases 
& loans from IMF
dummy for parliamentary elections (1 if 
elections held in that year)
actual purchases & loans from IMF, share 
of nominal GDP
actual purchases & loans from IMF * 
EU17 interaction
actual purchases & loans from IMF * 
NMS10 interaction
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Internal instruments are used for endogenous variables (the 
lagged dependent variable and the output gap). Lag limits are 1/2 for the lagged dependent variable and 2/3 for the output gap. The 'collapse' option is always used. 
actual purchases & loans from IMF * 
SEE7 interaction
dummy for IMF program/loan * EU17 
interaction
dummy for IMF program/loan * NMS10 
interaction
dummy for IMF program/loan * SEE6 
interaction
dummy for actual purchase/loan taken 
from IMF
exchange rate regime (higher=more 
flexibility)
all w/o Greece 2010
 
Table 3.8. Effects of IMF arrangements and the exchange rate regime 
108 
 
 Finally, in Table 3.9 we analyse the effects of fiscal rules and governance on 
fiscal policy outcomes. In this part, we use several synthetic indicators created by 
other authors and institutions as part of their research or work (which usually 
contains a more detailed measurement and analysis of various aspects of fiscal 
governance). To the best of our knowledge, there are no fiscal governance indicators 
for South-eastern European countries, which limits our investigation to the 27 EU 
member states. Therefore, after reproducing the baseline results for the entire sample 
in column 1 of Table 3.9, in column 2 we reproduce the baseline results on EU27, 
while in column 3 we add the standardised fiscal rule index of the European 
Commission. This indicator measures and aggregates the strength of fiscal rules 
according to their scope and impact on fiscal policy in various levels of government. 
Therefore, it shows the effect of fiscal rules imposed on the national level, which 
constrain fiscal policy beyond the wider Stability and Growth Pact. As expected, 
countries with stronger fiscal rules implement more disciplined fiscal policies 
(column 3). Column 4 indicates that fiscal rules have an equal effect in both strong 
and new member states. In addition, results in column 5 show that fiscal rules are 
having an independent effect, and are not affecting policy by changing its cyclical 
character, since the interaction term between the output gap and fiscal rules is 
insignificant, the coefficients on output gap and on fiscal rules are almost unchanged.  
 In the last two columns we investigate the effects of the type of fiscal 
governance. These indicators draw on the work by von Hagen (1992), Hallerberg and 
von Hagen (1999), Gleich (2003) and Fabrizio and Mody (2006). Broadly speaking, 
these authors measure various aspects of the institutional setup and the budgeting 
process to create two main fiscal governance types: delegation and contracts. In 
countries where delegation dominates, most of the authority on budget drafting and 
implementation is concentrated in a single person or institution (typically the finance 
minister or the prime minister), who tends to have a relatively strong discretionary 
power over other ministers. On the other hand, in countries with the 'contract' type, 
the budgetary process is usually much more subject to contracts and commitments by 
the government parties.  
 In practice, the two types of fiscal governance are not completely exclusive, so 
we add both indicators in column 6 of Table 3.9. We use indicators from Hallerberg 
et al. (2009) for old EU member states and Hallerberg and Yläoutinen (2010) for 
NMS10, and their availability shortens our sample to 1995-2007 for old and 1998-2007 
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for new EU member states51. Our findings suggest that the 'contract' type results in 
more disciplined policies, while the 'delegation' type has no impact on fiscal 
outcomes. However, results in column 7 indicate that there are significant differences 
across country groups regarding the effects of the type of fiscal governance. Indeed, 
the disciplining effect of the 'contract' type of fiscal governance is present only in 
NMS10, which could be explained by the fact that they tend to have coalition 
governments and are hence expected to adopt the 'contract' type of governance more 
often than old member states. On the other hand, the 'delegation' type of governance 
has a significantly negative effect on fiscal outcomes in old EU member states52, which 
argues against the prevalent practice of vesting powers of budget drafting and 
implementation in one person in these countries. 
 
                                                
51 We are grateful to Mark Hallerberg for providing additional information on the data on fiscal 
governance. 
52 As in all other cases, discretionary policy remains pro-cyclical in this specification, but now at a 
significance level just above 10%.  
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Column: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Dependent variable:
lagged dependent variable 0.69*** 0.70*** 0.70*** 0.71*** 0.79*** 0.53*** 0.48***
(0.07) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.10) (0.11)
output gap, % of HP trend GDP -0.15** -0.16** -0.17*** -0.17*** -0.14*** -0.12** -0.11
(0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05) (0.07)
output gap * fiscal rules index interaction -0.02
(0.09)
lagged public debt, % of nom. GDP 0.01* 0.01** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.01*** 0.01 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
inflation rate 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.00 0.03
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02)
dummy for Maastricht criteria (95-98) 0.66*** 0.47** 0.48** 0.44* 0.49** 0.47** 0.01
(0.20) (0.18) (0.20) (0.22) (0.18) (0.20) (0.23)
-0.56*** -0.60** -0.66** -0.65** -0.75*** -0.45** -0.36**
(0.20) (0.25) (0.26) (0.25) (0.26) (0.17) (0.17)
fiscal rules index (higher=stronger rules) 0.55*** 0.47***
(0.13) (0.12)
fiscal rules index * EU17 interaction 0.52***
(0.13)
fiscal rules index * NMS10 interaction 0.61***
(0.22)
delegation in fiscal governance -0.99
(0.77)
delegation * EU17 interaction -2.49**
(1.04)
delegation * NMS10 interaction 0.95
(1.14)
contracts in fiscal governance 1.58***
(0.50)
contracts * EU17 interaction 0.57
(0.37)
contracts * NMS10 interaction 1.83**
(0.84)
dummy for EU17 -0.48 2.24*
(0.40) (1.13)
dummy for NMS10 -0.63** -1.17
(0.28) (0.78)
constant -0.23 -0.27 -0.60** -0.55* 0.08
(0.29) (0.30) (0.27) (0.27) (0.66)
Observations 464 414 414 414 414 291 291
Number of instruments 20 20 21 23 24 19 22
Number of countries 33 27 27 27 27 25 25
Countries included (all=EU27+SEE6) all EU27 EU27 EU27 EU27
EU27 w/o 
Cyprus and 
Malta
EU27 w/o 
Cyprus and 
Malta
Period (maximum per country) 1995-2010 1995-2010 1995-2010 1995-2010 1995-2010 1995-2007 1995-2007
Year dummies included (not shown) 2002-2010 2002-2010 2002-2010 2002-2010 2002-2010 2002-2007 2002-2007
p-value for F-statistics, joint significance test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in differences 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in differences 0.45 0.19 0.25 0.25 0.31 0.35 0.41
Hansen test of overid. restrictions p-value 0.69 0.47 0.51 0.51 0.54 0.63 0.35
GMM instruments for levels: Hansen test 
excluding group p-value
0.42 0.22 0.24 0.24 0.29 0.77 0.70
GMM instruments for levels: Diff-in-Hansen test 
of exogeneity of instruments p-value
0.78 0.76 0.79 0.81 0.72 0.36 0.16
Source: Author's estimations. 
Cyclically-adjusted primary balance (HP trend GDP), % of nominal GDP
dummy for parliamentary elections (1 if 
elections held in that year)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Internal instruments are used for endogenous 
variables (the lagged dependent variable and the output gap). Lag limits are 1/2 for the lagged dependent variable and 2/3 for the output gap. The 'collapse' option 
is always used. 
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3.5 Extensions and robustness checks  
 
In this section we carry out several extensions and robustness checks. In order 
to keep our focus on the main issues and to streamline the discussion, we focus only 
on key issues of interest and limit our attention to the baseline specification on 
cyclicality from Eq. 18 (reproduced below), without the part of additional political, 
institutional and other variables in Xit. Similar to previous sections, diagnostic tests in 
this section indicate no serious problem with specification or the estimation method. 
The Arellano-Bond tests consistently indicate that there is first-order but not second-
order autocorrelation. Further, p-values of the Hansen test of over-identifying 
restrictions do not approach unity, but in a few cases drop below 0.25, which is the 
lower bound of the range suggested by Roodman (2009b). In addition, in all cases the 
difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets do not reject the 
validity of GMM instruments for levels, i.e. there is no preference for difference GMM 
over system GMM. The difference-in-Hansen test also indicates that in all cases the 
"steady state" assumption required for system GMM is fulfilled, and that there is no 
problem with error cross-section dependence (Sarafidis et al., 2009).  
 
 
                                                       Eq. 18 
  
where: 
Bal   - budget balance (total or primary, unadjusted or cyclically-adjusted) as 
a share of nominal GDP  
Cycle - indicator for cyclical movements of the economy (output gap) 
Debt  - public debt as a share of GDP 
Infl      - inflation rate 
X  - 1 x m vector of additional explanatory variables (economic, political, 
institutional)   
Θ - corresponding n x 1 vector of coefficients of additional explanatory 
variables 
 
 
3.5.1 Sources and asymmetries in the cyclicality of discretionary fiscal 
policy 
 
First, in Table 3.10 below we analyse the sources of cyclicality, i.e. whether the 
particular cyclical character of fiscal policy is a result of cyclically-adjusted revenues 
or of primary expenditures. Therefore, in the first column we reproduce baseline 
results, with the cyclically-adjusted primary balance as the dependent variable, while 
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in the next two columns we use the same specification to check for the cyclical 
character of cyclically-adjusted revenues and primary expenditures in the entire 
sample. Some of the findings are expected and in line with baseline results: there is 
considerable inertia in revenues and particularly expenditures, and election years 
result in lower revenues and higher expenditures, indicating heavy use of fiscal 
policy to affect election outcomes in the entire sample. However, in the light of the 
significantly negative output gap indicating pro-cyclical policy in column 1 (i.e. lower 
balance in expansions and higher balance in recessions), it is surprising that the 
output gap is insignificant in both the revenue and expenditure equations in columns 
2 and 3. This result means that both discretionary revenues and expenditures were a-
cyclical, although it should be noted that in column 3 revenues are borderline pro-
cyclical at a significance level of 12% (lower revenues in expansions).  
 Therefore, we delve into this issue further. In column 4 of Table 3.10 we 
reproduce the analysis of the cyclically-adjusted primary balance by country groups, 
while in columns 5 and 6 we do the same for cyclically-adjusted revenues and 
primary expenditures. The findings confirm our suspicion that there are significant 
differences in the cyclical character of revenues and expenditures between country 
groups, which explains the somewhat confusing result from the first 3 columns. 
Indeed, the significant negative output gap on both revenues and expenditures for old 
EU member states in columns 5 and 6 shows that revenues were pro-cyclical (falling 
in expansions and rising in recessions), while expenditures were counter-cyclical 
(falling in expansions and rising in recessions). These effects offset each other, thus 
yielding an a-cyclical discretionary fiscal policy, as indicated by the insignificant 
effect of the output gap on cyclically-adjusted balances for these countries in column 
4. On the other hand, the pro-cyclical policy in NMS10 from column 4 is completely 
explained by pro-cyclical revenues in column 5 (falling in expansions and rising in 
recessions), while the insignificant output gap for these countries in the expenditure 
equation in column 6 shows they were a-cyclical. Further, results for SEE6 are not 
clear cut. On the one hand, the significant negative output gap indicates strongly pro-
cyclical discretionary policy in these countries in column 4 (lower surplus in 
expansions and higher surplus in recessions). On the other hand, both revenues and 
expenditures are a-cyclical, as the output gap in these countries in columns 5 and 6 is 
insignificant. However, the output gap in the expenditure equation is significant only 
at a level of 15%, indicating that pro-cyclicality in South-eastern European countries is 
probably driven by expenditures, which rise in expansions and fall in recessions.  
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Finally, in the last two columns we also investigate the finding that, in the 
entire sample, elections cause falling revenues and rising expenditures (columns 2 
and 3). Interacting election years with country group dummies in columns 7 and 8 
shows that these results are completely driven by old EU member states. In this 
group, in election years, policy-makers try to affect their chances of re-election by 
lowering revenues (presumably by lowering taxes or offering tax-credits) and 
particularly by increasing expenditures. On the other hand, there is no such effect in 
transition countries, which is somewhat surprising since governing parties in these 
countries are almost regularly accused of heavy spending in election years. 
Nevertheless, these results are in line with findings in previous sections. In particular, 
they confirm previous results from Table 3.3  that elections have an important 
negative effect only in old EU member states. In addition, they are in line with 
findings in Subsection 3.4.1 that plurality electoral systems have a negative effect on 
fiscal policy in old EU member states. There we suspected that this might reflect the 
presence of pork-barrel projects, which is indirectly confirmed with the finding of 
higher spending in election years in old EU member states in column 8 of Table 3.10.  
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Column: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Dependent variable:
Cyclically-
adjusted 
primary 
balance (HP 
trend GDP), % 
of nom. GDP
Cyclically-
adjusted 
revenues (HP 
trend GDP), 
% of nom. 
GDP
Cyclically-
adjusted 
primary 
expenditures 
(HP trend 
GDP), % of 
nom. GDP
Cyclically-
adjusted 
primary 
balance (HP 
trend GDP), % 
of nom. GDP
Cyclically-
adjusted 
revenues (HP 
trend GDP), 
% of nom. 
GDP
Cyclically-
adjusted 
primary 
expenditures 
(HP trend 
GDP), % of 
nom. GDP
Cyclically-
adjusted 
revenues (HP 
trend GDP), 
% of nom. 
GDP
Cyclically-
adjusted 
primary 
expenditures 
(HP trend 
GDP), % of 
nom. GDP
lagged dependent variable 0.69*** 0.55* 0.74*** 0.70*** 0.89*** 0.59*** 0.33 0.70***
(0.07) (0.30) (0.26) (0.07) (0.16) (0.15) (0.32) (0.22)
output gap, % of HP trend GDP -0.15** -0.19 -0.06 -0.26** -0.11
(0.07) (0.12) (0.09) (0.11) (0.08)
output gap*EU17 interaction 0.02 -0.20*** -0.41***
(0.12) (0.07) (0.12)
output gap*NMS10 interaction -0.18*** -0.17*** -0.12
(0.04) (0.06) (0.08)
output gap*SEE6 interaction -0.27*** -0.12 0.21
(0.06) (0.52) (0.14)
lagged public debt, % of nom. GDP 0.01* 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00
(0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
inflation rate 0.02*** -0.06* -0.03 0.02*** 0.00 -0.03*** -0.04** -0.02
(0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
dummy for Maastricht criteria (95-98) 0.66*** 0.78 -0.19 0.83** -0.10 -0.52 0.98 -0.03
(0.20) (0.74) (0.73) (0.35) (0.33) (0.47) (0.73) (0.62)
-0.56*** -0.32** 0.42*** -0.49** -0.23 0.50***
(0.20) (0.15) (0.15) (0.19) (0.20) (0.17)
elections*EU17 interaction -0.25* 0.50***
(0.13) (0.11)
elections*NMS10 interaction -0.36 0.25
(0.31) (0.59)
elections*SEE6 interaction -0.42 0.43
(0.63) (0.43)
dummy for EU17 0.21 4.64 16.97*** 28.52** 12.68
(0.48) (6.87) (5.86) (13.43) (9.15)
dummy for NMS10 -0.17 4.04 15.49** 25.47** 11.67
(0.25) (6.28) (5.83) (11.67) (8.79)
dummy for SEE6 0.37 3.72 13.11** 25.22** 10.47
(0.29) (5.90) (5.03) (11.74) (8.23)
constant -0.23 17.71 10.12
(0.29) (11.45) (10.40)
Observations 464 484 465 464 484 465 484 465
Number of instruments 20 22 20 28 30 28 26 26
Number of countries 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33
Countries included (all=EU27+SEE6) all all all all all all all all
Period (maximum per country) 1995-2010 1995-2010 1995-2010 1995-2010 1995-2010 1995-2010 1995-2010 1995-2010
Year dummies included (not shown) 2002-2010 2002-2010 2002-2010 2002-2010 2002-2010 2002-2010 2002-2010 2002-2010
p-value for F-statistics, joint significance 
test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in differences 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.25 0.04
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in differences 0.45 0.35 0.66 0.63 0.26 0.72 0.43 0.68
Hansen test of overid. restrictions p-value 0.69 0.16 0.33 0.85 0.19 0.54 0.41 0.38
GMM instruments for levels: Hansen test 
excluding group p-value
0.42 0.26 0.40 0.58 0.34 0.20 0.28 0.35
GMM instruments for levels: Diff-in-Hansen 
test of exogeneity of instruments p-value
0.78 0.13 0.25 0.88 0.14 0.92 0.59 0.38
Source: Author's estimations. 
dummy for parliamentary elections (1 if 
elections held in that year)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Internal instruments are used for endogenous variables 
(the lagged dependent variable and the output gap). Lag limits are 1/2 for the lagged dependent variable (but 1/4 in columns 2, 5, 7 and 8) and 2/3 for the output gap. The 
'collapse' option is always used. 
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We also wanted to check for asymmetries in the cyclical character of fiscal 
policy, i.e. whether policy-makers react differently to cyclical movements in 
expansions and recessions. Therefore, after reproducing the baseline results on 
cyclically-adjusted primary balances in the first column, in Table 3.11 below we 
report the results from the interaction of the output gap with dummy variables for 
expansions and recessions (defined as ones in cases of positive and negative output 
gap, respectively, and zero otherwise). According to results in the second column, 
there was considerable asymmetry in fiscal policy reactions. In expansions, policy-
makers were reacting pro-cyclically by reducing budget balances (significantly 
negative coefficient on the output gap), while the reaction in recessions was a-cyclical. 
In the next two columns we check whether this reaction is dominated by revenues or 
primary expenditures. According to column 3, there is no particular asymmetry in 
revenues, i.e. the insignificant output gap interaction terms show revenues were a-
cyclical in both expansions and recessions, which fits with the previous finding that 
revenues in the entire sample were a-cyclical (column 2 of Table 3.10). However, 
results in column 4 of Table 3.11 indicate that fiscal policy asymmetry was in fact a 
reflection of asymmetric reaction of expenditures. The significantly positive 
interaction term for expansions indicates that they resulted in policy-makers feeling 
comfortable about the effects and length of the boom, and hence were reacting by 
increasing expenditures, which amounts to pro-cyclical policy. On the other hand, the 
interaction term for recessions is negative and borderline significant (p=0.12), which 
means that they were reacting in a borderline counter-cyclical manner by increasing 
expenditures in recessions. Overall, these results mean that policy-makers tend to 
increase expenditures regardless of cyclical output movements. This might also 
explain the previous finding of a-cyclical expenditures in column 3 of Table 3.10, 
which might reflect the offseting effects of pro-cyclical expenditures in expansions 
and (borderline) counter-cyclical expenditures in recessions.  
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Columns 1 2 3 4
Dependant variable Cyclically-adjusted 
primary balance (HP 
trend GDP), % of nom. 
GDP
Cyclically-adjusted 
primary balance (HP 
trend GDP), % of nom. 
GDP
Cyclically-adjusted 
revenues (HP trend 
GDP), % of nom. GDP
Cyclically-adjusted 
primary expenditures 
(HP trend GDP), % of 
nom. GDP
lagged dependant variable 0.69*** 0.72*** 0.49* 0.43
(0.07) (0.08) (0.28) (0.32)
output gap, % of HP trend GDP -0.15**
(0.07)
output gap*expansions interaction -0.54*** -0.07 0.30*
(0.13) (0.14) (0.15)
output gap*recessions interaction 0.13 -0.35 -0.49
(0.25) (0.27) (0.30)
lagged public debt, % of nom. GDP 0.01* -0.00 0.03 0.03*
(0.00) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01)
inflation rate 0.02*** 0.02** -0.06*** -0.05
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03)
dummy for Maastricht criteria (95-98) 0.66*** 0.65*** 0.89 0.37
(0.20) (0.24) (0.80) (1.05)
-0.56*** -0.61*** -0.35** 0.44***
(0.20) (0.22) (0.16) (0.15)
dummy for expansions 1.05** 19.83* 20.92
(0.49) (10.47) (12.57)
dummy for recessions 0.78 19.84* 21.14*
(0.66) (10.13) (12.42)
constant -0.23
(0.29)
Observations 464 464 484 465
Number of instruments 20 24 26 24
Number of countries 33 33 33 33
Countries included (all=EU27+SEE6) all all all all
Period (maximum per country) 1995-2010 1995-2010 1995-2010 1995-2010
Year dummies included (not shown) 2002-2010 2002-2010 2002-2010 2002-2010
p-value for F-statistics, joint significance test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in differences 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.09
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in differences 0.45 0.56 0.45 0.67
Hansen test of overid. restrictions p-value 0.69 0.66 0.26 0.66
GMM instruments for levels: Hansen test excluding 
group p-value
0.42 0.40 0.30 0.41
GMM instruments for levels: Diff-in-Hansen test of 
exogeneity of instruments p-value
0.78 0.75 0.26 0.74
Source: Author's estimations. 
dummy for parliamentary elections (1 if 
elections held in that year)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Internal instruments are used for endogenous 
variables (the lagged dependent variable and the output gap). Lag limits are 1/2 for the lagged dependent variable (1/4 in column 3) and 2/3 for the output gap. The 
'collapse' option is always used. 
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3.5.2 Sample splits and the effects of crisis 
  
In Table 3.12, we analyse the robustness of the baseline results (reproduced in 
column 1) to sample splits at various points. First, we analyse possible effects of the 
introduction of the euro, so in column 2 we limit our sample to start in 1999. Key 
results do not change compared to the baseline. Indeed, discretionary policy in the 
entire sample is still highly inertial and quite pro-cyclical (i.e. the output gap is 
negative), elections have a significant negative impact on fiscal discipline, while the 
coefficient on debt maintains the very small size from before, although it is now 
insignificant. The main change is related to inflation, which is again estimated at the 
same size, but becomes insignificant when the first four years are dropped. We 
suspect that this is related to the significant adjustment in the early years, when some 
transition countries were still fighting with high inflation, while future euro area 
members were bringing down inflation in their efforts to meet the Maastricht 
entrance criteria. Indeed, in the baseline (column 1) we control for euro run-up 
effects with a dummy variable that equals 1 for original euro area members between 
1995 and 1998 and 0 otherwise, but this variable drops out from column 2 because of 
the sample shortening.   
 We proceed by analysing the baseline results on cyclicality in particular 
country groups, which are reproduced in column 3. We are interested whether they 
are robust to splitting the sample in 2004, which corresponds to the largest EU-
enlargement. This sub-sample analysis, which splits the entire sample almost in half 
(9 and 7 years, respectively), is presented in the last two columns of Table 3.12 and it 
yields some important insights. According to these results, the cyclical character in 
EU17 and in SEE6 did not change before and after 2004. In the old EU member states, 
the insignificant output gap indicates that discretionary policy was a-cyclical in both 
sub-samples, while the negative output gap for SEE6 means it was pro-cyclical all the 
time (albeit a bit less so in the latter years). However, there is a considerable change 
for the new EU member states. In this group, the pro-cyclicality in the entire period 
(column 3) is driven by the latter years, when the output gap is significantly negative 
(column 5), while discretionary policy before 2004 was a-cyclical, as indicated by the 
insignificant output gap in column 4. Indeed, these results indicate that, once in the 
EU, policy-makers in these countries felt less pressured to implement disciplined 
fiscal policies, so the character of fiscal policy shifted from a-cyclical to pro-cyclical. 
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Column: 1 2 3 4 5
Dependent variable:
lagged dependent variable 0.69*** 0.71*** 0.70*** 0.56*** 0.75***
(0.07) (0.09) (0.07) (0.12) (0.07)
output gap, % of HP trend GDP -0.15** -0.17**
(0.07) (0.06)
output gap*EU17 interaction 0.02 -0.03 0.03
(0.12) (0.10) (0.17)
output gap*NMS10 interaction -0.18*** -0.02 -0.27***
(0.04) (0.12) (0.07)
output gap*SEE6 interaction -0.27*** -0.66** -0.48***
(0.06) (0.26) (0.12)
lagged public debt, % of nom. GDP 0.01* 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
inflation rate 0.02*** -0.02 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.07
(0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01) (0.07)
dummy for Maastricht criteria (95-98) 0.66*** 0.83** 1.31*
(0.20) (0.35) (0.73)
-0.56*** -0.69*** -0.49** -0.30 -0.41
(0.20) (0.20) (0.19) (0.28) (0.31)
dummy for EU17 0.21 -0.60 -0.49
(0.48) (1.01) (0.68)
dummy for NMS10 -0.17 -1.28 -0.33
(0.25) (0.96) (0.53)
dummy for SEE6 0.37 -2.22 0.23
(0.29) (1.34) (0.54)
constant -0.23 0.18
(0.29) (0.33)
Observations 464 372 464 236 228
Number of instruments 20 19 28 28 25
Number of countries 33 33 33 31 33
Countries included (all=EU27+SEE6) all all all
all w/o Bosnia 
and Serbia
all
Period (maximum per country) 1995-2010 1999-2010 1995-2010 1995-2003 2004-2010
Year dummies included (not shown) 2002-2010 2002-2010 2002-2010 1995-2003 2004-2010
p-value for F-statistics, joint significance test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in differences 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in differences 0.45 0.47 0.63 0.75 0.81
Hansen test of overid. restrictions p-value 0.69 0.81 0.85 0.50 0.73
GMM instruments for levels: Hansen test excluding 
group p-value
0.42 0.71 0.58 0.42 0.31
GMM instruments for levels: Diff-in-Hansen test of 
exogeneity of instruments p-value
0.78 0.63 0.88 0.49 0.98
Source: Author's estimations. 
Cyclically-adjusted primary balance (HP trend GDP), % of nominal GDP
dummy for parliamentary elections (1 if 
elections held in that year)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Internal instruments are used for 
endogenous variables (the lagged dependent variable and the output gap). Lag limits are 1/2 for the lagged dependent variable and 2/3 for the 
output gap. The 'collapse' option is always used. 
 
Table 3.12. Robustness to sample splits 
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 We continue robustness checks related to sample splits by returning to the 
puzzling results in Section 3.3. For ease of comparison, baseline results on overall and 
discretionary fiscal policy by country groups from Table 3.3 are reproduced in the 
first two columns of Table 3.13, and now we show the year dummies. The puzzle is 
related to the a-cyclicality of both discretionary and overall policy in old EU member 
states (insignificant output gap in these countries in the first two columns), which 
indicates that automatic stabilizers were not effective in shifting the a-cyclical 
discretionary policy towards a counter-cyclical overall fiscal policy. Our suspicion 
that this effect might be driven by crisis years is supported by the highly significant 
negative year dummies in the recent years in the first two columns, indicating that 
both discretionary and overall balances were more negative during the crisis. 
Therefore, we decided to omit 2009 and 2010 from the sample in order to isolate the 
cyclical character in 'normal' years. Results for discretionary and overall policy for 
the shorter sample in country groups are shown in columns 3 and 4. Omitting 2009 
and 2010 does not affect results for NMS10 and SEE6, since in these countries 
discretionary policy is again pro-cyclical (negative output gap indicating balances 
worsen in expansions and improve in recessions), while overall policy in these 
countries is a-cyclical, indicating that automatic stabilisers were effective in offsetting 
the pro-cyclical discretionary policy. However, there are significant differences in old 
EU member states. Omitting the crisis years again results in a-cyclical discretionary 
policy, but the significantly positive output gap in the last column indicates that 
overall policy was indeed counter-cyclical, i.e. balances were rising in expansions and 
falling in recessions. This result is in accordance with expectations, as it indicates 
that, in 'normal' times, automatic stabilizers are effective in old EU member states as 
well, since they move the a-cyclical discretionary policy into a counter-cyclical overall 
policy. Overall, this result indicates that the crisis did affect the effectiveness of 
automatic stabilizers in old EU member states (effective in 'normal' times but not in 
crisis years), whereas no such change can be detected in the two groups of transition 
countries, where stabilizers are effective throughout the period.  
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Column: 1 2 3 4
Dependent variable:
Cyclically-adjusted primary 
balance (HP trend GDP), % 
of nominal GDP 
Overall, unadjusted primary 
balance, % of nominal GDP
Cyclically-adjusted primary 
balance (HP trend GDP), % 
of nominal GDP 
Overall, unadjusted primary 
balance, % of nominal GDP
lagged dependent variable 0.70*** 0.72*** 0.66*** 0.63***
(0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.14)
output gap*EU17 interaction 0.02 0.18 0.13 0.43**
(0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.17)
output gap*NMS10 interaction -0.18*** -0.02 -0.13*** 0.03
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
output gap*SEE6 interaction -0.27*** 0.01 -0.38*** -0.12
(0.06) (0.06) (0.10) (0.12)
lagged public debt, % of nom. GDP 0.00 -0.00 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
inflation rate 0.02*** 0.01** 0.02*** 0.01***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
dummy for Maastricht criteria (95-98) 0.83** 0.85** 0.83** 1.03***
(0.35) (0.39) (0.34) (0.37)
-0.49** -0.51** -0.39* -0.46**
(0.19) (0.22) (0.21) (0.23)
dummy for 2002 -0.62 -0.69* -0.43 -0.63
(0.38) (0.39) (0.44) (0.47)
dummy for 2003 -0.23 -0.44 -0.13 -0.28
(0.26) (0.28) (0.38) (0.44)
dummy for 2004 -0.13 -0.07 -0.08 0.11
(0.31) (0.32) (0.48) (0.52)
dummy for 2005 0.19 0.27 0.24 0.31
(0.31) (0.36) (0.40) (0.48)
dummy for 2006 -0.17 0.05 -0.16 0.08
(0.25) (0.26) (0.40) (0.44)
dummy for 2007 0.13 0.17 -0.15 0.04
(0.44) (0.47) (0.57) (0.63)
dummy for 2008 -1.29*** -2.09*** -1.45*** -1.95***
(0.41) (0.41) (0.47) (0.65)
dummy for 2009 -2.15*** -4.30***
(0.45) (0.46)
dummy for 2010 -0.58* -0.43
(0.34) (0.56)
dummy for EU17 0.21 0.47 0.08 0.07
(0.48) (0.56) (0.69) (0.83)
dummy for NMS10 -0.17 0.16 -0.42 -0.31
(0.25) (0.35) (0.42) (0.52)
dummy for SEE6 0.37 0.53 0.23 0.13
(0.29) (0.33) (0.75) (0.96)
Observations 464 467 399 402
Number of instruments 28 28 26 26
Number of countries 33 33 33 33
Countries included (all=EU27+SEE6) all all all all
Period (maximum per country) 1995-2010 1995-2010 1995-2008 1995-2008
Year dummies included (not shown) 2002-2010 2002-2010 2002-2008 2002-2008
p-value for F-statistics, joint significance test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in differences 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in differences 0.63 0.54 0.93 0.74
Hansen test of overid. restrictions p-value 0.85 0.58 0.16 0.11
GMM instruments for levels: Hansen test 
excluding group p-value
0.58 0.30 0.16 0.13
GMM instruments for levels: Diff-in-Hansen test 
of exogeneity of instruments p-value
0.88 0.80 0.27 0.20
Source: Author's estimations. 
dummy for parliamentary elections (1 if 
elections held in that year)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Internal instruments are used for endogenous variables 
(the lagged dependent variable and the output gap). Lag limits are 1/2 for the lagged dependent variable and 2/3 for the output gap. The 'collapse' option is always used. 
 
Table 3.13. Effects of the crisis 
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3.5.3 Jack-knifing  
 
 In this subsection, we further analyse the robustness of baseline results on 
cyclicality for the entire sample and across country groups. In particular, we use the 
jack-knifing procedure to analyse whether our results are driven by any particular 
country. According to the Stata reference manual, the jack-knife is a relatively old 
method  
 
"...to produce an alternative, first-order unbiased estimator for a statistic; a 
data-dependent way to calculate the standard error of the statistic and to 
obtain significance levels and confidence intervals; and a way of producing 
measures called pseudo-values for each observation, reflecting the 
observation’s influence on the overall statistic." (StataCorp, 2009, p. 793).  
 
In the context of our analysis, jack-knifing is used to calculate pseudo-
coefficients when omitting one country at a time and re-estimating using the same 
specification and time period. This yields N such pseudo-coefficients for each variable 
in an estimation (33 for the entire sample in our case), as well as the accompanying 
standard errors. Then, the "mean of the pseudo-values is the alternative, first-order 
unbiased estimator..., and the standard error of the mean of the pseudo-values is an 
estimator for the standard error" (StataCorp, 2009, p. 794). In effect, this means that 
the jack-knifing produces several outputs that can be useful in distinguishing whether 
a particular country is driving the results. 
First, in Table 3.14 we start by reproducing the baseline results on cyclicality in 
the entire sample in column 1, while in the second column we report the results from 
the jack-knifing procedure53. In line with the description of the procedure above, jack-
knifing does not change the coefficient estimates, but it does calculate other standard 
errors. However, the standard errors are not too different from those in the baseline, 
meaning that the key variables maintain their significance. The only exception is 
debt, which is now insignificant (a change in p-value from 0.07 to 0.2). Further, in 
columns 3 and 4 we repeat the same procedure with the baseline results on the 
cyclical character of fiscal policy in different country groups. Again, baseline results 
on the cyclicality of discretionary policy across country groups are quite robust, since 
jack-knifing does not affect the significance of the interaction between country 
dummies and the output gap.  
                                                
53 The estimation output from jack-knifing in Stata does not report any additional information beyond 
the ones reported in Table 3.14.  
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Column: 1 2 3 4
Estimation: Baseline Jack-knifed standard 
errors
Baseline Jack-knifed standard 
errors
Dependent variable:
lagged dependent variable 0.69*** 0.69*** 0.70*** 0.70***
(0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.1)
output gap, % of HP trend GDP -0.15** -0.15**
(0.07) (0.07)
output gap*EU17 interaction 0.02 0.02
(0.12) (0.23)
output gap*NMS10 interaction -0.18*** -0.18***
(0.04) (0.07)
output gap*SEE6 interaction -0.27*** -0.27***
(0.06) (0.1)
lagged public debt, % of nom. GDP 0.01* 0.01 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
inflation rate 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.04)
dummy for Maastricht criteria (95-98) 0.66*** 0.66*** 0.83** 0.83*
(0.20) (0.24) (0.35) (0.45)
-0.56*** -0.56*** -0.49** -0.49*
(0.20) (0.21) (0.19) (0.26)
dummy for EU17 0.21 0.21
(0.48) (0.64)
dummy for NMS10 -0.17 -0.17
(0.25) (0.33)
dummy for SEE6 0.37 0.37
(0.29) (0.37)
constant -0.23 -0.23
(0.29) (0.37)
Observations 464 464 464 464
Number of instruments 20 28
Number of countries 33 33 33 33
Countries included (all=EU27+SEE6) all all all all
Period (maximum per country) 1995-2010 1995-2010 1995-2010 1995-2010
Year dummies included (not shown) 2002-2010 2002-2010 2002-2010 2002-2010
p-value for F-statistics, joint significance test 0.00 0.00
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in differences 0.00 0.00
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in differences 0.45 0.63
Hansen test of overid. restrictions p-value 0.69 0.85
GMM instruments for levels: Hansen test 
excluding group p-value
0.42 0.58
GMM instruments for levels: Diff-in-Hansen 
test of exogeneity of instruments p-value
0.78 0.88
Source: Author's estimations. 
Cyclically-adjusted primary balance (HP trend GDP), % of nominal GDP
dummy for parliamentary elections (1 if 
elections held in that year)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Internal instruments are used for endogenous 
variables (the lagged dependent variable and the output gap). Lag limits are 1/2 for the lagged dependent variable and 2/3 for the output gap. The 'collapse' 
option is always used. The estimation output from jack-knife in Stata does not report any information beyond the ones reported above.
 
Table 3.14. Jack-knifing of baseline results for cyclicality in the entire sample and for 
cyclicality across country groups 
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 Despite the fact that the coefficients are very robust, we decided to check 
further for the effect of particular countries by analysing the pseudo-values in more 
detail. Therefore, in Figure 3.2 we report the pseudo-values for each variable in the 
baseline estimation of discretionary policy in the entire sample (column 2 in Table 
3.14). These graphs contain the pseudo-coefficient of each variable if a particular 
country is dropped from the sample (the big diamonds), but also the 90% confidence 
interval for the pseudo-coefficient by using the jack-knifed standard error (the 
vertical lines) and the point estimate for each coefficient when the entire sample is 
used without dropping any country (the horizontal line). Panel (a) shows that the 
coefficient on lagged fiscal policy is very robust to dropping any country from the 
sample, since all pseudo-coefficients are close to the point estimate for the entire 
sample and significant, as the confidence intervals are far from zero. According to 
panel (b), the negative coefficient on the output gap indicating pro-cyclicality is also 
quote robust, as in most cases the pseudo-coefficients are close to the point estimate 
for the entire sample. However, there are a few countries whose omission would 
cause the confidence interval to just about cross the zero line, meaning that the 
output gap coefficient in those cases would be still be significant, but only at just 
above 10%. Further, in panel (c), the confidence interval on the debt coefficient in 
several cases does not include the zero line, indicating that there are several countries 
whose omission would result in the coefficient on debt becoming significant at 10% 
(contrasting with insignificance in the baseline results). However, in all cases the 
pseudo-coefficients on the debt coefficient are close to the estimate for the entire 
sample and remain very small. Panels (d) and (e) show that baseline results on 
elections and Maastricht criteria are quite robust. Indeed, all pseudo-coefficients are 
close to the baseline estimate for the entire sample, and the omission of any country 
would still not change their significance, as confidence intervals never cross the zero 
line. On the other hand, panel (f) indicates that pseudo-coefficients on inflation are 
significant and very close to the baseline estimate when dropping any country except 
Romania. Indeed, the wide confidence interval that includes zero when dropping 
Romania indicates that it is in fact driving the significance of this variable, as omitting 
Romania would make inflation insignificant. We suspect that this reflects the 
continuously high inflation in Romania, which has the highest average inflation in the 
sample of 31.3% between 1995 and 2010.  
 In Figure 3.3 we perform a similar check on baseline results of the cyclicality 
of discretionary policy across country groups (column 4 in Table 3.14). Panel (a) 
shows that the observed a-cyclical discretionary policy in old EU member states is 
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entirely driven by Greece. Indeed, dropping Greece has substantial effects, as the 
pseudo-coefficient of the output gap shifts from 0.02 to 0.22 and becomes highly 
significant. Therefore, if we dropped Greece from our sample, we would find counter-
cyclical discretionary policy in old EU member states instead of a-cyclical as in 
baseline. On the other hand, the omission of any other country yields pseudo-
coefficients that are fairly close to the baseline point estimate, and they are all 
insignificant since the 90% confidence interval includes the zero line, thus supporting 
the baseline finding of a-cyclical discretionary policy in old EU member states. 
Further, panels (b) and (c) of Figure 3.3 show that pro-cyclicality in the two groups of 
transition countries is quite robust. Indeed, fiscal policy in NMS10 and SEE6 remains 
significantly pro-cyclical if any country is omitted, since confidence intervals never 
cross the zero line. However, in a few cases, omitting particular countries does have 
some impact on the coefficient size.   
In light of these findings, we also check whether there is some other country 
driving the results on cyclicality across country groups if we first drop Greece. 
However, no other country has such an impact. Panel (d) of Figure 3.3 shows that the 
coefficient estimate for old EU member states when dropping any additional country 
moves around the point estimate from the sample that only omits Greece, while 
confidence intervals above zero also show that discretionary policy is counter-cyclical 
in all cases. As expected, robustness is also maintained for transition countries in 
panels (e) and (f) when dropping any additional country besides Greece.  
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Figure 3.2. Robustness of baseline results in the entire sample to country omissions from the sample (jack-knifing) 
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Figure 3.3. Robustness of baseline results on cyclicality across country groups to country omissions from the sample (jack-knifing): using the 
entire sample (panels a-c) and omitting Greece from the sample (panels d-f) 
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3.6 Conclusions   
 
This chapter has investigated the cyclical character and determinants of 
discretionary and overall fiscal policy in 33 European countries between 1995 and 
2010. The absence of an overall theory on the cyclical character and determinants of 
fiscal policy and the relatively small sample size greatly affect our model specification 
and estimation strategy. Consequently, we start from a relatively simple model, and 
then extend it with numerous variables. This makes it possible to both investigate the 
robustness of the baseline result on cyclicality to the introduction of additional 
variables as well as to analyse their direct effect on fiscal policy. After a 
comprehensive discussion of estimation methods, we decided to use system GMM as 
the most appropriate method for our sample and our aim of study.  
Baseline results show that discretionary fiscal policy in the entire sample 
between 1995 and 2010 has been pro-cyclical, i.e. it has aggravated economic 
fluctuations, whereas overall policy has been a-cyclical, reflecting the effect of 
automatic stabilizers. In addition, we find that policy-makers have paid little 
attention to public debt movements, which resonates well with the recent European 
debt crisis. Further, we find considerable differences in the cyclical character among 
country groups. In the transition countries, overall fiscal policy is a-cyclical, but 
discretionary policy is pro-cyclical, especially in South-eastern Europe, which means 
that policymakers in these countries react to economic fluctuations in a destabilizing 
manner. On the other hand, both discretionary and overall policies are a-cyclical in 
old EU member states, indicating that neither automatic stabilizers, nor policymaker 
actions are affecting economic fluctuations. However, robustness checks show that 
this result in old EU member states is driven by the recent crisis years, as overall 
policy was previously counter-cyclical due to effective automatic stabilizers. Further, 
discretionary policy is considerably more relaxed in election years in old EU member 
states, but there is no such effect in the two groups of transition countries. In 
addition, the founding euro area members undertook significant fiscal adjustment 
before the euro introduction. However, there is little evidence that the common 
currency in itself is imposing more discipline, as the Stability and Growth Pact is not 
affecting fiscal outcomes and the cyclical character of fiscal policy.  
 Baseline results are extended with numerous political, institutional and other 
factors suggested by theoretical or practical considerations. It must be noted that 
baseline results on cyclicality are very robust to these extensions. In this part, we find 
that determinants of fiscal policy often differ among country groups. In transition 
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countries, the number of checks in the system worsens fiscal outcomes, which 
provides some evidence for voracity effects, which are however not found in old 
member states. The strength of government in old and particularly new EU member 
states is an important factor for successful and considerable fiscal adjustment. In old 
EU member states and in South-eastern European countries, plurality electoral 
systems result in lower fiscal discipline. While this opposes theoretical predictions, a 
possible explanation is the existence of pork barrel projects, as policymakers employ 
fiscal policy to affect chances of their re-election. Further, we find no evidence of less 
disciplined and more pro-cyclical fiscal policies in democratic countries with 
corruption, although democracy and corruption separately improve balances in the 
entire sample. The ideological composition of cabinet has important implications in 
old member states, as left-oriented governments and moves to the left result in lower 
budget balances. However, this factor plays no role in new member states, which 
probably reflects more blurred ideological definitions in these countries, as well as 
stronger constraints on fiscal policy by other factors which went beyond party 
divisions. Indeed, we find that IMF arrangements acted as a strong disciplining factor 
on fiscal policy in transition countries, but only if they were actually used, while the 
mere existence of an arrangement has no impact on fiscal policy. On the other hand, 
there is no effect of the type of the exchange rate regime in any country group. 
Finally, we find that fiscal rules impose more disciplined policies in both old and new 
member states. On the other hand, the effect of fiscal governance depends on the 
particular governance type. In new member states, the prevalent contract type results 
in more disciplined policies, while the delegation type dominant in old member states 
results in lower fiscal discipline in these countries.  
  We also carry out numerous robustness checks of baseline results. In this part, 
we find that baseline results are fairly robust to sample splits for the introduction of 
the euro and for the EU enlargement, with the important exception that discretionary 
policy in new member states turns from a-cyclical to pro-cyclical once they gain EU 
membership. Further, shortening the sample for the recent crisis years yields 
unchanged results for transition countries, but counter-cyclical overall policy in old 
EU member states before the crisis, as noted above. Finally, robustness checks using 
jack-knifing also indicate that baseline results are fairly robust for the entire sample. 
However, regarding differences among country groups, the jack-knifing procedure 
shows that the finding of a-cyclical discretionary policy in old EU member states is 
completely driven by Greece, as its omission from the sample would result in finding 
counter-cyclical discretionary policy in these countries.   
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Our analysis provides several important recommendations for policy-makers. 
The finding of pro-cyclical discretionary policy in the two groups of transition 
countries means that in these countries discretionary measures by policy-makers are 
in fact exacerbating economic fluctuations. Therefore, considerable efforts are 
needed to eliminate the amplifying effect of discretionary measures on economic 
fluctuations, and to move discretionary policy in a counter-cyclical direction. This 
could be achieved by better and timelier estimates of cyclical output movements, as 
well as better macroeconomic forecasts. In turn, this could then help a better design 
and implementation of discretionary measures in order to react to forecasts of 
economic fluctuations, given the implementation lags of fiscal policy. The removal of 
the pro-cyclical character of discretionary policy would also contribute in overall 
policy becoming counter-cyclical, bearing on mind that automatic stabilizers are 
found to be effective in all groups of European countries. Further, policymakers in all 
three country groups need to pay much more attention to debt sustainability. The 
results of our analysis and the ongoing European debt crisis indicate that insufficient 
attention was paid to this issue in the past.  
The analysis of various political, institutional and other determinants of fiscal 
policy also yields some important recommendations. Most notably, fiscal policy is less 
disciplined in election years, indicating that policy-makers employ fiscal policy in 
order to improve their re-election chances. Therefore, considerable efforts are needed 
to remove this political business cycle effect, which is found mostly in old EU member 
states, although transition countries are not expected to be immune to it as well. One 
way to do so would be the use of fiscal rules, which are already employed in several 
countries. Although we do not investigate this issue in detail, our analysis does 
suggest that the strength of fiscal rules has a disciplining effect on budget balances. In 
addition, efforts to increase levels of democratisation and to control corruption are 
also expected to lead to better fiscal outcomes. This is particularly important for 
South-eastern European countries, which still lag behind EU member states regarding 
these indicators. Finally, upon eventual membership in the EU, which is their long-
term goal, South-eastern European countries should try to avoid the experience of 
new EU member states, which appear to have shifted towards pro-cyclical 
discretionary policy once they acceded to the EU.  
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4.1 Theoretical background 
  
  The effects of fiscal policy on output in the short-run (fiscal multipliers) have 
been the focus of macroeconomics since its establishment as a separate discipline in 
the wake of the Great Depression. However, after the failure of Keynesian models in 
1970s, the focus of academic research moved towards monetary policy. Only in the 
late 1990s were empirical researchers starting to come back to the possible effects of 
fiscal policy on output, whereas the theoretical literature started to incorporate fiscal 
policy in theoretical models. The recent global economic and financial crisis and the 
restricted effectiveness of monetary policy due to the zero lower bound of interest 
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rates reignited the interest of academics and policymakers in the effectiveness of 
fiscal policy, and in particular in the short-run effects on output. Indeed, as Romer 
(2011) notes, between 2009 and 2011 there have been more studies on the effects of 
fiscal policy than in the previous quarter century.   
 The theoretical prescriptions on the fiscal multiplier are fairly diverse, and 
depend on the model assumptions. Therefore, in presenting the various theoretical 
predictions, it is useful to start from the systematisation of theories54 provided by an 
excellent theoretical and empirical review of Hebous (2011), and then briefly analyse 
the predicted size and signs of fiscal multipliers in the main theoretical studies. The 
first line of division of economic theories is whether they incorporate forward-
looking behaviour by economic agents, and then whether they are applied to closed 
or open economies.  
 
 
4.1.1 Traditional theories 
 
Among the traditional theories, i.e. the ones without forward-looking 
behaviour, the classical theory predicts no effects of fiscal policy on output, which 
reflects the assumptions of fully flexible prices and a vertical aggregate supply curve. 
On the other hand, conventional Keynesian theory predicts that fiscal policy has an 
important effect on output movements, which is usually presented via the IS-LM 
framework for closed economies, appended by the Mundell-Fleming model for open 
economies. The main assumptions of Keynesian models are that prices are sticky, 
consumption depends on current and not on future income and usually that money 
supply is fixed. In these circumstances, in closed economies, higher government 
spending causes higher aggregate demand which increases output due to the sticky 
prices (non-vertical aggregate supply curve in the short-run). Higher output increases 
income, and therefore private consumption rises. The higher income also increases 
the money demand, which in turn contributes to higher interest rates, given the fixed 
money supply, and thus dampens private investments via the crowding out. However, 
overall investments can also be higher if private investments are more responsive to 
the higher output than to the higher interest rate or if part of the higher government 
spending takes the form of higher public investment. The tax multiplier has a similar 
                                                
54 Our survey is focused on the most important theoretical models, which are almost exclusively related 
to advanced countries (typically the United States). This explains the absence of theoretical models on 
fiscal policy for transition countries in our survey, which is similar to other studies that survey the 
theoretical literature (e.g. Hebous (2011) and Hemming et al. (2002)). 
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direction, although the effects of tax cuts have a lower magnitude due to the 
propensity to save part of the higher income. Therefore, conventional Keynesian 
theory predicts the fiscal multipliers are positive mostly due to their favourable 
effects on private consumption and possibly on private investment. However, 
Giavazzi and McMahon (2013) note that, while Keynesian theory also predicts a rise 
in real wages, it does not provide explicit prescriptions on the labour supply and the 
hours worked (due to the absence of wealth effects in Keynesian models), which is a 
key feature of modern models described below.  
 The Mundell-Fleming model extends the Keynesian IS-LM framework to open 
economies. However, an important additional distinction is necessary here, related to 
the exchange rate regime. In countries with flexible exchange rates and perfect 
capital mobility, the higher interest rate associated with higher aggregate demand 
will result in an inflow of capital. This will in turn cause nominal appreciation of the 
domestic currency, which also translates into real appreciation due to the sticky 
prices. Further, the real appreciation will worsen the trade balance, which offsets the 
positive effects of fiscal policy on output, although private consumption is still higher. 
On the other hand, in countries with fixed exchange rates, the central bank will 
respond to pressures for nominal appreciation by increasing the money supply, 
which in turn contributes further to higher output. Therefore, although there are 
variations depending on the extent of capital mobility or the expenditure switching 
effects, the general prediction of the Keynesian theory for open economies is that 
fiscal policy is effective in countries with a fixed exchange rate regime, and the 
opposite holds for countries with flexible exchange rates.   
 
 
4.1.2 Modern (dynamic-optimising) theories 
 
 Traditional Keynesian models are hardly used in modern macroeconomics due 
to the lack of microeconomic foundations and the omission of rational expectations. 
Instead, modern macroeconomics has evolved to incorporate important theoretical 
and modelling insights of the 1970s and 1980s, by relying largely on Dynamic 
Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models, which are also used in advanced 
economies’ central banks for policy analysis and forecasting. DSGE models rely on the 
neo-classical methodology of general equilibrium analysis of inter-temporal 
optimisation by rational economic agents. This means that DSGE models include 
forward looking economic agents, which form their decisions based on rational 
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expectations. After deriving the optimising and equilibrium conditions and 
linearising around the steady state to get a set of linear equations and then defining 
model parameters by calibration or estimation, models are shocked by stochastic 
disturbances (e.g. fiscal or monetary policy shocks or productivity shocks) in order to 
find out the response of the main variables of interest.  
DSGE models are not unique and can be broadly divided in two groups, 
depending on the modelling of prices and possibly, market structure, somewhat 
resembling the old division into classical economics and Keynesian theory. DSGE 
models that incorporate flexible prices and perfect competition in all markets belong 
to Real business cycle (RBC) models. On the other hand, New Keynesian DSGE 
models55 typically include price rigidities and possibly other frictions in the economy. 
Most DSGE models, either of the RBC or the New Keynesian variety, are not focused 
on fiscal policy. Indeed, their primary focus is the analysis and explanation of 
business cycles, which relies on real shocks (RBC) or on various frictions in the 
economy which give rise to an effective monetary policy (New Keynesian). However, 
as discussed below, several recent DSGE models are extended to incorporate fiscal 
policy and to yield predictions for the effects of fiscal policy shocks (e.g. Linnemann 
and Schabert (2003) and Smets and Wouters (2007)). It should also be noted that most 
DSGE models apply to closed economies, although several studies extend them to 
open economies (e.g. Monacelli and Perotti (2010)), as discussed below.  
 Several authors build RBC models in order to analyse business cycles and the 
responses to various types of shocks (e.g. Aiyagari et al. (1992) or Baxter and King 
(1993)). In these models, the key channels for fiscal policy are wealth effects, inter-
temporal effects and disturbances to first order conditions (Ramey, 2011b). In 
addition, there are no lending constraints for economic agents, the production 
function has constant returns to scale and the utility function is separable in 
consumption and leisure (Perotti, 2008), which makes them complements. The 
starting assumption in baseline RBC models is that government spending shocks are 
financed by lump-sum, i.e. non-distortionary taxes. Households, which are forward-
looking, treat a government spending shock as an increase in the present value of 
future taxes. Therefore, due to the negative wealth effects they lower their current 
consumption and increase the labour supply, which in turn contributes to higher 
output. The higher labour supply also contributes to lower real wages and lower 
marginal productivity of labour, which in turn contributes to higher private 
                                                
55 For excellent reviews on the development of the new neoclassical synthesis as the consensus in 
modern macroeconomics, including the adoption of DSGE models and the New Keynesian theory, see 
Goodfriend (2007) and Woodford (2009). 
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investments due to the higher marginal productivity of capital. In the baseline RBC 
model, due to hypothesized Ricardian equivalence, it does not matter whether 
government spending is financed by a higher deficit or higher current taxes, while 
distortionary taxes such as labour income taxes would result in lower labour supply 
and lower output (Ramey, 2011b). In an extended version of the baseline RBC model, 
Burnside et al. (2004) introduce investment adjustment costs and persistent habits in 
personal consumption as important features of preferences and technology. 
However, the results of the baseline RBC model still hold, albeit with a more 
protracted response by employment and investment.  
  New Keynesian models also use the RBC methodology, which relies on inter-
temporal optimisation by rational economic agents. However, New Keynesian models 
depart from the assumptions of a frictionless world inherent to RBC models, most 
notably by incorporating price stickiness and often monopolistic competition in DSGE 
models. Standard New Keynesian models such as the seminal models of Christiano 
et al. (2005), Smets and Wouters (2003) and Smets and Wouters (2007) are primarily 
focused on the response to monetary policy shocks56, although the latter incorporate 
government spending shocks as well. Linnemann and Schabert (2003) are among the 
first to focus more closely on the role of fiscal policy in the New Keynesian models, 
and they also incorporate monopolistic competition in their model. The baseline 
predictions of New Keynesian models are similar to RBC models due to the prevalence 
of wealth effects. More precisely, in baseline New Keynesian models, the government 
spending shock also results in negative wealth effects, which cause households to 
lower their consumption and increase their labour supply. In circumstances of price 
stickiness and monopolistic competition, firms react to the higher demand by 
producing more output (Perotti, 2008). The higher output results in higher labour 
demand which offsets the increase in labour supply, resulting in higher real wages. 
Nevertheless, this increase in wages is generally insufficient to offset the dominant 
negative wealth effects on consumption (Beetsma and Giuliodori, 2011). Related to 
this, Linnemann and Schabert (2003) find that a positive response of consumption is 
possible only if monetary policy is sufficiently accommodative.  
  Overall, both the neoclassical theory (RBC models) and New Keynesian models 
find that government spending shocks cause higher output, although the size of the 
fiscal multiplier is generally lower than one. This implies lower private consumption 
and higher labour supply, whereas there are divergent predictions on real wages and 
labour demand. Therefore, the prediction on the reaction of output is insufficient to 
                                                
56 For a description of standard New Keynesian models, see Clarida et al. (1999) or Woodford (2003).  
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discriminate which theory describes macroeconomic reality better57. In addition, 
most empirical studies (surveyed in Section 4.2) also find that government spending 
has positive effects on output. More importantly, the predicted fall in private 
consumption in both theories is opposite to the findings in most of the empirical 
literature that government spending shocks cause higher consumption. This 
contradiction motivated several extensions of both RBC and New Keynesian models 
(surveyed below), aimed at reconciling theoretical results with empirical evidence. 
Indeed, empirical studies, which slightly preceded the more detailed incorporation of 
fiscal policy in theoretical models in the 2000s, have strongly affected the theoretical 
modelling of fiscal policy (Caldara and Kamps, 2008). 
 
 
4.1.3 Extensions of baseline RBC and New Keynesian models 
 
 Various studies have provided extensions of baseline RBC and New Keynesian 
theoretical models. In several cases, these extensions are aimed at addressing the 
puzzle of lower private consumption in the wake of spending shocks in theoretical 
models, as opposed to the higher private consumption, which is found in most 
empirical studies. For instance, Linnemann (2006) uses an RBC model, but introduces 
non-separability in the utility of consumption and leisure, which makes them 
substitutes (as opposed to complements in baseline RBC), as well as an intertemporal 
consumption elasticity smaller than one. In such a setting, government spending 
shocks again cause higher labour supply and lower leisure due to negative wealth 
effects. However, now the fall in leisure causes a rise in the marginal utility of 
consumption, so the households both supply more labour and consume more58 in 
order to compensate the negative wealth effects. As a result, for reasonable 
parameter values, in this model government spending shocks cause an increase in 
consumption, employment and output, while real wages are lower. Therefore, 
Linnemann (2006) concludes that the findings of the empirical literature conform to 
the standard theoretical framework of intertemporal optimisation by representative 
rational agents. Further, Ravn et al. (2006) extend an RBC model with monopolistic 
competition and 'deep habits' in the personal consumption of individual goods59. This 
                                                
57 Responses of private investment are less clear in theoretical models, and may depend on numerous 
factors (Perotti, 2008).  
58 However, Bilbiie (2009) notes that the positive response of consumption is possible only if it is an 
inferior good.  
59 'Deep habits' refers to consumers forming habits from the consumption of individual goods, as 
opposed to the standard assumption of habit formation from the consumption of a single aggregate good 
(Ravn et al., 2006).   
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combination makes the price markup over marginal cost time-variant, unlike the 
time-invariant markups in most other models. Their main finding is that markups 
behave counter-cyclically in equilibrium. This means that the higher output as a 
result of the positive government spending shock also causes a decline in markups, 
which is in line with the empirical literature (Rotemberg and Woodford, 1999). 
Therefore, in this model, the increase in government spending has the usual wealth 
effects of a fall in consumption and higher labour supply, which would have a 
downward pressure on wages in the absence of deep habits. However, the 
countercyclical behaviour of markups due to the presence of deep habits (i.e. their 
fall) contributes to a higher demand for labour, which offsets the rise in labour 
supply and hence contributes to higher real wages in equilibrium. The higher real 
wages in turn lower leisure and increase consumption. Therefore, Ravn et al. (2006) 
conclude that their model modifies the standard RBC predictions, and moves them in 
line with empirical findings of higher consumption in the case of government 
spending shocks, although the magnitude of this rise is smaller than in most empirical 
studies. Finally, another way of finding a positive reaction of consumption to 
government spending shocks is to relax the assumption of intertemporal optimisation 
by economic agents, which is a strategy pursued by Galí et al. (2007). In their New 
Keynesian model, they incorporate the proposal by Mankiw (2000) that DSGE models 
should allow heterogeneity of households, since in reality part of them do not smooth 
consumption but instead consume all of their current disposable income (for reasons 
such as borrowing/lending constraints or myopia). Therefore, Galí et al. (2007) extend 
a standard New Keynesian model with sticky prices to allow the existence of 
Ricardian and non-Ricardian households, with the latter behaving according to a rule 
of thumb and consuming all their disposable income each period, without borrowing 
or saving. While standard results such as higher labour supply due to wealth effects 
are still present in the model, sticky prices enable real wages to rise as a result of 
government spending shocks. However, the combination of higher employment and 
rising real wages also contributes to higher current income, which increases the 
consumption of rule-of-thumb consumers. Galí et al. (2007) conclude that this also 
leads to a rise in overall consumption for empirically plausible parameter values, 
which brings results closer to the main findings in empirical studies. However, using 
the estimated euro area model by Smets and Wouters (2003) and extending it with 
rule-of-thumb consumers, Coenen and Straub (2005) find that there is low probability 
of a positive response of overall consumption to government spending shocks, mostly 
because of the low share of rule-of-thumb consumers, as well as large negative wealth 
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effects. Regarding the model in Galí et al. (2007), Ramey (2011a) also notes that 
several "ultra-Keynesian" features such as sticky prices, high share of rule-of-thumb 
consumers and off-the-labour-supply-curve60 assumptions are necessary to generate a 
positive response of private consumption to government spending.  
 The division into RBC and New Keynesian models can also be extended to a 
relatively diverse body of theoretical literature on open economies. The international 
business cycle model was laid out in a seminal paper by Backus et al. (1994), whereas 
the New Keynesian ideas dominate in the large field on new open economy 
macroeconomics, which is largely based on Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995). However, in 
the open economy literature there are additional factors which complicate the 
derivation of straightforward theoretical predictions on the effects of government 
spending shocks, such as the completeness of international asset markets, the 
openness and the extent of asset substitutability across borders61 (Beetsma and 
Giuliodori, 2011).  
 In the frictionless international RBC model of Backus et al. (1994), a shock to 
government spending has a positive effect on output and a negative effect on private 
consumption due to negative wealth effects, which resembles the predictions of RBC 
models for closed economies. However, their model also predicts a worsening of 
terms of trade and of the trade balance. Further, the benchmark open economy DSGE 
model of Monacelli and Perotti (2010) also entails a fall in private consumption due to 
wealth effects, which causes real appreciation of the exchange rate due to 
international risk-sharing, and this result holds in a variety of model specifications. 
On the other hand, the Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) model predicts that the fall in 
private consumption due to wealth effects also induces a fall in money demand, 
which under fixed money supply requires a rise in the price level in order to restore 
the money market equilibrium. Due to the purchasing power parity, the increase in 
the domestic price level further entails nominal depreciation of the domestic 
currency.  
 
 
 
                                                
60 This is the version of the model in Galí et al. (2007) that assumes imperfectly competitive labour 
markets, where households meet all the labour demand from firms as long as wages are above the 
households' marginal rate of substitution.  
61 A more detailed review of the theoretical literature on the effects of fiscal policy in open economies is 
beyond the scope of our study. See the appendix in Abbas et al. (2011) for a useful survey of the relevant 
literature and Corsetti and Muller (2006) for a discussion of the main issues related to the international 
fiscal policy transmission and twin deficits in theoretical models.  
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4.1.4 The sign and size of fiscal multipliers  
 
There are also differences in the theoretical literature regarding the predicted 
size and even sign of fiscal multipliers, i.e. the effects of fiscal policy on output. For 
instance, Leeper (2010) notes that the one clear message from the vast empirical and 
theoretical literature is that fiscal multipliers are "all over the map". Coenen et al. 
(2012) note that despite numerous advantages of structural economic models, the 
incomplete consensus on structural features and calibration can have an important 
effect on results on fiscal multipliers. From the classes of models surveyed above, the 
old Keynesian models, represented in the IS-LM framework, have fiscal multipliers 
larger than one. On the other hand, the baseline RBC model of Baxter and King (1993) 
yields short-run output multiplier ranges between -2,5 and below 1, depending on 
whether government shocks are temporary or permanent, and whether they are 
financed by lump-sum or distortionary taxes. In their meta-regression analysis, 
Gechert and Will (2012) also note that the size of fiscal multipliers in neoclassical 
models is usually between zero and one. Extensions of the RBC framework also yield 
multipliers lower than one, which is related to the prevalence of Ricardian effects in 
these models in absence of frictions in the economy.  
The addition of various frictions is generally not sufficient to bring multipliers 
above one, as findings from various New Keynesian DSGE models point out. For 
instance, in an estimated New Keynesian DSGE model for the euro area, Smets and 
Wouters (2003) find that output multipliers for government spending are positive, but 
lower than one, and this also holds with flexible prices and wages. Cogan et al. (2010) 
find similar results when using the estimated New Keynesian model on the US 
economy by Smets and Wouters (2007), i.e. that government spending has a positive 
effect on output, but the multiplier is still lower than one. When introducing rule-of-
thumb households, they find a slightly higher multiplier, but this extension does not 
have a significant quantitative impact on results. In addition, in their extension of a 
standard sticky price New Keynesian model with rule-of-thumb (non-Ricardian) 
households, Galí et al. (2007) find that output multipliers are positive, but they exceed 
one only if labour markets are non-competitive or the share of rule-of-thumb 
households significantly exceeds the baseline of 50%. Indeed, Ramey (2011b) notes 
that these two features essentially transform the New Keynesian into an old 
Keynesian model. Further, there are several studies which compare fiscal multipliers 
for various New Keynesian models. For instance, Gechert and Will (2012) provide a 
meta-regression analysis of 89 theoretical and empirical papers on fiscal multipliers. 
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Regarding New Keynesian models, they note that the size of the fiscal multiplier is 
generally between zero and one, although it can exceed these bounds in several 
particular cases. For instance, multipliers can be negative (i.e. fiscal contractions can 
be expansionary) in cases of non-linear or non-Keynesian effects of fiscal policy62. 
Multipliers higher than one can be obtained when introducing rule-of-thumb 
households (as surveyed above) or when the monetary policy is at the zero-lower-
bound. Indeed, the latter case, which is highly relevant in current economic 
circumstances in advanced countries, is probably the only one where there is some 
agreement in the literature that fiscal multipliers can be large. Several recent studies 
in the New Keynesian framework conclude that, in a deflationary environment and 
with monetary policy constrained by the zero lower bound of interest rates, higher 
government spending financed by higher deficits can yield higher inflationary 
expectations (e.g. Christiano et al. (2011) or Woodford (2011)). With constant nominal 
interest rates, higher expected inflation results in lower real interest rates, thus 
reigniting economic activity and yielding fiscal multipliers considerably larger than 
one. The results on large fiscal multipliers in circumstances with accommodative 
monetary policy, which includes circumstances of zero-lower-bound, are also 
confirmed by Coenen et al. (2012) in their detailed comparison of several structural 
DSGE models used in leading national and international policy institutions. More 
generally, they find that short-run fiscal multipliers in all models surveyed can be 
sizable, although the detailed results presented show that they exceed one only in a 
relatively limited number of cases, regardless of the model.  
Overall, the models surveyed offer different routes to replicate the empirical 
findings of rising consumption in the wake of government spending shocks. Related 
to this, the size of the fiscal multiplier depends largely on the type of model used, 
various model assumptions and innovations, the type of fiscal instrument, the way of 
financing of government spending, the behaviour of monetary policy and the 
particular calibration or estimation also means there is still no consensus on the 
particular effects of government spending on output in the theoretical literature. This 
also applies to the transmission channels of fiscal policy effects on consumption and 
other important macroeconomic variables. This coincides with warnings by several 
other studies that there is no single fiscal multiplier. Therefore, in the next section we 
                                                
62 This is often labelled as expansionary fiscal consolidations (or equivalently recessionary fiscal 
expansions). Alesina and Ardagna (2010) note that such effects could work through demand channels 
(e.g. via positive wealth effects if current fiscal contraction reduces expectations for future contractions, 
or via lower premiums on government bonds) and through supply channels (via the labour market and 
the individual supply of labour). However, a more detailed survey of the theoretical literature on non-
Keynesian effects of fiscal policy is beyond the scope of the current study.  
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will survey in more details the empirical literature on fiscal multipliers, which is even 
more voluminous than the theoretical literature. While results between theoretical 
models and empirical studies differ in several cases, not least the effects of fiscal 
policy on consumption, there are certainly channels in which they influence each 
other. For instance, important innovations in theoretical models have been 
introduced in order for them to be able to replicate the results found in empirical 
studies, particularly regarding the effects of fiscal policy on private consumption. 
More generally, the DSGE literature regularly uses VAR and other empirical evidence 
both to calibrate the models and to cross-check their results. On the other hand, 
empirical studies also rely on theoretical insights, particularly when designing the 
study setup and imposing identification restrictions. Last but not least, our focus on 
the empirical literature is also motivated by our interest in empirically analysing the 
effects of fiscal policy in European countries.    
 
 
4.2 Empirical review - fiscal policy VARs 
 
The return of fiscal policy in the focus of empirical studies is a result of three 
broad developments in economic theory and policy-making. First, large macro-
econometric models widely used in the 1970s and 1980s were critically attacked by 
the seminal critiques by Lucas (1976) on the sensitivity of model parameters to 
structural changes and by Sims (1980) on the "incredible" identification assumptions, 
which made these models fall out of fashion. Instead, economic studies, including 
fiscal policy, moved towards the application of DSGE models based on optimisation 
(as surveyed above) and more sophisticated empirical methods, including Vector Auto 
Regressions, or VARs (surveyed below). Second, empirical studies on fiscal policy 
blossomed as a result of the inability of DSGE models to reach a conclusion on the 
effects of fiscal policy on output and consumption. Third, the empirical research was 
initially intended to enable the discrimination whether fiscal policy effects were 
closer to neo-classical or Keynesian predictions. However, in the recent years the 
focus moved towards the estimation of the size of the fiscal multiplier, in order to also 
address policy debates on whether fiscal stimulus was the appropriate measure to 
fight the recent global economic crisis (Ramey, 2013).  
The wide field of empirical research on fiscal policy can be loosely grouped in 
three broad categories (Fatás and Mihov, 2001b). First, several studies focus on 
stabilisation properties of fiscal policies, i.e. the cyclical character and determinants 
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of fiscal policy (as surveyed in Chapter 2 and empirically applied to European 
countries in Chapter 3). A second branch of the empirical literature pays more 
attention to macroeconomic effects of episodes of fiscal consolidations63. Finally, the 
third group of empirical studies focuses on the short-run effects of fiscal policy on 
output (fiscal multipliers) but also on other macroeconomic variables, which is also 
our main interest. The vast majority of studies do this by studying dynamic effects of 
fiscal policy via Vector Auto Regressions (VARs), which will hence be in the focus of 
our empirical review. However, due to the width and the richness of this literature, 
our review will primarily focus on the most important studies and their main 
methodological contributions, whereas comparatively less attention will be paid to 
results in studies. To put things into perspective, in his meta-regression analysis of 89 
studies of fiscal policy multipliers, which also include those using other theoretical or 
empirical approaches, Gechert and Will (2012) count 255 estimates of output 
multipliers based on fiscal VARs, and numerous estimates of effects of other 
variables. Clearly, a comprehensive survey of the results is out of the scope of our 
literature review. Related to this, since our focus in this survey is on the main 
methodological approaches in the fiscal VAR literature and the main results in the 
most important studies, we also refrain from surveying the empirical studies on 
effects of fiscal policy in transition countries. Indeed, as discussed in detail below, the 
most important contributions in the fiscal VAR literature use data for advanced 
countries (primarily United States), whereas other studies typically only extend these 
methods and specifications to other countries, including a relatively limited number 
of studies on transition countries64.  
Before the literature survey, it should be noted that the main question asked in 
the empirical literature is "What are the effects of fiscal policy shocks?". This brings 
back the decomposition of fiscal policy in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3: fiscal policy can be 
decomposed into automatic stabilizers and discretionary policy; the latter can further 
be decomposed into endogenous or systematic discretionary policy and exogenous 
discretionary policy. Automatic stabilizers capture the automatic response of 
government revenues or spending to output movements, such as higher tax receipts 
in expansions or higher unemployment benefits in recessions. Systematic, or 
                                                
63 While clearly related to effects of fiscal policy on output, this branch of empirical literature is distinct 
because it focuses on identifying and analysing effects of episodes of fiscal consolidations, including 
cases of expansionary fiscal contractions. Some of the key contributions in this literature include 
Giavazzi and Pagano (1990), Giavazzi and Pagano (1996), Alesina and Perotti (1997), Alesina and Ardagna 
(2010) and Guajardo et al. (2011). However, since our aim is to analyse the effects of fiscal policy in 
general, and not the effects of fiscal consolidation episodes, we do not survey this literature in more 
detail.  
64 For analysis of effects of fiscal policy in transition countries using fiscal VARs, see for instance Jemec 
et al. (2011) for Slovenia, Ravnik and Zilic (2011) for Croatia and Franta (2012) for the Czech Republic.  
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endogenous discretionary policy captures the response of policy-makers to economic 
movements, such as lowering taxes or increasing spending in recessions. Finally, 
exogenous fiscal policy covers changes in government revenues or spending that are 
not directly related to output movements, but undertaken for various other reasons, 
such as wars, political or ideological motives or the need to meet the Maastricht 
Treaty conditions in the European context65. It is exactly this part that constitutes the 
focus of empirical studies, including our study in the following chapter, i.e. the effects 
of exogenous fiscal policy measures (fiscal policy shocks) in European countries. On 
the other hand, cyclicality studies, including our empirical study in Chapter 3, focus 
mostly on the endogenous discretionary policy, i.e. how policymakers react to 
business cycles. 
There are two main problems in the empirical research in this field. The first 
problem is related to the identification of exogenous fiscal policy. This in fact covers 
two related issues (Alesina and Giavazzi, 2013): the fact that government spending, 
revenues and output move together, and the fact that they also affect and are affected 
by other factors such as prices, exchange rates and interest rates. The correlation and 
the dependence on other factors then make it difficult to isolate truly exogenous fiscal 
policy (fiscal policy shocks), which is a crucial point before estimating its effects on 
output and other macroeconomic variables. The second main problem in empirical 
research is related to anticipation effects, or fiscal policy foresight. This is related to 
the fact that economic agents might anticipate future fiscal policy and therefore 
change their current behaviour. If the econometric estimation ignores this effect of 
anticipated policy on current variables, then the estimated response of output and 
other variables may be wrongly attributed to current fiscal policy, which may hence 
yield biased fiscal multipliers. The approach to the identification of fiscal policy 
shocks is in fact the main feature that distinguishes the five approaches in the VAR 
literature. In addition, they also pay different attention to the importance and 
treatment of the anticipation problem.  
Therefore, next we will first discuss the five main identification approaches in 
the VAR literature on fiscal policy and the accompanying main empirical findings. In 
order to facilitate exposition, when describing them and the main results of studies 
using them we will deliberately downplay some methodological problems. Indeed, 
after the presentation of the main identification approaches, we will compare and 
                                                
65 In their seminal study of monetary policy in the US, Bernanke and Mihov (1998) note that exogenous 
policy shocks reflect many random factors that affect policy decisions, such as personalities of 
policymakers, political factors, data revisions and various technical issues. They also note that, if there 
are no exogenous shocks, the effects of policy on the economy can not be identified by any econometric 
method.  
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contrast them in the light of the identification and anticipation problems, as well as 
some other methodological and data issues (Section 4.3). Finally, in the last section we 
will present panel VAR as one of the key extensions of the main VAR approaches.  
Before moving to identification approaches, it is useful to briefly present some 
key features of fiscal VARs that are dominant in the literature. A common feature in 
almost all fiscal VARs is that they include government spending, government 
revenues66 and output at the least. In light of the seminal study by Blanchard and 
Perotti (2002), there is general agreement that at least these three endogenous 
variables should be included in VARs aimed at analysing the effects of fiscal policy. 
The vast majority of studies also include additional variables, particularly inflation 
and interest rates. Indeed, there are arguments that these five variables make up the 
minimal necessary set for the investigation of dynamic effects of fiscal policy and are 
sufficient to describe the dynamic properties of the economy (Fatás and Mihov, 
2001b). Further, many VARs also include several other macroeconomic variables, 
such as labour market variables, GDP components or budget components. However, it 
should be noted that studies seldom provide explicit justifications for their particular 
choice of variables or their functional form. Nevertheless, the set of endogenous 
variables included in fiscal VARs is generally aimed at capturing the key aspects of 
the transmission mechanism of fiscal policy. Related to this, the set of variables also 
reflects the particular focus of the investigation as well as the need to make a 
distinction between key theoretical predictions (e.g. private consumption, wages or 
employment). On the other hand, VARs are usually kept to several variables in order 
to avoid VAR over-parameterisation. Bearing all this on mind, before moving on to a 
discussion of the identification approaches in fiscal VARs,  we summarise the key 
aspects of specification of fiscal VARs that use the most common identification 
approaches in Table 4.1 in the end of this section. Due to the sheer size of the 
literature, it is impossible to include all dimensions of studies in a single table. 
Therefore, in Table 4.1 we focus mostly on the endogenous variables included and 
their functional form, and abstract from other features of fiscal VARs.  
Further, most empirical studies use quarterly data, although some studies 
argue in favour of annual data67. The vast majority of studies employ time series 
                                                
66 Fatás and Mihov (2001b) note that it is recommended to enter spending and revenues separately and 
not the budget deficit, since economic theories differ in the predictions of the effects of spending and 
revenues. This advice is followed by almost all of the literature (Table 4.1). 
67 The issue of data frequency is discussed further in Section 4.3 and in the next chapter. In order to 
avoid repetition, the discussion of this and other important details of empirical studies that are 
mentioned in the literature review (cash-based or accrual fiscal data, short- or long-run interest rates, 
the functional form of variables) is mostly relegated to Section 4.3 as well as the next chapter, where it is 
linked to the design of our study.   
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analysis, whereas a few recent studies also incorporate panel estimation (Section 4.4 
and the next chapter). Further, the vast majority of studies routinely impose short-
run restrictions, and not long-run ones. Finally, the main focus in VARs is the 
identification of exogenous fiscal policy, and then the interpretation of impulse 
responses of other variables to fiscal policy shocks, while part of them also report 
calculated estimates of fiscal multipliers.  
In order to facilitate the discussion, we will briefly present the general VAR 
setup and its transformation in order to be able to identify structural shocks, such as 
government spending shocks or revenue shocks. In doing so, we follow standard 
textbook descriptions such as Enders (1994) and the survey on fiscal VARs by Caldara 
and Kamps (2008).  
The reduced form VAR can be represented as: 
 
                 Eq. 19 
        
where X is a vector of k endogenous variables (government spending, revenues 
and output at the least, and potentially other variables), A(L) is the m-th order lag-
polynomial (typically 4 lags for quarterly data), and ut represents a k-length vector of 
reduced form disturbances with E[ut]=0, E[utut']=Σu and E[utus']=0 for s≠t. The VAR can 
also include additional elements such as constants, time trends, seasonal dummies or 
exogenous variables, but here we abstract from them to maintain simplicity.  
The problem with the reduced-form VAR in Eq. 19 above is that disturbances ut 
will in general be mutually correlated if contemporaneous relations between 
variables are not taken into account (Corsetti and Muller, 2006). As a consequence, 
reduced-form VARs do not have a structural, economic interpretation. Therefore, the 
reduced-form should be transformed into a structural model, which is done by pre-
multiplying the reduced form by a k x k matrix A0: 
 
                        Eq. 20 
 
or 
 
                     Eq. 21 
 
where 
 
          Eq. 22 
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The last equation gives the relations between reduced form disturbances ut 
and structural shocks et. Usually it is assumed that there is no correlation between 
structural shocks, i.e. the variance-covariance matrix Σe of structural disturbances is 
diagonal. Further, the matrix A0 in Eq. 22 describes contemporaneous relations 
between the endogenous variables in X, while the matrix B describes the linear 
relationship between reduced form disturbances and structural shocks. However, 
without restrictions in A0 and B, the model is not identified. Indeed, there are several 
ways to impose restrictions68, i.e. to achieve identification, which is crucial in order to 
be able to interpret structural shocks in a meaningful manner. After identification, 
each variable can be written in a moving average representation, which enables the 
calculation of dynamic responses to structural shocks, usually presented through 
impulse responses (Rusnak, 2011). Depending on the manner in which they impose 
short-run restrictions to identify fiscal policy shocks, the fiscal VAR literature69 is 
commonly grouped in five main categories, which will be discussed in the next 
subsections: 
- VARs with recursive identification, which use the relatively simple 
Cholesky decomposition; 
- Blanchard-Perotti VARs, which apply the identification proposed by 
Blanchard and Perotti (2002); 
- VARs with sign restrictions on impulse responses; 
- Event-study VARs, which use exogenous events such as military build-ups 
to identify exogenous fiscal policy shocks; 
- Narrative VARs, which use congressional or legislative records to isolate 
exogenous fiscal policy shocks. 
 
 
In the following sections, we discuss the key features and results of the most 
important studies using these approaches, with a focus on recursive and BP SVAR as 
the most commonly used approaches (Rusnak, 2011). As noted above, before doing so, 
in Table 4.1 below we present key features of fiscal VARs, with a focus on endogenous 
variables included and their functional form. We abstract from other features of 
fiscal VARs, both for ease exposition, and the multitude of aspects of fiscal VARs that 
                                                
68 One can impose long-run or short-run restrictions. Long-run restrictions, originally proposed by 
Blanchard and Quah (1989) are usually derived from economic theory, which usually provides more 
predictions than for short-run relations. However, in line with the dominant studies of fiscal policy 
effects, we focus on short-run identification restrictions.   
69 The last two approaches were originally presented as single equations and later extended to VARs (as 
discussed in the following two sections). 
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are impossible to be captured in a single table. Related to this, in the table we mostly 
focus on the first three identification approaches. Due to their specifics, but also due 
to their less frequent use (as discussed below), in Table 4.1 we abstract from key 
studies using event-study and narrative approaches, but in subsections 4.2.4 and 4.2.5 
we do discuss the most important studies using these approaches.  
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Study Country 
coverage 
Period Identi-
fication 
method 
Endogenous 
variables in baseline VAR 
Endogenous variables in 
additional specifications 
Other comments 
Fatás and 
Mihov 
(2001b) 
United 
States 
1960-1996, 
quarterly 
data 
recursive  Real government spending, real 
GDP, GDP deflator, real net-taxes 
and real 3-month treasury bill 
interest rate (all in logs except 
interest rates). 
GDP components (consumption 
or investment and their 
components);  
labour market variables (real 
wages, hours and employment); 
private and official budget 
projections. 
Additional variables 
are added one at a time 
and ordered after 
government spending.  
Monacelli 
et al. (2010) 
United 
States 
1954-2006, 
quarterly 
data 
recursive  Real government consumption, 
real GDP, real private 
consumption of non-durables 
and services (all in logs and per 
capita terms), nominal 3-month 
treasury bills interest rate, 
marginal income tax rate and 1 
or 2 labour market variables.  
Various labour market variables: 
employment, hours, 
unemployment, labour force, 
vacancies, job finding 
probability, separation rate, real 
product wages, mark-up in 
manufacturing. 
Additional variables 
are added one or two at 
a time. 
Kim and 
Roubini 
(2008) 
United 
States 
1973-2004, 
quarterly 
data 
recursive  Log of real GDP, primary budget 
deficit as a share of GDP, current 
account deficit as a share of GDP, 
3-month real interest rate and log 
of the real exchange rate. 
Various budget components and 
current account components as a 
share of GDP. Extensions with 
alternative definitions of 
variables.  
Additional variables 
are added one at a 
time, adding to the 
baseline set of 
variables or 
substituting some of 
their components. 
Corsetti and 
Muller 
(2006) 
US, 
Australia, 
UK and 
Canada 
(country-
by-
country 
VARs) 
1979-2005 
(2004 for 
Australia), 
quarterly 
data 
recursive  Real government spending, real 
GDP (both in logs and per capita 
terms), primary budget balance 
as a share of GDP, inflation, long-
term nominal interest rate, log of 
terms of trade and trade balance 
as a share of GDP. Second 
specification that omits 
government spending and 
replaces trade balance with the 
current account balance.  
In the first specification, the 
trade balance is replaced in turn 
with investment and private 
consumption. In the second 
specification, the current account 
balance is replaced with the 
household savings ratio.  
/ 
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Study Country 
coverage 
Period Identi-
fication 
method 
Endogenous 
variables in baseline VAR 
Endogenous variables in 
additional specifications 
Other comments 
Caldara and 
Kamps 
(2008) 
United 
States 
1955-2006, 
quarterly 
data 
recursive, 
BP, sign 
restrictions, 
event-study 
Real government spending, real 
net-taxes, real GDP (all in logs 
and per capita terms), GDP 
deflator inflation rate  and the 
short-term interest rate. 
GDP components (consumption 
or investment and their 
components);  
labour market variables (real 
wages, employment and hours). 
Additional variables 
are added one at a 
time. 
Blanchard 
and Perotti 
(2002) 
United 
States 
1960-1997, 
quarterly 
data 
BP SVAR Real government spending, real 
net-taxes and real GDP (all in logs 
and per capita terms).  
GDP components.  Additional variables 
are added one at a time 
and ordered last. They 
also check for 
anticipation effects and 
analyse sub-periods 
and an extended 
sample.  
Perotti 
(2005) 
Australia, 
Canada, 
West 
Germany, 
UK, US 
(country-
by-
country 
VARs) 
1960-2001, 
quarterly 
data  
(Canada 
from 1961; 
UK from 
1963; 
Germany 
until 1989)  
BP SVAR Real government spending, real 
net-taxes and real GDP (all in logs 
and per capita terms), GDP 
deflator inflation rate, 10-year 
nominal interest rate. 
GDP components.  Additional variables 
are added one at a 
time. Also analysis of 
sub-samples before and 
after 1980 (1974 for 
Germany). 
Perotti 
(2008) 
Mostly 
United 
States, but 
also 
Australia, 
Canada 
and the 
UK  
(country-
by-
country 
VARs) 
1947-2005 
for US and 
early 1960s 
to 2006 for 
other 
countries in 
quarterly 
VARs. 
Longer 
series for 
annual 
VARs.  
BP SVAR, 
event-study 
Real government spending, 
marginal income tax rate, real 
GDP, real private consumption 
on nondurables and services, real 
private gross fixed capital 
formation (except tax rates, all in 
logs and per capita terms), log of 
hours in the non-farm business 
sector and log of real product 
hourly compensation in the non-
farm business sector.  
Alternative specifications with 
labour market variables replaced 
with the GDP deflator inflation 
rate and the 3-months nominal 
interest rate; also with the tax 
rate replaced with net-taxes.  
War-dummies are added for the 
event-study approach.  
Budget projections to check for 
anticipation effects.  
VARs with fewer 
variables for some 
quarterly and all 
annual VARs.  
Annual VARs use 
extended samples, 
some going back to 
1889.  
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Study Country 
coverage 
Period Identi-
fication 
method 
Endogenous 
variables in baseline VAR 
Endogenous variables in 
additional specifications 
Other comments 
Heppke-Falk 
et al. (2010) 
Germany 1974-2004, 
quarterly 
data 
BP SVAR Real GDP, GDP deflator inflation 
rate, nominal short-term interest 
rate, real government direct 
spending and real government 
primary net-revenues (all in logs 
except inflation and interest 
rates). 
Private consumption and 
investment. Various spending 
and revenue components.  
Expected spending to check for 
anticipation effects.  
GDP and budget 
components are added 
by replacing respective 
aggregates. Cash-based 
instead of accrual fiscal 
data due to data 
availability.  
de Castro 
and 
Hernández 
de Cos 
(2008) 
Spain 1980-2004, 
quarterly 
data 
BP SVAR Real government spending, real 
net-taxes, real GDP, GDP deflator 
and the 3-year interest rate.  
Private consumption and 
investment. Various spending 
and revenue components.  
Fiscal data are a 
mixture of cash-based 
and accrual data due to 
availability. Additional 
GDP components are 
added one at a time, 
while budget 
components replace 
respective aggregates. 
Giordano 
et al. (2007)  
Italy 1982-2004, 
quarterly 
data 
BP SVAR Real private GDP, private GDP 
deflator inflation rate, private 
employment, 10-year nominal 
interest rate, real government 
spending on goods and services, 
real government wages and real 
net-taxes (all in logs except 
interest rates). 
Private consumption and 
investment.  
Total government spending 
instead of spending on goods and 
services and government wages. 
GDP components are 
added instead of 
private GDP. Cash-
based instead of 
accrual fiscal data due 
to data availability.  
Marcellino 
(2006) 
France, 
Germany, 
Italy and 
Spain 
(country-
by-
country 
VARs) 
1981-2001, 
semi-
annual data 
BP SVAR Short-term foreign interest rate, 
short-term domestic interest rate, 
log nominal exchange rate to the 
Deutsche Mark (US dollar for 
Germany), total spending, total 
revenues, output gap (all 3 as 
shares of GDP), CPI inflation rate. 
Public debt as a share of GDP. 
Various spending and revenue 
components. 
Public debt is added 
last. Budget 
components are added 
by replacing respective 
aggregates. 
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Study Country 
coverage 
Period Identi-
fication 
method 
Endogenous 
variables in baseline VAR 
Endogenous variables in 
additional specifications 
Other comments 
Favero and 
Giavazzi 
(2007)  
United 
States 
1960-2005 
(from 1950 
for the 
narrative 
approach), 
quarterly 
data  
BP SVAR 
and 
narrative 
approach 
Real primary government 
spending, real government 
revenues, real GDP (all in logs 
and per capita terms), GDP 
deflator inflation rate and 
average cost servicing the debt.  
Public debt as a share of GDP. Also analysis of sub-
samples before and 
after 1980. 
Mountford 
and Uhlig 
(2009) 
United 
States 
1955-2000, 
quarterly 
data 
sign 
restrictions 
Real GDP, real private 
consumption, real government 
spending, real government 
revenues, real private residential 
investment, real private non-
residential investment (all in per 
capita terms), Federal Funds 
interest rate, adjusted monetary 
base, producer price index of 
crude metals and GDP deflator 
(all in logs except interest rates) 
/ / 
 
 
Table 4.1. Summary of the main features of country-by-country fiscal VAR studies using the recursive approach, the BP SVAR 
approach or sign restrictions to identify fiscal shocks 
(Note: Main or baseline specifications are presented and deterministic terms are ignored for ease of exposition.)   
152 
 
4.2.1 VARs with recursive identification 
 
The recursive identification was first proposed in a seminal article by Sims 
(1980), and has since become one of the most used empirical approaches in 
macroeconomics, particularly in monetary policy studies. Briefly, it restricts the B 
matrix to an identity matrix, and A0 to a lower triangular matrix with diagonal 
elements equal to 1. This implies that the decomposition of the variance-covariance 
matrix Σu is achieved via the Cholesky decomposition. However, the Cholesky 
decomposition implies causal ordering of variables, i.e. it specifies a particular 
relation between reduced-form disturbances ut and structural shocks et (see Eq. 23 
below for an example). The causal ordering means that variables that are ordered 
first are allowed to have a contemporaneous effect on later variables, but later 
variables do not contemporaneously affect the variables ordered before them (later 
effects are allowed). Therefore, in the recursive identification, the ordering of 
variables can have an important effect on results, so the restrictions implied by that 
ordering must rely on particular theoretical guidance or institutional information.  
The popularity of recursive VAR is probably due to its relative simplicity. It is 
widely used in the monetary policy literature, where identification restrictions are 
somewhat less contentious. Fatás and Mihov (2001b) were among the first to extend 
the use of recursive VARs to fiscal policy. Their main focus is on effects of government 
spending, since it is the main point where predictions of various theories diverge. In 
their baseline specification, Fatás and Mihov (2001b) include five endogenous 
variables in the VAR, which they consider to be a minimal set necessary to investigate 
dynamic effects of fiscal policy, with the following ordering: real government 
spending G, GDP Y, the GDP deflator inflation rate π, real net-tax revenues R and the 
real three-month treasury bill interest rate i. Caldara and Kamps (2008) use the same 
ordering with similar variables in their comparison of fiscal VARs across various 
identification approaches. In the context of the discussion above, this means that the 
relation between reduced-form disturbances ut and structural shocks et (or the 
expansion of Eq. 22 above) in these studies takes the following form:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
        
           
              
                  
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
     
     
     
     
      
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
Eq. 23 
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In Eq. 23, αn,m coefficients of the A0 matrix capture contemporaneous responses 
of variable n to a shock in variable m, ut are reduced-form disturbances and et
k are 
structural shocks to the k variable, i.e. the B matrix. This particular ordering has the 
following implications. Government spending shocks are identified on the basis of 
decision lags of fiscal policy, which means that spending does not contemporaneously 
react to output movements and other variables. This identification of spending shocks 
is widely accepted, since decision lags imply that it takes longer than a quarter for 
policy-makers to respond to movements in output and other economic factors 
(Blanchard and Perotti, 2002). Certainly, unemployment benefits do react to output 
movements as an automatic stabilizer, but their share in total government spending 
is fairly small. In addition, in most studies they are left out since revenues or taxes are 
defined in "net" terms, i.e. total revenues minus transfers. Therefore, the restriction 
imposed is that government spending can contemporaneously affect output and all 
other variables, but is not affected by them within the same quarter. Further, 
ordering GDP as the second variable means that it can be contemporaneously affected 
by government spending only, whereas it can have a contemporaneous effect on 
other variables. This is also not contentious, since higher government spending will 
generally show up in GDP figures contemporaneously. In addition, GDP can have an 
immediate impact on variables ordered further down, such as prices or tax revenues. 
Prices are ordered third, meaning that they can react contemporaneously to 
government spending and GDP, and are allowed to have a contemporaneous impact 
on tax revenues and interest rates. Further, tax revenues are ordered fourth, which 
means they can react contemporaneously to all variables except interest rates. The 
contemporaneous reaction of taxes to GDP (and prices) is also generally accepted, 
since it is expected that GDP and price shocks affect the tax base, which in turn affects 
tax revenues (Caldara and Kamps, 2008). Ordering tax revenues in this way thus 
allows them to reflect automatic stabilizers and inflationary effects on revenues. 
Finally, interest rates are ordered last since they are the ones generally expected to 
react immediately to other economic movements (e.g. higher interest rates in cases of 
inflationary pressures), but their transmission to other variables usually occurs with 
a delay of at least a quarter. Related to this, it is also common to define spending and 
revenues net of interest payments (e.g. Caldara and Kamps (2008)), which further 
justifies the lack of contemporaneous effects of interest rates on fiscal variables.   
 While most of the implications of this particular ordering are generally 
accepted in the literature, there is one important case where there is considerable 
disagreement - the ordering of tax revenues after government spending and output. 
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This particular ordering implies that revenues are allowed to react 
contemporaneously to government spending and output but not vice versa; or 
spending determines revenues but revenue decisions are taken only once spending is 
determined, which Fatás and Mihov (2001b) note is plausible, but not testable. In 
addition, this particular ordering allows for contemporaneous effects of output and 
inflation on taxes, but not for any contemporaneous feedback from taxes to output 
(and inflation). Alternatively, if taxes would be ordered before GDP, this would allow 
a contemporaneous effect of taxes on output, but would restrict the opposite effect to 
zero, thus implying an absence of automatic stabilizers.  
Researchers have dealt with this issue in several ways. For instance, Fatás and 
Mihov (2001b) claim that they intentionally leave the response of tax revenues 
unrestricted, i.e. allow them to respond to most other variables in the tradition of 
prominent semi-structural VARs70 of monetary policy (e.g. Bernanke and Mihov 
(1998)) since their focus is on tracing the effects of spending shocks and comparing 
them to theoretical predictions. Similar to this, some studies focus exclusively on 
government spending. Indeed, if one is focused on studying the effects only of the 
first variable ordered in the VAR (government spending in this case), then the 
ordering of the other variables does not matter (Christiano et al., 1999). Other studies 
use more elaborate identification approaches from the ones surveyed below, which 
allow them to trace more carefully effects of not only of government spending shocks, 
but also of revenue shocks.  
 The main finding by Fatás and Mihov (2001b) is that, in the US, government 
spending shocks have a positive and persistent effect on output, with an output 
multiplier larger than one, as well as a positive impact on real interest rates. 
However, since this reaction is consistent with a wide array of economic theories, 
they also provide several extensions and robustness checks of the baseline VAR (Table 
4.1 above). Their main finding in this part is that the rise in output in the baseline 
results is driven by the persistent rise in all components of consumption, whereas the 
reaction of investments is fairly low and mostly insignificant. In addition, private 
consumption increases are particularly pronounced in cases of government wage 
shocks. Further, while government spending increases private employment, it has 
little impact on total wages or hours worked, although there is a strong positive 
reaction by manufacturing wages and hours. Therefore, they conclude that empirical 
results deviate considerably from a baseline RBC model they also analyse, and are 
                                                
70 Semi-structural VARs refer to VARs that leave some of the relationships in a model unrestricted, and 
impose contemporaneous identification restrictions only on variables that are relevant for the issue 
being studied (Bernanke and Mihov, 1998).  
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closer to Keynesian predictions. The main deviations consist in the positive reaction 
of consumption, as well as in the observed positive correlation between consumption 
and employment in the VAR results, as opposed to their opposite movements in the 
RBC model. Finally, robustness checks indicate that, when augmenting the VAR with 
fiscal policy forecasts in order to control for possible anticipation effects, baseline 
results still hold, although error bands are somewhat wider.  
 Caldara and Kamps (2008) use a similar specification of the baseline VAR and 
extensions in their analysis of effects of fiscal policy in the US between 1955 and 2006 
through various identification approaches (Table 4.1 above). Unlike Fatás and Mihov 
(2001b), they analyse both government spending and tax shocks, and also carry out 
some policy analysis. Their main results from the baseline VAR show a persistent 
positive reaction of output to government spending shocks, with the output multiplier 
reaching a peak of 2 after 3 to 4 years. In addition, net taxes also rise following a 
government spending shock, albeit less than spending. Similar to Fatás and Mihov 
(2001b), they find that higher government spending increases private consumption, 
whereas the investment response is mostly insignificant. There is also a similar, 
insignificant response of hours worked, while Caldara and Kamps (2008) diverge in 
finding that the real product wage increases persistently. Therefore, their empirical 
results regarding increases of consumption and real wages are in line with most New 
Keynesian predictions, although the insignificant reaction of hours worked is at odds 
with the theoretical prediction of rising employment. As far as tax shocks are 
concerned, they find that there is an insignificant reaction of government spending, 
which implies a deficit-reducing effect. Overall, their separate analysis of spending 
and tax shocks thus points to significant positive spending multipliers and an absence 
of tax multipliers. 
Additional studies extend Cholesky VARs to investigate effects of fiscal policy to 
the open economy context. One of the first such studies is Kim and Roubini (2008), 
who are primarily interested in the effects of fiscal policy on the current account and 
the real exchange rate in the United States in the post-Breton Woods period. Unlike 
most other studies (Table 4.1 above), their baseline specification includes budget 
deficits instead of spending or taxes, which is in line with their aim to study the "twin 
deficit" hypothesis. Their main finding is that higher budget deficits cause persistent 
output increases and higher real interest rates, in line with finding of other studies 
surveyed above. However, budget deficit shocks also result in improved current 
account balances and real exchange rate depreciation, thus pointing to "twin 
divergence" instead of "twin deficits". These results are quite robust to a wide array of 
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checks such as alternative definitions of the budget deficit, various budget 
components and current account components. Therefore, they note that the result is 
contrary to the predictions of most theoretical models, while the models that predict 
such behaviour include different mechanisms from the ones they find in their 
extensions of the baseline specification. The extensions indicate that the improved 
current account in the wake of higher budget deficits reflects Ricardian responses, 
which increase private saving, as well as crowding out effects, since private 
investment declines. Overall, higher private saving and lower private investment thus 
offset the higher budget deficit in the short run. Further, the real depreciation is a 
result mostly of nominal depreciation and not of relative price changes, which points 
to price stickiness, in line with assumptions in most New Keynesian models.  
Corsetti and Muller (2006) extend the study by Kim and Roubini (2008) to 
Australia, UK and Canada, which differ in their trade openness71 (Table 4.1 above). 
For the US, they confirm earlier findings that fiscal expansions do not worsen the 
external balance, and might even improve it, but they have a negative impact on 
private investment. Similar findings are reached for Australia, which has an 
intermediate level of openness. On the other hand, they find evidence for twin 
deficits for the more open economies of UK and Canada, where expansionary fiscal 
policy shocks worsen the external balance, while there is little impact on private 
investments. Therefore, they find some empirical evidence for the predictions of their 
theoretical model that the effects of fiscal policy depend crucially on the level of 
openness and shock persistence. However, results on the reaction of relative prices 
and interest rates point to some uncertainty regarding the precise transmission 
channels of fiscal policy.  
 
 
4.2.2 Blanchard-Perotti structural VARs 
 
The main drawback of the recursive identification is the crucial importance 
laid on the ordering of variables, since that translates into contemporaneous 
restrictions that are imposed on the reaction of variables to structural shocks. 
Therefore, an alternative identification approach for fiscal policy shocks was first laid 
out by the seminal paper by Blanchard and Perotti (2002) in a fairly simple model 
consisted of government spending, taxes and output. It was later expanded by Perotti 
(2005) to also include inflation and interest rates. We follow the explanations in the 
                                                
71 Corsetti and Muller (2006) refer to the 2003 mimeo version of the Kim and Roubini (2008) study.  
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latter study to lay out the intuition behind what has since become known as 
Blanchard-Perotti Structural VAR72, henceforth BP-SVAR.  
Perotti (2005) sets out a VAR with the following ordering: real government 
spending per capita, real net primary revenues per capita, real output per capita, the 
GDP deflator inflation rate and 10-year nominal interest rates73. The initial point in 
the identification of structural shocks consists in the decomposition of reduced-form 
VAR disturbances uG and uR of the spending and revenue equations respectively as 
linear combinations of three components: automatic reaction of fiscal policy (to 
output, but also to inflation and interest rates); systematic or endogenous 
discretionary response of fiscal policy; and exogenous discretionary policy or 
structural fiscal policy shocks (Eq. 24 and Eq. 25).  
 
 
 
 
  
        
        
       
             
     
    Eq. 24 
 
  
        
        
       
             
     
   Eq. 25 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In these equations, α coefficients capture the contemporaneous reaction of 
government spending and revenues, in the first and second equation respectively, to 
economic movements (output, inflation and interest rates). In other words, α 
coefficients represent the sum of the automatic response and systematic discretionary 
policy. The equations also capture the contemporaneous response of spending and 
revenues to fiscal policy shocks, et
G and et
R. Indeed, et
G and et
R represent the exogenous 
policy, or structural spending and revenue shocks respectively, and it is assumed that 
their contemporaneous covariance is zero, but they are clearly correlated with 
                                                
72 Following the literature, we denote all VARs where identification restrictions are imposed as structural 
VARs (SVARs), including recursive VARs. Perotti (2011b) acknowledges this practice, but notes that there 
is nothing structural in recursive VARs, since they rely on a simple Cholesky decomposition, unlike other 
approaches that use different identification methods.   
73 The inclusion of long-term interest rates is justified by the argument that they are more important for 
consumption and investment than short-term interest rates. However, the use of short-term rates is quite 
common in the literature (Table 4.1), which often reflects data availability, but is also included as a better 
indicator of monetary policy.  
automatic + systematic discretionary 
response of fiscal policy to output, 
inflation and interest rates 
exogenous discretionary policy 
(structural fiscal policy shocks) 
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reduced-form residuals ut
G and ut
R. In order to identify the structural shocks, the key 
assumption is that there is an absence of systematic discretionary policy within the 
quarter. This is a reasonable assumption, which rests in the well known decision lags 
of fiscal policy, since it takes more than a quarter for policymakers to react to 
economic movements (Blanchard and Perotti, 2002). Therefore, in the absence of a 
contemporaneous discretionary response, α coefficients in Eq. 24 and Eq. 25 above 
represent only the automatic response of spending and revenues respectively to 
economic movements, or their output, inflation and interest rate elasticities in this 
case. The major contribution of Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Perotti (2005) is that 
they calculate these elasticities on the basis of a careful study of institutional 
information, statutory tax brackets, statutory unemployment benefits and other 
information. This is done in a similar manner to the calculation of automatic 
stabilizers by official institutions such as OECD and the European Commission, as 
surveyed in Chapter 2. Once these elasticities are obtained (α coefficients), the 
cyclically-adjusted fiscal shocks can be calculated in the following manner, i.e. by 
subtracting the automatic response from overall reduced-form disturbances: 
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Eq. 27 
 
 
 
From Eq. 24 and Eq. 25 above, the right hand side of Eq. 26 and Eq. 27  can be 
replaced by the following relations: 
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   Eq. 29 
 
 
Therefore, it is clear that cyclically-adjusted spending and revenue shocks are 
no more than linear combinations of the two structural fiscal policy shocks, et
G and 
et
R. In order to identify structural shocks, a final assumption is necessary regarding 
the restriction that is needed on the β coefficients to make one of them equal to zero. 
Perotti (2005) claims that there is little theoretical or empirical guidance on how to 
identify them, so he tries both options. However, he finds little difference whether βRG  
is identified and estimated and βGR is restricted to zero or vice versa, so he uses βGR =0 
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as a benchmark. Effectively, this means that decisions on spending are taken before 
those on revenues. After applying this procedure to identify exogenous, or structural 
fiscal policy shocks, it is relatively straightforward to use them to analyse the 
response of output and other economic variables to these shocks.  
Eq. 30 below presents the matrix representation of restrictions imposed in the 
BP SVAR approach, as used by Perotti (2005) for the SVAR on the United States data. It 
is important to note here that it differs in several important aspects from a recursive 
identification, which would have a lower triangular A0 matrix in the left hand side, 
where all α coefficients above the diagonal would be restricted to zero, and those 
below the diagonal would be freely estimated. In addition, the B matrix in the right 
hand side would be an identity matrix for recursive identification, whereas here one 
of its elements (βRG  ) is estimated, as noted above. This means that, with this ordering 
of variables, in the Cholesky identification αRY and αRπ would be restricted to zero, so 
there would be no contemporaneous effects of output and inflation to taxes. The 
crucial advantage of the BP approach is that, instead of a zero restriction, it imposes 
restrictions on these coefficients on the basis of calculated elasticities from 
institutional information. For instance, Perotti (2005) imposes 1.85 and 1.25 for net 
revenue elasticity to output and inflation respectively for the United States. In 
addition, instead of a zero restriction, Perotti (2005) also calculates the inflation 
elasticity of government spending to be equal to -0.5, arguing that government wages 
do not react contemporaneously to inflation, which means government employees 
have a reduction in real wages in cases of inflation shocks. Finally, the different 
ordering and the additional restrictions now also allow an estimation of a 
contemporaneous effect of taxes to output and inflation. This means that coefficients 
αYR and απR are unrestricted, as opposed to being restricted to zero in the recursive 
identification when taxes are ordered after output and inflation. Other assumptions 
are similar to the recursive identification. For instance, the output elasticity of 
government spending net of transfers is set to zero (αGY). In addition, the definition of 
fiscal variables net of interest means that interest rate changes do not have a 
contemporaneous effect on government spending and net revenues, so the interest 
elasticity of spending and revenues is also set to zero (αGi and αRi). 
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A natural point to start the review of empirical literature using this approach 
is the study that first proposed it by Blanchard and Perotti (2002). They include three 
variables in their baseline VAR on US data: real government spending per capita, real 
net taxes per capita (without transfers and interest payments) and real GDP per 
capita (Table 4.1 above). As noted above, the important innovation in their paper is 
that they identify government spending and net tax shocks by incorporating 
institutional information to calculate output elasticities of various components of 
taxes and spending. They find that government spending shocks have a positive effect 
and tax shocks have a negative effect on output. This conclusion is fairly robust to 
various extensions, such as the inclusion of deterministic or stochastic trends, various 
dummy variables, checks for anticipation effects or the analysis of sub-periods. In 
addition, fiscal multipliers are generally small and close to one, while the 
contemporaneous spending multiplier is marginally higher than the tax multiplier. 
They also extend the study to GDP components. In this part, they find that the positive 
effect of spending shocks on output works through a positive response of private 
consumption, whereas the response of investments is negative, as is the response of 
exports and imports. In addition, they find that investment declines both in cases of 
spending and tax shocks. Therefore, they conclude that the results point to mixed 
support for traditional theories: the positive response of consumption to government 
spending shocks is at odds with the neoclassical theory, whereas the fall in 
investments both for higher taxes and higher spending is at odds with the Keynesian 
theory which predicts opposite reactions to the two shocks.  
Perotti (2005) extends the study by Blanchard and Perotti (2002) to US and four 
other OECD countries on which he is able to find non-interpolated quarterly data 
(Table 4.1 above)74. He also extends the VAR with inflation and 10-year nominal 
interest rates in the VAR, arguing that the latter are more important for consumption 
and investment decisions compared to short-term rates. There are numerous results 
from various specifications, sub-samples and robustness checks, but the study also 
presents some fairly robust findings. Fiscal policy multipliers are generally small and 
the multiplier exceeds one only in US and Germany. However, this is mostly driven by 
the initial period, since splitting the sample yields multipliers larger than one in few 
cases before 1980. Indeed, there is consistent evidence that government spending 
multipliers have become weaker over time, and after 1980 the response of GDP, 
                                                
74 This study is further extended by Perotti (2008) in order to shed more light on the response of 
consumption and real wages in US and three other OECD countries (Table 4.1 above). In their 
comparison of identification approaches in fiscal VARs, discussed in Subsection 4.3.2, Caldara and Kamps 
(2008) also employ the BP SVAR approach, and find similar results to their application of the recursive 
approach (discussed above). 
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consumption and especially investment is either very small or negative. Tax 
multipliers are smaller than one in all countries, and they are again driven by the 
first sub-period, since after 1980 they are consistently negative in all countries except 
Canada. Additional checks confirm that there is little evidence for frequent claims 
that tax cuts are more effective than spending increases. Further, spending shocks 
have a generally positive effect on nominal and real interest rates after 1980, whereas 
government spending generally has small effects on prices.   
While most studies focus on the United States, there are several studies that 
extend the BP SVAR approach to other, mostly developed countries (Table 4.1 above). 
For instance, Heppke-Falk et al. (2010) study effects of fiscal policy in Germany 
between 1974 and 2004. They note that they could be using a Vector Error Correction 
Mechanism approach, since variables are all integrated of order one, but decide to 
estimate a SVAR instead because the economic interpretation of cointegrating vectors 
in VECM can be difficult with many disaggregated time series (i.e. it is difficult to find 
and impose economically meaningful cointegrating restrictions). Baseline results 
indicate that the positive response of output to spending is only significant at impact 
and the multiplier is lower than one, whereas the response of output to revenue 
shocks is insignificant. Prices only increase in cases of spending shocks, whereas the 
response of interest rates is insignificant for both spending and revenue shocks. 
Further, government spending shocks have a significant positive impact on 
consumption only, whereas responses of both consumption and investment to 
revenue shocks are insignificant, in line with most findings for the US.  
Further, Giordano et al. (2007) apply the BP SVAR approach to Italy between 
1982 and 2004 (Table 4.1 above). It should also be noted that, similar to some other 
studies (e.g. Heppke-Falk et al. (2010) for Germany), due to data availability they also 
use cash-based data for the fiscal variables, although non-interpolated quarterly data 
on an accrual basis are generally preferred (as discussed in Subsection 4.3.1). From 
the spending components, only purchases of goods and services have a significant 
effect on GDP, with cumulative multipliers larger than one up to four years after the 
shock. Government purchase multipliers at the higher range of the ones in OECD 
countries are attributed to the low persistence of fiscal shocks, as well as the negative 
response of net revenues, which further stimulates economic activity. Further, 
government spending generally has a small positive effect on inflation, and an 
insignificant effect on interest rates. In addition, higher government purchases of 
goods and services also increase private consumption and investment, while the 
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effects of total government spending are insignificant. Finally, they find that the 
effects of revenue shocks are very small.  
The studies surveyed here share not only a relatively common set of variables 
in the baseline VAR (Table 4.1 above), but they also omit debt from their 
investigation75. However, this issue has attracted some attention in the recent 
literature. For instance, Favero and Giavazzi (2007) criticise the omission of debt from 
standard VARs, since a fiscal shock is expected to constrain future revenues and/or 
spending in order to meet the intertemporal budget constraint. Indeed, they criticise 
the VAR literature because it ignores the debt dynamics that follows the fiscal shock, 
as well as the possible reaction of taxes and spending to the debt level. This omission 
could yield incorrect impulse responses due to potentially biased estimates and 
implausible implicit debt paths. They also note that the usual argument that variables 
usually included in VARs already include the elements that enter in the government 
intertemporal budget constraint is not sufficient to account for these possible effects. 
Therefore, they estimate two versions of VARs similar to Perotti (2005): one without, 
and the second with an inclusion of the debt-to-GDP ratio. However, most conclusions 
of the baseline studies on the effects of fiscal shocks remain qualitatively unchanged. 
The most important exception is related to the response of long-term interest rates to 
fiscal shocks. Indeed, they find that, in the second analysed sub-period (1981-2006), 
long-term interest rates initially fall in cases of spending shocks (as in the 1960-1979), 
but rise over time if the debt feedback is included.  
 
 
4.2.3 Sign restrictions 
 
The third approach to the identification of fiscal policy shocks consists of 
imposing sign restrictions on VAR impulse responses. This method was first proposed 
in the context of monetary policy studies by Uhlig (1999), and was later extended to 
fiscal policy studies by Canova and Pappa (2007) and Mountford and Uhlig (2009). 
However, as Rusnak (2011) notes in his survey of fiscal multiplier studies, the sign 
restriction approach is used far less than the recursive and BP SVAR approaches. 
Therefore, here we only present the key features of this approach as used by 
Mountford and Uhlig (2009) as one of the most important studies76.  
                                                
75 One exception is Marcellino (2006) in their analysis of the effects of fiscal policy shocks in the four 
largest euro area countries. They find that baseline results are fairly robust to the inclusion of public 
debt.  
76 Caldara and Kamps (2008) also apply the sign restrictions approach in their study of US fiscal policy 
using various identification approaches (Table 4.1 above).  
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Unlike the previous two approaches, the sign restrictions approach does not 
impose size restrictions on the contemporaneous relations between variables. 
Instead, it imposes restrictions on the signs of the impulse responses of variables to 
particular shocks. The identification is achieved by assuming that various variables 
react in a different manner to various shocks. In addition, unlike the recursive and 
the BP SVAR approach, the sign restrictions approach does not prescribe the number 
of restrictions in order to reach identification, and it is possible to identify shocks 
with few restrictions. Instead, the necessary restrictions depend on the number and 
nature of shocks one aims to identify and in particular on the successful 
discrimination between the reactions to the identified shocks and to other shocks 
affecting the variables.  
The sign restrictions approach is relatively flexible on the number and manner 
in which shocks are identified. Mountford and Uhlig (2009) use Bayesian estimation77 
to analyse fiscal policy effects in the US between 1955 and 2000 (Table 4.1 above). 
They identify five shocks (of which three are fiscal) by imposing a mix of zero and 
sign restrictions on the impulse response of various variables in the VAR for the 
current and three periods ahead. Shocks which move output, consumption, non-
residential investment and revenues all in the same direction are identified as 
business cycle shocks. However, this restriction also employs a crucial identification 
assumption: all movements of both GDP and revenues in the same direction are 
attributed to business cycle shocks, which thus reflect expansions driving the rise of 
government revenues, not vice versa. While this is a reasonable assumption, it does 
have an important drawback that it does not allow for potentially important episodes 
of expansionary fiscal contractions (e.g. higher GDP in the wake of higher taxes). 
Further, shocks causing higher interest rates, lower monetary base and lower prices 
up to a year later are identified as monetary policy shocks, which is a fairly standard 
approach in the literature.  
An important point in the identification of fiscal policy shocks is the 
assumption that they are orthogonal to business cycle shocks, and potentially to 
monetary policy shocks. The orthogonality constraint means that business cycle 
shocks and monetary policy shocks are identified before fiscal policy shocks, i.e. it is 
excluded that the response of fiscal variables to fiscal policy shocks is the same as the 
response to the two other shocks. The implication is that all responses of fiscal 
                                                
77 Bayesian estimation is common when sign restrictions are imposed, which are hardly ever applied 
with classical estimation, although Moon et al. (2011) propose a method to do so. On the other hand, the 
other identification approaches are possible with both estimation methods. Indeed, Caldara and Kamps 
(2008) also use Bayesian methods in their comparison of fiscal VARs, but note that median impulse 
responses are virtually the same as point estimates with the classical approach.  
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variables consistent with business cycle and monetary policy shocks are attributed to 
them, whereas the residual responses are then attributed to fiscal policy shocks.  
Mountford and Uhlig (2009) identify three separate fiscal policy shocks by 
restricting the response only of fiscal variables in the current and future three 
quarters. The identification of three shocks aims to capture the variety of fiscal 
policies and possible policy mixes: revenue shocks (revenues rise and spending is 
kept unchanged, implying higher budget surpluses), deficit-financed spending shocks 
(spending rises and revenues are kept unchanged, which implies deeper budget 
deficits) and balanced budget spending shocks (higher expenditures financed by 
higher revenues). Their main results indicate that it is important to control for the 
business cycle shock, but not for the monetary policy shock. Deficit-financed spending 
shocks have a relatively weak positive short-term impact on output, with the 
spending multiplier well below one. In addition, spending shocks have little impact 
on private consumption and interest rates, but they strongly crowd out both 
residential and non-residential private investment. On the other hand, deficit 
financed tax-cuts (i.e. negative revenue shocks) have a very effective positive impact 
on output, with a multiplier that is initially low but rises to two after two years, as 
well as a positive impact on private consumption.  
 
 
4.2.4 The event-study approach 
 
The event-study approach78 uses exogenous information on military build-ups 
to identify fiscal policy shocks and study their impact on the economy and has been 
applied exclusively to US data. In essence, it identifies military build-up episodes 
based on various news sources, which are treated as exogenous because they are not 
related to domestic economic movements but driven by foreign policy considerations. 
It was first introduced by Ramey and Shapiro (1998), who used a univariate context to 
study the response of various variables to spending shocks, which were captured by 
dummy variables representing several large military build-up episodes in the US after 
the Second World War (the Korean War, the Vietnam War and the Carter-Reagan 
build-up). Edelberg et al. (1999) and Burnside et al. (2004) extended it to a VAR 
approach, which has since become common in this literature. Finally, a similar 
                                                
78 The event-study approach is sometimes labelled "dummy variable" approach, but this is not entirely 
correct in terms of the extensions in Ramey (2011a). We also avoid the label "narrative approach" and in 
line with common practice apply it to the approach in the next subsection.  
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approach that utilises military spending with long annual US data is used by Hall 
(2009) and Barro and Redlick (2011).  
The proponents of the event-study approach claim that it has several 
advantages over the other approaches, particularly the recursive identification and 
BP SVARs (as discussed in Subsection 4.3.1). On the other hand, the event-study 
approach is only appropriate for studying spending shocks and not revenue shocks. 
In addition, it is only applicable to the United States, since it is difficult to identify 
large military spending episodes in other countries. Therefore, due to its importance 
in exposing methodological criticisms of recursive and BP SVARs, here we explain the 
main features of this approach and some important results based on the important 
study by Ramey (2011a), but we abstract from extensive details of this method.  
The main aim of Ramey (2011a) is to compare the results of several versions of 
the event-study approach to BP SVARs for government spending shocks. She starts 
from a fairly standard VAR consisted of real government spending, real GDP, hours 
worked, real private consumption, real private fixed investment, marginal tax rates 
and real product wages. In her baseline version, she extends the VAR with a dummy 
variable for four military episodes, which are identified based on news sources 
reporting large expected rises in defence spending induced by foreign policy 
considerations. The military dates variable is ordered first in the VAR and its shocks 
(identified recursively) are used as government spending shocks, similar to the BP 
SVAR which orders government spending first and identifies spending shocks in a 
recursive manner. In the wake of spending shocks, GDP and hours worked rise in 
both approaches, although by more in the event-study approach. However, the BP 
SVAR approach also finds higher private consumption and real wages, in line with 
most New Keynesian predictions, whereas the event-study approach finds lower 
private consumption and wages, consistent with the RBC literature. Using additional 
checks, Ramey (2011a) traces this difference to timing issues. That is, she argues that 
the event-study approach correctly takes into account anticipated effects, and hence it 
better captures the response of the other variables to exogenous spending shocks. In 
contrast, it is argued that what the BP SVAR identifies as exogenous spending shocks 
are in fact anticipated spending rises, thus leading to spurious findings of positive 
responses of GDP, consumption and wages to spending shocks. Indeed, delaying the 
shocks identified via military dates yields similar results to the original BP SVAR 
approach, indicating that in the latter there is a delay in the identification of shocks, 
which accounts for the difference in results between the two approaches.  
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4.2.5 The narrative approach 
 
The narrative approach is based on a similar idea as the event-study approach, 
but uses a more comprehensive and careful investigation of various sources of 
information to identify exogenous changes in fiscal policy. It was first proposed by 
Romer and Romer (2004) in the context of monetary policy, and was extended to 
fiscal policy or more precisely to tax shocks in the seminal contribution by Romer and 
Romer (2010). The narrative approach consists of a careful study of official 
presidential and legislative records to uncover the motivation behind changes in 
taxes. This in fact represents the main advantage of the narrative approach, i.e. it 
does not rely on potentially contentious identification restrictions to identify 
exogenous fiscal policy shocks like the first three approaches. However, similar to the 
event-study approach, this method is also inapplicable beyond the United States and a 
few other developed countries to which it has recently been extended79. Indeed, it 
requires the existence and investigation of detailed and sufficiently long public and 
official records containing the intentions behind fiscal policy changes. Such records 
are either not available, or not easily accessible (not least for linguistic reasons) for 
several European countries, which are our main focus. Therefore, since we will not 
be using this method in our empirical analysis, here we will present only the main 
results in the key paper in this literature. In addition, for the same reasons, here we 
will refrain from a detailed description of important methodological extensions with 
potential effects on the results, which will be discussed in Section 4.3.  
Romer and Romer (2010) use official information such as Presidential speeches 
and Congressional records to create a series of shocks to government revenues, 
including their size, timing and motivation between 1947 and 2006. They distinguish 
two types of legislated tax changes: endogenous changes, which are taken as counter-
cyclical measure or in response to spending movements, and exogenous changes, 
which are taken as a result of concerns about inherited deficits, long-run growth or 
other reasons. Then, in their baseline specification they use this series of revenue 
shocks as a determinant of output changes in a single equation framework, although 
                                                
79 Using official budget sources on fiscal policy between 1945 and 2009, Cloyne (2013) constructs a 
narrative dataset and applies this approach to analyse effects of tax changes in the United Kingdom. In 
addition, using historical records such as budget speeches and IMF documents, Devries et al. (2011) build 
a database of fiscal consolidation episodes in 17 OECD countries between 1978 and 2009 which is used by 
Guajardo et al. (2011) in their application of the narrative approach to study the effects of consolidations 
on economic activity. They also note that no other multi-country dataset based on the narrative 
approach has been compiled.  
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they also present some simple VAR results80. Their main results indicate that 
exogenous revenue shocks have a significant and quick impact on output, with the 
fiscal multiplier for tax cuts around three. Robustness checks confirm the main 
results, with the multiplier higher than two. In addition, they find that the response of 
output is quite persistent, and that it is driven mostly by higher private investments. 
On the other hand, broader measures of revenue shocks result in considerably lower 
multipliers than exogenous tax changes, thus providing strong arguments for correct 
identification of the motivation of tax changes in order to avoid biased results.  
 
 
4.3 Summary of fiscal VAR studies  
 
 The previous sections described the main approaches to the identification of 
fiscal policy shocks in the fiscal VAR literature, as well as the main results of the most 
important studies of each approach. There are two main conclusions that arise from 
this survey. First, various approaches have significant differences in the restrictions 
imposed to identify fiscal policy shocks, as well as in the treatment of the anticipation 
problem in fiscal policy. The next subsection will discuss these issues more closely, as 
well as the related issue of the frequency and type of data used in fiscal VARs. Second, 
in the wake of the lack of agreement regarding the size and even the direction of 
fiscal policy effects, a question naturally arises whether there are systematic reasons 
for the different results in the literature. This will be the focus of Subsection 4.3.2. We 
will discuss these issues by comparing and contrasting the five main approaches and 
pointing to some important aspects. However, in both sections we will focus on main 
issues and arguments only, as a detailed discussion of these issues is beyond the scope 
of our study. For the sake of brevity, we will be concise on the features of particular 
approaches, since these issues were discussed in Section 4.2.  
  
 
4.3.1 Reconsideration of the main problems of VAR studies 
  
The identification of fiscal policy in the recursive and the BP SVAR approach 
exploits the delay between economic movements and reactions by policymakers, 
which typically appear at least a quarter after economic movements (Blanchard and 
Perotti, 2002). The recursive approach uses this information to identify government 
                                                
80 As discussed below, the narrative approach has been extended to a VAR framework by Perotti (2011a) 
and Favero and Giavazzi (2012).  
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spending shocks by ordering government spending first in the VAR. This procedure is 
well accepted and fairly straightforward, reflecting the fact that recursive VARs are 
one of the main tools of modern empirical macroeconomics. However, the weakness 
of the recursive approach is that the identification of other shocks might be 
problematic, since it depends on how variables are ordered and involves the 
imposition of potentially contentious zero restrictions on the contemporaneous 
relations between other variables.  
There are three main ways to deal with this problem. First, some authors focus 
only on government spending shocks. Indeed, as long as one is interested only in the 
shock to the variable ordered first in the VAR (government spending in this case), the 
ordering of other variables does not matter (Christiano et al., 1999). Second, a few 
authors proceed with using recursive identification to analyse revenue shocks as well, 
noting that the results are subject to the drawbacks regarding identification 
restrictions. Third, some studies use alternative identification approaches. Among 
them, the approach most closely related to the recursive VAR is the BP SVAR. Its initial 
point is also related to decision lags, which imply that contemporaneously there is no 
discretionary response of fiscal policy to economic movements. The BP SVAR 
approach also identifies government spending shocks via recursive identification by 
ordering them first. However, it pays much more attention to the identification of 
revenue shocks, which is based on a careful investigation of institutional and legal 
sources regarding contemporaneous relations between variables. 
Proponents of the BP SVAR approach note that an important condition for both 
the recursive and the BP SVAR approach is that one uses quarterly data on fiscal 
variables, preferably on an accrual basis and not interpolated from annual data. It is 
argued that the quarterly frequency is crucial because identification relies on 
decision lags, i.e. on policymakers not reacting to economic movements in the same 
period. Further, some authors argue that the fiscal data used should be recorded on 
an accrual basis, not a cash basis81 (Perotti, 2005). While the use of the accrual method 
is prescribed by modern macroeconomic accounting standards, often these series are 
not very long, since data have often been recorded on a cash basis in the past and 
often continue to do so, at least partially. Indeed, there are very few countries, mostly 
developed ones, where long enough accrual data are available. All this leads some 
authors to use cash-based data in lack of any other option for the countries they are 
                                                
81 The cash method registers fiscal receipts and outlays when the budget receives or makes the payment. 
The accrual method registers revenues and spending at the time of the activity for which they are 
received or paid. Public investments are one of the main areas where discrepancies arise due to long 
implementation periods and the particular details of the method used to register the payments and the 
activity. For an intuitive description and more details on these issues, see Perotti (2005). 
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studying (e.g. Heppke-Falk et al. (2010) for Germany and Giordano et al. (2007) for 
Italy). This also applies to most transition countries, where long enough series of 
fiscal data are only available on a cash basis. In addition, it is often argued that one 
should use non-interpolated fiscal data, i.e. data originally collected at quarterly 
frequency since interpolation from annual data might induce a wrong seasonal 
pattern as well as impute incorrect dynamics in the data, thus yielding potentially 
spurious results (Ilzetzki et al., 2013). Indeed, in the studies surveyed above, authors 
often restrict the sample to the countries where non-interpolated quarterly data are 
available. However, this is also a data availability issue, since national statistics often 
only publish fiscal data which are explicitly or implicitly interpolated from annual 
data at various degrees.    
 While both the recursive and the BP SVAR approach with quarterly data 
exploit the decision lags in fiscal policy to identify fiscal policy shocks, they are often 
criticised because they ignore legislative and implementation lags as an important 
feature of the fiscal policy process. These lags imply that fiscal policy measures are 
often proposed, discussed or decided well before they actually come into force and 
have an effect on the economy. Economic agents might therefore anticipate future 
fiscal policy and change their current behaviour, which gives rise to the anticipation 
problem, or the problem of fiscal policy foresight. If the econometric estimation 
ignores this effect of anticipated fiscal policy on current variables, then the estimated 
response of output and other variables may be wrongly attributed to current fiscal 
policy, which may hence yield biased fiscal multipliers82. The serious econometric 
implications of fiscal foresight were analysed theoretically in an influential paper by 
Leeper et al. (2009), who focus on tax shocks but their findings can be generalised to 
spending shocks as well. According to them, with fiscal foresight, in equilibrium there 
is a misalignment between the information set available to the econometrician and 
the one available to economic agents in reality. This prevents the recovery of 
structural shocks from the data in a conventional manner in standard VARs. 
Formally, fiscal foresight results in equilibrium time series with a non-fundamental 
representation as they contain a non-invertible moving average component.   
In view of this criticism regarding the problems of fiscal foresight, the 
empirical literature generally proceeds in one of the following three manners to 
address the fiscal foresight problem. First, numerous authors continue to use the 
recursive or the BP SVAR approach, which as the meta-regression analysis in Rusnak 
(2011) shows, are still by far the most used empirical approaches in studying the 
                                                
82 See Perotti (2011b) for an algebraical exposition of the resulting bias in SVARs.  
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effects of fiscal policy. However, most of these studies do recognise potential 
consequences of anticipated policy, but rely on various arguments why they are likely 
to be small and hence can be neglected. For instance, Perotti (2005) shows that the 
effects of government spending shocks are inadequately estimated only if the omitted 
announcement shock is serially correlated. In such a case, the estimated fiscal policy 
shock also picks up the direct effect of the omitted shock on output, as well as indirect 
effects via interest rates, which generally reflect announcement shocks immediately. 
He also notes that the extent to which the expected fiscal policy by the private sector 
relies on official policy announcements is ultimately an empirical issue. Indeed, his 
analysis for the US and four other OECD countries shows that policy announcements 
are generally unable to predict reduced-form VAR spending and revenue residuals83.  
This indicates that policy announcements have little impact on how the private sector 
forms its expectations and how it behaves. In addition, he notes that the importance 
of the estimated shock being unanticipated depends on unanticipated and anticipated 
shocks having different effects, which is a controversial empirical issue. Further, 
Mertens and Ravn (2010) develop a fiscal SVAR estimator for cases when fiscal shocks 
are anticipated. They conclude that anticipated effects are problematic in standard 
VARs if the anticipation rate is low84 (which is contrary to standard economic theory) 
and if anticipated shocks are important. However, in their empirical application to US 
data they fail to find evidence that would oppose the findings of the standard VAR 
studies. The DSGE investigation of identification approaches in Chahrour et al. (2012) 
also fails to find evidence that the BP SVAR approach is biased due to anticipated 
effects. Moreover, several authors explicitly or implicitly use the findings by other 
studies such as Giannone and Reichlin (2006), Yang (2007) and Sims (2012). Their 
findings imply that including forward looking variables in the VAR can mitigate the 
fiscal foresight problem and the accompanying non-invertibility arising from fiscal 
foresight, and consequently minimise the potential bias in VARs. According to these 
studies, variables such as private consumption, investment, prices or interest rates 
react to anticipated fiscal policy, implying that their inclusion can be used to capture 
future policy, i.e. as a way to control for anticipated policy. Therefore, empirical 
studies typically include some or all of these variables in the VAR in order to capture 
anticipated effects of fiscal policy and identify proper unexpected fiscal shocks. Doing 
so helps not only to minimise the fiscal foresight problem, but also to discriminate 
                                                
83 Most studies using the recursive or the BP SVAR approach, including some of the studies surveyed in 
Section 4.2.2 above, also check for possible anticipation effects in similar manners, but tend to find that 
their baseline results are quite robust.  
84 Low anticipation rates mean economic agents discount future news at higher rates.  
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among competing economic theories, which have different predictions about the 
response of these variables to fiscal shocks.   
 A second way to deal with the anticipation problem is to use annual instead of 
quarterly data. The main advantage of using annual data in this context is that fiscal 
policy is less likely to be anticipated one year ahead than one or two quarters ahead 
(Perotti, 2008). Beetsma and Giuliodori (2011) note that an additional important 
advantage of using annual data is that the recovered shocks are more realistic, since 
new fiscal impulses typically do not appear at quarterly frequency, but once a year 
when the budget is adopted (and perhaps in mid-year budget supplements). They also 
note that advantages of annual data include the avoidance of: (i) particular quarterly 
features of certain taxes or government outlays and (ii) seasonality problems. Last 
but not least, annual data may often be the only fiscal data available, since in many 
cases, including some European countries and most transition countries, long enough 
series of non-interpolated quarterly data are not available. However, while the use of 
annual data does help with the anticipation problem, it might make identification of 
fiscal policy shocks more difficult. This is due to the fact that identification in the 
recursive and BP SVAR approaches relies on decision lags, i.e. on the assumption that 
policymakers do not react contemporaneously to output movements. This is 
reasonable at quarterly frequency, but with annual data this implies that they do not 
react to economic movements during the year. However, although this might seem as 
a too strong assumption, there is no consensus on this issue in the literature. One 
argument for relying on annual data again relates to the fact that there is only one 
important fiscal event in a year - the government budget. Therefore, budget limits on 
spending, revenues and deficits may constrain policymakers from responding quickly 
to contemporaneous economic movements. In addition, Beetsma et al. (2006) and 
Beetsma et al. (2009) provide some robustness checks with quarterly data that show 
that identification restrictions with annual data are plausible for countries where this 
exercise could be carried out, i.e. where non-interpolated quarterly fiscal data exist. 
Their findings are often used as an additional argument for proceeding with annual 
data in part of the literature (besides the data availability problem). Indeed, there are 
several studies which use fiscal VARs with annual data. For instance, Bénétrix and 
Lane (2009) use a VAR with recursive identification to analyse effects of government 
spending shocks in Ireland. In addition, several of the studies surveyed in Section 4.2 
extend their baseline quarterly VAR studies to annual data, typically on the US and a 
few other OECD countries for which long enough data are available (e.g. Perotti 
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(2008)). Last but not least, annual data are typically used in studies which employ the 
panel VAR approach, surveyed below.  
 A third way to deal with both the anticipation problem (and the potentially 
contentious identification restrictions) in the recursive VAR and BP SVAR is to use an 
alternative identification approach. Indeed, all the three alternative approaches were 
developed with the aim to overcome the pitfalls of recursive VARs and BP SVARs 
regarding identification restrictions and consequences of anticipated fiscal policy. For 
instance, proponents of the sign restrictions approach (e.g. Mountford and Uhlig 
(2009)) claim that it successfully handles the anticipation problem, which is achieved 
not by imposing zero or quantitative restrictions on contemporaneous relations 
between variables, but by imposing restrictions on the sign of their contemporaneous 
and future responses to particular fiscal shocks.  Further, the restrictions to identify 
fiscal policy shocks can be imposed in a relatively "atheoretical" or "agnostic" 
manner, thus avoiding the imposition of potentially contentious identification 
restrictions based on ordering or institutional information. More precisely, fiscal 
shocks can be identified by imposing restrictions on the response fiscal variables (and 
imposing orthogonality to other identified shocks, as described in Subsection 4.2.3), 
and not by imposing restrictions on the movement of output, consumption and 
investment. Therefore, the method is "agnostic" regarding the response of these key 
non-fiscal variables of interest to fiscal shocks (Mountford and Uhlig, 2009). In 
addition, identification relies purely on the data, and not on institutional and other 
information to separate fiscal policy shocks from business cycle shocks (i.e. automatic 
stabilizers). Last but not least, restrictions can be imposed in a minimalistic manner, 
e.g. by not identifying all the shocks but only the ones in the focus of the particular 
study. Nevertheless, despite its relative flexibility, the sign restrictions approach is 
among the least used in studies of effects of fiscal policy (Rusnak, 2011). This probably 
reflects some of its drawbacks, such as the dependence of identification of various 
shocks on fiscal policy shocks being orthogonal to business cycle shocks, thus 
preventing "non-Keynesian" effects of fiscal policy (expansionary fiscal contractions) 
which are sometimes found in the empirical literature. In addition, Perotti (2005) 
notes that, while it deals with anticipation effects, the sign restrictions approach 
cannot identify the exact timing of fiscal shocks.  
 The final two identification approaches rely on incorporating external 
information from narrative records into the estimation of fiscal policy shocks and the 
analysis of their effects. The event-study approach has been applied to spending 
shocks, whereas the narrative approach has been applied to revenue shocks. 
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Proponents of the event-study approach claim that its main advantage lies in 
achieving identification not by imposing potentially contentious restrictions, but by 
using military episodes or expected defence spending, which are generally accepted 
to be exogenous to domestic economic movements. Related to this, Ramey (2011a) 
claims that the advantage of event-study VARs in dealing with the anticipation 
problem explains the different results compared to recursive and BP approaches85, 
which are argued to be therefore unable to properly deal with the anticipation 
problem. The final approach in fiscal VAR studies is the narrative approach, which 
was proposed by Romer and Romer (2010) originally in a single equation setting and 
later extended in a VAR. It identifies revenue shocks by relying on official fiscal policy 
records such as Presidential speeches and Congressional records. Overall, both the 
event-study approach and the narrative approach claim that they avoid imposing 
contentious identification restrictions by relying instead on external information to 
identify fiscal policy shocks. Equally as important, they claim that the anticipation 
problem is minimised because these external information enable capturing the 
proper timing of the exogenous shock, which is more realistic than the recovery of 
shocks based on potentially contentious identification restrictions, since in the latter 
case responses to shocks might in reality reflect responses to anticipated fiscal policy.  
However, these approaches are not universally accepted in the literature. For 
instance, Perotti (2008) argues that the foundations for the results of the event-study 
approach in Ramey (2011a) are not robust and they reflect the fact that military 
episodes are different, which limits their relevance for the effects of fiscal policy in 
normal times86. Besides, he also argues that the reliance on this method suffers from a 
severe small sample problem, which raises the possibility that military episodes are 
in fact capturing other important shocks possibly hitting the economy at the same 
time. Similar to the procedure followed in some other BP SVAR studies, he also checks 
and fails to find evidence that official budget forecasts Granger-cause SVAR shocks, 
which indicates that fiscal policy shocks identified via BP SVARs are not anticipated. 
In addition, Perotti (2011b) re-examines and extends the exercises in Ramey (2011a) 
to conclude that there is no fundamental difference in results if both the BP SVAR and 
the event-study are applied to the same specification and sample, which implies that 
the BP SVAR approach remains appropriate for empirical studies. However, Ramey 
(2011c) replies that findings in Perotti (2011b) are incorrect if one carefully compares 
the two approaches with the same specification to estimate identical samples, which 
                                                
85 As noted above, the BP SVAR approach also relies on recursive identification of spending shocks. 
86 These checks are performed on the 2006 working paper version of Ramey (2011a).  
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indeed yields different results between the event-study approach and BP SVARs87. 
Regarding the narrative approach, its extensions into a VAR by Perotti (2011a) and 
particularly Favero and Giavazzi (2012) show that results in fact often resemble the 
ones of the standard BP SVAR approach, thus bringing into question the advantages of 
the narrative approach. In addition, Mertens and Ravn (2012) argue that about half of 
the exogenous tax changes in the narrative approach proposed by Romer and Romer 
(2010) have in fact been anticipated, with a median anticipation horizon of six 
quarters. More importantly, both the event-study and the narrative approach have so 
far been almost exclusively applied to the United States. Indeed, their essential ideas 
make them almost impossible to apply in the context of other countries, especially 
transition countries. More precisely, the event-study approach relies on exogenous 
military build-up dates, which are hardly important outside the US. In addition, the 
narrative approach requires the existence in the public domain and the careful 
investigation of detailed official records of fiscal policy for a sufficiently long period. 
Again, this is generally not the case for countries other than the US and a very few 
other developed countries. Therefore, due to these practical constraints, as well as the 
inconclusive evidence on the advantages of the event-study and narrative approaches 
regarding the anticipation problem, the empirical literature still mostly relies on the 
recursive approach and BP SVARs to identify fiscal policy shocks and analyse their 
effects on the economy.  
 Another important drawback of the empirical, as well as the theoretical 
literature, is that very little attention is paid to the size of the fiscal multiplier in 
recessions. Indeed, the original Keynesian proposals on fiscal stimulus were aimed 
precisely at circumstances of deep recessions, with high unemployment and low 
capacity utilisation. Parker (2011) investigates the reasons why the literature is 
unable to provide a robust answer to the question regarding possibly different effects 
of fiscal policy in recessions and expansions, and also proposes some suggestions how 
to rectify this. He notes that the main reason for the inability to answer this question 
is methodological, since the literature typically employs linear models or linear 
solution methods which assume identical efficiency of fiscal policy in recessions and 
expansions. Indeed, variability is excluded in most DSGE models due to the fact that 
they are usually linearised around a single point, whereas VAR models are unable to 
cope with state dependence. He suggests that theoretical models should start to 
incorporate nonlinearities in the demand elasticity of output, which is already 
                                                
87 The debate between Roberto Perotti and Valerie Ramey is much more detailed and nuanced, but 
describing it in more details is beyond the scope of our study.  
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attracting some attention, particularly in the literature on the zero-lower-bound 
surveyed above. However, Parker (2011) notes that in those studies the non-linearity 
does not depend on the state of the economy but on fixed interest rates. On the other 
hand, problems are more difficult regarding the quantification of effects in VARs. The 
inference in standard VARs essentially depends on their linear structure, and large 
changes are required to incorporate state dependences in a VAR. In addition, 
recessions and especially deep recessions are quite rare in the data used in most 
studies (Table 4.1 above). Consequently, even if state dependence is modelled in a 
VAR, the data-intensive estimation would further exacerbate the weak inference 
problem in VARs, which would probably yield imprecise estimates of the multiplier. 
Therefore, he argues that more attention should be paid to microeconomic studies on 
the effects of fiscal policy, since they can estimate the partial equilibrium response of 
agents to particular policies. Ramey (2011b) also notes that empirical cross-state 
studies for the US can yield important insights on the effects of fiscal policy. However, 
she warns that transforming those findings into a quantification of the overall fiscal 
multiplier is not straightforward. It should be noted that this literature is constrained 
by the fact that appropriate microeconomic and cross-state data are only available for 
the United States. On the other hand, the recent literature also provides some 
advances in studying different effects of fiscal policy in recessions and expansions via 
extensions of conventional macroeconomic techniques. Most notably, Auerbach and 
Gorodnichenko (2012) use regime switching SVARs in the US context, allowing 
different effects of government spending and revenues over business cycles. If no 
endogenous regime change is allowed, than they find that impact spending 
multipliers are the same, but cumulative multipliers are around 2 in recessions and 
slightly negative in expansions. In addition, when they allow for feedback and 
endogenous change in regimes in response to spending shocks, spending multipliers 
are typically between 0 and 0.5 in expansions, and between 1 and 1.5 in recessions, 
although in this case the size of the multiplier varies considerably in particular points 
in time. However, Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012) note that calculating full 
dynamic responses in the latter case is complicated, whereas Ramey (2011b) warns 
that the estimation of these models is not trivial, and many important issues arise in 
the process88. The same authors extend this approach to several OECD countries in 
Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2013). They confirm their previous finding that 
spending multipliers are larger in recessions, and they also find that the response of 
                                                
88 Besides these reasons, these methods are inapplicable for our analysis, since they require longer series 
than the ones available for European countries, particularly transition countries.  
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several other variables also varies with the cycle. On the other hand, Pereira and 
Lopes (2014) use Bayesian time-varying parameters VAR with BP identification to 
analyse spending and revenue shocks in the US between 1965 and 2009. They find a 
considerable decline in the effectiveness of net-taxes in stimulating output, as well as 
a decline in the effectiveness of spending, which is however much smaller and fairly 
imprecisely estimated. In addition, there is only moderate evidence that the size of 
the tax multiplier in recessions has increased over time.  Further, Kirchner et al. 
(2010) use Bayesian time-varying parameters VAR with recursive identification to 
analyse effects of government spending shocks in the euro area between 1980 and 
2008. Their main findings indicate that the effectiveness of government spending on 
stimulating output in the short term has increased until the late 1980s and decreased 
thereafter to about 0.5 in the current decade, while there has also been a considerable 
decline in long-term multipliers. 
 
 
4.3.2 Sources of different results of fiscal VAR studies 
 
 There are several broad conclusions that may be drawn regarding the size of 
the fiscal multiplier and the transmission of fiscal shocks in the economy, exceptions 
in some studies notwithstanding. Most studies using the recursive and the BP SVAR 
approach tend to find that the government spending multiplier is positive and its size 
is usually around one. Most often, spending shocks have a positive effect on private 
consumption, an insignificant or negative effect on private investment, and mostly a 
positive effect on real wages and employment. These findings are generally in line 
with the New Keynesian predictions on effects of government spending shocks. On 
the other hand, findings of other identification approaches are fairly mixed. The 
event-study approach also finds a positive effect of spending shocks on output, with 
the fiscal multiplier around one, as well as a positive effect on hours worked, but a 
negative effect on consumption and real wages. Therefore, this approach tends to 
confirm neoclassical predictions regarding the effects of government spending. 
Further, the sign restrictions approach finds that spending multipliers are positive 
but lower than one, and there is also a generally positive reaction of private 
consumption. In addition, the sign restrictions approach finds strong positive 
multipliers of tax cuts. A strong positive effect of tax cuts is also found in the original 
study using the narrative approach, while later studies extending the same approach 
to a VAR tend to find somewhat lower multipliers, which are however still above one. 
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On the other hand, studies using the recursive and the BP SVAR approach typically 
find that revenue multipliers are lower than one or insignificant.  
 The diversity of results on fiscal multipliers, on the transmission mechanism of 
fiscal policy and on the connections to theoretical predictions is a well known feature 
of this literature, and it has also attracted various comments and suggestions by 
authors. For instance, Perotti (2008) notes that while economists mostly agree 
regarding the effects and transmission of monetary policy, there is little consensus 
regarding the theoretical predictions and the interpretation of empirical results on 
the effects and the transmission of fiscal policy. Leeper (2010) notes that the lack of 
consensus reflects difficulties in studying different datasets, econometric techniques 
and economic models. However, he also notes that results often diverge even when 
the same country and time period is concerned. Therefore, he argues that the wide 
range of results brings the literature into a 'fiscal multiplier morass', which is 
attributed to fiscal policy relying on unsystematic speculation, or what is labelled 
'fiscal alchemy' as opposed to 'monetary science'. Further, in a brief survey of key 
empirical studies, Ramey (2011b) finds that most of them give fairly similar answers 
regarding the spending multiplier (between 0.6 and 1.8), despite differences in 
samples, specification and identification approaches. However, she also notes that the 
range within studies themselves is almost as wide as the one between studies, and 
that standard errors are typically large. When excluding lower estimates reflecting 
tax-financing of spending increases, and higher estimates reflecting extraordinary 
recessionary circumstances, she finds that the multiplier for deficit-financed 
temporary spending increases is plausibly between 0.8 and 1.5. However, the 
uncertainty involved also means that the multiplier could be somewhere between 0.5 
and 2, which presumably limits the usefulness of empirical studies in policy debates. 
Further, Spilimbergo et al. (2009) also note that the range of fiscal multipliers is fairly 
wide. For instance, multipliers are between 0.3 and 0.6 for revenues, 0.5 and 1.8 for 
capital spending and 0.3 and 1 for other spending. In addition, they note that 
multipliers for low income countries generally lie between negative and 0.5. Finally, 
the descriptive analysis in Rusnak (2011) shows that there are no systematic 
differences regarding the size of the spending multiplier across four identification 
approaches in fiscal VARs, but that the average estimated multiplier for the US is 
considerably higher than for other countries.  
 Our survey of empirical studies and the comments by various other authors 
indicate that it is fairly difficult to pin point the precise source of the diversity of 
results on effects of fiscal policy. Indeed, this diversity could reflect a wide variety of 
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factors, including but not limited to different countries and time periods included, 
different identification restrictions, possible consequences of anticipation effects, 
slightly different specifications (Table 4.1 above) or structural country differences. 
Therefore, any data reduction exercise or tabular presentation of findings would 
likely provide only superficial evidence, without being able to provide an answer on 
the systematic reasons for the diversity of findings. On the other hand, a careful 
investigation of the reasons for this diversity is a fairly complicated task due to the 
wide array of factors mentioned above and is therefore well beyond the scope of our 
study. However, there have been several careful attempts to reconcile the findings 
across various studies and to try to find systematic reasons for their diversity. 
Understandably, this literature is in itself both wide and detailed, so next we briefly 
review its main findings.   
 As noted above, there is a relatively long debate between two leading 
economists in this field, Roberto Perotti and Valerie Ramey, regarding the proper 
method to identify government spending shocks and the importance of anticipation 
effects (Perotti (2008), Ramey (2011a), Perotti (2011b) and Ramey (2011c)). Perotti is a 
strong advocate of the BP SVAR approach. His studies tend to find that the spending 
multiplier is positive and around one, and that spending shocks have a positive effect 
on consumption, real wages and employment, thus bringing results in line with the 
New Keynesian predictions. However, Ramey finds that these results are entirely due 
to the wrong timing of spending shocks in the BP SVAR approach, in particular its 
omission of importance of anticipation effects (Ramey, 2011a). She argues that when 
spending shocks are correctly identified with the event-study approach, the findings 
are in line with neoclassical predictions, particularly regarding the negative response 
of consumption and real wages and positive response of hours worked. While there 
are many important points in the debate, essentially it does not provide a useful 
conclusion on the proper identification method, and not even on whether results 
differ across methods. As Alesina and Giavazzi (2013) summarise it, Ramey believes 
that the event-study approach using exogenous military events is the best way to 
identify exogenous fiscal policy and that it is important to account for anticipation 
effects, while Perotti believes that the event-study approach suffers from a small-
sample bias (due to very few war episodes) and incomplete consideration of other 
important factors, and that controlling for anticipation effects does not matter. 
 Caldara and Kamps (2008) provide a careful comparison of results across the 
first four identification approaches on the same sample of US data (Table 4.1 above) 
Their main findings are that the qualitative response of key variables to spending 
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shocks in the recursive, BP SVAR and sign restrictions approaches is fairly similar and 
close to some of the New Keynesian predictions, although there are some differences 
regarding the size of the fiscal multiplier. On the other hand, results of the event-
study approach are more in line with neoclassical predictions. Further, they find 
more divergent responses to revenue shocks across the first three identification 
approaches (with the event-study approach being inapplicable for revenue shocks). 
Their further investigation attributes this discrepancy regarding tax multipliers to the 
size of the automatic stabilizers which is estimated or calibrated for the various 
approaches. Both the recursive approach and the standard BP SVAR approach yield 
small automatic stabilizers, unlike large stabilizers in the sign-restrictions approach 
and in the BP SVAR approach when this parameter is freely estimated (instead of 
being calibrated based on institutional information). Therefore, they conclude that 
this uncertainty about the size of automatic stabilizers translates into different results 
of tax cut multipliers, which suggests that more attention should be paid to the 
modelling of tax shocks and the cyclical adjustment of taxes in fiscal VARs.     
  In a more recent study, these authors come back to the sources of different 
results in fiscal VAR studies and to the possibility of the construction of robust fiscal 
multipliers with SVARs (Caldara and Kamps, 2012). They again show that different 
restrictions across identification approaches about the output elasticity of taxes and 
spending yield widely different fiscal multipliers, but that there is a way to map 
estimates of elasticities into fiscal multipliers. Therefore, they propose that output 
elasticities of taxes and spending should be imposed in the form of probability 
distributions of elasticities based on empirical evidence. They note that this differs 
from the existing approaches, which either impose a 'dogmatic' single value of the 
output elasticity, or are very loose and impose almost no output elasticity of taxes and 
spending. When narrowing the elasticities to empirically plausible estimates, they 
find that the median tax multiplier becomes larger than one after five quarters, 
whereas the median spending multiplier exceeds one across all horizons. In addition, 
there is a high probability that private consumption responds positively to spending 
shocks, in line with New Keynesian predictions.  
 Several studies also focus on the reconciliation of the findings of the narrative 
approach proposed by Romer and Romer (2010) with the ones in the BP SVAR 
literature. The baseline version of Romer and Romer (2010) relies on single equation 
regression of output on revenue shocks, although they also present some simple VAR 
results. However, Favero and Giavazzi (2012) pay more attention to the incorporation 
of narrative revenue shocks in a standard VAR framework, akin to the ones of 
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Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Perotti (2008) and argue that their method is robust 
to anticipation effects. Their main motivation is to reconcile the two methods, 
particularly bearing on mind the large multipliers in the narrative approach 
compared to fairly small positive multipliers (which do not exceed unity) typical for 
the BP SVAR literature. When they use a VAR to analyse the effects of tax shocks 
identified with the narrative approach instead of the limited information approach of 
single equations used by Romer and Romer (2010), they find little difference in 
results, and multipliers are closer to the lower ones in the BP SVAR literature. 
Therefore, they argue that the discrepancy in results on the size of the tax multiplier 
is not due to the different identification of the shocks, but to the different models 
used. On the other hand, Chahrour et al. (2012) build a DSGE model to analyse the 
reasons for the different sizes of tax multipliers in the narrative and the BP SVAR 
approach. Their main findings indicate that this discrepancy is not due to the 
different transmission mechanism in the two approaches (i.e. different model 
specification); rather, it reflects either the failure of both approaches to identify the 
same tax shocks or small-sample uncertainty. Perotti (2011a) further extends the 
database and the methodology to incorporate shocks identified via the narrative 
approach in a VAR, allowing for different impacts of endogenous and exogenous 
changes. He finds that multipliers are somewhere between the large multipliers in 
Romer and Romer (2010) and lower multipliers found by Favero and Giavazzi (2012).   
 Finally, two recent meta-regression analyses also aim to provide an answer to 
the sources of discrepancy in the empirical literature regarding the size of the fiscal 
multipliers. Rusnak (2011) analyses 27 studies that contain 135 estimates of impulse 
responses, predominantly using the recursive and BP SVAR approaches. As noted 
above, in the descriptive analysis he finds that there is no systematic difference on 
spending multipliers regarding identification approaches, while the average 
multiplier is higher in the US than in other countries. The meta-regression analysis 
suggests that there is little systematic effect from estimation characteristics, although 
the effect is rather imprecisely estimated, while detailed results suggest that 
multipliers are somewhat lower for the sign-restrictions approach. However, the 
main finding from the meta-regression is that the discrepancy regarding the size of 
the multiplier is mostly due to structural country characteristics, while differences in 
study design are less important. There are strong indications that high levels of public 
debt, higher trade openness and higher average short-term interest rates all decrease 
the size of the multiplier. Interestingly, he also finds that studies using annual data 
tend to find significantly higher multipliers. Further, Gechert and Will (2012) provide 
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a wider and more detailed meta-regression analysis of 89 theoretical and empirical 
studies including 749 observations of multiplier values (of which 255 are from fiscal 
VARs). They classify and analyse studies alongside several important dimensions, 
such as the type of fiscal impulse, the model class, the multiplier calculation method 
and additional controls, which enables them to reach more nuanced conclusions. 
Their main finding indicates that multipliers of public investment in empirical studies 
are significantly higher than the ones for overall spending, whereas there is no 
significant difference among other spending sub-components and taxes. Regarding 
fiscal VARs, regressions omitting controls and additional variables indicate that the 
recursive, BP SVAR and narrative approaches have significantly higher fiscal 
multipliers than the sign-restrictions and event-study approaches, mostly in line with 
our survey above. However, these differences among identification approaches 
disappear once controls and additional variables are included more carefully, such as 
the way the multiplier is calculated (at peak or the integral of the impulse response), 
the horizon included in the calculation of the multiplier, the time span and frequency 
of the data and the share of imports in GDP. For instance, they find that multipliers 
calculated at peak are larger than integral (cumulative) multipliers, and multipliers 
are also larger if calculated over a longer horizon. This change in results mostly 
reflects the fact that different identification approaches yield different shapes of 
impulse responses, which are related to the way the fiscal multiplier is calculated and 
the horizon included in the calculation. In addition, multipliers are higher if time 
series are longer, but lower if more recent years are included in the sample, although 
authors warn that most studies do not include the recent stimulus packages. Further, 
similar to Rusnak (2011), they find that multipliers are lower for economies with a 
higher share of imports, but differ from Rusnak (2011) in finding that studies using 
annual data tend to find lower multipliers. Therefore, their overall conclusion is that 
the size of the multiplier depends crucially on the particular setting and method 
chosen, which should be taken into consideration in policy debates.  
 
 
4.4 Panel VARs    
 
 The studies surveyed above use conventional VARs in a time series context, 
including those studying fiscal policy in several countries by using separate VARs for 
each country, typically with quarterly data. However, a strand of the recent literature 
employs panel VARs (PVARs) to study the effects of fiscal policy shocks in several 
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countries together. One of the main advantages of the PVAR approach is that it 
enables the study of fiscal policy effects in a larger sample of countries, for which 
data series may not be long enough for country-by-country VARs. Most studies using 
PVAR use annual data, which are often the only series available, since sufficiently 
long non-interpolated quarterly data are often not available, as noted above. In 
addition, an important advantage of the PVAR is that it combines the conventional 
VAR approach of treating all variables as endogenous with the panel approach, which 
allows for unobserved country heterogeneity. Studies surveyed below typically pool 
the observations for various countries over years and estimate the reduced-form VAR 
in Eq. 31. However, the PVAR imposes cross-country homogeneity, which might be a 
strong assumption when one analyses various countries, although studies tend to 
focus on countries with similar characteristics. Therefore, in order to account for 
country differences, additional elements are often included in the estimation, most 
notably country and/or time fixed effects, time trends or exogenous variables, while 
some studies also use various sample splits. The inclusion of additional terms, 
particularly fixed effects, and more generally the combination of VAR and panel 
estimation, give rise to particular methodological issues and challenges, most notably 
the LSDV bias in dynamic panels as well as the need for proper treatment of country 
heterogeneity. However, in this part we will only briefly survey the studies employing 
the PVAR on fiscal policy, and refrain from a more detailed methodological 
discussion, which will be provided in Chapter 5, where we will use this approach in 
our empirical study89.  
 
                      Eq. 31 
   
 
 Beetsma and Giuliodori (2011) provide an extensive analysis of effects of 
government spending shocks using the PVAR approach with annual data and 
recursive identification in the European context. Their baseline VAR consists of real 
government spending, real cyclically-adjusted net taxes, real GDP, nominal long-term 
interest rate and real effective exchange rate for 14 EU countries between 1970 and 
2004. To account for heterogeneity, they also include country fixed effects, country-
specific time trends and time dummies. Their main results show that government 
spending has a positive impact on output, with the fiscal multiplier larger than one. 
                                                
89 For an extensive description of PVARs, important methodological issues and their treatment, see 
Juessen and Linnemann (2010) and Canova and Ciccarelli (2013). 
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In addition, they find that higher government spending results in higher budget 
deficits, as well as higher interest rates and real appreciation. Beetsma and Giuliodori 
(2011) also provide numerous extensions and robustness checks. For instance, 
modifying the deterministic terms does not have a considerable impact on baseline 
results. More importantly, using various sensitivity checks, they find little evidence 
that the anticipation problem affects their results. They also address the potential 
problems of recursive identification with annual data first by relaxing the 
assumption of a zero-contemporaneous effect of output on spending, and then by 
using private instead of total GDP. However, in both cases the baseline results on the 
positive effects of spending on output are largely unchanged. Further, the results of 
alternative specifications and sub-samples indicate that private consumption and 
investment rise in the wake of spending shocks, while imports rise and exports fall, 
thus indicating evidence for the 'twin deficit' hypothesis. In addition, when splitting 
the sample according to trade openness, they find that higher government spending 
has a smaller positive output effect and a stronger and more persistent negative 
impact on trade balances in open economies.  
 The PVAR with annual data has also been used to analyse the effects of 
government spending on the current account and the real exchange rate, for instance 
by Bénétrix and Lane (2013) and Endegnanew et al. (2012). Bénétrix and Lane (2013) 
analyse 11 EMU countries between 1970 and 2006, although their main focus is not on 
fiscal multipliers but on the effects of shocks to particular components of government 
spending on the real exchange rate. In their VAR they include various components of 
real government spending (one at a time), the real GDP and the CPI-based real 
exchange rate, which are all in logs and expressed as deviations from the other 10 
EMU countries. They also include country fixed effects and country specific time 
trends in order to address country heterogeneity, as well as year dummies to 
eliminate cross-country contemporaneous residual correlation. In line with the 
dominant practice in this literature, they use the recursive approach to identify the 
government spending shock. Similar to Beetsma and Giuliodori (2011), their main 
findings indicate that government spending shocks appreciate the real exchange rate, 
although the magnitude and persistence differs across components.  
 Endegnanew et al. (2012) also use PVAR with recursive identification to 
analyse effects of government spending in microstates and possible differences with 
other countries90 between 1970 and 2009. Unlike the previous two studies, but in line 
                                                
90 They have 155 countries in their sample, of which 42 are microstates, defined as countries with a 
population lower than 2 million.  
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with significant parts of the literature in other areas (e.g. Love and Zicchino (2002)), 
instead of mean-differencing of the variables they use forward mean differencing in 
order to remove country fixed effects and avoid the LSDV bias, i.e. they use the 
Helmert transformation based on Arellano and Bover (1995). They find that the 
effects of spending shocks on output are very small in both sub-samples, albeit less 
persistent in microstates. However, there are significant differences in the response 
of the current account, which deteriorates by double as much in microstates as in 
other countries, probably reflecting the typically higher openness of the former. 
Finally, government consumption shocks have no effect on the real exchange rate in 
the global sample, but they result in real appreciation on impact in microstates.  
    Ilzetzki et al. (2013) use PVAR with recursive identification to analyse effects 
of fiscal policy in a diverse unbalanced sample of 20 high-income and 24 developing 
countries for which they are able to find non-interpolated quarterly data between 
1970 and 2007 (with a typical span of about ten years per country). Their main VAR 
specification is fairly simple, and it includes deviations of real government 
consumption and real GDP from trend. However, the main results are mostly robust 
to the extensions of the baseline specification to include deviations of real 
government investment from trend, the current account balance, the short-term 
policy interest rate and change in the real exchange rate. In order to account for 
country heterogeneity, they split the sample by various country characteristics, which 
also enables them to analyse more closely how they affect the effectiveness of fiscal 
policy. They find that government consumption shocks have a positive effect on 
output in developed countries, with the cumulative fiscal multiplier lower than one, 
while their effect in developing countries is insignificant. There are also significant 
differences in the effects of fiscal policy on output depending on the exchange rate 
regime. The additional analysis shows that this difference is due to the response of 
monetary policy, which indicates that the extent of monetary policy accommodation 
is crucial when one analyses fiscal multipliers. Indeed, they find that the cumulative 
multiplier in fixed exchange rate regimes is sometimes larger than one, while it is 
effectively zero in countries with flexible exchange rates. In line with most other 
studies, they also find that country trade openness is another crucial determinant of 
effects of fiscal policy, with the cumulative fiscal multiplier exceeding one in 
relatively closed economies and negative in more open economies. These differences 
in results on the multiplier hold regardless if the differences in openness reflect trade 
barriers or the size of the internal market. Further, they find that when splitting the 
sample according to high public debt episodes, debt levels above 60% of GDP result in 
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negative cumulative fiscal multipliers, as opposed to positive multipliers with lower 
indebtedness. In addition, there is some evidence that the cumulative government 
investment multiplier is close to one and significantly higher than the government 
consumption multiplier in developing countries, although there is no significant 
difference in the effect of the two components in high-income countries. Overall, 
these findings lead them to conclude that the trends of higher trade openness, higher 
exchange rate flexibility and higher public debts could be expected to lower the 
effectiveness of fiscal policy in the future.  
 The key features of the empirical studies that use panel VAR to analyse fiscal 
policy are presented in Table 4.2 below. The aim of this table is not only to summarise 
the features and the uses of panel VAR in analysing fiscal policy, but also to help 
during the design of our empirical study in the following chapter and to compare it to 
the existing studies. Again, we abstract from presenting results of these studies 
(discussed above) for ease of exposition, as they are impossible to capture in a single 
table. 
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Study Country 
coverage 
Period Identifi-
cation 
method 
Endogenous 
variables in baseline 
VAR 
Deterministic 
terms 
Additional specifications and other 
comments 
Bénétrix 
and Lane 
(2013) 
11 EMU 
countries 
(EMU12 
except 
Luxembourg) 
1970-2006, 
annual 
Recursive Various components of 
real government spending 
(one at a time), real GDP 
and the CPI-based real 
effective exchange rate (all 
in logs, expressed as 
deviations from the other 
10 EMU countries). 
Country fixed 
effects, country-
specific time 
trends, year 
dummies. 
Alternative specifications: jack-knifing, adding 
the remaining government spending, sub-
periods, adding public debt, replacing CPI-based 
real effective exchange rate with alternatives. 
Endegnanew 
et al. (2012) 
155 countries 1970-2009, 
annual 
Recursive Real government 
consumption, real GDP, 
current account as a share 
of GDP, real effective 
exchange rate (all in logs 
except the current 
account).  
Country fixed 
effects.  
Besides the global sample, also an analysis of 
microstates, defined as countries with a 
population lower than 2 million.  
Forward mean differencing is used (Helmert 
transformation), with GMM estimation. 
Ilzetzki 
et al. (2013) 
44 countries 
(20 developed 
and 24 
developing) 
1970-2007, 
quarterly 
(typical 
span 10 
years per 
country) 
Recursive Real government 
consumption and real GDP 
(both as deviations from 
quadratic trend).  
Country fixed 
effects.  
Also the baseline bi-variate PVAR for sub-sample 
analysis (based on country income, exchange 
rate regime, trade openness and high-debt 
episodes). Alternative specifications include the 
real effective exchange rate (in first differences), 
real government consumption and investment 
(both as deviations from quadratic trend), the 
current account as a share of GDP and the 
monetary policy interest rate.  
Beetsma 
et al. (2006) 
14 EU 
countries 
(EU15 except 
Luxembourg) 
1965-2004, 
annual 
Recursive Real government 
spending, real cyclically-
adjusted net taxes, real 
GDP (all in logs). 
Country fixed 
effects, country-
specific time 
trends, year 
dummies. 
Extensions of the model with the log of the price 
level, the short-term nominal interest rate and 
the log of the real effective exchange rate. Sub-
samples for country size and original EU 
member states. Alternative specifications: 
private instead of total GDP and government 
consumption and investment instead of total 
spending. Checks for identification restrictions 
(smaller PVARs for fewer countries with 
quarterly data). Also an extensive analysis of a 
panel trade model and fiscal policy spill-overs 
via trade in the EU. 
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Study Country 
coverage 
Period Identifi-
cation 
method 
Endogenous 
variables in baseline 
VAR 
Deterministic 
terms 
Additional specifications and other 
comments 
Beetsma and 
Giuliodori 
(2011) 
14 EU 
countries 
(EU15 except 
Luxembourg) 
1970-2004, 
annual 
Recursive Real government 
spending, real cyclically-
adjusted net taxes, real 
GDP, the nominal long-
term interest rate and the 
real effective exchange 
rate (all in logs except the 
interest rate). 
Country fixed 
effects, country-
specific time 
trends, year 
dummies. 
Robustness checks: removing year dummies, 
quadratic instead of linear country-specific time 
trends, differences instead of levels. Various 
checks for anticipation effects and identifying 
restrictions. Alternative specifications with 
unadjusted taxes, public debt and real wages, as 
well as GDP components instead of total GDP. 
Sub-samples for various periods and trade 
openness. Also an analysis of fiscal spill-overs in 
the EU.     
Almunia 
et al. (2010) 
27 countries 1925-1939, 
annual 
Recursive Real government 
spending, real GDP, real 
government revenues (all 
in logs), central bank 
discount rate. 
Country fixed 
effects, country-
specific time 
trends, year 
dummies. 
Robustness checks: removal of deterministic 
terms, total instead of defence spending, non-
defence spending as an additional variable, 
different variable ordering, first differences 
instead of levels.  
Agnello and 
Sousa (2011) 
10 developed 
countries 
1970-2007, 
quarterly 
Recursive Property price index, GDP, 
GDP deflator, primary 
budget deficit, short-term 
interest rates, equity price 
index (all in logs except 
the interest rate).  
Country fixed 
effects.  
Alternative specification with spending instead 
of deficit. Also an analysis of effects of fiscal 
policy shocks during bust episodes in housing 
prices. 
Forward mean differencing is used (Helmert 
transformation), with GMM estimation. 
 
Table 4.2. Summary of the main features of fiscal panel VAR studies  
(Note: Main or baseline specifications are presented)   
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4.5 Conclusions  
 
The review of modern theoretical models and empirical studies on the effects 
of fiscal policy reveals that there is relatively little consensus in the modern literature 
regarding the size of the fiscal multiplier and the transmission mechanism of fiscal 
policy shocks. Theoretical studies relying on RBC models tend to find that fiscal policy 
has modest effects on output, which generally do not exceed one. In addition, 
expansionary fiscal policy increases labour supply and lowers private consumption 
due to the dominance of wealth effects. The New Keynesian literature, which 
augments the RBC model with price stickiness and possibly other frictions, also tends 
to find that wealth effects dominate and that the output multiplier is between zero 
and one, although it differs regarding the predictions on the labour demand and real 
wages. Further extensions of baseline New Keynesian models introduce additional 
frictions in order to replicate the prevalent finding in the empirical literature that 
higher government spending has positive effects on private consumption, albeit with 
limited success. Overall, the theoretical predictions on the size of the fiscal multiplier 
and the transmission mechanism depend on a wide range of factors, such as the 
model features, the type of fiscal instrument, the particular calibration or estimation 
and the behaviour of monetary policy. The only case where the theoretical literature 
appears to agree is that fiscal policy is very effective in current circumstances of 
recessionary developments and accommodative monetary policy.  
There is also a wide array of results on the size of the fiscal multiplier and the 
transmission mechanism in the empirical literature, which is dominated by VAR 
studies imposing various types of restrictions in order to identify exogenous fiscal 
policy shocks. Typically, studies using the recursive and the Blanchard-Perotti SVAR 
tend to find results in line with New Keynesian predictions, whereas studies using the 
event-study approach are mostly in line with neoclassical predictions regarding the 
effects of government spending. In addition, studies using sign restrictions or the 
narrative approach tend to find relatively high tax multipliers, resembling traditional 
Keynesian predictions. However, there is generally little agreement in the empirical 
literature where this divergence in results is coming from, and whether it stems from 
the particular type of identification restrictions imposed and the manner in which 
various approaches deal with the anticipation problem. On the other hand, there 
appears to be some consensus that structural country characteristics have an 
important effect on the size of the fiscal multiplier. For instance, the meta-regression 
analysis of fiscal VARs by Rusnak (2011) finds that high levels of public debt, higher 
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trade openness and higher average short-term interest rates all decrease the size of 
the fiscal multiplier.  
Therefore, the conclusion of our theoretical and empirical review is in line 
with some comments in the literature that there is no such thing as "the fiscal 
multiplier". For instance, Spilimbergo et al. (2009) note that fiscal multipliers are 
country-, time- and circumstance-specific. In addition, Carroll (2009) notes that 
questions about "the multiplier" are like questions about "the temperature" since both 
vary across time and space, whereas more attention should be paid to the important 
factors affecting this variance of results. Further, there is still a lively debate 
regarding empirical techniques, which yields no definite answer on "the technique" to 
be used in estimation. However, when designing our empirical investigation in the 
next chapter, we will utilise the discussions in this chapter on features advantages 
and disadvantages of the recursive, BP-SVAR and sign restrictions approaches using 
country VARs, as well as panel VARs. Related to this, we will not consider the event-
study and the narrative approach, since they are hardly applicable outside the US 
context, while our aim is to empirically analyse the effects of fiscal policy in European 
countries. Last but not least, in line with the literature, we will also decide on the 
particular empirical methodology based on the length, frequency and type of data 
available. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
190 
 
 
191 
 
Chapter 5 - Empirical investigation of the effects 
of fiscal policy in European countries, with 
particular reference to transition countries 
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................... 191 
5.2 Methodology and data........................................................................................... 194 
5.2.1 Initial remarks on the method of investigation and data ............................ 194 
5.2.2 Description of panel VAR ............................................................................... 198 
5.3 Results of baseline specification and sub-sample analysis ................................. 204 
5.3.1 Baseline specification ..................................................................................... 204 
5.3.2 Baseline results and robustness checks ........................................................ 210 
5.3.3 Sub-sample analysis (effects of structural characteristics) .......................... 217 
5.4 Results on the transmission mechanism of fiscal policy and other extensions 223 
5.4.1 Effects of fiscal policy on private consumption and investment ................. 224 
5.4.2 Effects of various components of government spending ............................. 226 
5.4.3 Effects of debt on the transmission of fiscal policy shocks .......................... 229 
5.4.4 Transmission of fiscal policy shocks in the open economy context ............ 231 
5.4.5 Jack-knifing the results of the baseline specification ................................... 234 
5.5 Conclusions ............................................................................................................ 235 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
  
The aim of this chapter is to address the second main issue of the thesis - what 
are the effects of fiscal policy in European countries (old and new EU member states). 
The empirical investigation in this chapter will focus on four key questions of 
academic and policy importance: i. what is the short- to medium-run effect of fiscal 
policy on output, i.e. what is the size and sign of fiscal multipliers; ii. what are the 
short- to medium-run effects of fiscal policy on other key macroeconomic variables; 
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iii. how do main country structural characteristics affect the size and sign of fiscal 
multipliers;  iv. what is the transmission mechanism of fiscal policy, i.e. is it more 
closely related to neo-classical predictions or to New Keynesian predictions.  
The empirical investigation will draw on the review of the relevant theoretical 
and empirical literature in Chapter 4, and we will pay particular attention to the 
discussions and recommendations of the empirical literature when designing our 
empirical analysis. However, due to the extensive size of the empirical literature, 
which was surveyed in the previous chapter, we will only refer to particular points 
and arguments in other studies when justifying our methodological choices, and will 
refrain from a more detailed discussion in order to avoid unnecessary repetition with 
the previous chapter.  
While the empirical analysis provided here is directly linked to the literature 
review provided in the previous chapter, it is also linked to Chapter 3, which focused 
on empirical investigation of the cyclical character and determinants of fiscal policy 
in European countries. This connection is important in three main aspects. First, the 
empirical analysis here refers to the same decomposition of overall fiscal policy into 
automatic stabilizers and discretionary policy, with the latter consisted of 
endogenous (systematic) and exogenous fiscal policy. Indeed, one of the main aims in 
Chapter 3 was to analyse the cyclical character of the systematic (endogenous) fiscal 
policy, and some attention was also paid to overall fiscal policy. In addition, by the 
incorporation of additional political, institutional and other variables, in Chapter 3 we 
also tried to analyse important influences on exogenous policy. On the other hand, in 
line with the relevant literature, the aim of the empirical investigation provided in 
this chapter is to identify exogenous fiscal policy (i.e. fiscal policy shocks) and analyse 
its effects on output and other macroeconomic variables. In terms of the 
decomposition of fiscal policy in Chapter 3, and particularly Figure 3.1, here we will 
focus on exogenous fiscal policy, whereas in Chapter 3 we analysed both endogenous 
discretionary policy (via the output gap) and exogenous policy (via the additional 
indicators). In particular, in this chapter we focus on identifying exogenous fiscal 
policy shocks and analysing their impact on output and other macroeconomic 
variables. Our use of the VAR methodology implies that the 'normal' fiscal policy rule 
is already captured in the VAR (via the inclusion of government spending, revenues 
and GDP), while we focus on policy shocks, which correspond to exogenous fiscal 
policy in terms of Chapter 3 and particularly Figure 3.1. The second way in which this 
chapter relates to Chapter 3 is via the empirical specification in its broader sense. In 
Chapter 3, we were effectively analysing the effects of output on fiscal balances, and 
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interpreting them as the cyclical stance of fiscal policy. On the other hand, in this 
chapter we try to analyse the opposite: the effects of fiscal policy on output, and on 
other macroeconomic variables. In other words, here we try to analyse the opposite 
question to the one in Chapter 3, notwithstanding the focus on different components 
of overall fiscal policy (discussed above). The third point of connection to Chapter 3 is 
directly related to the main questions of investigation in this chapter, and also has a 
fundamental policy importance. More precisely, if fiscal multipliers are low, and if 
fiscal policy has little effect on macroeconomic movements, then the issue of the 
cyclical character loses a great part of its importance. Indeed, if fiscal policy can not 
affect output movements, it does not matter too much whether it is counter-, a- or 
pro-cyclical.  On the other hand, large fiscal multipliers warrant a more aggressive 
use of counter-cyclical fiscal policy, since in such a case fiscal policy would be 
effective in stabilising the business cycle.   
As Chapter 4 showed, there is already an extensive body of literature on the 
effects of fiscal policy. The aim of this chapter is to build upon it and extend it in 
several important aspects. First, unlike the vast majority of studies, which focus on a 
single country (mostly the US) or a few developed countries, our study will focus on 
27 EU member states. Related to this, the study will also include most European 
transition countries, which is an important extension bearing on mind the relative 
scarcity of empirical studies on the effects of fiscal policy in transition countries (as 
noted in the previous chapter). In order to study fiscal policy in a group of countries, 
we will use panel VAR, which has become available relatively recently and is able to 
combine the advantages of panel and VAR methods. Second, our study will pay 
particular attention to the methodological recommendations and suggestions in the 
relevant literature, which is expected to enable a proper identification of fiscal policy 
and consequently make it possible to reach valid results on the effects of fiscal policy. 
Third, the study will provide extensive investigation of the possible influence of 
country structural characteristics on the effects of fiscal policy. By doing so, it will be 
in line with recommendations that there is no the fiscal multiplier, but that fiscal 
multipliers are country-, time- and circumstance-specific (Spilimbergo et al., 2009). 
Fourth, the study will aim to provide additional details on the transmission 
mechanism of fiscal policy, thus enabling an indirect test on the predictions of the 
two main macroeconomic theories on the effects of fiscal policy. Finally, based on the 
results of the extensive investigation, the study aims to provide recommendations 
that would be useful to policymakers when designing and implementing fiscal policy.  
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This chapter proceeds as follows. The next section presents the methodology of 
investigation and the data. Section 5.3 analyses the effects of fiscal policy in the 
overall sample and in numerous sub-samples. Section 5.4 modifies the baseline 
specification in order to investigate the transmission mechanism in more detail, and 
also provides some robustness checks. Section 5.5 concludes.  
 
 
5.2 Methodology and data 
 
5.2.1 Initial remarks on the method of investigation and data 
 
The empirical investigation critically depends on two choices regarding the 
methodology of investigation: the identification of exogenous fiscal policy shocks and 
the method of estimation. Since an extensive survey of the relevant literature and a 
discussion of advantages and drawbacks of the various approaches are already 
provided in the previous chapter, here we focus only on the methodology and 
specification to be used in our study. Certainly, we will refer to the relevant literature 
when making our choices.  
Our empirical investigation of the effects of fiscal policy on output and other 
macroeconomic variables will be based on Panel Vector Auto Regression (panel VAR 
or PVAR), with annual data and with recursive identification of policy shocks. The 
choice of panel VAR deviates from the vast majority of the literature, which uses 
country VARs, although several recent studies also employ PVAR when researching 
fiscal policy or other issues (as discussed in the previous chapter). However, our 
choice of PVAR is a direct reflection of the aims of the study and data availability. As 
noted above, we want to study the effects of fiscal policy in European countries, as 
well as the possible influence of country characteristics and the transmission 
mechanism of fiscal policy. One way to do that might be to run country VARs, and 
then analyse the results in terms of the size of the multiplier or differences by 
structural characteristics. However, we are unable to use such an approach because 
of the length and the quality of available fiscal data for European countries (discussed 
below), particularly for transition countries. Therefore, we have decided to follow the 
dominant empirical literature in employing the VAR approach, but we pool the 
countries in one large group (and various sub-samples) in order to be able to address 
the aims of the study. Doing so also enables us to utilise one of the main advantages of 
the panel VAR method, which combines the conventional VAR approach of treating all 
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variables as endogenous, with the panel approach, which allows for unobserved 
country heterogeneity.  
In our investigation we will use annual instead of quarterly data, which are 
prevalent in the fiscal VAR literature, particularly in country-by-country VARs. This 
choice reflects both data availability and recommendations of the relevant empirical 
literature. It is often argued that, when using fiscal VARs with quarterly data, one 
should preferably use fiscal data collected on an accrual basis, not cash-basis, as well 
as use data that are collected at quarterly frequency, not interpolated from annual 
data (see Subsection 4.3.1 in the previous chapter for details and discussion). 
However, sufficiently long series of non-interpolated quarterly data collected on an 
accrual basis are only available for a very few developed countries. Therefore, due to 
our aim to study fiscal policy in a wider group of European countries, for which 
sufficiently long series of non-interpolated quarterly fiscal data on an accrual basis 
are simply not available, we choose to use annual data in our empirical analysis. 
Besides the data availability issue, Beetsma and Giuliodori (2011) note that the use of 
annual data has additional advantages in avoiding particular quarterly features of 
certain taxes or government outlays and avoiding seasonality problems. 
 The use of annual data has several important implications regarding the 
anticipation problem and the identification problem, which are essential features of 
fiscal VARs (see the discussion in Section 4.3 of the previous chapter for details). The 
anticipation problem, or the fiscal foresight problem, arises because economic agents 
might anticipate future fiscal policy and change their current behaviour. This could 
yield biased fiscal multipliers, i.e. a wrong attribution of the response of output and 
other variables to current fiscal policy, whereas in fact they are responding to 
anticipated future policy. However, while there are various discussions on the 
severity of the consequences of this problem with quarterly data (as discussed in the 
previous chapter), it is often argued that the use of annual data greatly ameliorates 
the anticipation problem, since fiscal policy is less likely to be anticipated one year 
ahead than one or two quarters ahead (Perotti, 2008). In order to further mitigate the 
anticipation problem, we will also include in the VAR several forward-looking 
variables such as prices and interest rates. This is in line with arguments in the 
literature (Giannone and Reichlin (2006), Yang (2007) and Sims (2012)) that the 
inclusion of various forward-looking variables mitigates the anticipation problem, 
since they react contemporaneously to anticipated fiscal policy, implying that they 
can be used to capture future fiscal policy.  
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While it is generally agreed that the use of annual data mitigates the 
anticipation problem, there are warnings that it might complicate the recursive 
identification of fiscal policy shocks, which we will use in the empirical investigation. 
Indeed, in the recursive and the BP SVAR approaches, the identification of fiscal 
policy shocks relies crucially on decision lags of fiscal policy, which reflect the 
generally accepted observation that policymakers do not react contemporaneously to 
output movements but this reaction has some delay. With recursive identification in a 
VAR with quarterly data, this is reflected by ordering government spending (and 
sometimes revenues) before output, implying that the former do not react to the latter 
within the same quarter. As discussed in Section 4.3 in the previous chapter, this 
might be a too strong assumption when using annual data, since it implies that 
policymakers do not react to economic movements during the year. However, there 
are several arguments that support the use of annual data even with recursive 
identification (besides data availability reasons). The main argument is the fact that 
there is only one important fiscal event in a year (the government budget), so 
policymakers are often constrained from responding quickly to contemporaneous 
economic movements. Related to this, Beetsma and Giuliodori (2011) note that with 
annual data that the recovered shocks are more realistic, since new fiscal impulses 
typically do not appear at quarterly frequency, but once a year when the budget is 
adopted (and perhaps in mid-year budget supplements). In addition, Beetsma et al. 
(2006) and Beetsma et al. (2009) provide robustness checks for several countries 
where non-interpolated quarterly fiscal data are available, and show that recursive 
identification restrictions for government spending shocks in a VAR with annual data 
are indeed plausible. Their results are often used as an argument supporting the use 
of annual data with recursive identification of fiscal policy shocks, including the 
studies using panel VAR surveyed in the previous chapter.  
The last important issue in this initial discussion of the estimation approach is 
related to the method of identification of fiscal policy shocks. As mentioned above, we 
will also proceed with VAR estimation, in line with almost the entire empirical 
literature. In particular, we will focus on the short-run effects of fiscal policy, which 
reflects both the focus of the empirical literature as well as data availability, which 
prevents us from investigating long-run effects. However, when using VARs, an 
important choice has to be made regarding the identification of structural shocks 
(fiscal policy shocks in this case). As discussed in detail in Section 4.2 of the previous 
chapter, there are five main methods used in the literature to identify fiscal policy 
shocks in a VAR. However, the last two of them are inapplicable for our sample of 
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countries: the event-study method has been applied only for the U.S. based on 
defence spending, whereas the narrative method requires the availability of detailed 
legislative records in order to extract policy shocks. We are also reluctant to use sign 
restrictions due to the drawbacks denoted in Section 4.3 such as the typical exclusion 
of some potentially important features (e.g. 'expansionary fiscal contractions'), and 
the difficulties of this method to precisely capture the timing of the shock (Perotti, 
2005). Consequently, we are left with the choice between identification based on 
recursive ordering of variables and on the Blanchard-Perotti structural VAR (BP 
SVAR), which are by far the two most frequently used methods in the literature 
(Rusnak, 2011). However, the BP SVAR method also requires institutional information 
regarding the elasticity of government spending and revenues to output and inflation. 
Since such information is not available in sufficient detail for our sample of countries, 
we have chosen to proceed with the identification of fiscal policy shocks based on 
recursive identification. Consequently, our identification method is in line with all 
recent studies that use panel VAR to analyse effects of fiscal policy (Table 4.2).  
As discussed in the previous chapter, and particularly in Section 4.3, the VAR 
with recursive identification is perhaps the most used approach in empirical 
macroeconomics. The identification of structural shocks in this method relies on the 
Cholesky decomposition of the variance-covariance matrix of the reduced-form 
disturbances (hence the alternative name "the Cholesky method"). A crucial part of 
this method consists of the causal ordering of variables, which means that variables 
that are ordered first in the VAR are allowed to have a contemporaneous effect on 
later variables, but later variables do not contemporaneously affect variables ordered 
before them. In the context of our study, we will follow the literature and order 
government spending first in the VAR, implying that government spending can 
contemporaneously affect other variables, but contemporaneous feedback effects are 
not possible91. Indeed, if one is interested only in the effects of the variable ordered 
first (government spending in this case), the ordering of the other variables does not 
matter (Christiano et al., 1999). However, this method is more problematic if one 
wants to analyse shocks to the other variables as well, since particular assumptions 
about timing need to be fulfilled. This is the reason why identification with recursive 
ordering is seldom used for analysing revenue shocks, i.e. the identification of 
revenue shocks requires additional assumptions on their contemporaneous links to 
government spending and output. Consequently, we will focus on government 
                                                
91 Incidentally, this way of identification of spending shocks is also common practice for the BP SVAR 
approach.  
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spending shocks when analysing the effects of fiscal policy, in line with the majority 
of the literature. Related to this, when discussing fiscal multipliers, effectively this 
will apply to government spending multipliers.     
Our analysis uses annual data starting in 1995 and ending in 2012 (18 years), 
which is the longest period available at the time of writing. As noted above, we 
include 27 EU member countries in our analysis. Similar to our approach in Chapter 
3, this group consists of 15 old EU member states plus Malta and Cyprus, as well as the 
10 new EU member states from Central and Eastern Europe (the 2004 and 2007 
enlargement cohorts). Due to the lack of sufficiently long disaggregated data on 
spending and revenues, which are required for the empirical analysis in this chapter, 
we are forced to omit South-eastern European countries from our sample. We briefly 
describe the data definition when specifying our baseline model in Section 5.3, while 
detailed data definitions and sources are provided in Appendix 5.1.  
 
 
5.2.2 Description of panel VAR 
 
As noted above, due to the aims of our study and the data availability, we have 
decided to use panel VAR in our analysis. Panel VAR shares a similar specification 
with standard time-series VAR, but also introduces cross-section specifics. The 
reduced form of panel VAR is:  
 
                             Eq. 32 
    
 
In the reduced-form VAR in Eq. 32, t indexes years and, unlike the standard 
VAR, i subscripts are added for cross-section units. X is a vector of k endogenous 
variables, A(L) is the m-th order lag-polynomial, M is a vector with possible additional 
elements (unit-specific intercepts, common or unit-specific time trends, period 
dummies or exogenous variables), and u represents a k-length vector of reduced-form 
disturbances. Similar to the standard time-series VAR, disturbances u will generally 
be contemporaneously correlated across equations, and serially uncorrelated, and it 
is assumed that they are uncorrelated across units in the panel VAR.  
However, in order to proceed with economic interpretation, it is necessary to 
transform this reduced-form PVAR into its structural form, just like the time-series 
VAR. Since this transformation resembles the one for time-series VAR, which is 
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already described in detail in Chapter 4, here we present only the general structural 
form of the PVAR that we will use in our analysis:  
 
                                Eq. 33 
 
 
In Eq. 33, the k x k matrix A0 with ones in the diagonal represents the 
contemporaneous relations between endogenous variables, whereas D(L) is the 
matrix polynomial in the lag operator L that captures the relation between 
endogenous variables X (e.g. GDP, government spending and revenues) and their lags. 
The vector of orthogonal structural shocks ei,t reflects the shocks to each equation in 
the VAR, with var (εi,t)= Ω, i.e. structural shocks are independent across the time and 
cross-section dimensions. Pre-multiplying Eq. 33 with the A0
-1 matrix obtains the 
reduced form of VAR in Eq. 32 above (as discussed in detail in Chapter 4). Just like in 
standard VARs, in panel VAR the estimation proceeds equation by equation with OLS, 
meaning that the number of equations to be estimated equals the number of 
variables times the number of cross-section units (k*i). In this representation of PVAR, 
slope coefficients are constant across units (slope homogeneity), effectively pooling 
the data across units in order to maintain degrees of freedom.   
In order to be able to interpret shocks in an economically meaningful manner, 
identification restrictions must be imposed on the structural form of the VAR (Eq. 33). 
As noted above, we will use recursive identification in order to identify fiscal policy 
shocks (also discussed in detail in Chapter 4). The imposition of these restrictions 
implies that shocks to variables ordered first may affect later variables 
contemporaneously, but that shocks to the latter variables do not have a 
contemporaneous effect on earlier variables. This restriction is reflected in the zero 
elements in the A0 matrix in Eq. 34 below, which expands the structural form of the 
panel VAR from Eq. 33, with αnm elements representing the contemporaneous 
reaction of variable m to shocks in variable n. For ease of exposition, the panel VAR in 
Eq. 34 includes only government spending g, taxes t and output y (k=3) and one lag, 
while deterministic terms are omitted.  
 
 
   
      
         
   
    
    
    
   
         
         
         
   
      
      
      
   
 
 
 
 
    
 
    
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
                                                                                        
Eq. 34 
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The panel VAR specification has several advantages that make it particularly 
useful for empirical application in macroeconomics. First, it has the advantage of the 
VAR methodology in treating all the variables as endogenous and interdependent in 
both a static and a dynamic sense (Canova and Ciccarelli, 2013). It also enables the 
analysis of a variety of shocks, both endogenous and exogenous. In addition, just like 
common VAR, PVAR also starts from a relatively general statistical model, with few or 
no theoretical restrictions imposed, thus allowing results to be driven by the data. 
However, in distinction from time-series VARs, in PVARs a cross-dimensional 
dimension is added, thus making it possible to exploit the heterogeneous information 
in cross-section data, but also to increase the sample size in order to eliminate 
idiosyncratic effects (Gavin and Theodorou, 2005). Related to this, Rebucci (2003) 
notes that pooling units increases the degrees of freedom and potentially the 
efficiency of estimates, thus reducing the risk of over-fitting. Last but not least, similar 
to standard VARs, in panel VARs each equation can be estimated by OLS, which is 
consistent and asymptotically efficient (Kireyev, 2000).     
While the PVAR combines the features and hence the advantages of VAR and 
panel methods, it also combines their drawbacks, which might have important 
implications for the results. The first drawback is the imposition of slope 
homogeneity among units (constant D matrix in Eq. 34 above), which could lead to 
heterogeneity bias if in fact there is heterogeneity in data. Indeed, the imposition of 
slope homogeneity may limit the usefulness of these models for policy advice at the 
unit i.e. country level (Georgiadis, 2012). Therefore, in order to account for 
unobserved heterogeneity among countries, we will also introduce country fixed 
effects ci  (as well as a common time trend tt
92), thus following the dominant approach 
in the empirical literature using PVAR estimation (Table 4.2 in the previous chapter). 
This means that our baseline model to be estimated is the panel VAR with fixed effects 
(PVAR FE) in Eq. 35.  
 
                                  Eq. 35 
 
 
Due to data limitations, we are still forced to maintain homogenous slope 
coefficients, thus imposing the same dynamics across cross-section units. This 
approach is criticised by Canova and Ciccarelli (2013), who argue that in order to 
                                                
92 As noted below, we also estimate a specification with country-specific linear trends, which could also 
account for country heterogeneity. However, since the results are robust (Appendix 5.3), we proceed 
with the baseline version with a common time trend.  
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properly account for heterogeneity one should introduce slope coefficients varying 
across cross-sections, and possibly across time periods as well. However, besides 
serious data availability and computational issues, there are counter-arguments in 
the literature that a relatively simple model like this one is applicable when one is 
interested in common aspects in macroeconomic data and not idiosyncratic effects 
(Gavin and Theodorou, 2005) and that the PVAR FE model is not too restrictive if one 
is interested in average policy effects (Georgiadis, 2012). Besides, the dominant 
approach in empirical studies still relies on the imposition of common slope 
coefficients (Table 4.2 in the previous chapter). Therefore, we will also follow this 
approach, but we will further address heterogeneity by using cyclically-adjusted 
revenues in all our specifications, thus accounting for the part of heterogeneity 
arising from the differences in automatic stabilizers across countries. Last but not 
least, we will pay additional attention to heterogeneity by splitting our sample across 
various structural country characteristics in Section 5.3.  
However, while the PVAR FE addresses unobserved country heterogeneity, it 
leads to the well known problem of biased coefficients in dynamic panels with fixed 
effects (Nickell, 1981). Indeed, dynamic panels with fixed effects yield downwards 
biased coefficients (the "Nickell bias"), although the bias declines with a longer time 
dimension, regardless of the cross-section size. As was noted in Chapter 3, using a 
Monte Carlo study on single-equation panel estimators for macroeconomic data, 
Judson and Owen (1997) conclude that LSDV yields considerable bias of the auto-
regressive parameter - of up to 28% - when the sample consists of 20 periods and up 
to 20% even when the time dimension is increased to 30. Overall, the Nickell bias is 
well acknowledged in the empirical literature, since annual macroeconomic series 
are rarely long enough in order to sufficiently mitigate it. In addition, it is particularly 
relevant in our case with only 18 years of data. Generally, there are two options how 
to proceed, and we will briefly discuss them in order to justify our decision.  
The first option would be to use an alternative estimator not liable to the 
Nickell bias, such as alternative panel estimation methods. Indeed, various authors 
estimate PVARs using GMM estimation based on the forward mean differencing or 
orthogonal deviations (the Helmert transformation) in order to remove fixed effects. 
This approach was originally proposed and implemented for PVARs by Love and 
Zichino (2006) and is used in PVARs for fiscal policy by several studies, e.g. 
Endegnanew et al. (2012) and Agnello and Sousa (2011). However, the main drawback 
of such an approach is that GMM estimation generally requires a higher number of 
cross-section units than the 27 countries available in our dataset. Further, GMM 
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requires differencing, thus omitting sample information and potentially making 
inference less accurate (Canova and Ciccarelli, 2013). More importantly for our case, 
as discussed in Chapter 3 where we used system GMM to analyse the cyclical 
character and determinants of fiscal policy, GMM methods require careful 
identification of plausible instruments for the endogenous variables. On the other 
hand, in this chapter we have decided to use (panel) VAR methods precisely because 
they are capable to deal with endogeneity in a more straightforward manner, which 
is typical for studies of effects of fiscal policy. Last but not least, the Monte Carlo 
analysis of various macroeconomic panel VAR estimators in Juessen and Linnemann 
(2010) concludes that GMM estimators are relatively inferior to FE estimators due to 
the larger root mean square error.  
An alternative class of estimators that could be applicable to PVARs would be 
the mean group estimator originally due to Pesaran and Smith (1995) for dynamic 
panel data models, which could in principle avoid both the Nickell bias and the 
heterogeneity bias noted above. Indeed, even with a large time dimension, fixed 
effects may be inconsistent due to the imposition of slope homogeneity that induces 
residual serial correlation when regressors are auto-correlated. Therefore, the mean 
group estimator could be extended to the panel VAR by estimating VARs for each unit 
separately and then averaging results across units (Canova and Ciccarelli, 2013). 
However, this approach is hardly ever used in fiscal policy studies (with the exception 
of Kireyev (2000)), and also very seldom even discussed as a possible alternative. This 
might reflect the fact that mean group estimators were originally designed for single 
equation panel models in order to avoid endogeneity, whereas their extension to 
panel VARs requires the introduction of a higher number of lags in the model, 
potentially resulting in a considerable loss of degrees of freedom. Related to this, the 
reluctance to use mean group estimators is supported by the results in the Monte 
Carlo analysis of several estimators by Rebucci (2003), who extends the mean group 
estimator to the PVAR. He concludes that slope heterogeneities should be very high in 
order to justify alternatives to pooled estimators, including PVAR FE, and that the 
time dimension should be longer than a typical macroeconomic data set in order to 
justify the use of mean group estimators. In other words, the small sample bias may 
be more detrimental to the mean group estimator than the slope heterogeneity bias is 
to the PVAR FE estimator (Towbin and Weber, 2013). 
The second option to address the Nickell bias is to use PVAR FE with OLS 
estimation despite these drawbacks, and this will be our approach in the empirical 
estimation in the following sections. One argument for our choice of PVAR FE as the 
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estimation method is that it is used in several important studies of fiscal policy, with 
various time dimensions (Table 4.2 in the previous chapter). For instance, the time 
dimension is equal to 40 years in Beetsma et al. (2006) and 35 years in Beetsma and 
Giuliodori (2011), but they also analyse sub-samples which are considerably shorter, 
i.e. 20 years in the first and 25 and 29 years in the second study. Similar to this, 
Bénétrix and Lane (2013) use PVAR FE with 37 years. Due to data limitations and the 
aim of the paper, Almunia et al. (2010) use PVAR FE with only 15 years in their study 
of effects of monetary and fiscal policy during the Great Depression. Further, Juessen 
and Linnemann (2010) note several published studies in other areas that have used 
PVAR FE with a time dimension that is shorter or only slightly longer that our sample. 
In addition, the Monte Carlo analysis of various PVAR FE estimators in Juessen and 
Linnemann (2010) generally supports our choice of this method. Their main results 
show that the (downward) bias of the PVAR FE coefficients is considerable even when 
the time dimension is large, whereas GMM estimators perform well in terms of the 
bias but poorly in terms of the root mean square error, thus leading the authors to 
recommend the use of bias-corrected PVAR FE, which is also analysed. However, VAR 
coefficients in themselves are hardly ever of interest in empirical studies, which focus 
on impulse response functions (IRFs) to particular structural shocks. Therefore, we 
base our choice on additional results in the same study, which proceeds to analyse 
impulse response functions of various PVAR estimators. Using both Monte Carlo 
analysis and a practical application on a fiscal VAR, Juessen and Linnemann (2010) 
conclude that although they tend to under-estimate the shock persistence, impulse 
responses from the PVAR FE are reasonably close to the true impulse responses or the 
impulse responses from bias-corrected PVAR FE. Indeed, the difference in impulse 
responses is virtually undistinguishable at impact and fairly low at short horizons 
(e.g. 1 or 2 years after the shock)93. This result is attributed to the fact that impulse 
responses are complicated non-linear functions of VAR coefficients, so it is possible 
for impulse responses to be considerably less biased than the VAR coefficients 
themselves. Although Juessen and Linnemann (2010) recommend the use of bias-
corrected PVAR FE, they also warn that bias-correction methods might not be 
successful in reducing the bias when the time dimension is small, which certainly 
covers our case of 18 years94. Finally, as noted above, our decision to proceed with 
PVAR FE also relies on the arguments by Gavin and Theodorou (2005) that such a 
                                                
93 These comments are all derived from the graphs presented in Juessen and Linnemann (2010), as they 
do not provide precise quantitative results on the size of the bias of impulse responses. 
94 Besides, to the best of our knowledge, bias correction methods for panel VAR are still not available in 
standard software packages.  
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relatively simple model is applicable when one is interested in common aspects in 
macroeconomic data (responses to fiscal policy shocks in our case), and not in 
particular idiosyncratic effects.     
 
 
5.3 Results of baseline specification and sub-sample analysis 
  
5.3.1 Baseline specification  
  
 As noted in the previous section, we will use panel VAR (PVAR) with annual 
data and recursive identification of policy shocks in order to analyse the short- to 
medium-term effects of fiscal policy on macroeconomic variables. We will follow the 
practice and the arguments in the relevant empirical literature when defining our 
variables and the baseline specification. Here we discuss the main issues regarding 
the definition of series used, while the detailed definition and sources of data are 
presented in Appendix 5.1. 
 The survey of the literature in Chapter 4 (and particularly Table 4.1 and Table 
4.2) indicates that there is no consensus on a single set of variables to be included in 
the VAR and on their definition, and justifications are seldom given for particular 
choices made. However, in light of the seminal study by Blanchard and Perotti (2002), 
there is general agreement that, in order to analyse effects of fiscal policy, at least 
three endogenous variables should be included in the VAR: government spending or 
consumption, government revenues or net-taxes and GDP.  
 Therefore, we will also start with these three variables in our PVAR. However, 
we also include prices and interest rates in our baseline specification, in line with 
most empirical studies (as surveyed in the previous chapter). As discussed above, the 
inclusion of these two variables also helps to mitigate the anticipation problem of 
VARs with annual data. Indeed, they are used as forward-looking variables, since they 
react quickly to fiscal policy announcements, so their lags can be used to capture 
anticipated policy. Further, the responses of prices and interest rates are also 
interesting in their own right, since they capture key macroeconomic variables, 
including the response of monetary policy to fiscal policy shocks. As Table 4.1 in the 
previous chapter shows, these five endogenous variables are the ones most 
commonly included in VAR studies, and could be considered as the minimal set of 
macroeconomic variables necessary to capture dynamic effects of fiscal policy shocks 
(Fatás and Mihov, 2001b). These five variables are also included in some of the studies 
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using the panel VAR approach (Table 4.2). In addition, we are reluctant to extend our 
baseline specification with additional endogenous variables due to the well-known 
problem of over-parametrisation in the VAR, although additional variables will be 
included when analysing the transmission of fiscal policy in Section 5.4. Finally, in all 
specifications we include two exogenous variables: country fixed effects (in order to 
deal with unobserved heterogeneity, as discussed above) and a common linear time 
trend95, which is important in our case where variables enter the PVAR in levels (as 
discussed below) and are therefore clearly trended. The inclusion of these two 
exogenous variables is in line with most empirical studies using fiscal PVAR (Table 
4.2). On the other hand, we do not include year dummies, for several reasons. 
Although time dummies could help address possible cross-section error correlation, 
Table 4.2 shows that there is no consensus regarding their inclusion in the existing 
fiscal PVAR studies, with no particular explanation for their omission in studies that 
do so. What is equally important, results in studies that include time effects are 
robust to their exclusion (e.g. Almunia et al. (2010) or Beetsma and Giuliodori (2011), 
implying that cross-section error correlation does not yield substantially biased 
results. Related to this, while time dummies account for common shocks, they do not 
account for country-specific responses of endogenous variables to these shocks. We 
account for common shocks to some extent by the inclusion of a common time trend, 
which is a second-best solution to separate time dummies, since the linear time trend 
is a special (restricted) case of time dummies96. Moreover, our approach does go some 
way to accounting for possible country-specific responses by first including country-
specific trends as a robustness check, finding results that are similar to the baseline 
with common trend (Appendix 5.3) and, secondly, by using cyclically-adjusted 
revenues that can partially account for the country-specific response of revenues to 
common shocks (discussed below). In this manner, we both check and minimise the 
possible bias related to cross-section error correlation. Further, we were facing 
software limitations, as the code that we use (discussed below) does not support the 
inclusion of period dummies. However, despite this drawback, we decided to proceed 
with this particular PVAR code due to its relative flexibility in other aspects, such as 
the possibility to include trends and country fixed effects, to modify the specification 
to various research questions and to easily modify the tables and graphs (thus greatly 
facilitating inference and reporting). 
                                                
95 As noted below, our results are robust to the introduction of country-specific linear trends instead of a 
common time trend (Appendix 5.3).  
96 Based on the comment by Wooldridge in http://www.statalist.org/forums/forum/general-stata-
discussion/general/82335-time-dummies-and-time-trend-in-the-same-equation.  
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A closely related issue to the set of variables in the baseline VAR is their 
particular definition, and there is some divergence in the literature regarding some of 
the variables (see Table 4.1 and Table 4.2 in the previous chapter). In this part, we 
rely mostly in the numerous arguments provided in the extensive fiscal VAR 
literature. We use real GDP as an indicator of output, in line with the vast majority of 
the literature. Consequently, we use the GDP deflator as an indicator of price 
movements, although a few studies use the consumer price index or the private 
consumption deflator instead. Further, for interest rates we use average nominal 
three-month money market rates. As noted in Chapter 4, there is some divergence on 
this issue, since numerous studies use short-term rates, while others argue for the use 
of long-term interest rates, which are argued to be more relevant for private 
consumption and investment decisions (Perotti, 2005). However, we are reluctant to 
take such an approach for two reasons. First, short-term interest rates are better 
suited to quickly reflect anticipated fiscal policy, which is one of the reasons of the 
inclusion of interest rates in the VAR. Second, sufficiently long series of long-term 
interest rates are unavailable for some of the countries in our sample.  Finally, we 
define interest rates in nominal and not in real terms, which is common practice in 
the literature and should not be problematic due to the inclusion of prices in the VAR 
as well.  
The literature diverges somewhat more on the definition of fiscal variables. In 
our study, we follow arguments and definitions in Alesina et al. (2002), Caldara and 
Kamps (2008) and particularly Beetsma et al. (2006) and Beetsma and Giuliodori 
(2011). Fiscal variables are defined in real terms97, thus facilitating direct inference on 
the fiscal multiplier since GDP is also defined in real terms. Further, in line with the 
dominant approach in the literature, we define government spending and revenues 
net of interest payments (which are largely pre-determined due to deficits incurred in 
the past) as well as net of social benefits and other transfers98. Consequently, 
government spending is defined as the sum of government consumption 
(approximately the sum of public wages and purchases of goods and services) and 
government investment. On the other hand, for revenues we use net-taxes, defined as 
                                                
97 Government consumption is deflated with the government consumption deflator, government 
investment is deflated with the gross fixed capital formation deflator and, in absence of a more suitable 
deflator, revenue items are deflated with the GDP deflator.  
98 Blanchard and Perotti (2002) justify this choice with the theoretical expectation that, in the short run, 
effects of fiscal policy are transmitted by the effects of spending and taxes on aggregate demand and 
further on output. Related to this, the empirical literature is focused on the effects of spending and net-
taxes on output, whereas social benefits and other transfers represent redistribution of funds, but not a 
withdrawal from or a payment to the private sector as a whole and consequently should not have a first-
order short-run impact on macroeconomic variables (Bénétrix and Lane, 2013).     
207 
 
revenues minus transfers99. In particular, we follow the detailed calculations in 
Beetsma and Giuliodori (2011) and define net-taxes as the sum of indirect taxes, direct 
taxes, social benefits received and transfers received by the government, minus 
subsidies, social benefits paid and transfers paid by the government.  
 Another important point regarding the definition of fiscal variables is their 
cyclical adjustment, which is important for the ordering of the variables in the VAR 
and for accounting for country heterogeneity. We follow the arguments and 
calculations in Beetsma et al. (2006) and Beetsma and Giuliodori (2011) and cyclically 
adjust net-taxes, while government spending is left unadjusted. The reason for this is 
that the only component of government spending that is sensitive to the cycle is 
unemployment benefits, which are relatively small and are in any case not included 
in our measure of government spending (defined as government consumption plus 
investment). On the other hand, we remove the cyclical component of net-taxes by 
using country elasticities of various components of net-taxes to output (EC, 2005) as 
well as the trend GDP based on Hodrick Prescott filtering (in line with the discussion 
in Chapters 2 and 3). This procedure removes the effect of cyclical output movements 
on taxes (automatic stabilizers), thus leaving only the part of net-taxes that is under 
discretionary control of governments100. Therefore, the use of cyclically-adjusted net-
taxes addresses the issue of country heterogeneity, at least partially. Indeed, to the 
extent to which countries differ in the automatic response of net-taxes to output, this 
heterogeneity is removed by the cyclical adjustment procedure, thus making the 
imposition of homogenous slope coefficients less problematic. Further, it could be 
argued that the country-specific cyclical adjustment of revenues helps to partially 
address the problem of cross-section error correlation. In particular, if common 
business cycle shocks affect the countries in the sample (e.g. the recent global crisis), 
the cyclical adjustment removes the country-specific response of automatic stabilizers 
to these shocks, thus attenuating the possible consequences of omitting period effects 
from our specification. An additional important reason for the cyclical adjustment of 
net-taxes is related to the ordering of the variables in the VAR, which has 
considerable implications for the analysis of responses to spending shocks due to our 
use of recursive identification. Indeed, the use of cyclically- adjusted net-taxes also 
enables inference on the response of revenues to a spending shock, since it is 
cyclically-adjusted taxes that are under direct, i.e. discretionary control of the 
government (Beetsma and Giuliodori, 2011).  
                                                
99 Consequently, we use 'revenues' and 'net-taxes' interchangeably in the text.  
100 The cyclical adjustment procedure is described in detail and also used in Chapter 3, where we mostly 
used cyclically-adjusted fiscal data. 
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 In line with this discussion, as well as with the dominant practice in the 
empirical literature, we use the following ordering of variables in our VAR: 
government spending, cyclically-adjusted net taxes, GDP, prices and interest rates. 
The main implication of this particular ordering and of the recursive identification is 
that shocks to government spending (which is ordered first) are allowed to have a 
contemporaneous effect on every variable, but spending is not contemporaneously 
affected by shocks to any other variable101. As discussed above, we will focus on 
spending shocks, so the ordering of the other variables does not matter when 
analysing their effects (Christiano et al., 1999). The drawback of this ordering is that it 
implies that cyclically-adjusted net-taxes can not affect spending within a year, but 
can only respond to spending shocks. While this might seem like a too strong 
restriction, we rely on this ordering of spending and revenues because it is standard 
in the literature, but we provide a robustness check on this issue in Section 5.3.2. 
Related to this, Beetsma and Giuliodori (2011) argue that spending is mostly 
predetermined in the budget, whereas changes to spending within the year tend to be 
less important, implying that it is reasonable to order spending first. Further, output 
is ordered third, implying that it does not contemporaneously affect government 
spending and cyclically-adjusted net taxes. This restriction is justified by the omission 
of cyclically-sensitive components from our definition of government spending, as 
well as by the cyclical adjustment of net-taxes. Finally, the ordering of prices and 
interest rates last is common in the literature, and it implies that these variables react 
contemporaneously to movements in fiscal variables and to output but do not affect 
them within the year.  
 The final issues regarding the specification of our baseline VAR are related to 
the definition of variables in levels or in differences, their definition in absolute terms 
or per capita terms and the lag length of the VAR. Regarding the first issue, we define 
variables in log-levels (except the interest rates in percents) and not in differences, 
thus being in line with almost the entire literature that uses fiscal VARs (as 
summarised in Table 4.1 in the previous chapter). The main reason for this choice is 
                                                
101 This differs somewhat from our approach in Chapter 3, where it was reasonable to expect 
simultaneity between output and fiscal balances, which gave rise to endogeneity, thus warranting the 
use of system GMM. However, these differences in the approach are explained by the particular 
definition of variables, and are also in line with the relevant literature (as discussed throughout the text). 
In Chapter 3, we were focusing on budget balances (defined as the difference between total revenues and 
total spending), while here we focus separately on spending and revenues, which are both cleared of 
transfers and social benefits. Therefore, the omission of cyclically-sensitive components from 
government spending, which is our primary focus in this chapter, allows us to assume that GDP shocks 
do not contemporaneously affect spending as it is defined here. In other words, if GDP 
contemporaneously affected spending, this effect would most likely appear through transfers and social 
benefits, which are however removed from the definition of spending used here (as the sum of 
government consumption and government investment).  
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that it enables a straightforward interpretation of results, including the size of the 
fiscal multiplier. In addition, while the question whether variables in a VAR should be 
stationary is not definitively settled (Enders, 1994), we follow recommendations by 
Sims (1980) and Doan (1992) not to difference variables in the VAR even if they have a 
unit root. This approach is justified by the aim of the VAR, which is not to recover 
precise coefficient estimates but to analyse relations among variables (typically via 
impulse response functions, as discussed below). Further, it is argued that 
differencing throws away information on co-movements in the data. We also do not 
carry out tests on unit roots and cointegration, which is seldom done in empirical 
studies on fiscal policy, not least as a reflection of the low power of these tests in short 
time series. Indeed, even the few studies that perform such checks and find 
cointegration (e.g. Heppke-Falk et al. (2010) or Giordano et al. (2007)), proceed with 
VAR estimation in levels, arguing that it is difficult to impose economically 
meaningful cointegrating restrictions within a relatively general set of variables. 
However, in order to account for trending variables, we also include a time trend in 
our specification, in line with the majority of empirical studies surveyed in the 
previous chapter. The second issue, which is related to the definition of variables in 
absolute or per capita terms, is also not settled in the literature. Therefore, we use 
absolute amounts, but confirm the robustness of results to the definition in per capita 
terms in Appendix 5.3. Finally, we use 2 lags of each endogenous variable in our VAR. 
Related to this issue, it must be noted that, unlike time-series VARs, testing for lag-
length in PVARs is not straightforward (Babecký et al., 2012). Therefore, despite the 
risk of imprecise estimates due to low degrees of freedom, we take a relatively 
conservative approach by using 2 lags, which should be sufficient to remove any 
residual auto-correlation with annual data. In addition, the use of deeper lags would 
be unfeasible due to relatively small degrees of freedom, which is a common problem 
of VARs due to the proliferation of the number of coefficients with each additional 
lag. However, we also check for the robustness of our baseline results to the lag 
length in Section 5.3.2.  
 We can now define the structural form of our baseline panel VAR in Eq. 36 
below. Years are denoted by t subscripts and countries are denoted by i subscripts. As 
noted above, our analysis covers the period starting in 1995 and ending in 2012 (t=1, 
..., 18) and we include 27 countries that were EU members in 2012 (i=1, ..., 27). The 
endogenous variables included in the VAR and their ordering is as follows: the log of 
real government spending (g), the log of real cyclically-adjusted net-taxes (t), the log 
of real GDP (y), the log of the GDP deflator (p) and average annual three-month money 
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market interest rates in percents (r). In addition, we also include country-specific 
fixed effects (c) and a common time trend (t) as exogenous variables. D, E, P and H 
capture corresponding coefficients. The vector of orthogonal structural shocks ei,t 
reflects the shocks to each equation in the VAR. Finally, the first matrix in Eq. 36 
captures contemporaneous relations between endogenous variables (the A0 matrix). 
In particular, αnm elements of the A0 matrix represent the estimated contemporaneous 
reaction of variable m to shocks in variable n. The zero elements in the matrix reflect 
the restrictions of the recursive identification on the contemporaneous relations 
between variables, i.e. the restriction that variables ordered later do not have a 
contemporaneous effect on variables ordered before them.  
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36 
 
 
5.3.2 Baseline results and robustness checks 
  
 Before proceeding with estimations, a note is in order on the manner of 
estimation and presentation and discussion of the results. Since PVAR estimation is 
not yet part of standard software packages, we estimate our PVARs using the MATLAB 
code that has been developed and made public by Georgios Georgiadis102. Further, in 
line with effectively the entire literature using VARs, we are not interested in VAR 
coefficients, but we focus on impulse response functions (IRFs), which reflect the 
dynamic responses of variables to structural shocks. IRFs are based on the moving 
average representation of the VAR, and they are calculated as complex nonlinear 
interactions of VAR coefficients at different time horizons103. For the baseline model 
we will also present the forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD), which 
                                                
102 We are grateful to Mr. Georgiadis for the code and additional advice provided in our correspondence. 
The code is explained in Georgiadis (2012) and can be downloaded from 
https://sites.google.com/site/georgiosgeorgiadis111/research. This code can also estimate Panel 
Conditional Homogenous VARs (PCHVAR). A similar approach, which they call interacted PVAR (IPVAR), 
has been independently developed and used in Towbin and Weber (2013). We are also grateful to Pascal 
Towbin and Sebastian Weber for providing us the codes on IPVAR, which we hope we will find useful in 
some future application. While both the PCHVAR and the IPVAR methods allow for a richer analysis of 
heterogeneity than our approach of using sub-samples, we are unable to use these additional features 
due to the unavailability of sufficiently long data series required by both methods.   
103 For a detailed exposition on the calculation of impulse responses, see for instance Enders (1994). 
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decomposes the forecast error variance of each equation into contributions by 
separate structural shocks. However, in order to keep the discussion and the results 
manageable, we refrain from presenting FEVDs for our analysis of sub-samples and 
extensions.  
 As noted above, we will focus on government spending shocks. In line with the 
dominant practice in the literature, we present impulse responses to the government 
spending shock in graphical form (as well as 95% confidence intervals), while 
corresponding detailed tables are relegated to Appendix 5.2 and Appendix 5.3. Since 
one of the main aims of the study is to analyse the effects of fiscal policy on output, 
we also calculate and discuss the size of the fiscal multiplier. The fiscal multiplier is 
defined as the ratio of the change in output (∆Y) to the change in government 
spending (∆G) relative to their respective baselines104 (Spilimbergo et al., 2009). We 
focus on the impact multiplier or the multiplier at some horizon as a response to a 
shock at time t, but we do not discuss cumulative multipliers, which is in line with the 
established practice in the literature, as noted in surveys by Spilimbergo et al. (2009) 
and Rusnak (2011). In particular, we focus both on the impact multiplier, i.e. the 
impact response at the year of impact t (=∆Yt/∆Gt), and on the multiplier at some 
horizon h, i.e. one or more years after the shock at time t (=∆Yt+h/∆Gt); the same holds 
for responses of other variables besides GDP. In graphs, the year of impact is always 
zero, while the horizon starts with year 1, i.e. the year after the shock occurred. 
Further, in order to facilitate discussion, we standardise the size of the shock to be 
equal to 1% of GDP105. Consequently, we can directly interpret the impulse responses 
of GDP as the fiscal multiplier, i.e. the unit increase in GDP that is due to an increase 
in government spending for one unit of GDP. As far as the other variables are 
concerned, we mostly discuss the direction and the significances of responses as a 
                                                
104 The baseline is defined as the absence of fiscal shocks.  
105 Technically, this is done by defining the shock as one unit of spending, not as a standard deviation 
shock. Since spending enters in logs, a unit shock is in fact a shock equal to 1% of spending. However, 
with the re-scaling transformation, the unit shock of government spending is multiplied by the inverse of 
the average share of spending in GDP in the corresponding sample in order to define the size of the 
spending shock to be equal to one unit of GDP (and then to be able to directly interpret impulse 
responses of GDP as fiscal multipliers). Illustratively, without this transformation, impulse responses 
would show how a shock of one unit, i.e. 1% of spending is reflected in responses of other variables, 
expressed in percents (for variables in logs) or in percentage points (for rates or ratios). In such a case, 
additional calculations would be needed for the multiplier, since the spending shock and the response of 
GDP would be expressed in different units: the shock as 1% of spending, and the GDP response as a 
percentage of GDP. With this transformation, we multiply the size of the spending shock with the inverse 
of the share of government spending in GDP (around 25%), i.e. we multiply the shock by around 4. 
Consequently, the size of the spending shock now appears as 4 units, i.e. 4% of spending (due to logs), 
which is equivalent to a spending shock equal to 1% of GDP (because of the re-scaling). Since responses 
of GDP are also expressed in percents of the variable itself (as it also enters in logs), there is now a direct 
interpretation - for how many units (percents) does GDP change in response to a shock in government 
spending that is equal to one unit (1%) of GDP. As discussed above, this is in fact the definition of the 
fiscal multplier: ∆Y/∆G. 
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result of a positive spending shock of 1% of GDP, while detailed results are also 
presented in graphs and tables in Appendix 5.2. Where variables enter in logs (e.g. 
spending, GDP, net-taxes or the GDP deflator), the interpretation of responses is in 
terms of percentage changes of the responding variable, while for interest rates and 
variables that enter as a ratio (e.g. debt/GDP, net-exports/GDP) the responses are 
interpreted in percentage points. Finally, it should be noted that graphs also contain 
the 95% confidence intervals, while other conventional significance levels are 
presented in the tables in Appendix 5.2. However, we will mostly focus the size of the 
responses, although sometimes these are insignificant due to the relatively low 
degrees of freedom in our system.  
We can now present the results of our baseline specification from Eq. 36, 
which includes the entire sample of 27 EU countries over the 1995-2012, with time 
trend and country fixed effects and with 2 lags of endogenous variables in the VAR. 
The results in Figure 5.1 below show that the government spending shock is relatively 
persistent, as it takes around five years for its effects on spending to die out. At the 
year of the shock, governments also increase net-taxes, but this response becomes 
negative from the following year, presumably as governments try to reinforce the 
effects of spending rises by also lowering taxes. The response of real GDP to the 
spending shock is positive and the fiscal multiplier is around one at the year of the 
shock and in the following year. While this implies that fiscal policy does stimulate 
output, its effectiveness is relatively limited, since there are no stronger multiplicative 
effects beyond the approximately one-for-one response of GDP106. In addition, the 
fiscal multiplier is halved three years after the shock, when it also becomes 
insignificant107. Although we do not discuss cumulative multipliers (as noted above), 
these results indicate that, in the entire sample, the cumulative fiscal multiplier is one 
within five years and around 0.8 within ten years.  
The positive spending shock and the consequent increase in GDP also result in 
higher inflation, and the rise is significant for three years after the initial shock. 
Finally, interest rates fall on impact, while their direction changes the following year, 
although the responses become insignificant. While the initial negative response of 
                                                
106 The one-for-one response means that a one unit increase of government spending corresponds to one 
unit increase of GDP, which is true by definition if there are no stronger multiplicative effects. This is 
related to the fact that government spending is also included in the definition of GDP, i.e. government 
consumption is a separate component of GDP, whereas government investment is part of the total gross 
fixed capital formation.  
107 The positive response of GDP is insufficient to relate results to Real Business Cycle or New Keynesian 
theoretical predictions, since it is in line with predictions of both theories. We return to this issue when 
analysing the transmission mechanism of fiscal policy below.  
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interest rates is puzzling, we return to it in the following subsection when we analyse 
different sub-samples.  
 
 
Figure 5.1. Impulse responses to a government spending shock of 1% of real GDP - 
baseline specification 
 Note: The size of the spending shock in the entire sample and in all sub-
samples discussed below equals 1% of GDP, which is equivalent to around 4% 
of government spending (i.e. the inverse of the share of government spending 
in GDP. This share is around a quarter of GDP in the entire sample and in sub-
samples).  
 
 
 
 
 
Next we present results of the forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD), 
which is complementary to impulse responses. As noted above, the FEVD decomposes 
the forecast error variance of each equation into contributions by separate structural 
shocks. In line with our points of interest, in Table 5.1 we focus on the contribution of 
various shocks to the forecast error variance of GDP and the contribution of the 
government spending shock to the forecast error variance of various equations. The 
table on the left indicates that the forecast error variance of GDP is mostly 
attributable to GDP shocks. In addition, government spending shocks explain 8.4% of 
the forecast error variance on impact, and this effect fades out slowly in the future. 
On the other hand, the caveats regarding the proper identification of shocks to net-
taxes notwithstanding, they initially explain only 4.6% of the forecast error variance 
of GDP, but their importance rises to explaining up to around a quarter of the GDP 
error variance 5 years after the shock. Further, the table on the right of Table 5.1 
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shows that a relatively low share of fluctuations of other variables is attributable to 
spending shocks. Indeed, spending shocks explain the majority of fluctuations of 
spending itself, as well as some of the forecast error variance of GDP, but do not 
explain more than around 3% of the forecast error variance of the other three 
variables.  
 
 
 
 
Table 5.1. Forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD) - baseline specification 
(Note: The table on the left shows the contribution in % of each shock to the 
forecast error variance of GDP at various horizons. The table on the right 
shows the contribution in % of the spending shock to the FEVD of each 
variable at various horizons.) 
 
 
 
Bearing on mind the discussion above about the model specification, we 
present several robustness checks to impulse responses of the baseline specification. 
In order to facilitate the presentation and avoid cluttering, we present only the 
comparisons of alternative impulse responses without the confidence bands, which 
are presented in detailed graphs on separate alternatives in Appendix 5.2108.  
We start the robustness checks with the deterministic terms by comparing the 
baseline specification, which includes country fixed effects and a common linear time 
trend, with two alternatives109: country fixed effects without time trend, and pooled 
OLS with time trend. Figure 5.2 shows that results are fairly similar when the 
baseline is compared to the omission of the time trend. However, as discussed above, 
we keep the time trend in our specification due to the definition of variables in levels. 
On the other hand, results between the baseline and from the omission of country 
                                                
108 As noted previously, the comparison of impulse responses obtained when variables are defined in 
absolute terms and in per capita terms is relegated to Appendix 5.3. It shows that baseline results are 
robust to the alternative definition in per capita terms.   
109 An additional check is provided in Appendix 5.3, which shows that the baseline results are robust to 
the introduction of country-specific linear time trends instead of the common trend. Therefore, we 
proceed with the common time trend in all our specifications.   
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fixed effects are considerably different, with the responses in pooled VAR indicating a 
permanent level shift of GDP due to a spending shock, which is hardly feasible. This 
difference to the baseline is an indication that there is heterogeneity in our sample, so 
the maintenance of fixed effects is warranted in order to account for unobserved 
country heterogeneity.  
 
 
Figure 5.2. Impulse responses to a government spending shock of 1% of real GDP - 
robustness checks of deterministic terms  
 
 
 
Next we check the robustness of our results to alternative lag-length of 
endogenous variables in the PVAR. Figure 5.3 shows that baseline results from a 
second order PVAR are robust to both a shorter and a longer lag-length by one year. 
Indeed, the size and dynamics of responses are fairly similar in all cases, although the 
option with 3 lags displays a somewhat higher volatility of responses. This robustness 
indicates that there are no severe problems with residual auto-correlation. Therefore, 
we maintain our baseline PVAR with 2 lags, since adding an additional lag would 
consume considerable degrees of freedom without any obvious benefits.  
 
 
216 
 
 
Figure 5.3. Impulse responses to a government spending shock of 1% of real GDP - 
robustness checks of the lag-length of endogenous variables  
 
 
 
Finally, we also check the robustness of our results to an alternative ordering 
of variables. As discussed above, the main implication of the ordering of variables in 
our baseline PVAR (spending first, net-taxes second) is that spending shocks can affect 
net-taxes within the year, but not-vice versa. Although this is a standard assumption 
in the literature, we check the robustness of the results to ordering net-taxes first and 
spending second. In this case, spending shocks do not contemporaneously affect net-
taxes, but can still have a contemporaneous effect on other variables. In addition, 
spending can now also be affected contemporaneously by shocks to net-taxes. Results 
of the alternative ordering in Figure 5.4 below indicate that responses of other 
variables to spending shocks (which again appear at t=0) are similar to the ones in the 
baseline ordering. In particular, the response of spending to its own shocks is almost 
the same in the two cases. By design, the response of net-taxes in the alternative 
ordering is different at impact (within the year, i.e. t=0), since the contemporaneous 
response of net-taxes to spending shocks is now restricted to zero. However, after a 
spending shock, net-taxes have a similar dynamics in the following years. Further, the 
response of GDP to a spending shock is fairly similar in both cases, implying that the 
results on the fiscal multiplier are quite robust. The responses of prices and 
particularly interest rates are also robust to the alternative ordering.  
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Figure 5.4. Impulse responses to a government spending shock of 1% of real GDP - 
robustness checks of the different ordering of spending and net-taxes  
 
  
 
5.3.3 Sub-sample analysis (effects of structural characteristics) 
 
In this section we analyse the effects of government spending shocks in 
various sub-samples, which are defined by various country features. By doing so, we 
address one of the main aims of the thesis, i.e. to analyse whether country structural 
characteristics influence the effects of fiscal policy on macroeconomic variables. In 
addition, splitting the sample in various ways also enables us to deal with country 
heterogeneity in a more careful manner, since sub-samples analysed here consist of 
more homogenous groups than the entire sample of 27 EU member states.  
The analysis in this section applies the baseline specification of the panel VAR 
on various sub-samples. This means that we have five endogenous variables in the 
VAR: the log of real government spending, the log of real cyclically-adjusted net-taxes, 
the log of real GDP, the log of the GDP deflator and average annual three-month 
money market interest rates in percents. We also include country fixed effects and a 
common time trend as exogenous variables. On a technical note, in order to facilitate 
the discussion of results, we only present comparison graphs of impulse responses 
(and the corresponding 95% confidence intervals) for the sub-samples being analysed, 
whereas complete graphs and tables for each separate alternative are relegated to 
Appendix 5.2. It should also be noted that the 95% confidence intervals in the graphs 
below are somewhat wider than in the baseline results in Figure 5.1 due to the 
smaller sample sizes resulting from splitting the sample.  
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We first analyse possible differences in fiscal policy effects between the 17 old 
and 10 new EU member states (EU17 and NMS10 respectively110). This comparison is 
directly related to one of the aims of the thesis, which is concerned with the effects of 
fiscal policy in transition countries and possible differences with old EU member 
states. The comparison in Figure 5.5 shows that the response of spending to its own 
shock is fairly similar, and it becomes insignificant within 4 to 5 years. On the other 
hand, there is a complete opposite reaction of net-taxes. In old EU member states, 
positive spending shocks are accompanied by lower net-taxes as governments try to 
reinforce higher spending by also lowering revenues. In addition, this fall in net-taxes 
is significant for a considerable period into the future. On the other hand, spending 
shocks in transition countries are accompanied by an increase of net-taxes on impact, 
and the positive reaction of net-taxes is significant up to 3 years after the shock, 
indicating that governments in these countries try to pursue a more disciplined fiscal 
policy than in old EU member states. Further, the effects of spending shocks on GDP 
are positive in both old and new EU member states, and in both cases responses 
become insignificant around 3 years after the shock. However, the fiscal multiplier is 
higher in transition countries both at impact (1.3 in new and 0.6 in old EU member 
states) and into the future (e.g. 1 in new and 0.6 in old EU member states 3 years after 
the shock). Finally, although there are some differences in the dynamics, the reaction 
of prices and interest rates is fairly similar in the two groups of countries.  
 
 
Figure 5.5. Comparison of impulse responses to a government spending shock of 1% 
of real GDP - old and new EU member states  
 
                                                
110 Similar to Chapter 3, EU17 consists of 15 old EU member states plus Malta and Cyprus, while NMS10 
consists of the 10 new EU member states from Central and Eastern Europe (the 2004 and 2007 
enlargement cohorts). 
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 After analysing differences in effects of fiscal policy in old and new EU 
member states, we turn to the importance of country structural characteristics for the 
effects of fiscal policy. First we analyse the effects of the level of public debt by using 
the threshold of the average share of public debt to GDP of 60% between 1995 and 
2012 to split the sample into countries with high and low debt111 (Figure 5.6). Results 
indicate that there is indeed a different response to spending shocks in the two 
groups of countries. First, in countries with lower debt levels positive spending 
shocks are followed by higher net-taxes, unlike high-debt countries where higher 
spending is accommodated by lower taxes, thus potentially further increasing deficits 
and debt levels. What is more important, the fiscal multiplier is higher in less 
indebted countries, and this holds both at impact (1 in low-debt and 0.6 in high-debt 
countries) and into the future (e.g. 0.5 in low-debt and 0.3 in high-debt countries 3 
years after the shock). This result indicates that the effectiveness of fiscal policy is 
considerably stronger in low-debt than in high-debt countries, which is in line with a 
priori expectations and findings in the literature (Rusnak, 2011). Further, spending 
shocks tend to be followed by higher inflation in low-debt countries, possibly 
reflecting higher demand. On the other hand, the dynamics of the response of interest 
rates are similar, although there are some differences in magnitude.  
 
 
Figure 5.6. Comparison of impulse responses to a government spending shock of 1% 
of real GDP - high debt and low debt countries 
(Note: High debt countries: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Italy, Portugal. Low debt countries: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, 
Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom.) 
 
                                                
111 The threshold of 60% is in line with the Maastricht criteria for public debt. However, results are 
similar if the threshold is defined as 50% instead.  
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 Another factor which could affect the effects of fiscal policy is the level of trade 
openness, since it is expected that, in more open countries, there would be partial 
'leakages' of the positive fiscal shock, i.e. the higher demand could be met with higher 
imports, thus decreasing the effects on GDP and the size of the multiplier. In order to 
analyse this issue, we split our sample into more open and less open countries by 
using the level of average trade openness to GDP of 50% between 1995 and 2012 as a 
threshold112. Results in Figure 5.7 below support the a priori expectation that the 
effects of fiscal policy differ according to the level of openness. Somewhat 
surprisingly, on impact the size of the fiscal multiplier is slightly higher in more open 
than in less open economies (1.1 and 0.7 respectively). However, starting from one 
year after the shock, the fiscal multiplier is considerably higher in less open 
economies. In addition, it is also significant for three years after the shock in less 
open economies, while it becomes insignificant one year after the shock in more open 
economies. These results indicate that there are considerably more 'leakages' in more 
open economies via the import channel, thus making fiscal policy in these countries 
less effective. On the other hand, the openness level does not affect the responses of 
other variables to the spending shock, except for the impact responses.  
 
 
Figure 5.7. Comparison of impulse responses to a government spending shock of 1% of 
real GDP - more and less open countries  
(Note: More open countries: Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Slovakia, Slovenia. Less open 
countries: Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom.) 
 
                                                
112 Openness is calculated as the share of foreign trade in nominal GDP. Foreign trade is calculated as the 
sum of nominal exports and imports of goods and services divided by 2.  
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 As discussed in the previous chapter, in circumstances of low demand and zero 
lower bound of nominal policy rates, it is generally expected that the size of the fiscal 
multiplier would be higher than in normal circumstances. Therefore, in the last part 
of this section we analyse whether our baseline results on effects of fiscal policy 
shocks in European countries are partially a reflection of the Great Recession. In 
order to do so, we compare baseline results (1995-2012) to the ones that obtain when 
shortening the sample for the crisis years, i.e. using only the pre-crisis period 
between 1995 and 2008. While the shorter sample of 14 years magnifies potential 
small sample problems discussed in the previous section, results of this comparison in 
Figure 5.8 still yield some interesting insights. In the pre-crisis period, the size of 
fiscal multiplier is about half the size of the multiplier in the entire period, both on 
impact (0.4 compared to 1) and into the future. In addition, the response of GDP in the 
pre-crisis period becomes insignificant only one year after the shock, whereas in the 
entire period it is significant up to three years after the shock. Overall, these results 
suggest that fiscal policy is less effective in normal circumstances, while the results 
for the entire period are driven by the higher effectiveness in the recent crisis years, 
which is in line with expectations. Further, while the responses of other variables are 
similar, there are some differences in the response of interest rates. In particular, 
when using the entire period, interest rates fall on impact, and become insignificant 
thereinafter, which is somewhat puzzling. However, in the pre-crisis period, the 
response of interest rates to spending shocks is significantly positive on impact and 
up to three years after the shock. This difference is an indication that the response of 
monetary policy in the entire sample might be driven by the crisis years. Indeed, it 
appears that central banks respond to positive spending shocks with more restrictive 
policy in normal times, but accommodate fiscal policy shocks during the crisis years.     
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Figure 5.8. Comparison of impulse responses to a government spending shock of 1% 
of real GDP - baseline and pre-crisis period  
 
 
 
 Before moving to the analysis of the transmission mechanism of fiscal policy 
and other extensions of our baseline specification, it is useful to summarise the main 
findings so far related to main differences between results across various sub-
samples. Therefore, Table 5.2 below presents the main results on the size of the fiscal 
multiplier in the baseline specification and in various sub-samples. As discussed 
previously, the fiscal multiplier in the entire sample is around one on impact and 
after one year, and declines thereinafter. However, the fiscal multiplier is higher than 
one in new EU member states, whereas fiscal policy is less effective in old EU member 
states. Further, in line with theoretical predictions and findings in most empirical 
studies (Chapter 4), fiscal policy is considerably more effective in countries with low 
public debt levels and low trade openness. Last but not least, fiscal multipliers were 
much lower in 'normal', pre-crisis years. This implies that the results on the entire 
sample are driven by the much higher effectiveness of fiscal policy during crisis 
years, which is in line with traditional Keynesian predictions of effective fiscal policy 
in recessions. Overall, the results from this section and particularly the summary in 
Table 5.2  confirm the suggestion by Spilimbergo et al. (2009) that fiscal multipliers 
are country-, time- and circumstance-specific.  
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On impact After one year After 3 years After 5 years
Baseline (EU27, 1995-2012) 1.0*** 1.1*** 0.4* -0.1
Old EU member states (EU17) 0.6*** 1.0*** 0.6** -0.2
New EU member states (NMS10) 1.3*** 1.4*** 1.0** 0.9
High debt (debt/GDP>60%) 0.6*** 1.1*** 0.3 -0.8*
Low debt (debt/GDP<60%) 1.0*** 1.1*** 0.5* 0.3
High openness (>50% of GDP) 1.1*** 0.9*** -0.2 -0.6
Low openness (<50% of GDP) 0.7*** 1.2*** 0.7** 0.1
Pre-crisis (EU27, 1995-2008) 0.4*** 0.3** -0.1 -0.4
Size of the fiscal multiplier
 
Table 5.2. Fiscal multipliers in the entire sample and in various sub-samples  
(Note: The table shows the size of the fiscal multiplier, i.e. the response of real GDP (in 
%) to a government spending shock of 1% of real GDP. ***, ** and * denote significance 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.) 
 
 
 
5.4 Results on the transmission mechanism of fiscal policy and other 
extensions 
 
 This section provides various extensions of the baseline specification in order 
to shed some light on the transmission mechanism of  fiscal policy, which is one of 
the main aims of this chapter. In order to do so, we use various components of GDP 
and fiscal policy, as well as some additional variables. This enables us to also analyse 
the channels through which fiscal policy affects the economy, which are interesting in 
their own right. In addition, some of the extensions enable us to analyse relations 
between our empirical results and theoretical predictions. Last but not least, some of 
the extensions provide additional robustness checks on the baseline results. In all 
cases, we start from the baseline specification of our PVAR with five endogenous 
variables (Eq. 36 and Subsection 5.3.2) and modify it in accordance with the issues we 
are analysing113. Similar to the previous section, here we only present comparison 
graphs of impulse responses (with corresponding 95% confidence intervals) for the 
specifications being analysed, whereas complete graphs and tables for each separate 
alternative are provided in Appendix 5.2.  
 
                                                
113 Our baseline specification has five endogenous variables in the VAR: the log of real government 
spending, the log of real cyclically-adjusted net-taxes, the log of real GDP, the log of the GDP deflator and 
average annual three-month money market interest rates in percents. We also include country-specific 
fixed effects and a common time trend as exogenous variables. 
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5.4.1 Effects of fiscal policy on private consumption and investment 
 
We start this part of the analysis by augmenting the baseline specification with 
four additional variables: private consumption, private investment, real wages per 
employee and total employment114. In line with the practice in the literature (e.g. 
Caldara and Kamps (2008) and Perotti (2005)), we add one variable at a time to our 
baseline of 5 variables, which yields four additional specifications with 6 variables115. 
In order to facilitate the discussion and bearing on mind the robustness of the 
responses of the other variables, we only present the responses of each additional 
variable to a spending shock of 1% of GDP, whereas the complete responses for each 
of the four specifications are relegated to Appendix 5.2.  
 Figure 5.9 below presents the responses of the additional variables in 
respective extended 6-variable PVARs when the entire sample is used. According to 
the results, government spending shocks of 1% of GDP are followed by increases both 
of private consumption and private investment. While the response of investment is 
about double the one of consumption both at impact and in the future, they both have 
a similar dynamic and both are significant up to 2 years after the shock. In addition, 
the results indicate that the rise of private consumption is a reflection of the rise of 
both real wages and employment following a government spending shock.  
 The extension of the baseline specification with these variables also makes it 
possible to analyse whether effects of fiscal policy are in line with Real Business Cycle 
(RBC) or New Keynesian predictions. Indeed, as discussed in detail in the previous 
chapter, both groups of theories predict that government spending shocks cause 
higher output. Related to this, our previous finding of rising output in response to 
spending shocks in the baseline specification is in line with the vast majority of other 
empirical studies as well as predictions of the two main theories. However, theories 
diverge on the predicted response of other variables, particularly private 
consumption, real wages and employment, while predictions on the response of 
private investment are less clear (Perotti, 2008). Our finding of a positive response of 
private consumption to spending shocks is in line with almost the entire empirical 
literature, but opposite to predictions of both baseline RBC and baseline New 
Keynesian theoretical models, which predict that private consumption would fall due 
                                                
114 Most studies on US data use private sector wages and private sector employment. While such an 
approach would be more consistent with the use of private consumption and private investment, data on 
private sector wages and employment for EU countries are not available from the European Commission 
AMECO database.  
115 Each new variable is added before GDP. However, as discussed above, the ordering does not matter 
since we are interested only in the effects of spending shocks, which are ordered first.  
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to dominant negative wealth effects. Indeed, as surveyed in Chapter 4, the extension 
of baseline theoretical models was partially motivated by their inability to explain 
overwhelming empirical evidence of rising private consumption. Related to this, our 
empirical results are in line with predicted responses in some of these extended 
theoretical models. In particular, our finding of rising private consumption, real 
wages and employment is in line with predictions both from extended RBC models 
with monopolistic competition and 'deep habits' in the consumption of individual 
goods (Ravn et al., 2006) and extended New Keynesian models with rule-of-thumb 
consumers (Galí et al., 2007).  
 
 
Figure 5.9. Impulse responses of additional variables to a government spending 
shock of 1% of real GDP - extended PVARs with 6 variables 
(Note: Only responses of the additional variable in each of the four 6-
variable PVARs are shown. For complete results of each specification, 
see Appendix 5.2)  
  
 
 Next we carry out the same exercise with an additional variable in the baseline 
specification, but now split the sample to old and new EU member states in order to 
analyse whether there are differences in the transmission mechanism between the 
two groups. Figure 5.10 broadly confirms results from the entire sample, with 
dynamics and signs of the responses similar in the two groups, although there are 
differences in the strength of the responses. More precisely, in both groups private 
consumption rises in response to government spending shocks, as do wages and 
employment as two key factors supporting consumption. However, the rise of 
consumption, wages and employment is stronger in new member states, and this 
holds both at impact and into the future. In addition, the response of consumption 
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and wages becomes insignificant in both country groups two years after the shock, 
whereas the rise of employment is significant for longer in new than in old member 
states (five as opposed to two years). Finally, the positive response of private 
investment is stronger in new member states on impact, but afterwards the response 
is both stronger and significant for a longer period in old member states.   
 
 
Figure 5.10. Comparison of impulse responses to a government spending shock of 
1% of real GDP in extended PVARs with 6 variables - old and new EU 
member states  
 
  
5.4.2 Effects of various components of government spending  
 
Although we are focused in the effects of government spending shocks, in line 
with the vast majority of the literature, we are also interested in whether components 
of government spending have different effects on output and other macroeconomic 
variables. This is not directly related to any theoretical model, but still provides some 
interesting insights on the transmission mechanism of fiscal policy. Therefore, we 
proceed by separately analysing the effects of the two components of government 
spending: consumption and investment. In addition, we also consider the effects of 
the two components of government consumption: the government wage bill and the 
government non-wage consumption. In order to do so, in the baseline specification116, 
                                                
116 Our baseline specification has five endogenous variables in the VAR: the log of real government 
spending, the log of real cyclically-adjusted net-taxes, the log of real GDP, the log of the GDP deflator and 
average annual three-month money market interest rates in percents. We also include country-specific 
fixed effects and a common time trend as exogenous variables. 
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we replace real government spending with its components, one at a time, and present 
the responses of GDP to shocks of 1% of GDP of various components in Figure 5.11, 
whereas complete responses of all variables are relegated to Appendix 5.2. According 
to the results, there are some differences in the effect of spending components on 
output. In particular, government investment is the more effective tool in stimulating 
output compared to government consumption. Indeed, the response of GDP to 
government investment shocks is stronger than the response to government 
consumption shocks at impact and up to three years after the shock, while in both 
cases the response of GDP becomes insignificant about two years after the shock. 
Further, among the components of government consumption, government wage bill 
shocks are more effective than government non-wage consumption shocks up to two 
years after the shock, although in both cases the response becomes insignificant 
rather quickly. Overall, these results indicate that, if the aim is to stimulate output, 
the most effective way to do so is by increasing government investment. If 
government consumption is used, the effects of government employees' wages are 
somewhat larger than those of non-wage consumption (i.e. government purchases of 
goods and services). 
 
 
Figure 5.11. Impulse responses of GDP to a shock of 1% of real GDP in various 
spending components 
 
 
 
 We further enrich the analysis of the transmission mechanism by considering 
the effects of various government spending components on private consumption and 
investment as key components of GDP. In order to do so, in our baseline VAR we 
replace GDP with private consumption and private investment, and then replace 
government spending with its components one at a time. Similar to previously, in 
Figure 5.12 below we only present the responses of private consumption and 
investment to shocks of 1% of GDP to various components, whereas complete 
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responses of all variables are provided in Appendix 5.2. Results indicate that total 
government spending shocks have stronger positive effects on private investment 
than on consumption, although in both cases the effect becomes insignificant after 
two years. As far as the components of spending are concerned, somewhat 
surprisingly government consumption is more effective in stimulating private 
investment than private consumption on impact, but in both cases responses quickly 
become insignificant. On the other hand, in line with expectations, government 
investment is more effective in stimulating private investment than private 
consumption. Further, shocks to the government wage-bill have positive effects on 
both private consumption and investment on impact but this effect quickly becomes 
insignificant. Finally, government non-wage consumption shocks are more effective 
in stimulating private investment on impact, whereas their effects on both private 
consumption and investment become insignificant in the first year after the shock. 
Overall, these results indicate that the fiscal policy works mostly via its effects on 
private investment, which normally appears to be more responsive, whereas 
responses of private consumption are lower, in line with the expected relatively 
higher inertia in household consumption. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.12. Impulse responses of private consumption and private investment to a 
shock of 1% of real GDP in various spending components 
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5.4.3 Effects of debt on the transmission of fiscal policy shocks 
 
We proceed by analysing the robustness of our baseline results for the entire 
sample to the inclusion of the public debt ratio in the specification. As discussed in 
the previous chapter, public debt is not usually included in the VAR, which has been 
criticised by Favero and Giavazzi (2007) since a fiscal shock is expected to constrain 
future revenues and spending due to the intertemporal budget constraint. 
Consequently, they argue that results of standard fiscal VARs may be biased due to 
the omission of debt, and recommend that the analysis of fiscal shocks should take 
into account the debt dynamics and allow for possible feedback from debt to fiscal 
and other variables. Therefore, we augment our baseline specification for the entire 
sample with the share of public debt to GDP as an endogenous variable. Results in 
Figure 5.13 below indicate that baseline responses of other variables to a government 
spending shock are robust to the inclusion of the debt level. This also holds for the 
response of interest rates, which is opposite to findings by Favero and Giavazzi (2007) 
that in the US interest rates respond differently to spending shocks when debt is 
included in the VAR. In addition, the debt/GDP ratio itself slightly falls on impact in 
response to a spending shock, probably reflecting the rise of net-taxes and of GDP on 
impact. However, there is a significant increase in the debt/GDP ratio of up to 2 
percentage points in the future and this response dies out rather slowly. Overall, 
these results on the response of public debt suggest that spending shocks have a 
considerable deteriorating effect on fiscal sustainability. Indeed, in the wake of 
spending shocks, the rise of spending is quite persistent, unlike the positive response 
of net-taxes, which dies out considerably faster, thus giving rise to higher budget 
deficits and consequently higher debt levels.  
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Figure 5.13. Comparison of impulse responses to a government spending shock of 
1% of real GDP - baseline and baseline extended with debt/GDP as 
endogenous variable 
 
  
 
We carry out the same exercise with the inclusion of debt, but now we split the 
sample to old and new EU member states. Since baseline responses of all variables in 
both country groups are robust to the inclusion of debt, we relegate them to Appendix 
5.2, while here we focus on the response of GDP and fiscal variables in the two 
groups. Results in Figure 5.14 below indicate that baseline responses of GDP to 
spending shocks are robust to the inclusion of debt in both country groups. In 
addition, the conclusion from the baseline that fiscal multipliers are higher in new 
than in old member states holds when debt is added. Finally, it appears that fiscal 
sustainability is stronger in new than in old member states, since government 
spending shocks result in a low and insignificant response of debt in new member 
states, unlike old member states where spending shocks are followed by considerably 
higher debt levels. Additional results indicate that this difference in the response of 
debt levels is related to the response of net-taxes in old and new EU member states, 
which was also discussed above. Indeed, in new EU member states, government 
spending shocks are followed by higher net-taxes. On the other hand, higher spending 
in old EU member states is accommodated by lower taxes, and consequently debt 
levels are higher, thus giving rise to concerns about debt sustainability.   
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Figure 5.14. Comparison of impulse responses of GDP to a government spending 
shock of 1% of real GDP with and without debt/GDP - old and new EU 
member states  
 
 
 
5.4.4 Transmission of fiscal policy shocks in the open economy context 
 
In order to check the robustness of baseline results and to provide further 
insights into the workings of fiscal policy, we extend our analysis by introducing 
some open economy elements. This point is particularly relevant, since our sample 
consists of small open economies. We first provide two modifications of the baseline 
PVAR with five variables117. First, in the baseline specification we replace GDP with 
private consumption and private investment (6-variable PVAR in Figure 5.15). Second, 
to this specification we also add real exports and real imports of goods and services, 
which yields an 8-variable PVAR. The comparison of responses to government 
spending shocks in the two specifications is presented in Figure 5.15. The 6-variable 
PVAR confirms previous findings that private consumption and investment react 
positively to government spending shocks, with the response of private investment 
around double that of private consumption. In addition, the responses of net-taxes, 
the GDP deflator and interest rates are similar to those of the baseline specification 
with GDP (commented above). The results of the 6-variable PVAR are robust to the 
                                                
117 Our baseline specification has five endogenous variables in the VAR: the log of real government 
spending, the log of real cyclically-adjusted net-taxes, the log of real GDP, the log of the GDP deflator and 
average annual three-month money market interest rates in percents. We also include country-specific 
fixed effects and a common time trend as exogenous variables. 
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inclusion of real exports and imports in the specification in the 8-variable PVAR. In 
this case, responses of exports and imports themselves are in line with expectations. 
Government spending shocks only marginally increase exports on impact, but the 
response becomes insignificant thereinafter. On the other hand, spending shocks 
result in higher imports of goods and services, and the increase is significant up to 
two years after the shock. The positive response of imports can be explained by the 
considerable import share of government spending, private consumption and private 
investment, which all rise in response to a positive spending shock.  
 
 
 
Figure 5.15. Comparison of impulse responses to a government spending shock of 
1% of real GDP - specifications with GDP components 
 
  
 
Besides extending the baseline specification with separate GDP components, 
we provide an alternative open economy specification by introducing variables that 
are more common in the relevant literature. More precisely, we bring back GDP 
instead of using separate GDP components, since the extended 8-variable VAR 
consumes considerable degrees of freedom. Further, we also remove prices, and use 
the CPI-based real exchange rate and real interest rates instead, which is a common 
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approach in the open economy context. This specification is completed by the 
introduction of the ratio of real net-exports to GDP, thus partially resembling the 
analysis for the US by Kim and Roubini (2008). Results in Figure 5.16 below confirm 
the previous finding that GDP rises in response to spending shocks, even when this 
alternative specification is used. Further, spending shocks result in a small real 
exchange rate depreciation on impact, but the effect soon becomes insignificant. Real 
interest rates tend to fall in response to spending shocks, thus mimicking the fall in 
nominal interest rates and the increase in prices from the baseline specification. 
Finally, spending shocks result in a considerable deterioration of the trade deficit of 
around 1.1 percentage points of GDP on impact, and the fall is significant up to two 
years after the shock. The worse trade deficit in the wake of spending shocks could be 
explained mostly by the previous finding of rising imports, which are also related to 
the stronger economic activity and accommodative real interest rates. However, net-
exports start rising around three years after the shock, which could reflect higher 
private investment (found earlier) and higher productivity of the domestic economy.  
 
 
Figure 5.16. Impulse responses to a government spending shock of 1% of real GDP - 
open economy specification 
 
 
 
In Figure 5.17 we repeat the open economy analysis, but now for the sub-
samples of old and new EU member states. Responses of net-taxes and GDP are 
similar to the ones in respective baseline specifications for the two country groups 
commented previously, with the fiscal multiplier higher in new member states, and 
rising net-taxes in new member states as opposed to falling net-taxes in old member 
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states. Further, results indicate that government spending shocks are followed by real 
appreciation in old EU member states, unlike the minimal real depreciation in new 
member states, although in both cases responses are mostly insignificant. The 
dynamics of real interest rates and net-exports are similar in both country groups, as 
they both fall on impact and then soon become insignificant. The only difference is 
that both real interest rates and net-exports initially fall more in new than in old 
member states.  
 
 
Figure 5.17. Comparison of impulse responses to a government spending shock of 
1% of real GDP in the open economy specification - old and new EU 
member states  
 
 
 
5.4.5 Jack-knifing the results of the baseline specification 
 
The final analysis in this part provides an additional robustness test by using 
the jack-knifing procedure118, which enables to check whether baseline results for the 
entire sample are driven by any particular country. Jack-knifing is used to calculate 
pseudo-coefficients when omitting one country at a time, in effect yielding 27 sets of 
pseudo-coefficients (i.e. one set for each country omitted), as well as accompanying 
standard errors and impulse responses. This set of results, presented in Figure 5.18, 
can be useful in distinguishing whether a particular country is driving the results. 
Figure 5.18 contains the impulse responses and the 95% confidence interval from the 
                                                
118 A similar approach was used in the empirical analysis in Chapter 3, which also provides details about 
the procedure.  
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baseline specification with 27 countries, as well as impulse responses if one country is 
dropped from the sample, but we do not report jack-knifed confidence bands in order 
to avoid cluttering. Baseline responses appear very robust to the exclusion of any 
country from the sample, since jack-knifed responses are mostly close to the baseline 
ones. In addition, jack-knifed responses are within the 95% confidence bands of the 
baseline, except for minor differences in some of the jack-knifed responses on impact.  
  
 
Figure 5.18. Impulse responses to a government spending shock of 1% of real GDP - 
jack-knifing the baseline specification (removing one country at a time)  
 
 
 
5.5 Conclusions 
 
 This chapter provides an empirical analysis of the effects of fiscal policy on 
output and other macroeconomic variables in European countries. It begins with an 
extensive discussion of the methodological design of our empirical analysis. In this 
part, it also relates to the literature survey in the previous chapter, particularly when 
considering various approaches used in the empirical literature and their advantages 
and drawbacks. At the same time, the discussion also relates the choice of the 
methodology to the main aims of the study and the sample at hand (annual data on 27 
European countries between 1995 and 2012). On the basis of this discussion, the panel 
VAR with fixed effects is chosen as the most appropriate empirical method, mostly 
due to its ability to treat all variables as endogenous and to allow for unobserved 
country heterogeneity. In addition, PVAR with fixed effects enables inference on the 
common aspects in macroeconomic data (Gavin and Theodorou, 2005), which is 
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precisely the main aim of our study. In line with the dominant approach in the fiscal 
VAR literature and particularly in studies using PVAR, our analysis uses recursive 
identification of fiscal policy shocks, and we focus on responses of GDP and other 
macroeconomic variables to government spending shocks. An extensive discussion of 
numerous specification issues, on which there is no consensus in the main literature, 
is also provided in this chapter.  
By using PVAR, we extend the relatively limited and fairly recent body of 
literature that uses this method. Indeed, PVAR is still a relative novelty in terms of 
empirical application, as it relies mostly on user-written software codes. Compared to 
the design of the relevant studies on fiscal policy (summarised in Table 4.2 of the 
previous chapter), we extend the existing literature using PVAR in several important 
aspects. First, we analyse a wider sample of countries for a similar period of time (old 
and new EU member states, starting in the mid-1990s and ending after the recent 
global economic crisis). Both aspects of our sample give rise to contributions: in 
contrast to all other PVAR studies of fiscal policy, we extend this method to transition 
countries; and, by including the period up to 2012, we are able to take account of the 
recent crisis in our analysis, which enables indirect inference on the size of the fiscal 
multiplier in 'normal' times compared to the post-crisis period. Second, unlike several 
other PVAR studies of fiscal policy, we apply this method in an extensive manner to 
deal with country heterogeneity. Third, a similarly extensive application of the 
method is also used during the detailed investigation of the transmission mechanism 
of fiscal policy. Last but not least, our model specifications and variable definitions to 
a considerable extent rely on the arguments put forward in the extensive fiscal VAR 
literature (summarised in Table 4.1 of the previous chapter), which is not always the 
case in the relatively small body of PVAR studies of fiscal policy.  
 When the baseline specification for the entire sample is used, results indicate 
that fiscal policy has a statistically significant, but relatively small effects on other 
macroeconomic variables. The most important result in this part is that the fiscal 
multiplier is around one on impact and a year after the fiscal shock, and declines 
thereinafter. This implies that fiscal policy is effective in stimulating output, but 
stronger multiplicative effects on GDP are absent, since the effect is approximately 
one-for-one. In addition, government spending shocks are followed by higher net-
taxes on impact, but their response soon dies out as governments try to accommodate 
spending shocks by lower taxes. Prices also rise following a spending shock, in line 
with higher demand, whereas the response of interest rates is negative on impact but 
soon becomes insignificant. The baseline analysis is followed by numerous 
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robustness checks using various modifications, which generally confirm the baseline 
results.  
 The chapter proceeds to analyse effects of fiscal policy shocks in various sub-
samples, which are defined by various country characteristics or different time 
periods. The results, summarised previously in Table 5.2, confirm the importance of 
structural characteristics when analysing the fiscal multiplier. In particular, fiscal 
multipliers are higher in new than in old EU member states. In addition, new EU 
member states appear to implement more disciplined fiscal policies, since net-taxes 
are increased in the wake of higher government spending, unlike old EU member 
states where net-taxes fall. Further, in line with expectations, the fiscal multiplier is 
higher in countries with lower debt levels and lower openness. Finally, omitting the 
crisis years from the sample indicates that the results for the entire period are driven 
by the higher effectiveness of fiscal policy during the recent crisis, which is entirely in 
line with traditional Keynesian predictions on the effectiveness of fiscal policy in 
recessions. On the other hand, during 'normal' pre-crisis years, the fiscal multiplier is 
considerably lower than one, whereas monetary policy becomes more restrictive in 
the wake of spending shocks. Overall, the results from the sub-sample analysis thus 
confirm the suggestion by Spilimbergo et al. (2009) that fiscal multipliers are country-, 
time- and circumstance-specific.  
 The last part of the chapter deals provides numerous extensions to the baseline 
specification in order to analyse the transmission mechanism of fiscal policy and its 
relations to main theoretical predictions. The findings in this part suggest that 
government spending shocks cause rises in both private investment and 
consumption, with the latter being supported by higher real wages and higher 
employment. This is in line with findings in most other empirical studies, but opposes 
both baseline Real Business Cycle and baseline New Keynesian models. However, the 
rise of private consumption, wages and employment is consistent with extensions of 
both types of baseline theoretical models. Findings in this part also suggest that fiscal 
policy is more effective when implemented via government investment than via 
government consumption. Further, the introduction of the share of debt in GDP in the 
model in order to account for intertemporal budget constraints and debt feedbacks to 
fiscal policy does not affect baseline results. However, it does yield some worrying 
implications for fiscal sustainability, since spending shocks are followed by rising 
debt levels in old EU member states, which could be related well to the recent 
European debt crisis. Further, the specification is modified to also incorporate some 
open economy elements. This extension again confirms baseline results, and also 
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suggests that trade deficits worsen in the wake of spending shocks, which is driven by 
rising imports. This part of the analysis concludes with jack-knifing of baseline 
results, which appear to be robust to the omission of any single country from the 
sample.
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6.1 Introduction 
 
   The work on this thesis began in early 2011, as the world economy was 
undergoing the deepest and the longest crisis since the Great Depression and 
policymakers were trying to find a way to support a sustainable economic recovery. 
This period, which came to be known as the Great Recession, raised some important 
questions about the role of fiscal policy in stimulating output and in the stabilization 
of macroeconomic fluctuations. The attention paid to these issues by policy-makers 
was thus related to and further stimulated the work on these issues in academia, both 
regarding theoretical models and empirical research. Accordingly, the original aim of 
the thesis was to investigate the stabilization properties of fiscal policy, its role and its 
effectiveness. Since this is a very wide area of research, in the early stages of the work 
on the thesis the focus was narrowed down to a few key issues related to fiscal policy 
in European countries. Related to this, the thesis focuses on issues that are at the 
heart of the academic and policy debates in the context of the European debt crisis. In 
particular, the aim of the thesis is to analyse the cyclical character and determinants 
of fiscal policy, as well as the short- to medium-term effects of fiscal policy on output 
and other macroeconomic variables in European countries, with particular reference 
to transition countries.  
 In order to meet this aim, the thesis focuses on the following research 
objectives:  
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 To briefly review the main macroeconomic and fiscal policy 
developments in European countries; 
 To review and critically assess the theoretical and empirical literature on 
the cyclical character and determinants of fiscal policy, as well as on the 
effects of fiscal policy on output and other macroeconomic variables; 
 To analyse empirically the cyclical character and determinants of fiscal 
policy in European countries, with a particular focus on transition 
countries;   
 To analyse empirically the short- to medium-term effects of fiscal policy 
on output and other macroeconomic variables in European countries, 
with a particular focus on transition countries;   
 To draw policy recommendations relevant for transition countries and 
Macedonia in particular. 
 
This chapter presents the conclusions of our investigation. In particular, the 
next section summarises the main findings of the thesis and relates them to the 
research objectives, while Section 6.3 uses our findings to draw some policy 
recommendations. Section 6.4 presents our contributions to knowledge. Section 6.5 
discusses some limitations of our research and the final section provides ideas for 
future research.   
  
 
6.2 Main findings of the thesis  
 
The first research objective is addressed in the introductory chapter (Chapter 
1), which provides stylised facts on the main fiscal policy and macroeconomic 
developments in European countries for the period that is the subject of the empirical 
analysis in the thesis. Stylised facts show that average GDP growth between 1995 and 
2012 was higher and more volatile in the two groups of transition countries than in 
old EU member states, and this was the case particularly in new EU member states, 
i.e. the more advanced transition countries. These countries also had larger cyclically-
adjusted budget deficits than old EU member states during the period, while public 
debt in the vast majority of transition countries was considerably lower than in their 
Western European peers.  
  The thesis proceeds with the investigation of the stabilisation properties of 
fiscal policy, i.e. its cyclical character, as well as the determinants of fiscal policy. 
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Chapter 2 surveys the relevant theoretical and empirical literature, which is related to 
the second research objective. It starts by reviewing the traditional theories, as well 
as more recent theoretical explanations offered in response to findings in several 
empirical studies. Considerable attention is then paid to the specific environment for 
the design and implementation of fiscal policy in European countries, including the 
Maastricht Treaty, the Stability and Growth Pact and the specifics of the transition 
process. Further, it discusses key measurement and conceptual issues that affect our 
empirical work, such as the indicators for cyclical movements and the decomposition 
of fiscal policy into automatic stabilizers, endogenous and exogenous discretionary 
policy. The chapter then moves to the review and critical assessment of the empirical 
studies of cyclicality. They are roughly divided into two groups: earlier studies, which 
mostly use a two-stage approach, and more recent studies, which tend to use a single 
stage approach and provide various extensions. Particular attention is paid to the 
manner in which the more recent literature addresses the drawbacks of the earlier 
studies related to specification and estimation method.  
Chapter 3 provides a comprehensive empirical analysis of the cyclical 
character and determinants of fiscal policy in European countries, which is the third 
research objective of the thesis. The absence of an overall theory on the cyclical 
character and determinants of fiscal policy and the relatively small sample greatly 
affect our estimation strategy. Consequently, we start from a relatively simple model, 
and then extend it with numerous variables (one at a time). This makes it possible to 
both investigate the robustness of the result on cyclicality from the baseline 
specification to the introduction of additional variables as well as to analyse their 
direct effect on budget balances. After a discussion of possible estimation methods 
and their advantages and disadvantages, we decided to use system GMM as the most 
appropriate method for our sample and our aim of study. Results from the initial 
model specification show that discretionary fiscal policy is pro-cyclical in the entire 
sample between 1995 and 2010 (i.e. it has aggravated economic fluctuations), whereas 
overall policy has been a-cyclical, reflecting the effect of automatic stabilizers. In 
addition, it appears that policy-makers pay little attention to public debt movements, 
since the effect of public debt on budget balances is relatively small, which relates 
well to the recent European debt crisis. Further, we find considerable differences in 
the cyclical character of fiscal policy among country groups. Indeed, pro-cyclicality in 
the entire sample is driven by transition countries, since discretionary policy is a-
cyclical in old EU member states, but pro-cyclical in new EU member states and even 
more so in South-eastern European countries. Results from this initial specification 
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(both for the entire sample and the country groups) are robust to the inclusion of two 
additional variables which complete our baseline specification: the dummy for the 
run-up to the introduction of the euro and the dummy for parliamentary elections. 
Related to this, we find that fiscal policy was tighter as countries were preparing to 
adopt the common currency. On the other hand, elections worsen budget balances, 
thus indicating that policymakers tend to relax fiscal policy in order to affect election 
outcomes, which amounts to political business cycle effects.  
The baseline specification is then extended with numerous variables and 
modified to investigate additional issues related to fiscal policy. We find relatively 
weak evidence for the presence of voracity effects, i.e. the argument in some studies 
that pro-cyclicality rises with the higher dispersion of power or the number of power 
groups. We also find that strong government majorities result in more disciplined 
fiscal policy, presumably because they are in a better position to push through fiscal 
adjustment programmes. Further, plurality electoral systems worsen fiscal discipline 
in old EU member states and South-eastern European countries. In addition, we find 
that the level of democratisation and of control of corruption both result in more 
disciplined fiscal policies. However, our results do not support the finding of more 
pro-cyclical policies in "corrupt democracies" in some studies. Further, both the 
strength of the leftist orientation of the government and changes of government 
ideology towards the left result in higher budget deficits in old EU member states. 
There is no evidence of such effects in new EU member states, presumably because 
ideological definitions are less clear-cut in these countries, but also because fiscal 
policy was affected comparatively more by some constraints related to the transition 
process. In particular, we find that de facto IMF arrangements had a strong 
disciplining effect on fiscal policy in both groups of transition countries. Further, 
fiscal policy in our sample is also affected by certain aspects of fiscal governance. In 
particular, the implementation of fiscal rules has a disciplining effect on budget 
balances in both old and new EU member states.  
The additional extensions provide further evidence on differences among the 
country groups. When analysing sources of cyclicality, we find that the a-cyclical 
discretionary policy in old EU member states is a result of the compensating influence 
of pro-cyclical revenues and counter-cyclical expenditures119. On the other hand, we 
find that pro-cyclicality in new EU member states comes from pro-cyclical revenues, 
while there is some evidence that in South-eastern European countries it is driven by 
                                                
119 Revenues are pro-cyclical because they fall in expansions and rise in recessions, thus exacerbating the 
effects of the business cycle. Expenditures also fall in expansions and rise in recessions, which makes 
them counter-cyclical.  
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pro-cyclical expenditures. Further, splitting the sample at various years also yields 
some interesting insights. When splitting the sample in 2004 for the first wave of EU 
enlargement, we find that fiscal policy has shifted from a-cyclicality to pro-cyclicality 
in new member states after entering the EU. Finally, omitting the last two crisis years 
confirms the results of the baseline specification for transition countries, i.e. pro-
cyclical discretionary policies but a-cyclical overall policies due to automatic 
stabilizers. We also find that, in more 'normal' times, discretionary policy in old EU 
member states is again a-cyclical (as in the entire period), but automatic stabilizers 
are effective and they shift overall fiscal policy towards a counter-cyclical stance. 
Indirectly, this result indicates that the ineffectiveness of automatic stabilizers in the 
old EU member states for the entire period in fact arises from the specific 
environment in the recent crisis years.   
Finally, the chapter also provides an additional robustness check by jack-
knifing the baseline specification i.e. removing one country from the sample at a time 
and re-estimating in order to analyse whether results are driven by any single 
country. The detailed results show that pro-cyclicality in the entire sample in the 
baseline specification is robust to the omission of any single country. On the other 
hand, when analysing country groups, it appears that the a-cyclicality of discretionary 
policy in old EU-member states is robust to dropping any other country except 
Greece, whose omission yields counter-cyclical discretionary policy in this group. 
Finally, pro-cyclical discretionary policy in the two groups of transition countries is 
robust to dropping any single country from the respective groups.  
The extensive analysis of the stabilisation properties of fiscal policy naturally 
leads to the question as to whether policy-makers are in fact able to affect output 
movements. Indeed, if effects of fiscal policy on output are limited (fiscal multipliers 
are low), this greatly reduces the scope and the need for stabilising policies. 
Therefore, in the second half of the thesis we analyse the opposite question: what are 
the effects of fiscal policy on output and other macroeconomic variables. In this part, 
we only include old and new EU member states between 1995 and 2012, but omit 
South-eastern European countries due to lack of sufficiently disaggregated fiscal data.  
We start our investigation of the short- to medium-term effects of fiscal policy 
by surveying the relevant theoretical and empirical literature in Chapter 4, which 
relates to the second research objective of the thesis. Due to the sheer size of this 
literature, we only focus on the key contributions by first describing important 
theoretical and empirical studies and then critically assessing advantages and 
drawbacks of particular empirical approaches. In this part, we note that both neo-
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classical and New Keynesian theoretical models predict negative effects of fiscal 
expansion on private consumption due to dominant wealth effects, while they differ 
on the expected size of the response of output. We also survey the extensions to 
baseline models aimed at matching the common finding in the empirical literature of 
positive responses of private consumption to expansionary fiscal policy shocks. 
Related to this, we find that the theoretical literature predicts fiscal multipliers higher 
than one only if models incorporate considerable Keynesian features or in cases of a 
zero lower bound of monetary policy. We also survey the extensive empirical 
literature, which typically studies effects of fiscal policy using some type of Vector 
Auto Regressions (VARs). Particular attention is paid to the manner in which various 
types of VARs impose restrictions in order to identify exogenous fiscal policy shocks, 
which is the most important issue in the empirical literature. We also discuss how 
VARs deal with the anticipation problem, which is also important in the context of 
fiscal policy. Our survey shows that studies using the recursive and the Blanchard-
Perotti SVAR tend to find results in line with New Keynesian predictions, i.e. that the 
government spending multiplier is positive and its size is usually around one, as well 
as positive responses of private consumption to spending shocks. On the other hand, 
studies using the event-study approach are mostly in line with neoclassical 
predictions, since the fiscal multiplier is around one, but spending shocks have a 
negative effect on consumption. In addition, studies using sign restrictions or the 
narrative approach tend to find relatively high tax multipliers, resembling traditional 
Keynesian predictions. However, this summary is only tentative, since it is difficult to 
precisely identify the source of the wide range of results in the empirical literature. 
Indeed, the variation of results could reflect not only the different identification 
restrictions (types of VARs), but also a  wide variety of other factors, such as different 
countries and time periods analysed, possible consequences of anticipation effects, 
different specifications or structural country differences. Related to the last point, 
some of the studies indicate that the effectiveness of fiscal multipliers also 
considerably depends on country features such as the level of public debt, the level of 
trade openness or the monetary policy stance. Overall, our survey is in line with most 
of the other findings in the literature that there is no such thing as "the fiscal 
multiplier", but that fiscal multipliers are country-, time- and circumstance-specific 
(Spilimbergo et al., 2009).   
The critical assessment of the relevant literature, particularly regarding 
features, advantages and disadvantages of various empirical methods, informs our 
analysis in Chapter 5. Here we provide an empirical investigation of the short- to 
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medium-term effects of fiscal policy on output and other macroeconomic variables in 
European Union countries between 1995 and 2012, which is related to the fourth 
research objective of the thesis. In order to do so, we use fixed effects panel VAR with 
annual data and recursive identification of government spending shocks. We focus on 
government spending shocks because their identification based on recursive VAR is 
relatively straightforward, which is in line with the dominant approach in the 
literature. Further, the choice of panel VAR as our empirical method reflects the 
empirical survey in the previous chapter, the aim of our study and the available 
frequency and length of data. In addition, panel VAR has the advantages of panel 
methods, since it allows for unobserved heterogeneity, as well as of VAR, since it 
treats all variables as endogenous.  
Our baseline results indicate that expansionary government spending shocks 
have a positive effect on output, with the fiscal multiplier around one in the year of 
the shock and the following year, and lower thereinafter. This implies that the 
effectiveness of fiscal policy is relatively limited, since there are no stronger 
multiplicative effects beyond the approximately one-for-one response of GDP. 
Further, effects of spending shocks on spending itself are positive and relatively 
persistent, whereas revenues initially rise but fall thereinafter, presumably as 
governments try to reinforce the effects of spending rises by also lowering taxes. 
These results are quite robust to alternative specifications of deterministic trends, 
different lag-lengths of the panel VAR and the different ordering of spending and 
revenues. We also investigate whether country structural characteristics influence 
the effectiveness of fiscal policy by splitting the sample in various ways, which also 
enables us to deal with country heterogeneity in a more careful manner. One of the 
most important findings in this part is that fiscal multipliers are positive in both old 
and new EU member states. However, they are considerably higher in the latter 
group (i.e. transition countries) both at impact and into the future. In addition, 
governments in transition countries increase taxes in the wake of expansionary 
spending shocks, while fiscal policy in old EU member states is less disciplined, since 
positive spending shocks are accommodated by lower taxes. Further, when splitting 
the sample according to debt levels, we find that fiscal policy is more effective in low 
debt than in high debt countries, in line with expectations. In addition, low debt 
countries tend to pursue more disciplined policies as spending shocks are 
accompanied by higher taxes, unlike high debt countries where revenues fall. Results 
regarding trade openness are also in line with expectations, since fiscal multipliers 
are higher in less open economies, while in more open economies there are 
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considerably more 'leakages' via the import channel. Finally, cutting the sample in 
2008 in order to abstract from the crisis period also yields some important results 
regarding the effects of fiscal policy in more 'normal' years. Here we find that the 
fiscal multiplier in the pre-crisis period is about half the size of the multiplier in the 
entire sample. This suggests that fiscal policy is less effective in normal 
circumstances, while the results for the entire period are driven by the recent crisis 
years, which is in line with expectations for higher effectiveness of fiscal policy in 
circumstances of zero lower bound of nominal interest rates. We also find that in the 
pre-crisis period monetary policy becomes more restrictive in the wake of spending 
shocks. This indicates that the results for the entire period of interest rates initially 
falling and then becoming insignificant are actually driven by the accommodating 
monetary policy during the crisis. 
We also carry out various extensions of the baseline specification in order to 
shed some light on the transmission mechanism of fiscal policy and to provide 
robustness checks on baseline results. In this part we find that government spending 
shocks cause higher private investment and private consumption, with the latter 
being supported by higher real wages and higher employment. This is in line with 
most other empirical studies, as well as with extended Real Business Cycle and new-
Keynesian models. In addition, fiscal policy is more effective when implemented via 
higher government investment than via higher government consumption. Further, 
the introduction of the share of debt in GDP also yields some important insights. The 
extension of the baseline model with public debt confirms baseline results, but it also 
yields some worrying implications for fiscal sustainability, since spending shocks are 
followed by rising debt levels in old EU member states, which could be related well to 
the recent European debt crisis. On the other hand, spending shocks do not have such 
an effect on debt in new EU member states, probably since higher spending in these 
countries is also accompanied by higher taxes. Further, the introduction of open 
economy elements also confirms baseline results, and suggests that trade deficits 
worsen in the wake of spending shocks, which is explained by rising imports. Finally, 
we also provide an additional robustness check by jack-knifing the baseline 
specification. In this part we find that baseline results are robust to the exclusion of 
any single country, and this holds both when analysing the entire sample and when 
analysing old and new EU member states separately.    
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6.3 Policy implications 
 
This section provides several recommendations for policy-makers arising from 
our study, thus meeting the final research objective of the thesis. It is expected that 
these recommendations would be useful for South-eastern European countries in 
general and Macedonia in particular, since they are yet to undergo the transition and 
reform processes completed by more advanced transition countries that are now EU 
members.  
Our analysis of the cyclical character and determinants of fiscal policy 
indicates that there are considerable differences among old EU member states and 
the two groups of transition countries. In particular, discretionary policy is a-cyclical 
in old EU member states, but it is pro-cyclical in new EU member states and even 
more so in South-eastern Europe, which means that in these countries discretionary 
measures by policy-makers are in fact exacerbating economic fluctuations. Therefore, 
considerable efforts are needed in order to eliminate the amplifying effect of 
discretionary measures on economic fluctuations, and to move discretionary policy in 
a counter-cyclical direction. This could be achieved by better and timelier estimates of 
cyclical output movements, as well as better macroeconomic forecasts. In turn, this 
could then help a better design and implementation of discretionary measures in 
order to react to forecasts of economic fluctuations, bearing on mind implementation 
lags of fiscal policy. The removal of the pro-cyclical character of discretionary policy 
would also contribute in overall policy becoming counter-cyclical, bearing on mind 
that automatic stabilizers are found to be effective in transition countries. Further, 
policymakers in all three country groups need to pay much more attention to debt 
sustainability. The results of our analysis indicate that insufficient attention was paid 
to this issue in the past, which relates well to the ongoing European debt crisis. At the 
same time, our results also point that, despite the generally low debt levels compared 
to their Western European peers, there should be no complacency in transition 
countries regarding this issue.  
The analysis of various political, institutional and other determinants of fiscal 
policy also yields some important recommendations. Most notably, fiscal policy is less 
disciplined in election years, indicating that policy-makers employ fiscal policy in 
order to improve their re-election chances. Therefore, considerable efforts are needed 
to remove this feature, which is found mostly in old EU member states, although 
transition countries are not expected to be immune to it as well. One way to do so 
would be the use of fiscal rules, which are already employed in several countries. 
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Although we do not investigate this issue in detail, our analysis does suggest that the 
strength of fiscal rules has a disciplining effect on budget balances. In addition, efforts 
to increase levels of democratisation and to control corruption are also expected to 
lead to better fiscal outcomes. This is particularly important for South-eastern 
European countries, which still lag behind EU member states regarding these 
indicators. Finally, upon eventual membership in the EU, which is their long-term 
goal, South-eastern European countries should try to avoid the experience of new EU 
member states, which appeared to have shifted towards pro-cyclical discretionary 
policy once they had achieved this goal.  
The comprehensive analysis of the effects of fiscal policy on output and other 
macroeconomic variables advises us against drawing generalised recommendations 
for all countries and all times, in line with other recommendations in the literature. 
While we find that in the entire sample higher spending does result in higher GDP, 
the size of the fiscal multiplier does not exceed one, implying that the effects of fiscal 
policy are relatively limited. In addition, the effectiveness of fiscal policy in the entire 
sample appears to be reflecting the crisis period, when it was in fact the only policy 
tool available due to the zero lower bound of nominal interest rates in most countries. 
This implies that, once the economic recovery becomes sustained, it is likely that 
fiscal multipliers will fall back to their common levels in more 'normal' 
circumstances, i.e. positive but below one. Consequently, in such a case, preference 
should be given to monetary policy in attempts to affect short-term output 
movements, as well as to structural reforms when trying to affect long-term output.  
Our analysis also indicates that policy-makers should pay particular attention 
to structural characteristics of their countries when trying to affect output via 
government spending. For instance, expansionary spending in transition countries is 
more effective in stimulating output than in old EU-member states. In addition, 
higher spending in transition countries is also accompanied by higher taxes, which 
consequently leads to a relatively stable path of public debt. Our results imply that 
this practice of expansionary spending and higher taxes should also be used in old 
EU-member states in order to prevent the worrying trend of rising debt levels in the 
wake of higher spending, without at the same time jeopardising the positive effects of 
higher spending on output. In addition, such a practice should also be applicable to 
South-eastern European countries, since it would ensure that they could stimulate 
output without worsening debt levels. Further, policy-makers in countries with high 
public debt and high trade openness should refrain from using government spending 
to stimulate output, since such a policy is largely ineffective. Related to the open 
249 
 
economy context, which applies to virtually all countries in our sample, it should be 
expected that higher government spending would lead to higher trade deficits as well, 
due to the importance of the import channel. All of these findings are particularly 
important for South-eastern European countries, since they generally have high trade 
openness and relatively deep trade deficits, while some of them are also on a clear 
upward public debt trajectory. Nevertheless, in cases when higher government 
spending is employed, it is better to use government investment than consumption, 
since the former is more effective in stimulating output. 
 
 
6.4 Contributions to knowledge 
 
Bearing on mind the aim of our thesis, its contributions to knowledge are 
mostly empirical in nature. In addition, some of the contributions are also related to 
the application of particular investigation methods. Last but not least, while it does 
not directly extend the theoretical literature, the thesis systematises key contributions 
from the extensive body of literature, which could be useful in the design of future 
theoretical models and empirical studies.  
The main contribution to knowledge from the thesis is that it provides a 
comprehensive empirical analysis of the cyclical character, determinants and effects 
of fiscal policy in European countries. This is an important academic and policy issue, 
particularly in the current economic circumstances. While there are certainly 
numerous studies analysing fiscal policy in Europe, they are mostly focused on a 
single country or on a group of old EU member states. On the other hand, our study 
focuses explicitly on old, new and prospective EU member states. Therefore, to the 
best of our knowledge, it is the first study to provide a systematic empirical analysis 
of fiscal policy in the two groups of transition countries covering a relatively long 
time period. Related to this, the study also draws the attention to numerous 
differences in the determinants and effects of fiscal policy between old EU member 
states and transition countries. Consequently, our study is able to provide well-
founded recommendations for policy-makers.  
The second main contribution to knowledge is that we enrich our analysis of 
the two key issues (i.e. the cyclical character and the effects of fiscal policy) with 
numerous additional factors, which both check the robustness of key results and shed 
some more light on fiscal policy in European countries. For instance, when analysing 
the cyclical character of fiscal policy, we introduce numerous additional political, 
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institutional and other factors in the analysis. Treating this group of factors in a 
comprehensive manner addresses an important gap in the existing literature, which 
mostly ignores these issues or treats only some of the factors. Related to this, the 
introduction of these factors enables us to check the robustness of our finding on the 
cyclical character of fiscal policy, but also to investigate the direct effect of these 
factors on fiscal outcomes. Further, when analysing the effects of fiscal policy on 
output and other macroeconomic variables, we extend our analysis with various 
country structural characteristics, thus relating to the recommendation in the 
literature that there is no single fiscal multiplier. In addition, the thesis provides an 
extensive investigation of the transmission mechanism of fiscal policy. Finally, in 
both parts of the investigation we provide numerous robustness checks on our 
baseline results. This is done first by various modifications of our baseline 
specifications, and then also by jack-knifing in order to check the possibility that 
baseline results might be driven by a single country in the sample.  
  As far as the application of method is concerned, the study carries out 
extensive searches for the most appropriate model specification and empirical 
approach to analyse the issues at hand. By doing so, it avoids some of the drawbacks 
which are related to variable definitions, model specifications and estimation 
methods in the existing studies. For instance, in our analysis of the cyclical character 
and determinants of fiscal policy, we decide to use system GMM. This method is 
expected to offer an appropriate treatment of endogeneity and dynamics, which are 
key aspects of the analysis, but are often not treated properly in parts of the literature 
that use other methods. In addition, when analysing effects of fiscal policy, we use 
fixed effects panel VAR, which addresses two key issues in the analysis of the effects 
of fiscal policy, i.e. it allows for unobserved country heterogeneity and treats all 
variables in the VAR as endogenous. In addition, crucially for our aim, it enables us to 
study the effects of fiscal policy in a comprehensive manner in a group of countries, 
unlike the vast majority of fiscal policy studies that use single-country VARs. By 
applying panel VAR, we use a method that is a relative novelty in terms of empirical 
application to investigate important policy and research issues. More precisely, PVAR 
as a method is still not widely available in standard software packages but relies on 
user-written codes that are often generously made available to fellow researchers and 
are thus open to scrutiny and critique, which helps their continuous improvement. As 
our survey of the relevant literature shows, there are only a relatively few, mostly 
recent studies that use panel VAR to investigate the effects of fiscal policy. By applying 
this method to investigate fiscal policy in all EU member states, our main contribution 
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consists in extending this body of knowledge to a wider sample of countries for a 
similar period of time (starting in the mid-1990s and ending after the recent global 
economic crisis). Both aspects of our sample give rise to contributions: in contrast to 
all other PVAR studies of fiscal policy, we extend this method to transition countries; 
and, by including the period up to 2012, we are able to take account of the recent 
crisis in our analysis, which enables indirect inference on the size of the fiscal 
multiplier in 'normal' times compared to the post-crisis period. In addition, unlike 
several other PVAR studies of fiscal policy, we apply this method in an extensive 
manner to deal with country heterogeneity, i.e. to study the possible dependence of 
the effects of fiscal policy on various country structural characteristics. A similarly 
extensive application of the method is also used during the detailed investigation of 
the transmission mechanism of fiscal policy. It should also be noted that our model 
specifications and variable definitions to a considerable extent rely on the arguments 
put forward in the extensive fiscal VAR literature, which is not always the case in the 
relatively few existing PVAR studies of fiscal policy.     
 
 
6.5 Limitations of the research 
 
The limitations of our research are primarily related to the length, the 
frequency and the quality of data available, which may all magnify the weaknesses of 
the estimation methods employed in our thesis. For instance, we use system GMM 
when analysing the cyclical character and determinants of fiscal policy. Although 
system GMM does have numerous advantages over other methods, GMM methods 
were originally designed and are mostly used for typical microeconomic panels with 
a large cross-section and short-time dimension, while their small sample properties 
may be problematic. Indeed, the problems of "too many instruments" are particularly 
serious in small samples and/or those with a large time dimension, since it is exactly 
in such cases that the rapid growth of the instrument count is to be expected. 
Consequently, GMM estimators can be severely biased and inefficient in 
macroeconomic panels, which are typically small. This poses a problem for our 
sample when analysing the cyclical character and determinants of fiscal policy, which 
consists of a maximum of 33 countries and 16 years, and hence does not fit the typical 
samples on which system GMM was originally implemented. In addition, the 
relatively small sample size also affects our estimation strategy, which starts from a 
relatively simple specification and then introduces numerous additional variables 
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one at a time. While the opposite, general-to-specific approach is more common in the 
empirical literature, we are unable to implement it since we would face a 
considerable problem with degrees of freedom.  
Our analysis of the effects of fiscal policy using fixed effects panel VAR also has 
some limits which are partially related to data availability. Most importantly, the use 
of fixed effects in dynamic panels is known to lead to biased coefficients, which is 
expected to affect our coefficients as well since we use only 18 years of data. While 
some studies show that impulse responses, which are of key interest when using 
panel VARs, are comparatively less biased, it is still possible that the bias of fixed 
effects in dynamic panels is also present in our study. Another issue for concern 
regarding the use of panel VAR is the imposition of slope homogeneity, which is 
common for most panel methods. In order to address this issue, we provide 
numerous modifications of our analysis, such as using fixed effects to capture 
unobserved heterogeneity, splitting the sample according to various country features 
and using cyclically-adjusted revenues. However, it should be taken into account that 
not all heterogeneity is accounted for in these manners, particularly when analysing 
the entire sample. Consequently, to the extent that heterogeneity remains present in 
our sample, the heterogeneity bias could still lead to biased estimates. Further, since 
we were unable to introduce period dummies, another potential source of bias in our 
results is related to the possibility of cross-section dependence (to the extent that it is 
not addressed by our use of a common time trend, country-specific time trends, and 
cyclically-adjusted revenues). This is mostly related to the fact that only recently has it 
become possible to use PVAR in empirical applications by relying on user-written 
codes and the code we use does not have this function (but is otherwise fairly 
comprehensive, including its relative flexibility in practical application and 
capabilities for generating tables and graphs that facilitate inference and reporting).  
Further, there are some weaknesses regarding our method of identification of fiscal 
policy shocks by using recursive VAR with annual data, which are employed due to 
the absence of quarterly fiscal data compiled on an accrual basis. Most importantly, 
the explicit assumption in our case is that government spending does not react to 
revenue and output movements within the year. While this mostly holds, since 
spending is largely pre-determined within the annual budget, there might be cases 
when this assumption is too strong, which means that spending shocks are not 
completely exogenous. Last but not least, our use of recursive identification of 
government spending shocks is widely accepted in the literature. However, this 
method prevents us from analysing effects of revenue shocks, since restrictions for 
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such an analysis with recursive identification would require fairly strong 
assumptions regarding the contemporaneous effects among variables in the VAR.  
The last important limitation of our research is more general and is related to 
the period under analysis. In particular, the last several years in our sample capture 
the period of the Great Recession, which also includes considerable changes in the 
determinants and effects of fiscal policy in European countries. We try to account for 
the crisis period in a few specifications by omitting the latest years from our 
investigation in order to focus on more 'normal' years. However, in most 
specifications we use the entire sample available at the time of working on the thesis 
in order to avoid more severe problems arising from short time series. The implicit 
assumption in our analysis is therefore that there are no structural breaks, which 
enables the use of estimation methods that assume no breaks in the data. If however 
the recent crisis does represent a structural break, then the use of system GMM and 
panel VAR would not be entirely appropriate, and consequently the validity of our 
results could be weakened.  
 
 
6.6 Suggestions for further research 
 
Our suggestions for future research are based on the limitations of our study 
discussed above, but also on issues that we chose to omit because they were beyond 
the scope of our thesis.  
The main avenue for further research regarding the cyclical character of fiscal 
policy would be to use real-time instead of ex post data on fiscal policy and cyclical 
output movements. Real-time data are the ones that are available to policy-makers at 
the time of designing and implementing fiscal policy. Their use would enable 
researchers to distinguish whether the particular cyclical character of fiscal policy is 
due to the intentions of policy-makers, or to information that was unknown to policy-
makers ex ante. Such an analysis would require the construction of a database of 
projected fiscal policy and projected output movements, which might not always be 
easily available. However, it would also shed additional light on the reasons behind 
the particular cyclical character of fiscal policy. 
There are several ideas for further research regarding the effects of fiscal 
policy on output and other macroeconomic variables. For instance, the use of 
Bayesian estimation methods would make it possible to overcome, or at least to 
alleviate some of the weaknesses arising from the small sample problems. Related to 
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this, Bayesian methods would also facilitate alternative methods for identification of 
fiscal policy shocks such as sign restrictions. Further, there is scope for research on 
the effects of fiscal policy in European countries, particularly transition countries, 
using narrative identification of fiscal policy shocks, which is often claimed to be able 
to overcome identification problems by directly inferring policy-maker intentions (i.e. 
whether particular policy measures are endogenous or exogenous). However, such an 
analysis would require the construction of a detailed dataset on reasons behind fiscal 
policy changes in a wide group of countries, which is usually done by investigating 
various legislative records. Last but not least, effects of fiscal policy could also be 
investigated by building single- or multi-country New Keynesian models. One way to 
proceed with such an idea would be to start from a relatively simple structural model 
and then to extend it by incorporating various fiscal policy features.  
The final area where further research is needed and would indeed be welcome 
is related to the recent crisis and more generally to non-linearities in the 
determinants and effects of fiscal policy. Indeed, additional research is needed 
regarding possible changes in the cyclical character and in the effects of fiscal policy 
during and after the crisis. A possible approach that could incorporate both the pre-
crisis and the crisis periods would be to use estimation methods that allow for time-
varying parameters. However, in both cases, it should be taken into account that, in 
order to analyse these issues in a satisfactory manner, it is often required to use data 
series that are both longer and of higher frequency than the ones that are currently 
available.     
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Appendix 3.1 - Data sources and definitions for Chapter 3 
 
Variable 
code 
Variable name Variable description Source/calculation 
bal_pr2gdp overall, unadjusted 
primary balance, 
% of nominal GDP 
overall, cyclically 
unadjusted primary 
budget balance as a 
share of nominal GDP 
AMECO Database of the 
European Commission 
(November 2011) for EU27. 
For SEE6, author's 
calculation based on data 
from national statistical 
offices, central banks or 
finance ministries, and 
international sources such 
as the IMF World Economic 
Outlook Database and EBRD 
Transition Reports 
capb_ngdp_
pot 
cyclically-adjusted 
primary balance 
(production 
function potential 
GDP), % of nominal 
GDP 
cyclically-adjusted 
primary balance as a 
share of nominal GDP, 
adjusted using the 
production function 
potential GDP 
AMECO Database 
capb_ngdp_
tr 
cyclically-adjusted 
primary balance 
(HP trend GDP), % 
of nominal GDP 
cyclically-adjusted 
primary balance as a 
share of nominal GDP, 
adjusted using the 
Hodrick-Prescott trend 
GDP 
AMECO Database for EU27. 
For SEE6, author's 
calculation based on data 
from national statistical 
offices, central banks or 
finance ministries, and 
international sources such 
as the IMF World Economic 
Outlook Database and EBRD 
Transition Reports. The 
cyclical adjustment is done 
following the methodology 
described in Fedelino et al. 
(2009), and using the 
author's calculation of 
Hodrick-Prescott trend real 
GDP. In absence of relevant 
information, revenue and 
expenditure elasticities for 
SEE6 are approximated by 
using respective averages 
for NMS calculated from 
country elasticities in EC 
(2005). 
carev_ngdp
_tr 
cyclically-adjusted 
revenues, % of 
nominal GDP 
cyclically-adjusted 
revenues as a share of 
nominal GDP, adjusted 
using the Hodrick-
Prescott trend GDP 
caprexp_ng
dp_tr 
cyclically-adjusted 
primary 
expenditures, % of 
nominal GDP 
cyclically-adjusted 
primary expenditures as 
a share of nominal GDP, 
adjusted using the 
Hodrick-Prescott trend 
GDP 
gap_pot output gap, % of 
potential GDP 
output gap as a share of 
potential real GDP based 
on production function 
AMECO Database 
gap_tr output gap, % of 
HP trend GDP 
output gap as a share of 
Hodrick-Prescott trend 
real GDP 
AMECO Database for EU27. 
For SEE6, author's 
calculation based on data 
from national statistical 
offices, central banks or 
finance ministries, and 
international sources such 
as the IMF World Economic 
Outlook Database and EBRD 
Transition Reports 
debt2gdp public debt, % of 
nominal GDP 
public debt as a share of 
nominal GDP 
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infl inflation rate average annual CPI 
inflation, in % 
AMECO Database, except 
Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and Serbia 
from IMF WEO Database 
(September 2011) 
maastricht dummy for 
Maastricht criteria 
dummy=1 for the eleven 
founding euro area 
members between 1995 
and 1998, 0 otherwise 
European Central Bank 
sgp dummy for SGP dummy=1 if the country 
is a member of the euro 
area in that year, 0 
otherwise 
legelec_dpi
1 
dummy for 
parliamentary 
elections 
dummy=1 if there were 
parliamentary elections 
in that year, 0 otherwise 
World Bank Database of 
Political Institutions 2010, 
except Montenegro and 
Serbia from www.parties-
and-elections.eu 
checks_dpi number of checks 
in the system 
number of checks and 
balances in the political 
system (ranging from 1 
to 11) 
World Bank Database of 
Political Institutions 2010 
herfgov_dp
i 
fragmentation of 
government seats 
in parliament 
sum of squares of the 
share of parliament seats 
controlled by each 
government party in 
total government-
controlled seats in 
parliament (100=single-
party government) 
maj_dpi government 
majority in 
parliament 
government-controlled 
seats in parliament as a 
share of total seats 
housesys_d
pi1 
dummy for 
electoral system 
dummy=1 if most 
parliament seats are 
elected by the plurality 
system, 0 otherwise 
World Bank Database of 
Political Institutions 2010, 
except Montenegro and 
Serbia from the Inter-
Parliamentary Union 
(http://www.ipu.org/english/
home.htm) 
pres_dpi dummy for 
political system 
dummy=1 if the political 
system is presidential, 0 
otherwise 
World Bank Database of 
Political Institutions 2010 
dec_exp decentralisation of 
expenditures 
share of expenditures of 
local and regional and 
sub-national state 
governments in total 
expenditures (sum of 
local and regional, state 
and central government 
expenditures) 
Eurostat 
dec_rev decentralisation of 
revenues 
share of revenues of 
local and regional and 
sub-national state 
governments in total 
revenues (sum of local 
and regional, state and 
central government 
revenues) 
Eurostat 
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govparty ideological 
composition of 
cabinet 
cabinet posts by 
ideological orientation of 
parties as a share of total 
posts, weighted by the 
number of days the 
government was in office 
in a given year; ranging 
from hegemony of right-
wing and centre parties 
to hegemony of left 
parties (range is 1 to 5, 
according to thresholds 
of shares of 0%, 33,3%, 
66,6% and 100%) Comparative Political Data 
Set III gov_new dummy for change 
in ideological 
composition of 
cabinet 
dummy=1 if the 
ideological composition 
of government cabinet 
changed from the 
previous year, 0 
otherwise 
gov_gap ideological gap 
between new and 
old cabinet 
ideological gap between 
the new and the old 
cabinet, calculated as 
difference in the 
ideological composition 
of the cabinet govparty 
(positive=move to the 
left) 
democ_pol democratisation level of institutionalised 
democracy, ranging from 
0 to 10 for the highest 
level 
Polity IV database 
corr_wb control of 
corruption 
perception of corruption, 
ranging from -2.5 to 2.5 
for highest to lowest 
corruption, respectively 
World Bank Worldwide 
Governance Indicators 2010; 
between 1996 and 2002, data 
are reported for every 
second year, so values for 
1997, 1999 and 2001 
calculated by the author as 
averages of adjacent years 
prog_prgf_i
mf 
dummy for 
program or loan 
with IMF 
dummy=1 if the country 
had in place an IMF 
program or a loan during 
the year, 0 otherwise 
IMF Annual Reports (various 
issues) and IMF 
International Financial 
Statistics 
pur_loan2n
gdp 
actual purchases 
and loans from the 
IMF, share of 
nominal GDP 
purchases and loan 
disbursements from the 
IMF as a share of 
nominal GDP 
IMF Annual Reports (various 
issues) and IMF 
International Financial 
Statistics; nominal GDP from 
AMECO for EU27, and for 
SEE6 from  national 
statistical offices, the IMF 
WEO Database and EBRD 
Transition Reports 
pur_loan2n
gdp_dv 
dummy for actual 
purchase/loan 
taken from IMF 
dummy=1 if the country 
actually made a purchase 
or loan disbursement 
from the IMF during the 
year, 0 otherwise 
IMF Annual Reports (various 
issues) and IMF 
International Financial 
Statistics 
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regime_imf exchange rate 
regime 
exchange rate regime 
according to the IMF 
classification, ranging 
from 1 to 8 for free 
floating 
IMF Annual Reports from 
1998; for the period before 
1998, data from von Hagen 
and Zhou (2005) and central 
banks 
rules fiscal rules index standardised index of the 
strength and coverage of 
national and sub-
national fiscal rules, 
ranging from -1 to 2.3 for 
strongest rules 
European Commission, 
Directorate General for 
Economic and Financial 
Affairs 
deleg delegation in fiscal 
governance 
index of delegation in 
fiscal governance, 
ranging between 0 and 1 
for countries with all 
rules and norms 
associated with 
delegation 
Hallerberg et al. (2009) for 
old EU member states and 
Hallerberg and Yläoutinen 
(2010) for new EU member 
states contr1 contracts in fiscal 
governance 
index of contracts in 
fiscal governance, 
ranging between 0 and 1 
 good dummy for 
expansions 
dummy=1 if output gap is positive, 0 otherwise 
 bad dummy for 
recessions 
dummy=1 if output gap is negative, 0 otherwise 
eu17 dummy for EU17 dummy=1 for EU members before 2004 and Cyprus and 
Malta, 0 otherwise 
nms10 dummy for NMS10 dummy=1 for countries from Central and Eastern 
Europe that gained EU membership in 2004 or 2007, 0 
otherwise 
see6 dummy for SEE6 dummy=1 for South-eastern European countries 
(Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, 
Montenegro and Serbia), 0 otherwise 
 
279 
 
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
22
D
E
U
L
U
X
F
R
A
M
L
T
S
W
E
B
E
L
A
U
T
IT
A
E
S
P
P
R
T
N
L
D
F
IN
G
B
R
D
N
K
C
Y
P
G
R
C
IR
L
P
O
L
H
U
N
S
V
K
S
V
N
C
Z
E
E
S
T
B
G
R
R
O
M
L
T
U
L
V
A
M
K
D
B
IH
M
N
E
H
R
V
S
R
B
A
L
B
Average, minimum and maximum output gap by 
countries 1995-2010, % of HP trend GDP
Average HP output gap
Minimum & Maximum
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
Average output gap by country groups 1995-2010, 
% of HP trend GDP
EU17
NMS10
SEE6
Appendix 3.2 - Additional graphs related to the output gap (Chapter 3) 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Source: European Commission AMECO Database for EU17, 
NMS10 and some SEE6 countries. National statistical offices, 
central banks or finance ministries, EBRD, and the IMF WEO 
Database for some SEE6 countries. For SEE6, gaps are based 
on author's calculations.  
 
Note: All group averages are unweighted. 
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Output gaps in old EU member states, new EU member states and South-eastern Europe, as % of Hodrick-Prescott trend 
output and of potential output based on production function (ends in the next page) 
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Appendix 3.3 - Stata printouts for tables in Chapter 3 
 
 
Table 3.1 Column 1 
 
xtabond2 capb_ngdp_tr L.capb_ngdp_tr gap_tr L.debt2gdp infl dy_1995-dy_2010 if 
year>1994 & year<2011 & (eu27==1|see6==1), gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, laglimits(1 2) 
collapse) gmm(gap_tr, laglimits (2 3) collapse) iv(L.debt2gdp infl dy_1995-
dy_2010) two robust small 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: country                         Number of obs      =       464 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        33 
Number of instruments = 25                      Obs per group: min =         5 
F(19, 32)     =    131.32                                      avg =     14.06 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        16 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
capb_ngdp_tr |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
capb_ngdp_tr | 
         L1. |      0.712      0.069    10.26    0.00        0.571       0.854 
             | 
      gap_tr |     -0.155      0.061    -2.55    0.02       -0.279      -0.031 
             | 
    debt2gdp | 
         L1. |      0.009      0.005     2.01    0.05       -0.000       0.018 
             | 
        infl |      0.016      0.008     2.03    0.05       -0.000       0.032 
     dy_1995 |     -0.290      0.442    -0.66    0.52       -1.191       0.610 
     dy_1996 |      0.665      0.481     1.38    0.18       -0.315       1.644 
     dy_1997 |      0.175      0.704     0.25    0.80       -1.259       1.610 
     dy_1998 |      0.376      0.661     0.57    0.57       -0.970       1.723 
     dy_1999 |      0.159      0.562     0.28    0.78       -0.986       1.305 
     dy_2000 |      0.808      0.567     1.42    0.16       -0.347       1.963 
     dy_2001 |     -0.399      0.692    -0.58    0.57       -1.809       1.010 
     dy_2002 |     -0.797      0.626    -1.27    0.21       -2.072       0.478 
     dy_2003 |     -0.171      0.584    -0.29    0.77       -1.361       1.019 
     dy_2004 |     -0.013      0.610    -0.02    0.98       -1.255       1.229 
     dy_2005 |      0.314      0.617     0.51    0.61       -0.941       1.570 
     dy_2006 |     -0.029      0.632    -0.05    0.96       -1.316       1.258 
     dy_2007 |      0.460      0.703     0.65    0.52       -0.971       1.891 
     dy_2008 |     -1.019      0.712    -1.43    0.16       -2.469       0.432 
     dy_2009 |     -1.905      0.583    -3.27    0.00       -3.093      -0.718 
     dy_2010 |     -0.464      0.443    -1.05    0.30       -1.367       0.438 
       _cons |     -0.424      0.659    -0.64    0.52       -1.766       0.917 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(L.debt2gdp infl dy_1995 dy_1996 dy_1997 dy_1998 dy_1999 dy_2000 dy_2001 
    dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
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    L(2/3).gap_tr collapsed 
    L(1/2).L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    L.debt2gdp infl dy_1995 dy_1996 dy_1997 dy_1998 dy_1999 dy_2000 dy_2001 
    dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010 
    _cons 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.gap_tr collapsed 
    D.L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.72  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.55  Pr > z =  0.579 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =  13.60  Prob > chi2 =  0.009 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =   1.36  Prob > chi2 =  0.851 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(2)    =   0.82  Prob > chi2 =  0.662 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   0.54  Prob > chi2 =  0.765 
  gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, collapse lag(1 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   0.30  Prob > chi2 =  0.584 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.06  Prob > chi2 =  0.787 
  gmm(gap_tr, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   1.09  Prob > chi2 =  0.297 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   0.27  Prob > chi2 =  0.965 
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Table 3.1 Column 2 
 
xtabond2 capb_ngdp_tr L.capb_ngdp_tr gap_tr L.debt2gdp infl dy_2002-dy_2010 if 
year>1994 & year<2011 & (eu27==1|see6==1), gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, laglimits(1 2) 
collapse) gmm(gap_tr, laglimits (2 3) collapse) iv(L.debt2gdp infl dy_2002-
dy_2010) two robust small 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: country                         Number of obs      =       464 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        33 
Number of instruments = 18                      Obs per group: min =         5 
F(13, 32)     =     83.77                                      avg =     14.06 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        16 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
capb_ngdp_tr |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
capb_ngdp_tr | 
         L1. |      0.707      0.073     9.70    0.00        0.558       0.855 
             | 
      gap_tr |     -0.158      0.064    -2.48    0.02       -0.288      -0.028 
             | 
    debt2gdp | 
         L1. |      0.009      0.004     2.15    0.04        0.001       0.018 
             | 
        infl |      0.017      0.006     2.85    0.01        0.005       0.029 
     dy_2002 |     -0.781      0.396    -1.97    0.06       -1.588       0.026 
     dy_2003 |     -0.239      0.293    -0.81    0.42       -0.835       0.358 
     dy_2004 |     -0.178      0.288    -0.62    0.54       -0.765       0.408 
     dy_2005 |      0.139      0.279     0.50    0.62       -0.429       0.707 
     dy_2006 |     -0.205      0.253    -0.81    0.42       -0.720       0.311 
     dy_2007 |      0.296      0.443     0.67    0.51       -0.608       1.199 
     dy_2008 |     -1.181      0.405    -2.92    0.01       -2.006      -0.357 
     dy_2009 |     -2.149      0.432    -4.97    0.00       -3.029      -1.268 
     dy_2010 |     -0.681      0.454    -1.50    0.14       -1.604       0.243 
       _cons |     -0.256      0.316    -0.81    0.42       -0.899       0.387 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(L.debt2gdp infl dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 
    dy_2009 dy_2010) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/3).gap_tr collapsed 
    L(1/2).L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    L.debt2gdp infl dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 
    dy_2009 dy_2010 
    _cons 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.gap_tr collapsed 
    D.L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.86  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.65  Pr > z =  0.515 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =  15.44  Prob > chi2 =  0.004 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =   1.78  Prob > chi2 =  0.776 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(2)    =   1.22  Prob > chi2 =  0.543 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   0.56  Prob > chi2 =  0.756 
  gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, collapse lag(1 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   0.69  Prob > chi2 =  0.406 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.09  Prob > chi2 =  0.779 
  gmm(gap_tr, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   1.44  Prob > chi2 =  0.230 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   0.34  Prob > chi2 =  0.952 
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Table 3.1 Column 3 
 
xtabond2 bal_pr2gdp L.bal_pr2gdp gap_tr L.debt2gdp infl dy_1995-dy_2010 if 
year>1994 & year<2011 & (eu27==1|see6==1), gmm(L.bal_pr2gdp, laglimits(1 2) 
collapse) gmm(gap_tr, laglimits (2 3) collapse) iv(L.debt2gdp infl dy_1995-
dy_2010 ) two robust small 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: country                         Number of obs      =       467 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        33 
Number of instruments = 25                      Obs per group: min =         5 
F(19, 32)     =     26.82                                      avg =     14.15 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        16 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
  bal_pr2gdp |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  bal_pr2gdp | 
         L1. |      0.765      0.083     9.24    0.00        0.597       0.934 
             | 
      gap_tr |      0.013      0.068     0.19    0.85       -0.125       0.150 
             | 
    debt2gdp | 
         L1. |      0.009      0.006     1.49    0.15       -0.003       0.021 
             | 
        infl |      0.007      0.011     0.61    0.55       -0.015       0.029 
     dy_1995 |     -1.428      0.756    -1.89    0.07       -2.967       0.111 
     dy_1996 |      0.784      0.602     1.30    0.20       -0.443       2.011 
     dy_1997 |      0.420      0.740     0.57    0.57       -1.087       1.926 
     dy_1998 |      0.100      0.685     0.15    0.88       -1.295       1.495 
     dy_1999 |      0.020      0.604     0.03    0.97       -1.210       1.251 
     dy_2000 |      1.046      0.595     1.76    0.09       -0.165       2.257 
     dy_2001 |     -0.706      0.789    -0.89    0.38       -2.314       0.902 
     dy_2002 |     -1.043      0.716    -1.46    0.16       -2.501       0.416 
     dy_2003 |     -0.661      0.645    -1.03    0.31       -1.976       0.653 
     dy_2004 |      0.036      0.639     0.06    0.96       -1.265       1.337 
     dy_2005 |      0.291      0.646     0.45    0.66       -1.026       1.608 
     dy_2006 |      0.260      0.680     0.38    0.70       -1.124       1.645 
     dy_2007 |      0.537      0.786     0.68    0.50       -1.064       2.138 
     dy_2008 |     -1.687      0.786    -2.15    0.04       -3.287      -0.087 
     dy_2009 |     -4.064      0.676    -6.01    0.00       -5.441      -2.688 
     dy_2010 |     -0.245      0.473    -0.52    0.61       -1.208       0.718 
       _cons |     -0.191      0.793    -0.24    0.81       -1.806       1.423 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(L.debt2gdp infl dy_1995 dy_1996 dy_1997 dy_1998 dy_1999 dy_2000 dy_2001 
    dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/3).gap_tr collapsed 
    L(1/2).L.bal_pr2gdp collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
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    L.debt2gdp infl dy_1995 dy_1996 dy_1997 dy_1998 dy_1999 dy_2000 dy_2001 
    dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010 
    _cons 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.gap_tr collapsed 
    D.L.bal_pr2gdp collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -4.02  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.77  Pr > z =  0.442 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =  23.59  Prob > chi2 =  0.000 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =   5.45  Prob > chi2 =  0.244 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(2)    =   1.06  Prob > chi2 =  0.588 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   4.39  Prob > chi2 =  0.111 
  gmm(L.bal_pr2gdp, collapse lag(1 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   0.26  Prob > chi2 =  0.608 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   5.19  Prob > chi2 =  0.159 
  gmm(gap_tr, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   1.49  Prob > chi2 =  0.222 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   3.96  Prob > chi2 =  0.266 
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Table 3.1 Column 4 
 
 
xtabond2 bal_pr2gdp L.bal_pr2gdp gap_tr L.debt2gdp infl dy_2002-dy_2010 if 
year>1994 & year<2011 & (eu27==1|see6==1), gmm(L.bal_pr2gdp, laglimits(1 2) 
collapse) gmm(gap_tr, laglimits (2 3) collapse) iv(L.debt2gdp infl dy_2002-
dy_2010 ) two robust small 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: country                         Number of obs      =       467 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        33 
Number of instruments = 18                      Obs per group: min =         5 
F(13, 32)     =     36.69                                      avg =     14.15 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        16 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
  bal_pr2gdp |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  bal_pr2gdp | 
         L1. |      0.729      0.072    10.12    0.00        0.582       0.876 
             | 
      gap_tr |     -0.006      0.058    -0.10    0.92       -0.124       0.113 
             | 
    debt2gdp | 
         L1. |      0.009      0.005     1.73    0.09       -0.002       0.019 
             | 
        infl |      0.008      0.006     1.33    0.19       -0.004       0.021 
     dy_2002 |     -0.836      0.383    -2.18    0.04       -1.617      -0.055 
     dy_2003 |     -0.480      0.312    -1.54    0.13       -1.116       0.157 
     dy_2004 |     -0.003      0.298    -0.01    0.99       -0.609       0.604 
     dy_2005 |      0.299      0.315     0.95    0.35       -0.343       0.940 
     dy_2006 |      0.247      0.271     0.91    0.37       -0.304       0.799 
     dy_2007 |      0.649      0.460     1.41    0.17       -0.289       1.586 
     dy_2008 |     -1.603      0.374    -4.28    0.00       -2.365      -0.841 
     dy_2009 |     -4.194      0.428    -9.81    0.00       -5.065      -3.323 
     dy_2010 |     -0.489      0.481    -1.02    0.32       -1.468       0.490 
       _cons |     -0.143      0.393    -0.36    0.72       -0.944       0.659 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(L.debt2gdp infl dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 
    dy_2009 dy_2010) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/3).gap_tr collapsed 
    L(1/2).L.bal_pr2gdp collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    L.debt2gdp infl dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 
    dy_2009 dy_2010 
    _cons 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.gap_tr collapsed 
    D.L.bal_pr2gdp collapsed 
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.96  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.68  Pr > z =  0.498 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =  23.08  Prob > chi2 =  0.000 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =   3.38  Prob > chi2 =  0.496 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(2)    =   1.18  Prob > chi2 =  0.555 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   2.20  Prob > chi2 =  0.332 
  gmm(L.bal_pr2gdp, collapse lag(1 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =  0.948 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   3.38  Prob > chi2 =  0.337 
  gmm(gap_tr, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   2.31  Prob > chi2 =  0.129 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.07  Prob > chi2 =  0.783 
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Table 3.1 Column 5 
 
xtabond2 capb_ngdp_pot L.capb_ngdp_pot gap_pot L.debt2gdp infl dy_2002-dy_2010 
if year>1994 & year<2011 & (eu27==1), gmm(L.capb_ngdp_pot, laglimits(1 2) 
collapse) gmm(gap_pot, laglimits (2 3) collapse) iv(L.debt2gdp infl dy_2002-
dy_2010 ) two robust small 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: country                         Number of obs      =       405 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        27 
Number of instruments = 18                      Obs per group: min =        10 
F(13, 26)     =     55.83                                      avg =     15.00 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        16 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
capb_ngdp_~t |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
capb_ngdp_~t | 
         L1. |      0.833      0.138     6.02    0.00        0.549       1.118 
             | 
     gap_pot |     -0.124      0.058    -2.15    0.04       -0.243      -0.006 
             | 
    debt2gdp | 
         L1. |      0.009      0.005     1.87    0.07       -0.001       0.019 
             | 
        infl |      0.019      0.003     5.52    0.00        0.012       0.026 
     dy_2002 |     -0.954      0.380    -2.51    0.02       -1.735      -0.172 
     dy_2003 |     -0.197      0.243    -0.81    0.43       -0.697       0.304 
     dy_2004 |     -0.002      0.437    -0.00    1.00       -0.900       0.896 
     dy_2005 |      0.134      0.360     0.37    0.71       -0.606       0.873 
     dy_2006 |      0.011      0.323     0.04    0.97       -0.652       0.675 
     dy_2007 |      0.673      0.526     1.28    0.21       -0.409       1.754 
     dy_2008 |     -0.800      0.358    -2.23    0.03       -1.537      -0.064 
     dy_2009 |     -2.361      0.631    -3.74    0.00       -3.657      -1.065 
     dy_2010 |     -0.648      0.471    -1.38    0.18       -1.616       0.320 
       _cons |     -0.377      0.242    -1.56    0.13       -0.874       0.121 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(L.debt2gdp infl dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 
    dy_2009 dy_2010) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/3).gap_pot collapsed 
    L(1/2).L.capb_ngdp_pot collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    L.debt2gdp infl dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 
    dy_2009 dy_2010 
    _cons 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.gap_pot collapsed 
    D.L.capb_ngdp_pot collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.63  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   1.49  Pr > z =  0.137 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =   9.06  Prob > chi2 =  0.060 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =   3.94  Prob > chi2 =  0.414 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(2)    =   2.98  Prob > chi2 =  0.225 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   0.96  Prob > chi2 =  0.619 
  gmm(L.capb_ngdp_pot, collapse lag(1 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   0.36  Prob > chi2 =  0.547 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   3.58  Prob > chi2 =  0.311 
  gmm(gap_pot, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   2.08  Prob > chi2 =  0.149 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.86  Prob > chi2 =  0.603  
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Table 3.1 Column 6 
 
 
xtabond2 capb_ngdp_tr L.capb_ngdp_tr gap_tr L.debt2gdp infl dy_2002-dy_2010 if 
year>1994 & year<2011 & (eu27==1), gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, laglimits(1 2) collapse) 
gmm(gap_tr, laglimits (2 3) collapse) iv(L.debt2gdp infl dy_2002-dy_2010 ) two 
robust small 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: country                         Number of obs      =       414 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        27 
Number of instruments = 18                      Obs per group: min =        10 
F(13, 26)     =    201.26                                      avg =     15.33 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        16 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
capb_ngdp_tr |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
capb_ngdp_tr | 
         L1. |      0.700      0.086     8.15    0.00        0.523       0.876 
             | 
      gap_tr |     -0.162      0.053    -3.08    0.00       -0.271      -0.054 
             | 
    debt2gdp | 
         L1. |      0.012      0.004     2.74    0.01        0.003       0.021 
             | 
        infl |      0.019      0.005     3.54    0.00        0.008       0.030 
     dy_2002 |     -1.076      0.387    -2.78    0.01       -1.872      -0.281 
     dy_2003 |     -0.487      0.238    -2.05    0.05       -0.975       0.002 
     dy_2004 |     -0.360      0.324    -1.11    0.28       -1.026       0.305 
     dy_2005 |     -0.107      0.291    -0.37    0.72       -0.706       0.491 
     dy_2006 |     -0.251      0.225    -1.12    0.27       -0.714       0.212 
     dy_2007 |      0.407      0.419     0.97    0.34       -0.453       1.267 
     dy_2008 |     -0.938      0.349    -2.69    0.01       -1.655      -0.221 
     dy_2009 |     -2.715      0.486    -5.59    0.00       -3.714      -1.717 
     dy_2010 |     -1.028      0.492    -2.09    0.05       -2.039      -0.017 
       _cons |     -0.330      0.336    -0.98    0.33       -1.020       0.360 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(L.debt2gdp infl dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 
    dy_2009 dy_2010) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/3).gap_tr collapsed 
    L(1/2).L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    L.debt2gdp infl dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 
    dy_2009 dy_2010 
    _cons 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.gap_tr collapsed 
    D.L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.54  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   1.02  Pr > z =  0.309 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =  21.14  Prob > chi2 =  0.000 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =   3.22  Prob > chi2 =  0.521 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(2)    =   2.50  Prob > chi2 =  0.286 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   0.72  Prob > chi2 =  0.697 
  gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, collapse lag(1 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   1.57  Prob > chi2 =  0.210 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.65  Prob > chi2 =  0.648 
  gmm(gap_tr, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   2.17  Prob > chi2 =  0.141 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.05  Prob > chi2 =  0.789 
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Table 3.2 Column 1 
 
xtabond2 capb_ngdp_tr L.capb_ngdp_tr gap_tr L.debt2gdp infl dy_2002-dy_2010 if 
year>1994 & year<2011 & (eu27==1|see6==1), gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, laglimits(1 2) 
collapse) gmm(gap_tr, laglimits (2 3) collapse) iv(L.debt2gdp infl dy_2002-
dy_2010) two robust small 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: country                         Number of obs      =       464 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        33 
Number of instruments = 18                      Obs per group: min =         5 
F(13, 32)     =     83.77                                      avg =     14.06 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        16 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
capb_ngdp_tr |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
capb_ngdp_tr | 
         L1. |      0.707      0.073     9.70    0.00        0.558       0.855 
             | 
      gap_tr |     -0.158      0.064    -2.48    0.02       -0.288      -0.028 
             | 
    debt2gdp | 
         L1. |      0.009      0.004     2.15    0.04        0.001       0.018 
             | 
        infl |      0.017      0.006     2.85    0.01        0.005       0.029 
     dy_2002 |     -0.781      0.396    -1.97    0.06       -1.588       0.026 
     dy_2003 |     -0.239      0.293    -0.81    0.42       -0.835       0.358 
     dy_2004 |     -0.178      0.288    -0.62    0.54       -0.765       0.408 
     dy_2005 |      0.139      0.279     0.50    0.62       -0.429       0.707 
     dy_2006 |     -0.205      0.253    -0.81    0.42       -0.720       0.311 
     dy_2007 |      0.296      0.443     0.67    0.51       -0.608       1.199 
     dy_2008 |     -1.181      0.405    -2.92    0.01       -2.006      -0.357 
     dy_2009 |     -2.149      0.432    -4.97    0.00       -3.029      -1.268 
     dy_2010 |     -0.681      0.454    -1.50    0.14       -1.604       0.243 
       _cons |     -0.256      0.316    -0.81    0.42       -0.899       0.387 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(L.debt2gdp infl dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 
    dy_2009 dy_2010) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/3).gap_tr collapsed 
    L(1/2).L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    L.debt2gdp infl dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 
    dy_2009 dy_2010 
    _cons 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.gap_tr collapsed 
    D.L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.86  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.65  Pr > z =  0.515 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =  15.44  Prob > chi2 =  0.004 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =   1.78  Prob > chi2 =  0.776 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(2)    =   1.22  Prob > chi2 =  0.543 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   0.56  Prob > chi2 =  0.756 
  gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, collapse lag(1 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   0.69  Prob > chi2 =  0.406 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.09  Prob > chi2 =  0.779 
  gmm(gap_tr, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   1.44  Prob > chi2 =  0.230 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   0.34  Prob > chi2 =  0.952 
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Table 3.2 Column 2 
 
 
xtabond2 capb_ngdp_tr L.capb_ngdp_tr_eu17 L.capb_ngdp_tr_nms10 
L.capb_ngdp_tr_see6 gap_tr eu17 nms10 see6 L.debt2gdp infl dy_2002-dy_2010 if 
year>1994 & year<2011 & (eu27==1|see6==1), gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr_eu17, laglimits(1 
2) collapse) gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr_nms10, laglimits(1 2) collapse) 
gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr_see6, laglimits(1 2) collapse) gmm(gap_tr, laglimits (2 3) 
collapse) iv(L.debt2gdp eu17 nms10 see6 infl dy_2002-dy_2010) two robust small 
nocons   
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: country                         Number of obs      =       464 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        33 
Number of instruments = 26                      Obs per group: min =         5 
F(18, 33)     =    353.67                                      avg =     14.06 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        16 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
capb_ngdp_tr |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
capb_ngdp~17 | 
         L1. |      0.900      0.079    11.45    0.00        0.740       1.060 
             | 
capb_ngdp~10 | 
         L1. |      0.463      0.098     4.72    0.00        0.263       0.662 
             | 
capb_ngdp~e6 | 
         L1. |      0.429      0.170     2.53    0.02        0.084       0.775 
             | 
      gap_tr |     -0.159      0.048    -3.35    0.00       -0.256      -0.063 
        eu17 |     -0.145      0.266    -0.55    0.59       -0.687       0.396 
       nms10 |     -0.810      0.302    -2.68    0.01       -1.425      -0.195 
        see6 |     -0.328      0.586    -0.56    0.58       -1.519       0.864 
             | 
    debt2gdp | 
         L1. |      0.006      0.004     1.35    0.19       -0.003       0.014 
             | 
        infl |      0.018      0.006     2.84    0.01        0.005       0.030 
     dy_2002 |     -0.697      0.370    -1.88    0.07       -1.449       0.056 
     dy_2003 |     -0.288      0.248    -1.16    0.25       -0.792       0.216 
     dy_2004 |      0.163      0.362     0.45    0.66       -0.574       0.899 
     dy_2005 |      0.434      0.309     1.40    0.17       -0.195       1.062 
     dy_2006 |      0.146      0.294     0.50    0.62       -0.453       0.744 
     dy_2007 |      0.345      0.424     0.81    0.42       -0.518       1.208 
     dy_2008 |     -1.273      0.412    -3.09    0.00       -2.111      -0.435 
     dy_2009 |     -2.378      0.354    -6.72    0.00       -3.098      -1.658 
     dy_2010 |     -0.842      0.319    -2.64    0.01       -1.491      -0.193 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(L.debt2gdp eu17 nms10 see6 infl dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 
    dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010) 
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  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/3).gap_tr collapsed 
    L(1/2).L.capb_ngdp_tr_see6 collapsed 
    L(1/2).L.capb_ngdp_tr_nms10 collapsed 
    L(1/2).L.capb_ngdp_tr_eu17 collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    L.debt2gdp eu17 nms10 see6 infl dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 
    dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.gap_tr collapsed 
    D.L.capb_ngdp_tr_see6 collapsed 
    D.L.capb_ngdp_tr_nms10 collapsed 
    D.L.capb_ngdp_tr_eu17 collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.90  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.58  Pr > z =  0.564 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(8)    =  12.68  Prob > chi2 =  0.123 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(8)    =   6.54  Prob > chi2 =  0.587 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(4)    =   1.07  Prob > chi2 =  0.898 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(4)    =   5.47  Prob > chi2 =  0.243 
  gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr_eu17, collapse lag(1 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(5)    =   5.33  Prob > chi2 =  0.377 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.21  Prob > chi2 =  0.749 
  gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr_nms10, collapse lag(1 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(5)    =   2.72  Prob > chi2 =  0.743 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   3.82  Prob > chi2 =  0.281 
  gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr_see6, collapse lag(1 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(5)    =   3.02  Prob > chi2 =  0.697 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   3.52  Prob > chi2 =  0.318 
  gmm(gap_tr, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(5)    =   4.03  Prob > chi2 =  0.546 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   2.52  Prob > chi2 =  0.472 
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Table 3.2 Column 3 
 
xtabond2 capb_ngdp_tr L.capb_ngdp_tr gap_tr_eu17 gap_tr_nms10 gap_tr_see6 eu17 
nms10 see6 L.debt2gdp infl dy_2002-dy_2010 if year>1994 & year<2011 & 
(eu27==1|see6==1), gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, laglimits(1 2) collapse) 
gmm(gap_tr_eu17, laglimits (2 3) collapse) gmm(gap_tr_nms10, laglimits (2 3) 
collapse)  gmm(gap_tr_see6, laglimits (2 3) collapse)  iv(L.debt2gdp eu17 nms10 
see6 infl dy_2002-dy_2010) two robust small nocons 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: country                         Number of obs      =       464 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        33 
Number of instruments = 26                      Obs per group: min =         5 
F(18, 33)     =    209.13                                      avg =     14.06 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        16 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
capb_ngdp_tr |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
capb_ngdp_tr | 
         L1. |      0.708      0.067    10.59    0.00        0.572       0.844 
             | 
 gap_tr_eu17 |     -0.039      0.103    -0.38    0.71       -0.248       0.170 
gap_tr_nms10 |     -0.182      0.042    -4.37    0.00       -0.267      -0.097 
 gap_tr_see6 |     -0.281      0.058    -4.87    0.00       -0.399      -0.164 
        eu17 |      0.324      0.449     0.72    0.48       -0.589       1.237 
       nms10 |     -0.241      0.269    -0.89    0.38       -0.788       0.307 
        see6 |      0.381      0.301     1.27    0.21       -0.231       0.993 
             | 
    debt2gdp | 
         L1. |      0.003      0.005     0.64    0.53       -0.007       0.014 
             | 
        infl |      0.020      0.004     5.31    0.00        0.012       0.028 
     dy_2002 |     -0.887      0.371    -2.39    0.02       -1.643      -0.132 
     dy_2003 |     -0.449      0.220    -2.04    0.05       -0.897      -0.001 
     dy_2004 |     -0.298      0.277    -1.07    0.29       -0.862       0.267 
     dy_2005 |      0.003      0.287     0.01    0.99       -0.581       0.587 
     dy_2006 |     -0.352      0.249    -1.41    0.17       -0.858       0.154 
     dy_2007 |      0.054      0.431     0.13    0.90       -0.823       0.931 
     dy_2008 |     -1.316      0.402    -3.27    0.00       -2.134      -0.498 
     dy_2009 |     -2.288      0.408    -5.60    0.00       -3.119      -1.458 
     dy_2010 |     -0.708      0.366    -1.93    0.06       -1.453       0.038 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(L.debt2gdp eu17 nms10 see6 infl dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 
    dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/3).gap_tr_see6 collapsed 
    L(2/3).gap_tr_nms10 collapsed 
    L(2/3).gap_tr_eu17 collapsed 
    L(1/2).L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
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  Standard 
    L.debt2gdp eu17 nms10 see6 infl dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 
    dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.gap_tr_see6 collapsed 
    DL.gap_tr_nms10 collapsed 
    DL.gap_tr_eu17 collapsed 
    D.L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.86  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.51  Pr > z =  0.613 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(8)    =  34.91  Prob > chi2 =  0.000 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(8)    =   3.61  Prob > chi2 =  0.891 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(4)    =   2.28  Prob > chi2 =  0.684 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(4)    =   1.33  Prob > chi2 =  0.857 
  gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, collapse lag(1 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(5)    =   2.87  Prob > chi2 =  0.720 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   0.74  Prob > chi2 =  0.865 
  gmm(gap_tr_eu17, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(5)    =   2.41  Prob > chi2 =  0.790 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.20  Prob > chi2 =  0.754 
  gmm(gap_tr_nms10, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(5)    =   3.23  Prob > chi2 =  0.664 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   0.38  Prob > chi2 =  0.945 
  gmm(gap_tr_see6, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(5)    =   2.60  Prob > chi2 =  0.762 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.01  Prob > chi2 =  0.799 
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Table 3.2 Column 4 
 
 
xtabond2 capb_ngdp_tr L.capb_ngdp_tr gap_tr L.debt2gdp_eu17 L.debt2gdp_nms10 
L.debt2gdp_see6 eu17 nms10 see6  infl dy_2002-dy_2010 if year>1994 & year<2011 
& (eu27==1|see6==1), gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, laglimits(1 2) collapse) gmm(gap_tr, 
laglimits (2 3) collapse) iv(L.debt2gdp_eu17 L.debt2gdp_nms10 L.debt2gdp_see6 
eu17 nms10 see6  infl dy_2002-dy_2010) two robust small nocons 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: country                         Number of obs      =       464 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        33 
Number of instruments = 22                      Obs per group: min =         5 
F(18, 33)     =     80.77                                      avg =     14.06 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        16 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
capb_ngdp_tr |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
capb_ngdp_tr | 
         L1. |      0.701      0.072     9.68    0.00        0.553       0.848 
             | 
      gap_tr |     -0.158      0.070    -2.26    0.03       -0.301      -0.016 
             | 
debt2gdp_~17 | 
         L1. |      0.004      0.006     0.80    0.43       -0.007       0.016 
             | 
debt2gdp_~10 | 
         L1. |      0.013      0.012     1.13    0.27       -0.011       0.037 
             | 
debt2gdp_s~6 | 
         L1. |     -0.033      0.016    -2.06    0.05       -0.065      -0.000 
             | 
        eu17 |      0.207      0.437     0.47    0.64       -0.682       1.095 
       nms10 |     -0.674      0.468    -1.44    0.16       -1.625       0.277 
        see6 |      1.537      0.615     2.50    0.02        0.287       2.787 
        infl |      0.021      0.005     3.88    0.00        0.010       0.032 
     dy_2002 |     -0.766      0.400    -1.91    0.06       -1.580       0.049 
     dy_2003 |     -0.208      0.284    -0.73    0.47       -0.786       0.369 
     dy_2004 |     -0.211      0.282    -0.75    0.46       -0.785       0.364 
     dy_2005 |      0.108      0.288     0.37    0.71       -0.477       0.693 
     dy_2006 |     -0.230      0.290    -0.79    0.43       -0.819       0.359 
     dy_2007 |      0.222      0.480     0.46    0.65       -0.755       1.198 
     dy_2008 |     -1.286      0.432    -2.97    0.01       -2.166      -0.406 
     dy_2009 |     -2.251      0.420    -5.36    0.00       -3.106      -1.397 
     dy_2010 |     -0.737      0.445    -1.66    0.11       -1.643       0.169 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(L.debt2gdp_eu17 L.debt2gdp_nms10 L.debt2gdp_see6 eu17 nms10 see6 infl 
    dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/3).gap_tr collapsed 
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    L(1/2).L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    L.debt2gdp_eu17 L.debt2gdp_nms10 L.debt2gdp_see6 eu17 nms10 see6 infl 
    dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.gap_tr collapsed 
    D.L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.88  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.67  Pr > z =  0.504 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =  15.61  Prob > chi2 =  0.004 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =   1.78  Prob > chi2 =  0.777 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(2)    =   1.26  Prob > chi2 =  0.533 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   0.52  Prob > chi2 =  0.772 
  gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, collapse lag(1 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   0.76  Prob > chi2 =  0.384 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.02  Prob > chi2 =  0.797 
  gmm(gap_tr, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   1.40  Prob > chi2 =  0.237 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   0.38  Prob > chi2 =  0.945 
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Table 3.2 Column 5 
 
xtabond2 bal_pr2gdp L.bal_pr2gdp gap_tr L.debt2gdp infl dy_2002-dy_2010 if 
year>1994 & year<2011 & (eu27==1|see6==1), gmm(L.bal_pr2gdp, laglimits(1 2) 
collapse) gmm(gap_tr, laglimits (2 3) collapse) iv(L.debt2gdp infl dy_2002-
dy_2010 ) two robust small 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: country                         Number of obs      =       467 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        33 
Number of instruments = 18                      Obs per group: min =         5 
F(13, 32)     =     36.69                                      avg =     14.15 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        16 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
  bal_pr2gdp |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  bal_pr2gdp | 
         L1. |      0.729      0.072    10.12    0.00        0.582       0.876 
             | 
      gap_tr |     -0.006      0.058    -0.10    0.92       -0.124       0.113 
             | 
    debt2gdp | 
         L1. |      0.009      0.005     1.73    0.09       -0.002       0.019 
             | 
        infl |      0.008      0.006     1.33    0.19       -0.004       0.021 
     dy_2002 |     -0.836      0.383    -2.18    0.04       -1.617      -0.055 
     dy_2003 |     -0.480      0.312    -1.54    0.13       -1.116       0.157 
     dy_2004 |     -0.003      0.298    -0.01    0.99       -0.609       0.604 
     dy_2005 |      0.299      0.315     0.95    0.35       -0.343       0.940 
     dy_2006 |      0.247      0.271     0.91    0.37       -0.304       0.799 
     dy_2007 |      0.649      0.460     1.41    0.17       -0.289       1.586 
     dy_2008 |     -1.603      0.374    -4.28    0.00       -2.365      -0.841 
     dy_2009 |     -4.194      0.428    -9.81    0.00       -5.065      -3.323 
     dy_2010 |     -0.489      0.481    -1.02    0.32       -1.468       0.490 
       _cons |     -0.143      0.393    -0.36    0.72       -0.944       0.659 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(L.debt2gdp infl dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 
    dy_2009 dy_2010) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/3).gap_tr collapsed 
    L(1/2).L.bal_pr2gdp collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    L.debt2gdp infl dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 
    dy_2009 dy_2010 
    _cons 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.gap_tr collapsed 
    D.L.bal_pr2gdp collapsed 
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.96  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.68  Pr > z =  0.498 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =  23.08  Prob > chi2 =  0.000 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =   3.38  Prob > chi2 =  0.496 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(2)    =   1.18  Prob > chi2 =  0.555 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   2.20  Prob > chi2 =  0.332 
  gmm(L.bal_pr2gdp, collapse lag(1 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =  0.948 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   3.38  Prob > chi2 =  0.337 
  gmm(gap_tr, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   2.31  Prob > chi2 =  0.129 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.07  Prob > chi2 =  0.783 
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Table 3.2 Column 6 
 
 
xtabond2 bal_pr2gdp L.bal_pr2gdp gap_tr_eu17 gap_tr_nms10 gap_tr_see6 eu17 
nms10 see6 L.debt2gdp infl dy_2002-dy_2010 if year>1994 & year<2011 & 
(eu27==1|see6==1), gmm(L.bal_pr2gdp, laglimits(1 2) collapse) gmm(gap_tr_eu17, 
laglimits (2 3) collapse) gmm(gap_tr_nms10, laglimits (2 3) collapse)  
gmm(gap_tr_see6, laglimits (2 3) collapse)  iv(L.debt2gdp eu17 nms10 see6 infl 
dy_2002-dy_2010) two robust small nocons 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: country                         Number of obs      =       467 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        33 
Number of instruments = 26                      Obs per group: min =         5 
F(18, 33)     =    123.01                                      avg =     14.15 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        16 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
  bal_pr2gdp |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  bal_pr2gdp | 
         L1. |      0.736      0.079     9.30    0.00        0.575       0.897 
             | 
 gap_tr_eu17 |      0.097      0.114     0.84    0.40       -0.136       0.329 
gap_tr_nms10 |     -0.029      0.041    -0.72    0.48       -0.112       0.054 
 gap_tr_see6 |     -0.015      0.056    -0.27    0.79       -0.130       0.100 
        eu17 |      0.580      0.524     1.11    0.28       -0.486       1.646 
       nms10 |      0.077      0.334     0.23    0.82       -0.603       0.757 
        see6 |      0.517      0.355     1.46    0.15       -0.204       1.239 
             | 
    debt2gdp | 
         L1. |      0.001      0.006     0.17    0.86       -0.011       0.013 
             | 
        infl |      0.009      0.003     2.96    0.01        0.003       0.016 
     dy_2002 |     -0.932      0.384    -2.43    0.02       -1.714      -0.150 
     dy_2003 |     -0.686      0.229    -3.00    0.01       -1.151      -0.220 
     dy_2004 |     -0.236      0.302    -0.78    0.44       -0.850       0.378 
     dy_2005 |      0.084      0.346     0.24    0.81       -0.620       0.788 
     dy_2006 |     -0.063      0.259    -0.24    0.81       -0.591       0.464 
     dy_2007 |      0.191      0.459     0.42    0.68       -0.744       1.125 
     dy_2008 |     -2.042      0.391    -5.22    0.00       -2.838      -1.246 
     dy_2009 |     -4.515      0.411    -10.98    0.00       -5.351      -3.679 
     dy_2010 |     -0.514      0.599    -0.86    0.40       -1.732       0.704 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(L.debt2gdp eu17 nms10 see6 infl dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 
    dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/3).gap_tr_see6 collapsed 
    L(2/3).gap_tr_nms10 collapsed 
    L(2/3).gap_tr_eu17 collapsed 
    L(1/2).L.bal_pr2gdp collapsed 
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Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    L.debt2gdp eu17 nms10 see6 infl dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 
    dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.gap_tr_see6 collapsed 
    DL.gap_tr_nms10 collapsed 
    DL.gap_tr_eu17 collapsed 
    D.L.bal_pr2gdp collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.82  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.56  Pr > z =  0.573 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(8)    =  39.03  Prob > chi2 =  0.000 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(8)    =   5.69  Prob > chi2 =  0.682 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(4)    =   4.27  Prob > chi2 =  0.371 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(4)    =   1.42  Prob > chi2 =  0.841 
  gmm(L.bal_pr2gdp, collapse lag(1 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(5)    =   4.45  Prob > chi2 =  0.487 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.24  Prob > chi2 =  0.744 
  gmm(gap_tr_eu17, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(5)    =   4.60  Prob > chi2 =  0.467 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.09  Prob > chi2 =  0.780 
  gmm(gap_tr_nms10, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(5)    =   4.17  Prob > chi2 =  0.525 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.52  Prob > chi2 =  0.679 
  gmm(gap_tr_see6, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(5)    =   4.61  Prob > chi2 =  0.465 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.07  Prob > chi2 =  0.783 
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Table 3.3 Column 1 
 
 
xtabond2 capb_ngdp_tr L.capb_ngdp_tr gap_tr L.debt2gdp infl dy_2002-dy_2010 if 
year>1994 & year<2011 & (eu27==1|see6==1), gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, laglimits(1 2) 
collapse) gmm(gap_tr, laglimits (2 3) collapse) iv(L.debt2gdp infl dy_2002-
dy_2010) two robust small 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: country                         Number of obs      =       464 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        33 
Number of instruments = 18                      Obs per group: min =         5 
F(13, 32)     =     83.77                                      avg =     14.06 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        16 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
capb_ngdp_tr |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
capb_ngdp_tr | 
         L1. |      0.707      0.073     9.70    0.00        0.558       0.855 
             | 
      gap_tr |     -0.158      0.064    -2.48    0.02       -0.288      -0.028 
             | 
    debt2gdp | 
         L1. |      0.009      0.004     2.15    0.04        0.001       0.018 
             | 
        infl |      0.017      0.006     2.85    0.01        0.005       0.029 
     dy_2002 |     -0.781      0.396    -1.97    0.06       -1.588       0.026 
     dy_2003 |     -0.239      0.293    -0.81    0.42       -0.835       0.358 
     dy_2004 |     -0.178      0.288    -0.62    0.54       -0.765       0.408 
     dy_2005 |      0.139      0.279     0.50    0.62       -0.429       0.707 
     dy_2006 |     -0.205      0.253    -0.81    0.42       -0.720       0.311 
     dy_2007 |      0.296      0.443     0.67    0.51       -0.608       1.199 
     dy_2008 |     -1.181      0.405    -2.92    0.01       -2.006      -0.357 
     dy_2009 |     -2.149      0.432    -4.97    0.00       -3.029      -1.268 
     dy_2010 |     -0.681      0.454    -1.50    0.14       -1.604       0.243 
       _cons |     -0.256      0.316    -0.81    0.42       -0.899       0.387 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(L.debt2gdp infl dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 
    dy_2009 dy_2010) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/3).gap_tr collapsed 
    L(1/2).L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    L.debt2gdp infl dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 
    dy_2009 dy_2010 
    _cons 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.gap_tr collapsed 
    D.L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.86  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.65  Pr > z =  0.515 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =  15.44  Prob > chi2 =  0.004 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =   1.78  Prob > chi2 =  0.776 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(2)    =   1.22  Prob > chi2 =  0.543 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   0.56  Prob > chi2 =  0.756 
  gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, collapse lag(1 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   0.69  Prob > chi2 =  0.406 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.09  Prob > chi2 =  0.779 
  gmm(gap_tr, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   1.44  Prob > chi2 =  0.230 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   0.34  Prob > chi2 =  0.952 
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Table 3.3 Column 2 
 
xtabond2 capb_ngdp_tr L.capb_ngdp_tr gap_tr L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 
dy_2002-dy_2010 if year>1994 & year<2011 & (eu27==1|see6==1), 
gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, laglimits(1 2) collapse) gmm(gap_tr, laglimits (2 3) 
collapse) iv(L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 dy_2002-dy_2010) two robust small 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: country                         Number of obs      =       464 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        33 
Number of instruments = 19                      Obs per group: min =         5 
F(14, 32)     =     78.99                                      avg =     14.06 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        16 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
capb_ngdp_tr |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
capb_ngdp_tr | 
         L1. |      0.708      0.074     9.51    0.00        0.556       0.859 
             | 
      gap_tr |     -0.162      0.064    -2.51    0.02       -0.293      -0.031 
             | 
    debt2gdp | 
         L1. |      0.009      0.004     2.24    0.03        0.001       0.018 
             | 
        infl |      0.016      0.006     2.77    0.01        0.004       0.027 
legelec_dpi1 |     -0.570      0.201    -2.83    0.01       -0.980      -0.160 
     dy_2002 |     -0.703      0.397    -1.77    0.09       -1.511       0.105 
     dy_2003 |     -0.263      0.289    -0.91    0.37       -0.853       0.326 
     dy_2004 |     -0.213      0.281    -0.76    0.45       -0.785       0.359 
     dy_2005 |      0.117      0.280     0.42    0.68       -0.454       0.688 
     dy_2006 |     -0.108      0.242    -0.45    0.66       -0.602       0.386 
     dy_2007 |      0.343      0.451     0.76    0.45       -0.576       1.261 
     dy_2008 |     -1.146      0.413    -2.77    0.01       -1.987      -0.304 
     dy_2009 |     -2.193      0.424    -5.17    0.00       -3.057      -1.329 
     dy_2010 |     -0.822      0.445    -1.85    0.07       -1.729       0.085 
       _cons |     -0.109      0.290    -0.38    0.71       -0.699       0.482 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 
    dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/3).gap_tr collapsed 
    L(1/2).L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 
    dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010 
    _cons 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.gap_tr collapsed 
    D.L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.80  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.91  Pr > z =  0.360 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =  16.88  Prob > chi2 =  0.002 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =   2.06  Prob > chi2 =  0.725 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(2)    =   1.71  Prob > chi2 =  0.426 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   0.35  Prob > chi2 =  0.838 
  gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, collapse lag(1 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   0.68  Prob > chi2 =  0.409 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.38  Prob > chi2 =  0.711 
  gmm(gap_tr, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   1.78  Prob > chi2 =  0.182 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   0.27  Prob > chi2 =  0.965 
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Table 3.3 Column 3 
 
 
xtabond2 capb_ngdp_tr L.capb_ngdp_tr gap_tr L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1_eu17 
legelec_dpi1_nms10 legelec_dpi1_see6 eu17 nms10 see6 dy_2002-dy_2010 if 
year>1994 & year<2011 & (eu27==1|see6==1), gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, laglimits(1 2) 
collapse) gmm(gap_tr, laglimits (2 3) collapse) iv(L.debt2gdp infl 
legelec_dpi1_eu17 legelec_dpi1_nms10 legelec_dpi1_see6 eu17 nms10 see6 dy_2002-
dy_2010) two robust small nocons 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: country                         Number of obs      =       464 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        33 
Number of instruments = 23                      Obs per group: min =         5 
F(19, 33)     =    168.11                                      avg =     14.06 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        16 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
capb_ngdp_tr |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
capb_ngdp_tr | 
         L1. |      0.715      0.074     9.68    0.00        0.565       0.866 
             | 
      gap_tr |     -0.168      0.063    -2.64    0.01       -0.297      -0.038 
             | 
    debt2gdp | 
         L1. |      0.005      0.005     0.93    0.36       -0.005       0.015 
             | 
        infl |      0.019      0.004     4.40    0.00        0.010       0.028 
legelec_d~17 |     -0.594      0.230    -2.58    0.01       -1.063      -0.126 
legelec_d~10 |     -0.570      0.492    -1.16    0.25       -1.571       0.431 
legelec_d~e6 |     -0.361      0.318    -1.14    0.26       -1.009       0.286 
        eu17 |      0.291      0.382     0.76    0.45       -0.487       1.068 
       nms10 |     -0.257      0.243    -1.06    0.30       -0.752       0.238 
        see6 |      0.041      0.266     0.15    0.88       -0.499       0.581 
     dy_2002 |     -0.667      0.397    -1.68    0.10       -1.475       0.142 
     dy_2003 |     -0.247      0.288    -0.86    0.40       -0.833       0.340 
     dy_2004 |     -0.169      0.281    -0.60    0.55       -0.740       0.402 
     dy_2005 |      0.152      0.286     0.53    0.60       -0.429       0.734 
     dy_2006 |     -0.075      0.242    -0.31    0.76       -0.567       0.417 
     dy_2007 |      0.376      0.450     0.84    0.41       -0.540       1.293 
     dy_2008 |     -1.138      0.420    -2.71    0.01       -1.992      -0.283 
     dy_2009 |     -2.152      0.425    -5.06    0.00       -3.016      -1.287 
     dy_2010 |     -0.762      0.440    -1.73    0.09       -1.657       0.132 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1_eu17 legelec_dpi1_nms10 legelec_dpi1_see6 
    eu17 nms10 see6 dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 
    dy_2009 dy_2010) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/3).gap_tr collapsed 
    L(1/2).L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
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Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1_eu17 legelec_dpi1_nms10 legelec_dpi1_see6 
    eu17 nms10 see6 dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 
    dy_2009 dy_2010 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.gap_tr collapsed 
    D.L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.82  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.89  Pr > z =  0.373 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =  15.96  Prob > chi2 =  0.003 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =   1.98  Prob > chi2 =  0.740 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(2)    =   1.71  Prob > chi2 =  0.425 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   0.27  Prob > chi2 =  0.876 
  gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, collapse lag(1 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   0.49  Prob > chi2 =  0.484 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.49  Prob > chi2 =  0.685 
  gmm(gap_tr, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   1.71  Prob > chi2 =  0.191 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   0.27  Prob > chi2 =  0.966 
  
312 
 
Table 3.3 Column 4 
 
xtabond2 capb_ngdp_tr L.capb_ngdp_tr gap_tr L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 
maastricht dy_2002-dy_2010 if year>1994 & year<2011 & (eu27==1|see6==1), 
gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, laglimits(1 2) collapse) gmm(gap_tr, laglimits (2 3) 
collapse) iv(L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht dy_2002-dy_2010) two 
robust small 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: country                         Number of obs      =       464 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        33 
Number of instruments = 20                      Obs per group: min =         5 
F(15, 32)     =     79.39                                      avg =     14.06 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        16 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
capb_ngdp_tr |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
capb_ngdp_tr | 
         L1. |      0.691      0.074     9.30    0.00        0.539       0.842 
             | 
      gap_tr |     -0.153      0.068    -2.25    0.03       -0.292      -0.015 
             | 
    debt2gdp | 
         L1. |      0.008      0.004     1.90    0.07       -0.001       0.017 
             | 
        infl |      0.017      0.005     3.11    0.00        0.006       0.028 
legelec_dpi1 |     -0.560      0.202    -2.78    0.01       -0.970      -0.149 
  maastricht |      0.665      0.199     3.34    0.00        0.259       1.071 
     dy_2002 |     -0.585      0.402    -1.45    0.16       -1.404       0.235 
     dy_2003 |     -0.107      0.311    -0.34    0.73       -0.740       0.526 
     dy_2004 |     -0.052      0.295    -0.18    0.86       -0.652       0.549 
     dy_2005 |      0.288      0.298     0.97    0.34       -0.319       0.896 
     dy_2006 |      0.035      0.248     0.14    0.89       -0.470       0.539 
     dy_2007 |      0.441      0.449     0.98    0.33       -0.474       1.356 
     dy_2008 |     -1.053      0.413    -2.55    0.02       -1.895      -0.211 
     dy_2009 |     -2.084      0.439    -4.75    0.00       -2.977      -1.191 
     dy_2010 |     -0.679      0.451    -1.51    0.14       -1.597       0.240 
       _cons |     -0.228      0.285    -0.80    0.43       -0.809       0.353 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 dy_2005 
    dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/3).gap_tr collapsed 
    L(1/2).L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 dy_2005 
    dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010 
    _cons 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
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    DL.gap_tr collapsed 
    D.L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.80  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.76  Pr > z =  0.446 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =  17.45  Prob > chi2 =  0.002 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =   2.23  Prob > chi2 =  0.694 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(2)    =   1.74  Prob > chi2 =  0.419 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   0.49  Prob > chi2 =  0.783 
  gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, collapse lag(1 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   0.95  Prob > chi2 =  0.331 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.28  Prob > chi2 =  0.733 
  gmm(gap_tr, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   1.86  Prob > chi2 =  0.173 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   0.37  Prob > chi2 =  0.946 
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Table 3.3 Column 5 
 
xtabond2 capb_ngdp_tr L.capb_ngdp_tr gap_tr gap_tr_maastricht L.debt2gdp infl 
legelec_dpi1 maastricht dy_2002-dy_2010 if year>1994 & year<2011 & 
(eu27==1|see6==1), gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, laglimits(1 2) collapse) gmm(gap_tr, 
laglimits (2 3) collapse) gmm(gap_tr_maastricht, laglimits (2 3) collapse) 
iv(L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht dy_2002-dy_2010) two robust small 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: country                         Number of obs      =       464 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        33 
Number of instruments = 23                      Obs per group: min =         5 
F(16, 32)     =     68.40                                      avg =     14.06 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        16 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
capb_ngdp_tr |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
capb_ngdp_tr | 
         L1. |      0.665      0.080     8.28    0.00        0.502       0.829 
             | 
      gap_tr |     -0.169      0.074    -2.28    0.03       -0.321      -0.018 
gap_tr_maa~t |      0.447      0.238     1.88    0.07       -0.038       0.933 
             | 
    debt2gdp | 
         L1. |      0.009      0.004     2.11    0.04        0.000       0.018 
             | 
        infl |      0.018      0.005     3.22    0.00        0.006       0.029 
legelec_dpi1 |     -0.499      0.214    -2.33    0.03       -0.935      -0.062 
  maastricht |      1.099      0.387     2.84    0.01        0.310       1.888 
     dy_2002 |     -0.488      0.401    -1.22    0.23       -1.304       0.328 
     dy_2003 |     -0.187      0.329    -0.57    0.57       -0.857       0.483 
     dy_2004 |     -0.032      0.303    -0.10    0.92       -0.648       0.585 
     dy_2005 |      0.236      0.320     0.74    0.47       -0.415       0.888 
     dy_2006 |      0.092      0.263     0.35    0.73       -0.443       0.627 
     dy_2007 |      0.387      0.484     0.80    0.43       -0.599       1.374 
     dy_2008 |     -1.159      0.457    -2.54    0.02       -2.091      -0.228 
     dy_2009 |     -2.214      0.470    -4.71    0.00       -3.172      -1.257 
     dy_2010 |     -0.752      0.503    -1.49    0.14       -1.776       0.273 
       _cons |     -0.327      0.271    -1.21    0.24       -0.879       0.225 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 dy_2005 
    dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/3).gap_tr_maastricht collapsed 
    L(2/3).gap_tr collapsed 
    L(1/2).L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 dy_2005 
    dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010 
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    _cons 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.gap_tr_maastricht collapsed 
    DL.gap_tr collapsed 
    D.L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.57  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.43  Pr > z =  0.668 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(6)    =  22.80  Prob > chi2 =  0.001 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(6)    =   5.64  Prob > chi2 =  0.464 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(3)    =   4.22  Prob > chi2 =  0.238 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.42  Prob > chi2 =  0.701 
  gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, collapse lag(1 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(3)    =   4.26  Prob > chi2 =  0.235 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.39  Prob > chi2 =  0.709 
  gmm(gap_tr, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(3)    =   4.46  Prob > chi2 =  0.216 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.18  Prob > chi2 =  0.758 
  gmm(gap_tr_maastricht, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(3)    =   2.12  Prob > chi2 =  0.548 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   3.52  Prob > chi2 =  0.318 
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Table 3.3 Column 6 
 
xtabond2 capb_ngdp_tr L.capb_ngdp_tr gap_tr L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 
maastricht sgp dy_2002-dy_2010 if year>1994 & year<2011 & (eu27==1|see6==1), 
gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, laglimits(1 2) collapse) gmm(gap_tr, laglimits (2 3) 
collapse) iv(L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht sgp dy_2002-dy_2010) two 
robust small 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: country                         Number of obs      =       464 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        33 
Number of instruments = 21                      Obs per group: min =         5 
F(16, 32)     =     74.39                                      avg =     14.06 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        16 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
capb_ngdp_tr |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
capb_ngdp_tr | 
         L1. |      0.692      0.073     9.49    0.00        0.543       0.840 
             | 
      gap_tr |     -0.154      0.068    -2.27    0.03       -0.293      -0.016 
             | 
    debt2gdp | 
         L1. |      0.008      0.005     1.57    0.13       -0.002       0.018 
             | 
        infl |      0.017      0.005     3.24    0.00        0.006       0.028 
legelec_dpi1 |     -0.560      0.200    -2.80    0.01       -0.968      -0.152 
  maastricht |      0.688      0.222     3.10    0.00        0.236       1.140 
         sgp |      0.046      0.234     0.20    0.85       -0.430       0.522 
     dy_2002 |     -0.585      0.402    -1.46    0.15       -1.403       0.232 
     dy_2003 |     -0.109      0.310    -0.35    0.73       -0.741       0.523 
     dy_2004 |     -0.052      0.295    -0.18    0.86       -0.652       0.548 
     dy_2005 |      0.287      0.299     0.96    0.34       -0.322       0.896 
     dy_2006 |      0.037      0.249     0.15    0.88       -0.471       0.545 
     dy_2007 |      0.444      0.447     0.99    0.33       -0.468       1.355 
     dy_2008 |     -1.053      0.414    -2.55    0.02       -1.896      -0.210 
     dy_2009 |     -2.082      0.437    -4.77    0.00       -2.972      -1.193 
     dy_2010 |     -0.682      0.448    -1.52    0.14       -1.595       0.231 
       _cons |     -0.230      0.293    -0.79    0.44       -0.826       0.366 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht sgp dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 
    dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/3).gap_tr collapsed 
    L(1/2).L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht sgp dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 
    dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010 
    _cons 
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  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.gap_tr collapsed 
    D.L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.81  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.76  Pr > z =  0.446 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =  17.54  Prob > chi2 =  0.002 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =   2.22  Prob > chi2 =  0.695 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(2)    =   1.76  Prob > chi2 =  0.415 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   0.46  Prob > chi2 =  0.793 
  gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, collapse lag(1 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   0.93  Prob > chi2 =  0.334 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.29  Prob > chi2 =  0.732 
  gmm(gap_tr, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   1.86  Prob > chi2 =  0.172 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   0.36  Prob > chi2 =  0.949 
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Table 3.3 Column 7 
 
xtabond2 capb_ngdp_tr L.capb_ngdp_tr gap_tr gap_tr_sgp L.debt2gdp infl 
legelec_dpi1 sgp dy_2002-dy_2010 if year>1994 & year<2011 & (eu27==1|see6==1), 
gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, laglimits(1 2) collapse) gmm(gap_tr, laglimits (2 3) 
collapse) gmm(gap_tr_sgp, laglimits (2 3) collapse) iv(L.debt2gdp infl 
legelec_dpi1 sgp dy_2002-dy_2010) two robust small 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: country                         Number of obs      =       464 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        33 
Number of instruments = 23                      Obs per group: min =         5 
F(16, 32)     =     67.05                                      avg =     14.06 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        16 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
capb_ngdp_tr |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
capb_ngdp_tr | 
         L1. |      0.699      0.061    11.37    0.00        0.574       0.824 
             | 
      gap_tr |     -0.146      0.069    -2.10    0.04       -0.287      -0.005 
  gap_tr_sgp |      0.139      0.204     0.68    0.50       -0.277       0.555 
             | 
    debt2gdp | 
         L1. |      0.012      0.007     1.86    0.07       -0.001       0.026 
             | 
        infl |      0.017      0.004     3.83    0.00        0.008       0.025 
legelec_dpi1 |     -0.543      0.214    -2.53    0.02       -0.980      -0.107 
         sgp |     -0.201      0.267    -0.75    0.46       -0.745       0.343 
     dy_2002 |     -0.659      0.427    -1.54    0.13       -1.528       0.211 
     dy_2003 |     -0.301      0.370    -0.81    0.42       -1.055       0.452 
     dy_2004 |     -0.120      0.330    -0.36    0.72       -0.792       0.552 
     dy_2005 |      0.140      0.334     0.42    0.68       -0.541       0.822 
     dy_2006 |     -0.174      0.308    -0.56    0.58       -0.801       0.453 
     dy_2007 |      0.127      0.633     0.20    0.84       -1.163       1.417 
     dy_2008 |     -1.365      0.560    -2.44    0.02       -2.505      -0.226 
     dy_2009 |     -2.056      0.549    -3.74    0.00       -3.175      -0.937 
     dy_2010 |     -0.672      0.352    -1.91    0.07       -1.389       0.045 
       _cons |     -0.182      0.419    -0.44    0.67       -1.035       0.671 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 sgp dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 dy_2005 
    dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/3).gap_tr_sgp collapsed 
    L(2/3).gap_tr collapsed 
    L(1/2).L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 sgp dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 
    dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010 
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    _cons 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.gap_tr_sgp collapsed 
    DL.gap_tr collapsed 
    D.L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.77  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.69  Pr > z =  0.493 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(6)    =  53.81  Prob > chi2 =  0.000 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(6)    =   4.07  Prob > chi2 =  0.667 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(3)    =   2.30  Prob > chi2 =  0.512 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.77  Prob > chi2 =  0.622 
  gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, collapse lag(1 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(3)    =   3.48  Prob > chi2 =  0.324 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   0.59  Prob > chi2 =  0.898 
  gmm(gap_tr, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(3)    =   2.75  Prob > chi2 =  0.432 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.32  Prob > chi2 =  0.723 
  gmm(gap_tr_sgp, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(3)    =   2.36  Prob > chi2 =  0.501 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.71  Prob > chi2 =  0.634 
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Table 3.3 Column 8 
 
xtabond2 capb_ngdp_tr L.capb_ngdp_tr gap_tr_eu17 gap_tr_nms10 gap_tr_see6 eu17 
nms10 see6 L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht dy_2002-dy_2010 if year>1994 
& year<2011 & (eu27==1|see6==1), gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, laglimits(1 2) collapse) 
gmm(gap_tr_eu17, laglimits (2 3) collapse) gmm(gap_tr_nms10, laglimits (2 3) 
collapse)  gmm(gap_tr_see6, laglimits (2 3) collapse) iv(L.debt2gdp infl 
legelec_dpi1 maastricht dy_2002-dy_2010 eu17 nms10 see6 ) two robust small 
nocons 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: country                         Number of obs      =       464 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        33 
Number of instruments = 28                      Obs per group: min =         5 
F(20, 33)     =    444.89                                      avg =     14.06 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        16 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
capb_ngdp_tr |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
capb_ngdp_tr | 
         L1. |      0.698      0.066    10.61    0.00        0.564       0.832 
             | 
 gap_tr_eu17 |      0.020      0.120     0.17    0.87       -0.223       0.263 
gap_tr_nms10 |     -0.180      0.043    -4.20    0.00       -0.267      -0.093 
 gap_tr_see6 |     -0.270      0.061    -4.44    0.00       -0.393      -0.146 
        eu17 |      0.213      0.477     0.45    0.66       -0.757       1.183 
       nms10 |     -0.174      0.253    -0.69    0.50       -0.687       0.340 
        see6 |      0.369      0.291     1.27    0.21       -0.222       0.960 
             | 
    debt2gdp | 
         L1. |      0.002      0.006     0.36    0.72       -0.009       0.013 
             | 
        infl |      0.020      0.004     5.37    0.00        0.012       0.027 
legelec_dpi1 |     -0.489      0.190    -2.58    0.01       -0.875      -0.104 
  maastricht |      0.832      0.352     2.36    0.02        0.116       1.547 
     dy_2002 |     -0.624      0.375    -1.66    0.11       -1.387       0.139 
     dy_2003 |     -0.228      0.262    -0.87    0.39       -0.760       0.304 
     dy_2004 |     -0.135      0.310    -0.43    0.67       -0.766       0.496 
     dy_2005 |      0.192      0.314     0.61    0.54       -0.446       0.831 
     dy_2006 |     -0.169      0.253    -0.67    0.51       -0.684       0.346 
     dy_2007 |      0.133      0.441     0.30    0.76       -0.764       1.031 
     dy_2008 |     -1.295      0.415    -3.12    0.00       -2.138      -0.451 
     dy_2009 |     -2.151      0.455    -4.73    0.00       -3.076      -1.226 
     dy_2010 |     -0.582      0.337    -1.73    0.09       -1.267       0.103 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 dy_2005 
    dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010 eu17 nms10 see6) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/3).gap_tr_see6 collapsed 
    L(2/3).gap_tr_nms10 collapsed 
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    L(2/3).gap_tr_eu17 collapsed 
    L(1/2).L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 dy_2005 
    dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010 eu17 nms10 see6 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.gap_tr_see6 collapsed 
    DL.gap_tr_nms10 collapsed 
    DL.gap_tr_eu17 collapsed 
    D.L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.84  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.48  Pr > z =  0.628 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(8)    =  33.36  Prob > chi2 =  0.000 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(8)    =   4.04  Prob > chi2 =  0.854 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(4)    =   2.86  Prob > chi2 =  0.582 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(4)    =   1.18  Prob > chi2 =  0.882 
  gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, collapse lag(1 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(5)    =   2.57  Prob > chi2 =  0.766 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.46  Prob > chi2 =  0.691 
  gmm(gap_tr_eu17, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(5)    =   2.48  Prob > chi2 =  0.780 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.56  Prob > chi2 =  0.668 
  gmm(gap_tr_nms10, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(5)    =   3.72  Prob > chi2 =  0.590 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   0.31  Prob > chi2 =  0.957 
  gmm(gap_tr_see6, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(5)    =   2.83  Prob > chi2 =  0.726 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.21  Prob > chi2 =  0.752 
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Table 3.4 Column 1 
 
xtabond2 capb_ngdp_tr L.capb_ngdp_tr gap_tr L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 
maastricht dy_2002-dy_2010 if year>1994 & year<2011 & (eu27==1|see6==1), 
gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, laglimits(1 2) collapse) gmm(gap_tr, laglimits(2 3) 
collapse) iv(L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht dy_2002-dy_2010) two 
robust small 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: country                         Number of obs      =       464 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        33 
Number of instruments = 20                      Obs per group: min =         5 
F(15, 32)     =     79.39                                      avg =     14.06 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        16 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
capb_ngdp_tr |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
capb_ngdp_tr | 
         L1. |      0.691      0.074     9.30    0.00        0.539       0.842 
             | 
      gap_tr |     -0.153      0.068    -2.25    0.03       -0.292      -0.015 
             | 
    debt2gdp | 
         L1. |      0.008      0.004     1.90    0.07       -0.001       0.017 
             | 
        infl |      0.017      0.005     3.11    0.00        0.006       0.028 
legelec_dpi1 |     -0.560      0.202    -2.78    0.01       -0.970      -0.149 
  maastricht |      0.665      0.199     3.34    0.00        0.259       1.071 
     dy_2002 |     -0.585      0.402    -1.45    0.16       -1.404       0.235 
     dy_2003 |     -0.107      0.311    -0.34    0.73       -0.740       0.526 
     dy_2004 |     -0.052      0.295    -0.18    0.86       -0.652       0.549 
     dy_2005 |      0.288      0.298     0.97    0.34       -0.319       0.896 
     dy_2006 |      0.035      0.248     0.14    0.89       -0.470       0.539 
     dy_2007 |      0.441      0.449     0.98    0.33       -0.474       1.356 
     dy_2008 |     -1.053      0.413    -2.55    0.02       -1.895      -0.211 
     dy_2009 |     -2.084      0.439    -4.75    0.00       -2.977      -1.191 
     dy_2010 |     -0.679      0.451    -1.51    0.14       -1.597       0.240 
       _cons |     -0.228      0.285    -0.80    0.43       -0.809       0.353 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 dy_2005 
    dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/3).gap_tr collapsed 
    L(1/2).L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 dy_2005 
    dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010 
    _cons 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
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    DL.gap_tr collapsed 
    D.L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.80  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.76  Pr > z =  0.446 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =  17.45  Prob > chi2 =  0.002 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =   2.23  Prob > chi2 =  0.694 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(2)    =   1.74  Prob > chi2 =  0.419 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   0.49  Prob > chi2 =  0.783 
  gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, collapse lag(1 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   0.95  Prob > chi2 =  0.331 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.28  Prob > chi2 =  0.733 
  gmm(gap_tr, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   1.86  Prob > chi2 =  0.173 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   0.37  Prob > chi2 =  0.946 
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Table 3.4 Column 2 
 
 
xtabond2 capb_ngdp_tr L.capb_ngdp_tr gap_tr L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 
maastricht dy_2002-dy_2010 if year>1994 & year<2011 & 
(eu27==1|dc_alb==1|dc_bih==1|dc_mkd==1|dc_hrv==1), gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, 
laglimits(1 2) collapse) gmm(gap_tr, laglimits (2 3) collapse) iv(L.debt2gdp 
infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht dy_2002-dy_2010) two robust small 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: country                         Number of obs      =       451 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        31 
Number of instruments = 20                      Obs per group: min =         6 
F(15, 30)     =     72.78                                      avg =     14.55 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        16 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
capb_ngdp_tr |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
capb_ngdp_tr | 
         L1. |      0.703      0.078     8.95    0.00        0.542       0.863 
             | 
      gap_tr |     -0.142      0.072    -1.96    0.06       -0.289       0.006 
             | 
    debt2gdp | 
         L1. |      0.008      0.004     2.00    0.05       -0.000       0.016 
             | 
        infl |      0.018      0.006     3.29    0.00        0.007       0.030 
legelec_dpi1 |     -0.591      0.210    -2.81    0.01       -1.020      -0.162 
  maastricht |      0.669      0.196     3.41    0.00        0.268       1.070 
     dy_2002 |     -0.560      0.406    -1.38    0.18       -1.390       0.270 
     dy_2003 |     -0.059      0.314    -0.19    0.85       -0.700       0.581 
     dy_2004 |     -0.057      0.300    -0.19    0.85       -0.671       0.556 
     dy_2005 |      0.215      0.284     0.76    0.45       -0.364       0.794 
     dy_2006 |      0.032      0.242     0.13    0.89       -0.461       0.526 
     dy_2007 |      0.373      0.452     0.82    0.42       -0.551       1.296 
     dy_2008 |     -0.939      0.409    -2.30    0.03       -1.774      -0.105 
     dy_2009 |     -2.195      0.457    -4.81    0.00       -3.127      -1.262 
     dy_2010 |     -0.643      0.484    -1.33    0.19       -1.632       0.345 
       _cons |     -0.247      0.276    -0.90    0.38       -0.810       0.316 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 dy_2005 
    dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/3).gap_tr collapsed 
    L(1/2).L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 dy_2005 
    dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010 
    _cons 
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  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.gap_tr collapsed 
    D.L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.69  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.50  Pr > z =  0.618 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =  16.69  Prob > chi2 =  0.002 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =   2.13  Prob > chi2 =  0.713 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(2)    =   1.62  Prob > chi2 =  0.446 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   0.51  Prob > chi2 =  0.775 
  gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, collapse lag(1 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   1.03  Prob > chi2 =  0.309 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.09  Prob > chi2 =  0.779 
  gmm(gap_tr, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   1.64  Prob > chi2 =  0.200 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   0.49  Prob > chi2 =  0.922 
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Table 3.4 Column 3 
 
xtabond2 capb_ngdp_tr L.capb_ngdp_tr gap_tr L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 
maastricht checks_dpi dy_2002-dy_2010 if year>1994 & year<2011 & 
(eu27==1|see6==1), gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, laglimits(1 2) collapse) gmm(gap_tr, 
laglimits (2 3) collapse)  iv(L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht 
checks_dpi dy_2002-dy_2010) two robust small 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: country                         Number of obs      =       450 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        31 
Number of instruments = 21                      Obs per group: min =         6 
F(16, 30)     =     76.12                                      avg =     14.52 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        16 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
capb_ngdp_tr |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
capb_ngdp_tr | 
         L1. |      0.695      0.075     9.25    0.00        0.541       0.848 
             | 
      gap_tr |     -0.145      0.071    -2.03    0.05       -0.290       0.001 
             | 
    debt2gdp | 
         L1. |      0.007      0.004     1.69    0.10       -0.001       0.015 
             | 
        infl |      0.021      0.006     3.27    0.00        0.008       0.034 
legelec_dpi1 |     -0.590      0.208    -2.83    0.01       -1.014      -0.165 
  maastricht |      0.767      0.251     3.05    0.00        0.254       1.280 
  checks_dpi |     -0.153      0.122    -1.25    0.22       -0.401       0.096 
     dy_2002 |     -0.591      0.402    -1.47    0.15       -1.413       0.230 
     dy_2003 |     -0.099      0.313    -0.31    0.76       -0.738       0.541 
     dy_2004 |     -0.103      0.306    -0.34    0.74       -0.728       0.522 
     dy_2005 |      0.206      0.279     0.74    0.47       -0.364       0.777 
     dy_2006 |      0.044      0.248     0.18    0.86       -0.462       0.550 
     dy_2007 |      0.383      0.453     0.84    0.41       -0.543       1.309 
     dy_2008 |     -0.957      0.411    -2.33    0.03       -1.795      -0.118 
     dy_2009 |     -2.215      0.439    -5.05    0.00       -3.112      -1.319 
     dy_2010 |     -0.688      0.479    -1.43    0.16       -1.667       0.291 
       _cons |      0.414      0.505     0.82    0.42       -0.618       1.446 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht checks_dpi dy_2002 dy_2003 
    dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/3).gap_tr collapsed 
    L(1/2).L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht checks_dpi dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 
    dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010 
    _cons 
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  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.gap_tr collapsed 
    D.L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.80  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.47  Pr > z =  0.636 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =  16.88  Prob > chi2 =  0.002 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =   2.16  Prob > chi2 =  0.706 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(2)    =   1.61  Prob > chi2 =  0.446 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   0.55  Prob > chi2 =  0.761 
  gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, collapse lag(1 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   0.93  Prob > chi2 =  0.335 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.23  Prob > chi2 =  0.745 
  gmm(gap_tr, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   1.72  Prob > chi2 =  0.190 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   0.44  Prob > chi2 =  0.932 
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Table 3.4 Column 4 
 
xtabond2 capb_ngdp_tr L.capb_ngdp_tr gap_tr L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 
maastricht checks_dpi_eu17 checks_dpi_nms10 checks_dpi_see6 eu17 nms10 see6 
dy_2002-dy_2010 if year>1994 & year<2011 & (eu27==1|see6==1), 
gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, laglimits(1 2) collapse) gmm(gap_tr, laglimits (2 3) 
collapse)  iv(L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht checks_dpi_eu17 
checks_dpi_nms10 checks_dpi_see6 eu17 nms10 see6 dy_2002-dy_2010) two robust 
small nocons 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: country                         Number of obs      =       450 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        31 
Number of instruments = 25                      Obs per group: min =         6 
F(21, 31)     =    100.86                                      avg =     14.52 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        16 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
capb_ngdp_tr |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
capb_ngdp_tr | 
         L1. |      0.693      0.072     9.69    0.00        0.547       0.839 
             | 
      gap_tr |     -0.148      0.069    -2.16    0.04       -0.289      -0.008 
             | 
    debt2gdp | 
         L1. |      0.002      0.005     0.45    0.66       -0.008       0.012 
             | 
        infl |      0.030      0.007     4.23    0.00        0.016       0.044 
legelec_dpi1 |     -0.587      0.205    -2.87    0.01       -1.005      -0.169 
  maastricht |      0.535      0.245     2.18    0.04        0.035       1.034 
checks_dp~17 |      0.117      0.106     1.10    0.28       -0.100       0.333 
checks_dp~10 |     -0.457      0.263    -1.74    0.09       -0.993       0.079 
checks_dp~e6 |     -0.682      0.120    -5.69    0.00       -0.926      -0.437 
        eu17 |     -0.229      0.445    -0.51    0.61       -1.137       0.679 
       nms10 |      1.542      1.043     1.48    0.15       -0.586       3.669 
        see6 |      2.157      0.455     4.74    0.00        1.229       3.085 
     dy_2002 |     -0.607      0.398    -1.53    0.14       -1.418       0.204 
     dy_2003 |     -0.144      0.312    -0.46    0.65       -0.780       0.492 
     dy_2004 |     -0.134      0.301    -0.45    0.66       -0.747       0.479 
     dy_2005 |      0.236      0.292     0.81    0.43       -0.359       0.831 
     dy_2006 |      0.115      0.233     0.50    0.62       -0.360       0.591 
     dy_2007 |      0.488      0.427     1.14    0.26       -0.382       1.359 
     dy_2008 |     -0.907      0.377    -2.41    0.02       -1.676      -0.138 
     dy_2009 |     -2.128      0.443    -4.81    0.00       -3.031      -1.226 
     dy_2010 |     -0.700      0.472    -1.48    0.15       -1.662       0.263 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht checks_dpi_eu17 
    checks_dpi_nms10 checks_dpi_see6 eu17 nms10 see6 dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 
    dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
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    L(2/3).gap_tr collapsed 
    L(1/2).L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht checks_dpi_eu17 checks_dpi_nms10 
    checks_dpi_see6 eu17 nms10 see6 dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 
    dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.gap_tr collapsed 
    D.L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.89  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.60  Pr > z =  0.551 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =  16.67  Prob > chi2 =  0.002 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =   1.91  Prob > chi2 =  0.752 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(2)    =   1.52  Prob > chi2 =  0.468 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   0.40  Prob > chi2 =  0.820 
  gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, collapse lag(1 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   0.81  Prob > chi2 =  0.367 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.10  Prob > chi2 =  0.777 
  gmm(gap_tr, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   1.59  Prob > chi2 =  0.208 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   0.33  Prob > chi2 =  0.955 
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Table 3.4 Column 5 
 
xtabond2 capb_ngdp_tr L.capb_ngdp_tr gap_tr L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 
maastricht herfgov_dpi dy_2002-dy_2010 if year>1994 & year<2011 & 
(eu27==1|see6==1), gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, laglimits(1 2) collapse) gmm(gap_tr, 
laglimits (2 3) collapse)  iv(L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht 
herfgov_dpi dy_2002-dy_2010) two robust small 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: country                         Number of obs      =       450 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        31 
Number of instruments = 21                      Obs per group: min =         6 
F(16, 30)     =     72.98                                      avg =     14.52 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        16 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
capb_ngdp_tr |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
capb_ngdp_tr | 
         L1. |      0.701      0.077     9.07    0.00        0.543       0.858 
             | 
      gap_tr |     -0.141      0.070    -2.02    0.05       -0.284       0.002 
             | 
    debt2gdp | 
         L1. |      0.009      0.004     2.31    0.03        0.001       0.017 
             | 
        infl |      0.018      0.005     3.43    0.00        0.007       0.029 
legelec_dpi1 |     -0.584      0.213    -2.74    0.01       -1.020      -0.149 
  maastricht |      0.668      0.202     3.30    0.00        0.255       1.081 
 herfgov_dpi |     -0.004      0.005    -0.71    0.48       -0.014       0.007 
     dy_2002 |     -0.549      0.403    -1.36    0.18       -1.372       0.275 
     dy_2003 |     -0.042      0.308    -0.14    0.89       -0.671       0.587 
     dy_2004 |     -0.039      0.302    -0.13    0.90       -0.657       0.578 
     dy_2005 |      0.214      0.283     0.76    0.46       -0.365       0.793 
     dy_2006 |      0.026      0.229     0.11    0.91       -0.442       0.494 
     dy_2007 |      0.359      0.436     0.82    0.42       -0.532       1.250 
     dy_2008 |     -0.955      0.397    -2.41    0.02       -1.766      -0.144 
     dy_2009 |     -2.195      0.458    -4.79    0.00       -3.130      -1.259 
     dy_2010 |     -0.655      0.484    -1.36    0.19       -1.643       0.332 
       _cons |     -0.065      0.429    -0.15    0.88       -0.942       0.812 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht herfgov_dpi dy_2002 dy_2003 
    dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/3).gap_tr collapsed 
    L(1/2).L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht herfgov_dpi dy_2002 dy_2003 
    dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010 
    _cons 
331 
 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.gap_tr collapsed 
    D.L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.67  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.52  Pr > z =  0.606 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =  16.39  Prob > chi2 =  0.003 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =   2.03  Prob > chi2 =  0.730 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(2)    =   1.56  Prob > chi2 =  0.457 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   0.47  Prob > chi2 =  0.791 
  gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, collapse lag(1 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   0.92  Prob > chi2 =  0.339 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.12  Prob > chi2 =  0.773 
  gmm(gap_tr, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   1.63  Prob > chi2 =  0.202 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   0.40  Prob > chi2 =  0.939 
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Table 3.4 Column 6 
 
xtabond2 capb_ngdp_tr L.capb_ngdp_tr gap_tr L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 
maastricht herfgov_dpi_eu17 herfgov_dpi_nms10 herfgov_dpi_see6 eu17 nms10 see6 
dy_2002-dy_2010 if year>1994 & year<2011 & (eu27==1|see6==1), 
gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, laglimits(1 2) collapse) gmm(gap_tr, laglimits (2 3) 
collapse)  iv(L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht herfgov_dpi_eu17 
herfgov_dpi_nms10 herfgov_dpi_see6 eu17 nms10 see6 dy_2002-dy_2010) two robust 
small nocons 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: country                         Number of obs      =       450 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        31 
Number of instruments = 25                      Obs per group: min =         6 
F(21, 31)     =    246.60                                      avg =     14.52 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        16 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
capb_ngdp_tr |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
capb_ngdp_tr | 
         L1. |      0.691      0.073     9.50    0.00        0.543       0.840 
             | 
      gap_tr |     -0.157      0.068    -2.31    0.03       -0.296      -0.019 
             | 
    debt2gdp | 
         L1. |      0.004      0.004     0.95    0.35       -0.005       0.013 
             | 
        infl |      0.020      0.005     4.23    0.00        0.011       0.030 
legelec_dpi1 |     -0.596      0.210    -2.83    0.01       -1.025      -0.167 
  maastricht |      0.562      0.232     2.42    0.02        0.089       1.036 
herfgov_d~17 |     -0.017      0.005    -3.44    0.00       -0.026      -0.007 
herfgov_d~10 |      0.018      0.016     1.13    0.27       -0.014       0.051 
herfgov_d~e6 |      0.010      0.009     1.05    0.30       -0.009       0.029 
        eu17 |      1.280      0.536     2.39    0.02        0.188       2.373 
       nms10 |     -1.382      0.943    -1.47    0.15       -3.304       0.540 
        see6 |     -0.585      0.599    -0.98    0.34       -1.807       0.638 
     dy_2002 |     -0.534      0.388    -1.38    0.18       -1.325       0.256 
     dy_2003 |     -0.023      0.297    -0.08    0.94       -0.629       0.583 
     dy_2004 |     -0.061      0.301    -0.20    0.84       -0.674       0.553 
     dy_2005 |      0.237      0.299     0.79    0.43       -0.373       0.847 
     dy_2006 |      0.152      0.248     0.61    0.54       -0.353       0.658 
     dy_2007 |      0.470      0.419     1.12    0.27       -0.385       1.325 
     dy_2008 |     -0.905      0.378    -2.39    0.02       -1.676      -0.134 
     dy_2009 |     -2.276      0.421    -5.40    0.00       -3.135      -1.416 
     dy_2010 |     -0.818      0.462    -1.77    0.09       -1.761       0.125 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht herfgov_dpi_eu17 
    herfgov_dpi_nms10 herfgov_dpi_see6 eu17 nms10 see6 dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 
    dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
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    L(2/3).gap_tr collapsed 
    L(1/2).L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht herfgov_dpi_eu17 herfgov_dpi_nms10 
    herfgov_dpi_see6 eu17 nms10 see6 dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 
    dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.gap_tr collapsed 
    D.L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.86  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.64  Pr > z =  0.520 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =  14.34  Prob > chi2 =  0.006 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =   2.01  Prob > chi2 =  0.734 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(2)    =   1.63  Prob > chi2 =  0.443 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   0.38  Prob > chi2 =  0.828 
  gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, collapse lag(1 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   0.99  Prob > chi2 =  0.319 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.02  Prob > chi2 =  0.797 
  gmm(gap_tr, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   1.48  Prob > chi2 =  0.223 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   0.52  Prob > chi2 =  0.913 
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Table 3.4 Column 7 
 
xtabond2 capb_ngdp_tr L.capb_ngdp_tr gap_tr L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 
maastricht maj_dpi dy_2002-dy_2010 if year>1994 & year<2011 & 
(eu27==1|see6==1), gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, laglimits(1 2) collapse) gmm(gap_tr, 
laglimits (2 3) collapse)  iv(L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht maj_dpi 
dy_2002-dy_2010) two robust small 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: country                         Number of obs      =       449 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        31 
Number of instruments = 21                      Obs per group: min =         6 
F(16, 30)     =    112.21                                      avg =     14.48 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        16 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
capb_ngdp_tr |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
capb_ngdp_tr | 
         L1. |      0.686      0.074     9.29    0.00        0.535       0.836 
             | 
      gap_tr |     -0.133      0.069    -1.92    0.06       -0.275       0.008 
             | 
    debt2gdp | 
         L1. |      0.008      0.004     2.03    0.05       -0.000       0.016 
             | 
        infl |      0.024      0.006     3.96    0.00        0.012       0.036 
legelec_dpi1 |     -0.589      0.215    -2.74    0.01       -1.028      -0.151 
  maastricht |      0.688      0.249     2.76    0.01        0.179       1.196 
     maj_dpi |      0.052      0.025     2.08    0.05        0.001       0.103 
     dy_2002 |     -0.490      0.403    -1.22    0.23       -1.312       0.332 
     dy_2003 |      0.010      0.344     0.03    0.98       -0.692       0.712 
     dy_2004 |     -0.078      0.309    -0.25    0.80       -0.708       0.553 
     dy_2005 |      0.247      0.308     0.80    0.43       -0.381       0.875 
     dy_2006 |      0.003      0.202     0.02    0.99       -0.409       0.416 
     dy_2007 |      0.195      0.417     0.47    0.64       -0.657       1.048 
     dy_2008 |     -1.187      0.380    -3.12    0.00       -1.963      -0.411 
     dy_2009 |     -2.327      0.468    -4.98    0.00       -3.282      -1.372 
     dy_2010 |     -0.822      0.511    -1.61    0.12       -1.867       0.222 
       _cons |     -3.124      1.444    -2.16    0.04       -6.073      -0.176 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht maj_dpi dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 
    dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/3).gap_tr collapsed 
    L(1/2).L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht maj_dpi dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 
    dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010 
    _cons 
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  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.gap_tr collapsed 
    D.L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -4.00  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.27  Pr > z =  0.788 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =  14.99  Prob > chi2 =  0.005 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =   1.90  Prob > chi2 =  0.754 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(2)    =   1.32  Prob > chi2 =  0.516 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   0.58  Prob > chi2 =  0.750 
  gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, collapse lag(1 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   0.60  Prob > chi2 =  0.440 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.30  Prob > chi2 =  0.729 
  gmm(gap_tr, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   1.60  Prob > chi2 =  0.206 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   0.30  Prob > chi2 =  0.960 
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Table 3.4 Column 8 
 
xtabond2 capb_ngdp_tr L.capb_ngdp_tr gap_tr L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 
maastricht maj_dpi_eu17 maj_dpi_nms10 maj_dpi_see6 eu17 nms10 see6 dy_2002-
dy_2010 if year>1994 & year<2011 & (eu27==1|see6==1), gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, 
laglimits(1 2) collapse) gmm(gap_tr, laglimits (2 3) collapse)  iv(L.debt2gdp 
infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht maj_dpi_eu17 maj_dpi_nms10 maj_dpi_see6 eu17 nms10 
see6 dy_2002-dy_2010) two robust small nocons 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: country                         Number of obs      =       449 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        31 
Number of instruments = 25                      Obs per group: min =         6 
F(21, 31)     =    181.90                                      avg =     14.48 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        16 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
capb_ngdp_tr |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
capb_ngdp_tr | 
         L1. |      0.695      0.067    10.30    0.00        0.557       0.832 
             | 
      gap_tr |     -0.130      0.072    -1.80    0.08       -0.278       0.018 
             | 
    debt2gdp | 
         L1. |      0.003      0.005     0.55    0.59       -0.007       0.013 
             | 
        infl |      0.030      0.007     4.38    0.00        0.016       0.044 
legelec_dpi1 |     -0.551      0.224    -2.46    0.02       -1.007      -0.095 
  maastricht |      0.559      0.231     2.42    0.02        0.088       1.031 
maj_dpi_eu17 |      0.032      0.018     1.78    0.09       -0.005       0.068 
maj_dpi_n~10 |      0.090      0.047     1.90    0.07       -0.006       0.187 
maj_dpi_see6 |     -0.019      0.033    -0.56    0.58       -0.086       0.049 
        eu17 |     -1.512      1.130    -1.34    0.19       -3.816       0.793 
       nms10 |     -5.270      2.625    -2.01    0.05       -10.624       0.084 
        see6 |      1.260      2.175     0.58    0.57       -3.176       5.697 
     dy_2002 |     -0.516      0.392    -1.32    0.20       -1.315       0.283 
     dy_2003 |     -0.058      0.331    -0.18    0.86       -0.734       0.617 
     dy_2004 |     -0.167      0.327    -0.51    0.61       -0.833       0.499 
     dy_2005 |      0.205      0.304     0.67    0.51       -0.415       0.824 
     dy_2006 |     -0.067      0.240    -0.28    0.78       -0.556       0.422 
     dy_2007 |      0.118      0.475     0.25    0.81       -0.851       1.086 
     dy_2008 |     -1.288      0.435    -2.96    0.01       -2.175      -0.401 
     dy_2009 |     -2.390      0.477    -5.00    0.00       -3.363      -1.416 
     dy_2010 |     -0.856      0.475    -1.80    0.08       -1.825       0.114 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht maj_dpi_eu17 maj_dpi_nms10 
    maj_dpi_see6 eu17 nms10 see6 dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 
    dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/3).gap_tr collapsed 
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    L(1/2).L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht maj_dpi_eu17 maj_dpi_nms10 
    maj_dpi_see6 eu17 nms10 see6 dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 
    dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.gap_tr collapsed 
    D.L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -4.12  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.06  Pr > z =  0.953 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =  16.39  Prob > chi2 =  0.003 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =   1.84  Prob > chi2 =  0.765 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(2)    =   1.35  Prob > chi2 =  0.509 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   0.49  Prob > chi2 =  0.782 
  gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, collapse lag(1 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   0.52  Prob > chi2 =  0.471 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.32  Prob > chi2 =  0.724 
  gmm(gap_tr, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   1.65  Prob > chi2 =  0.199 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   0.19  Prob > chi2 =  0.979 
  
338 
 
Table 3.5 Column 1 
 
 
xtabond2 capb_ngdp_tr L.capb_ngdp_tr gap_tr L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 
maastricht dy_2002-dy_2010 if year>1994 & year<2011 & (eu27==1|see6==1), 
gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, laglimits(1 2) collapse) gmm(gap_tr, laglimits(2 3) 
collapse) iv(L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht dy_2002-dy_2010) two 
robust small 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: country                         Number of obs      =       464 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        33 
Number of instruments = 20                      Obs per group: min =         5 
F(15, 32)     =     79.39                                      avg =     14.06 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        16 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
capb_ngdp_tr |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
capb_ngdp_tr | 
         L1. |      0.691      0.074     9.30    0.00        0.539       0.842 
             | 
      gap_tr |     -0.153      0.068    -2.25    0.03       -0.292      -0.015 
             | 
    debt2gdp | 
         L1. |      0.008      0.004     1.90    0.07       -0.001       0.017 
             | 
        infl |      0.017      0.005     3.11    0.00        0.006       0.028 
legelec_dpi1 |     -0.560      0.202    -2.78    0.01       -0.970      -0.149 
  maastricht |      0.665      0.199     3.34    0.00        0.259       1.071 
     dy_2002 |     -0.585      0.402    -1.45    0.16       -1.404       0.235 
     dy_2003 |     -0.107      0.311    -0.34    0.73       -0.740       0.526 
     dy_2004 |     -0.052      0.295    -0.18    0.86       -0.652       0.549 
     dy_2005 |      0.288      0.298     0.97    0.34       -0.319       0.896 
     dy_2006 |      0.035      0.248     0.14    0.89       -0.470       0.539 
     dy_2007 |      0.441      0.449     0.98    0.33       -0.474       1.356 
     dy_2008 |     -1.053      0.413    -2.55    0.02       -1.895      -0.211 
     dy_2009 |     -2.084      0.439    -4.75    0.00       -2.977      -1.191 
     dy_2010 |     -0.679      0.451    -1.51    0.14       -1.597       0.240 
       _cons |     -0.228      0.285    -0.80    0.43       -0.809       0.353 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 dy_2005 
    dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/3).gap_tr collapsed 
    L(1/2).L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 dy_2005 
    dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010 
    _cons 
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  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.gap_tr collapsed 
    D.L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.80  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.76  Pr > z =  0.446 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =  17.45  Prob > chi2 =  0.002 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =   2.23  Prob > chi2 =  0.694 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(2)    =   1.74  Prob > chi2 =  0.419 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   0.49  Prob > chi2 =  0.783 
  gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, collapse lag(1 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   0.95  Prob > chi2 =  0.331 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.28  Prob > chi2 =  0.733 
  gmm(gap_tr, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   1.86  Prob > chi2 =  0.173 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   0.37  Prob > chi2 =  0.946 
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Table 3.5 Column 2 
 
xtabond2 capb_ngdp_tr L.capb_ngdp_tr gap_tr L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 
maastricht housesys_dpi1 dy_2002-dy_2010 if year>1994 & year<2011 & 
(eu27==1|see6==1), gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, laglimits(1 2) collapse) gmm(gap_tr, 
laglimits (2 3) collapse)  iv(L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht 
housesys_dpi1 dy_2002-dy_2010) two robust small 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: country                         Number of obs      =       464 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        33 
Number of instruments = 21                      Obs per group: min =         5 
F(16, 32)     =     76.55                                      avg =     14.06 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        16 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
capb_ngdp_tr |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
capb_ngdp_tr | 
         L1. |      0.684      0.076     9.03    0.00        0.529       0.838 
             | 
      gap_tr |     -0.153      0.068    -2.23    0.03       -0.292      -0.013 
             | 
    debt2gdp | 
         L1. |      0.009      0.004     2.05    0.05        0.000       0.017 
             | 
        infl |      0.016      0.006     2.85    0.01        0.005       0.028 
legelec_dpi1 |     -0.560      0.202    -2.77    0.01       -0.971      -0.148 
  maastricht |      0.664      0.197     3.36    0.00        0.262       1.066 
housesys_d~1 |     -0.506      0.175    -2.88    0.01       -0.863      -0.149 
     dy_2002 |     -0.584      0.403    -1.45    0.16       -1.405       0.237 
     dy_2003 |     -0.128      0.310    -0.41    0.68       -0.760       0.503 
     dy_2004 |     -0.076      0.295    -0.26    0.80       -0.678       0.525 
     dy_2005 |      0.256      0.296     0.87    0.39       -0.346       0.859 
     dy_2006 |     -0.010      0.240    -0.04    0.97       -0.499       0.479 
     dy_2007 |      0.413      0.445     0.93    0.36       -0.494       1.320 
     dy_2008 |     -1.079      0.408    -2.65    0.01       -1.910      -0.248 
     dy_2009 |     -2.123      0.444    -4.79    0.00       -3.027      -1.220 
     dy_2010 |     -0.733      0.461    -1.59    0.12       -1.672       0.207 
       _cons |     -0.148      0.298    -0.50    0.62       -0.754       0.459 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht housesys_dpi1 dy_2002 dy_2003 
    dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/3).gap_tr collapsed 
    L(1/2).L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht housesys_dpi1 dy_2002 dy_2003 
    dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010 
    _cons 
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  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.gap_tr collapsed 
    D.L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.78  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.82  Pr > z =  0.414 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =  17.45  Prob > chi2 =  0.002 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =   2.29  Prob > chi2 =  0.683 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(2)    =   1.88  Prob > chi2 =  0.391 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   0.41  Prob > chi2 =  0.813 
  gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, collapse lag(1 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   1.02  Prob > chi2 =  0.313 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.27  Prob > chi2 =  0.736 
  gmm(gap_tr, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   1.87  Prob > chi2 =  0.172 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   0.42  Prob > chi2 =  0.936 
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Table 3.5 Column 3 
 
xtabond2 capb_ngdp_tr L.capb_ngdp_tr gap_tr L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 
maastricht housesys_dpi1_eu17 housesys_dpi1_nms10 housesys_dpi1_see6 eu17 nms10 
see6 dy_2002-dy_2010 if year>1994 & year<2011 & (eu27==1|see6==1), 
gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, laglimits(1 2) collapse) gmm(gap_tr, laglimits (2 3) 
collapse)  iv(L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht housesys_dpi1_eu17 
housesys_dpi1_nms10 housesys_dpi1_see6 eu17 nms10 see6 dy_2002-dy_2010) two 
robust small nocons 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: country                         Number of obs      =       464 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        33 
Number of instruments = 25                      Obs per group: min =         5 
F(21, 33)     =   3202.28                                      avg =     14.06 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        16 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
capb_ngdp_tr |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
capb_ngdp_tr | 
         L1. |      0.689      0.076     9.06    0.00        0.534       0.843 
             | 
      gap_tr |     -0.158      0.068    -2.31    0.03       -0.296      -0.019 
             | 
    debt2gdp | 
         L1. |      0.005      0.005     1.03    0.31       -0.005       0.016 
             | 
        infl |      0.020      0.005     3.92    0.00        0.009       0.030 
legelec_dpi1 |     -0.550      0.204    -2.69    0.01       -0.966      -0.134 
  maastricht |      0.534      0.201     2.66    0.01        0.125       0.943 
housesys_~17 |     -0.466      0.153    -3.05    0.00       -0.778      -0.155 
housesys_~10 |     -0.205      0.281    -0.73    0.47       -0.777       0.367 
housesys_~e6 |     -1.043      0.519    -2.01    0.05       -2.099       0.013 
        eu17 |      0.197      0.416     0.47    0.64       -0.650       1.044 
       nms10 |     -0.333      0.304    -1.10    0.28       -0.952       0.285 
        see6 |      0.274      0.302     0.91    0.37       -0.340       0.888 
     dy_2002 |     -0.598      0.398    -1.50    0.14       -1.409       0.212 
     dy_2003 |     -0.166      0.298    -0.56    0.58       -0.773       0.440 
     dy_2004 |     -0.125      0.287    -0.44    0.67       -0.710       0.459 
     dy_2005 |      0.203      0.287     0.71    0.49       -0.382       0.787 
     dy_2006 |     -0.058      0.228    -0.26    0.80       -0.523       0.406 
     dy_2007 |      0.363      0.443     0.82    0.42       -0.539       1.265 
     dy_2008 |     -1.139      0.417    -2.73    0.01       -1.988      -0.290 
     dy_2009 |     -2.186      0.435    -5.02    0.00       -3.071      -1.301 
     dy_2010 |     -0.785      0.457    -1.72    0.10       -1.716       0.145 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht housesys_dpi1_eu17 
    housesys_dpi1_nms10 housesys_dpi1_see6 eu17 nms10 see6 dy_2002 dy_2003 
    dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
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    L(2/3).gap_tr collapsed 
    L(1/2).L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht housesys_dpi1_eu17 
    housesys_dpi1_nms10 housesys_dpi1_see6 eu17 nms10 see6 dy_2002 dy_2003 
    dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.gap_tr collapsed 
    D.L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.80  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.87  Pr > z =  0.385 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =  17.54  Prob > chi2 =  0.002 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =   2.32  Prob > chi2 =  0.678 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(2)    =   1.98  Prob > chi2 =  0.371 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   0.33  Prob > chi2 =  0.847 
  gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, collapse lag(1 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   0.99  Prob > chi2 =  0.321 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.33  Prob > chi2 =  0.722 
  gmm(gap_tr, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   1.85  Prob > chi2 =  0.173 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   0.46  Prob > chi2 =  0.927 
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Table 3.5 Column 4 
 
xtabond2 capb_ngdp_tr L.capb_ngdp_tr gap_tr L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 
maastricht pres_dpi dy_2002-dy_2010 if year>1994 & year<2011 & 
(eu27==1|see6==1), gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, laglimits(1 2) collapse) gmm(gap_tr, 
laglimits (2 3) collapse)  iv(L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht pres_dpi 
dy_2002-dy_2010) two robust small 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: country                         Number of obs      =       464 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        33 
Number of instruments = 21                      Obs per group: min =         5 
F(16, 32)     =     80.18                                      avg =     14.06 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        16 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
capb_ngdp_tr |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
capb_ngdp_tr | 
         L1. |      0.690      0.074     9.34    0.00        0.539       0.840 
             | 
      gap_tr |     -0.155      0.068    -2.28    0.03       -0.293      -0.017 
             | 
    debt2gdp | 
         L1. |      0.008      0.004     1.79    0.08       -0.001       0.016 
             | 
        infl |      0.017      0.005     3.09    0.00        0.006       0.028 
legelec_dpi1 |     -0.558      0.201    -2.77    0.01       -0.969      -0.148 
  maastricht |      0.627      0.199     3.15    0.00        0.221       1.032 
    pres_dpi |     -0.353      0.190    -1.86    0.07       -0.740       0.034 
     dy_2002 |     -0.590      0.401    -1.47    0.15       -1.406       0.226 
     dy_2003 |     -0.113      0.311    -0.36    0.72       -0.748       0.521 
     dy_2004 |     -0.057      0.295    -0.19    0.85       -0.658       0.545 
     dy_2005 |      0.283      0.299     0.95    0.35       -0.326       0.892 
     dy_2006 |      0.039      0.248     0.16    0.88       -0.467       0.544 
     dy_2007 |      0.449      0.451     1.00    0.33       -0.469       1.367 
     dy_2008 |     -1.046      0.411    -2.54    0.02       -1.883      -0.209 
     dy_2009 |     -2.084      0.440    -4.74    0.00       -2.981      -1.188 
     dy_2010 |     -0.689      0.447    -1.54    0.13       -1.600       0.222 
       _cons |     -0.153      0.300    -0.51    0.61       -0.765       0.458 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht pres_dpi dy_2002 dy_2003 
    dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/3).gap_tr collapsed 
    L(1/2).L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht pres_dpi dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 
    dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010 
    _cons 
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  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.gap_tr collapsed 
    D.L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.79  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.77  Pr > z =  0.442 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =  17.16  Prob > chi2 =  0.002 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =   2.20  Prob > chi2 =  0.699 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(2)    =   1.75  Prob > chi2 =  0.417 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   0.45  Prob > chi2 =  0.799 
  gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, collapse lag(1 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   0.93  Prob > chi2 =  0.335 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.27  Prob > chi2 =  0.736 
  gmm(gap_tr, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   1.83  Prob > chi2 =  0.176 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   0.37  Prob > chi2 =  0.946 
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Table 3.5 Column 5 
 
xtabond2 capb_ngdp_tr L.capb_ngdp_tr gap_tr L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 
maastricht pres_dpi_eu17 pres_dpi_nms10 pres_dpi_see6 eu17 nms10 see6 dy_2002-
dy_2010 if year>1994 & year<2011 & (eu27==1|see6==1), gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, 
laglimits(1 2) collapse) gmm(gap_tr, laglimits (2 3) collapse)  iv(L.debt2gdp 
infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht pres_dpi_eu17 pres_dpi_nms10 pres_dpi_see6 eu17 
nms10 see6 dy_2002-dy_2010) two robust small nocons 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. 
Using a generalized inverse to calculate optimal weighting matrix for two-step 
estimation. 
Difference-in-Sargan/Hansen statistics may be negative. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: country                         Number of obs      =       464 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        33 
Number of instruments = 25                      Obs per group: min =         5 
F(21, 33)     =     76.89                                      avg =     14.06 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        16 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
capb_ngdp_tr |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
capb_ngdp_tr | 
         L1. |      0.711      0.075     9.43    0.00        0.557       0.864 
             | 
      gap_tr |     -0.169      0.068    -2.49    0.02       -0.306      -0.031 
             | 
    debt2gdp | 
         L1. |      0.005      0.005     0.93    0.36       -0.005       0.015 
             | 
        infl |      0.020      0.005     3.92    0.00        0.010       0.030 
legelec_dpi1 |     -0.588      0.224    -2.62    0.01       -1.045      -0.131 
  maastricht |     -0.090      1.846    -0.05    0.96       -3.846       3.666 
pres_dpi_~17 |     -10.369     22.405   -0.46    0.65      -55.952      35.213 
pres_dpi_~10 |     -0.378      0.226    -1.67    0.10       -0.838       0.083 
pres_dpi_s~6 |     -0.028      0.290    -0.10    0.92       -0.618       0.561 
        eu17 |      0.892      2.206     0.40    0.69       -3.595       5.380 
       nms10 |     -0.176      0.381    -0.46    0.65       -0.951       0.600 
        see6 |      0.086      0.357     0.24    0.81       -0.639       0.812 
     dy_2002 |     -0.665      0.443    -1.50    0.14       -1.566       0.236 
     dy_2003 |     -0.218      0.425    -0.51    0.61       -1.084       0.647 
     dy_2004 |     -0.160      0.404    -0.40    0.69       -0.981       0.661 
     dy_2005 |      0.142      0.469     0.30    0.76       -0.812       1.097 
     dy_2006 |     -0.045      0.332    -0.14    0.89       -0.722       0.631 
     dy_2007 |      0.417      0.454     0.92    0.36       -0.507       1.341 
     dy_2008 |     -1.111      0.442    -2.51    0.02       -2.010      -0.211 
     dy_2009 |     -2.120      0.445    -4.77    0.00       -3.025      -1.215 
     dy_2010 |     -0.813      0.605    -1.34    0.19       -2.044       0.418 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht pres_dpi_eu17 pres_dpi_nms10 
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    pres_dpi_see6 eu17 nms10 see6 dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 
    dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/3).gap_tr collapsed 
    L(1/2).L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht pres_dpi_eu17 pres_dpi_nms10 
    pres_dpi_see6 eu17 nms10 see6 dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 
    dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.gap_tr collapsed 
    D.L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.88  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.93  Pr > z =  0.352 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =  16.65  Prob > chi2 =  0.002 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =   1.95  Prob > chi2 =  0.745 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(2)    =   1.72  Prob > chi2 =  0.423 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   0.23  Prob > chi2 =  0.892 
  gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, collapse lag(1 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.95  Prob > chi2 =  0.583 
  gmm(gap_tr, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.95  Prob > chi2 =  0.583 
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Table 3.5 Column 6 
 
xtabond2 capb_ngdp_tr L.capb_ngdp_tr gap_tr L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 
maastricht dec_exp dy_2002-dy_2010 if year>1994 & year<2011 & 
(eu27==1|see6==1), gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, laglimits(1 2) collapse) gmm(gap_tr, 
laglimits (2 3) collapse)  iv(L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht dec_exp 
dy_2002-dy_2010) two robust small 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: country                         Number of obs      =       414 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        27 
Number of instruments = 21                      Obs per group: min =        10 
F(16, 26)     =    205.53                                      avg =     15.33 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        16 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
capb_ngdp_tr |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
capb_ngdp_tr | 
         L1. |      0.700      0.090     7.78    0.00        0.515       0.885 
             | 
      gap_tr |     -0.168      0.055    -3.03    0.01       -0.282      -0.054 
             | 
    debt2gdp | 
         L1. |      0.010      0.004     2.22    0.04        0.001       0.019 
             | 
        infl |      0.021      0.005     4.27    0.00        0.011       0.031 
legelec_dpi1 |     -0.598      0.246    -2.43    0.02       -1.103      -0.093 
  maastricht |      0.387      0.178     2.18    0.04        0.022       0.752 
     dec_exp |      0.025      0.012     2.18    0.04        0.001       0.049 
     dy_2002 |     -0.914      0.376    -2.43    0.02       -1.687      -0.141 
     dy_2003 |     -0.435      0.221    -1.96    0.06       -0.889       0.020 
     dy_2004 |     -0.259      0.329    -0.79    0.44       -0.935       0.417 
     dy_2005 |     -0.016      0.307    -0.05    0.96       -0.648       0.616 
     dy_2006 |     -0.050      0.198    -0.25    0.80       -0.457       0.357 
     dy_2007 |      0.501      0.408     1.23    0.23       -0.337       1.340 
     dy_2008 |     -0.874      0.329    -2.66    0.01       -1.550      -0.198 
     dy_2009 |     -2.671      0.515    -5.18    0.00       -3.731      -1.612 
     dy_2010 |     -1.165      0.499    -2.33    0.03       -2.191      -0.138 
       _cons |     -0.913      0.465    -1.96    0.06       -1.868       0.042 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht dec_exp dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 
    dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/3).gap_tr collapsed 
    L(1/2).L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht dec_exp dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 
    dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010 
    _cons 
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  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.gap_tr collapsed 
    D.L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.53  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   1.16  Pr > z =  0.246 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =  20.30  Prob > chi2 =  0.000 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =   3.25  Prob > chi2 =  0.517 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(2)    =   2.91  Prob > chi2 =  0.234 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   0.34  Prob > chi2 =  0.845 
  gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, collapse lag(1 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   0.81  Prob > chi2 =  0.368 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   2.44  Prob > chi2 =  0.487 
  gmm(gap_tr, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   2.57  Prob > chi2 =  0.109 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   0.68  Prob > chi2 =  0.879 
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Table 3.5 Column 7 
 
xtabond2 capb_ngdp_tr L.capb_ngdp_tr gap_tr L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 
maastricht dec_exp_eu17 dec_exp_nms10 eu17 nms10 dy_2002-dy_2010 if year>1994 & 
year<2011 & (eu27==1|see6==1), gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, laglimits(1 2) collapse) 
gmm(gap_tr, laglimits (2 3) collapse)  iv(L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 
maastricht dec_exp_eu17 dec_exp_nms10 eu17 nms10 dy_2002-dy_2010) two robust 
small nocons 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: country                         Number of obs      =       414 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        27 
Number of instruments = 23                      Obs per group: min =        10 
F(19, 27)     =    910.56                                      avg =     15.33 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        16 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
capb_ngdp_tr |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
capb_ngdp_tr | 
         L1. |      0.702      0.090     7.77    0.00        0.516       0.887 
             | 
      gap_tr |     -0.177      0.055    -3.22    0.00       -0.290      -0.064 
             | 
    debt2gdp | 
         L1. |      0.007      0.006     1.29    0.21       -0.004       0.019 
             | 
        infl |      0.024      0.005     4.58    0.00        0.013       0.035 
legelec_dpi1 |     -0.592      0.242    -2.45    0.02       -1.088      -0.096 
  maastricht |      0.325      0.175     1.85    0.07       -0.035       0.685 
dec_exp_eu17 |      0.022      0.011     2.00    0.06       -0.001       0.044 
dec_exp_n~10 |      0.054      0.042     1.31    0.20       -0.031       0.140 
        eu17 |     -0.570      0.537    -1.06    0.30       -1.671       0.531 
       nms10 |     -1.732      1.161    -1.49    0.15       -4.115       0.651 
     dy_2002 |     -0.916      0.371    -2.47    0.02       -1.677      -0.155 
     dy_2003 |     -0.440      0.197    -2.23    0.03       -0.844      -0.036 
     dy_2004 |     -0.256      0.330    -0.78    0.44       -0.933       0.420 
     dy_2005 |     -0.019      0.314    -0.06    0.95       -0.664       0.625 
     dy_2006 |     -0.025      0.201    -0.13    0.90       -0.437       0.386 
     dy_2007 |      0.542      0.412     1.32    0.20       -0.303       1.387 
     dy_2008 |     -0.868      0.338    -2.57    0.02       -1.562      -0.175 
     dy_2009 |     -2.682      0.523    -5.13    0.00       -3.756      -1.608 
     dy_2010 |     -1.177      0.501    -2.35    0.03       -2.206      -0.148 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht dec_exp_eu17 dec_exp_nms10 eu17 
    nms10 dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 
    dy_2010) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/3).gap_tr collapsed 
    L(1/2).L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
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  Standard 
    L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht dec_exp_eu17 dec_exp_nms10 eu17 
    nms10 dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 
    dy_2010 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.gap_tr collapsed 
    D.L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.62  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   1.16  Pr > z =  0.247 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =  20.86  Prob > chi2 =  0.000 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =   3.17  Prob > chi2 =  0.530 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(2)    =   2.91  Prob > chi2 =  0.234 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   0.26  Prob > chi2 =  0.878 
  gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, collapse lag(1 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   0.62  Prob > chi2 =  0.430 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   2.54  Prob > chi2 =  0.467 
  gmm(gap_tr, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   2.53  Prob > chi2 =  0.111 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   0.63  Prob > chi2 =  0.889 
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Table 3.6 Column 1 
 
xtabond2 capb_ngdp_tr L.capb_ngdp_tr gap_tr L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 
maastricht dy_2002-dy_2010 if year>1994 & year<2011 & (eu27==1|see6==1), 
gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, laglimits(1 2) collapse) gmm(gap_tr, laglimits(2 3) 
collapse)  iv(L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht dy_2002-dy_2010) two 
robust small 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: country                         Number of obs      =       464 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        33 
Number of instruments = 20                      Obs per group: min =         5 
F(15, 32)     =     79.39                                      avg =     14.06 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        16 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
capb_ngdp_tr |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
capb_ngdp_tr | 
         L1. |      0.691      0.074     9.30    0.00        0.539       0.842 
             | 
      gap_tr |     -0.153      0.068    -2.25    0.03       -0.292      -0.015 
             | 
    debt2gdp | 
         L1. |      0.008      0.004     1.90    0.07       -0.001       0.017 
             | 
        infl |      0.017      0.005     3.11    0.00        0.006       0.028 
legelec_dpi1 |     -0.560      0.202    -2.78    0.01       -0.970      -0.149 
  maastricht |      0.665      0.199     3.34    0.00        0.259       1.071 
     dy_2002 |     -0.585      0.402    -1.45    0.16       -1.404       0.235 
     dy_2003 |     -0.107      0.311    -0.34    0.73       -0.740       0.526 
     dy_2004 |     -0.052      0.295    -0.18    0.86       -0.652       0.549 
     dy_2005 |      0.288      0.298     0.97    0.34       -0.319       0.896 
     dy_2006 |      0.035      0.248     0.14    0.89       -0.470       0.539 
     dy_2007 |      0.441      0.449     0.98    0.33       -0.474       1.356 
     dy_2008 |     -1.053      0.413    -2.55    0.02       -1.895      -0.211 
     dy_2009 |     -2.084      0.439    -4.75    0.00       -2.977      -1.191 
     dy_2010 |     -0.679      0.451    -1.51    0.14       -1.597       0.240 
       _cons |     -0.228      0.285    -0.80    0.43       -0.809       0.353 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 dy_2005 
    dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/3).gap_tr collapsed 
    L(1/2).L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 dy_2005 
    dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010 
    _cons 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
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    DL.gap_tr collapsed 
    D.L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.80  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.76  Pr > z =  0.446 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =  17.45  Prob > chi2 =  0.002 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =   2.23  Prob > chi2 =  0.694 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(2)    =   1.74  Prob > chi2 =  0.419 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   0.49  Prob > chi2 =  0.783 
  gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, collapse lag(1 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   0.95  Prob > chi2 =  0.331 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.28  Prob > chi2 =  0.733 
  gmm(gap_tr, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   1.86  Prob > chi2 =  0.173 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   0.37  Prob > chi2 =  0.946 
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Table 3.6 Column 2 
 
xtabond2 capb_ngdp_tr L.capb_ngdp_tr gap_tr L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 
maastricht democ_pol dy_2002-dy_2010 if year>1994 & year<2011 & 
(eu27==1|see6==1), gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, laglimits(1 2) collapse) gmm(gap_tr,  
laglimits (2 3) collapse)  iv(L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht democ_pol 
dy_2002-dy_2010) two robust small 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: country                         Number of obs      =       458 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        32 
Number of instruments = 21                      Obs per group: min =         5 
F(16, 31)     =     64.93                                      avg =     14.31 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        16 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
capb_ngdp_tr |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
capb_ngdp_tr | 
         L1. |      0.698      0.074     9.49    0.00        0.548       0.848 
             | 
      gap_tr |     -0.153      0.069    -2.24    0.03       -0.293      -0.013 
             | 
    debt2gdp | 
         L1. |      0.006      0.004     1.32    0.20       -0.003       0.015 
             | 
        infl |      0.020      0.005     4.00    0.00        0.010       0.030 
legelec_dpi1 |     -0.593      0.205    -2.90    0.01       -1.011      -0.175 
  maastricht |      0.574      0.183     3.14    0.00        0.201       0.947 
   democ_pol |      0.289      0.125     2.32    0.03        0.035       0.544 
     dy_2002 |     -0.610      0.397    -1.54    0.13       -1.419       0.200 
     dy_2003 |     -0.110      0.295    -0.37    0.71       -0.712       0.492 
     dy_2004 |     -0.078      0.301    -0.26    0.80       -0.691       0.536 
     dy_2005 |      0.219      0.312     0.70    0.49       -0.416       0.855 
     dy_2006 |     -0.057      0.254    -0.23    0.82       -0.574       0.460 
     dy_2007 |      0.474      0.453     1.05    0.30       -0.449       1.398 
     dy_2008 |     -1.015      0.396    -2.56    0.02       -1.822      -0.208 
     dy_2009 |     -2.103      0.449    -4.68    0.00       -3.019      -1.187 
     dy_2010 |     -0.705      0.461    -1.53    0.14       -1.645       0.235 
       _cons |     -2.855      1.088    -2.62    0.01       -5.075      -0.636 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht democ_pol dy_2002 dy_2003 
    dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/3).gap_tr collapsed 
    L(1/2).L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht democ_pol dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 
    dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010 
    _cons 
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  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.gap_tr collapsed 
    D.L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.82  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   1.01  Pr > z =  0.314 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =  17.70  Prob > chi2 =  0.001 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =   2.25  Prob > chi2 =  0.690 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(2)    =   1.82  Prob > chi2 =  0.403 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   0.43  Prob > chi2 =  0.806 
  gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, collapse lag(1 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   0.72  Prob > chi2 =  0.398 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.53  Prob > chi2 =  0.675 
  gmm(gap_tr, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   2.02  Prob > chi2 =  0.155 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   0.23  Prob > chi2 =  0.973 
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Table 3.6 Column 3 
 
xtabond2 capb_ngdp_tr L.capb_ngdp_tr gap_tr L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 
maastricht democ_pol_eu17 democ_pol_nms10 democ_pol_see6 eu17 nms10 see6 
dy_2002-dy_2010 if year>1994 & year<2011 & (eu27==1|see6==1),  
gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, laglimits(1 2) collapse) gmm(gap_tr, laglimits (2 3) 
collapse)  iv(L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht democ_pol_eu17 
democ_pol_nms10 democ_pol_see6 eu17 nms10 see6 dy_2002-dy_2010) two robust  
small nocons 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: country                         Number of obs      =       458 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        32 
Number of instruments = 25                      Obs per group: min =         5 
F(21, 32)     =    105.46                                      avg =     14.31 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        16 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
capb_ngdp_tr |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
capb_ngdp_tr | 
         L1. |      0.701      0.072     9.70    0.00        0.554       0.848 
             | 
      gap_tr |     -0.152      0.072    -2.13    0.04       -0.298      -0.006 
             | 
    debt2gdp | 
         L1. |      0.004      0.005     0.90    0.38       -0.006       0.015 
             | 
        infl |      0.021      0.005     4.49    0.00        0.011       0.031 
legelec_dpi1 |     -0.602      0.211    -2.85    0.01       -1.033      -0.172 
  maastricht |      0.502      0.184     2.74    0.01        0.128       0.876 
democ_pol~17 |      0.322      0.166     1.93    0.06       -0.017       0.661 
democ_pol~10 |      0.173      0.142     1.22    0.23       -0.116       0.463 
democ_pol~e6 |      0.589      0.358     1.64    0.11       -0.141       1.318 
        eu17 |     -2.994      1.581    -1.89    0.07       -6.214       0.226 
       nms10 |     -1.887      1.311    -1.44    0.16       -4.558       0.784 
        see6 |     -4.807      2.989    -1.61    0.12       -10.896       1.282 
     dy_2002 |     -0.650      0.379    -1.71    0.10       -1.423       0.122 
     dy_2003 |     -0.157      0.266    -0.59    0.56       -0.699       0.385 
     dy_2004 |     -0.124      0.298    -0.42    0.68       -0.730       0.482 
     dy_2005 |      0.146      0.326     0.45    0.66       -0.519       0.810 
     dy_2006 |     -0.181      0.300    -0.60    0.55       -0.791       0.430 
     dy_2007 |      0.335      0.524     0.64    0.53       -0.732       1.402 
     dy_2008 |     -1.154      0.452    -2.55    0.02       -2.074      -0.233 
     dy_2009 |     -2.235      0.426    -5.24    0.00       -3.103      -1.367 
     dy_2010 |     -0.816      0.434    -1.88    0.07       -1.701       0.068 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht democ_pol_eu17 democ_pol_nms10 
    democ_pol_see6 eu17 nms10 see6 dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 
    dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
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    L(2/3).gap_tr collapsed 
    L(1/2).L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht democ_pol_eu17 democ_pol_nms10 
    democ_pol_see6 eu17 nms10 see6 dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 
    dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.gap_tr collapsed 
    D.L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.81  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   1.06  Pr > z =  0.288 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =  17.34  Prob > chi2 =  0.002 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =   2.19  Prob > chi2 =  0.701 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(2)    =   1.67  Prob > chi2 =  0.433 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   0.51  Prob > chi2 =  0.773 
  gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, collapse lag(1 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   0.71  Prob > chi2 =  0.401 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.48  Prob > chi2 =  0.686 
  gmm(gap_tr, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   1.93  Prob > chi2 =  0.164 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   0.25  Prob > chi2 =  0.969 
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Table 3.6 Column 4 
 
xtabond2 capb_ngdp_tr L.capb_ngdp_tr gap_tr L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 
maastricht corr_wb dy_2002-dy_2010 if year>1994 & year<2011 & 
(eu27==1|see6==1), gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, laglimits(1 2) collapse) gmm(gap_tr, 
laglimits (2 3) collapse) iv(L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht corr_wb 
dy_2002-dy_2010) two robust small 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: country                         Number of obs      =       448 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        33 
Number of instruments = 21                      Obs per group: min =         5 
F(16, 32)     =     62.64                                      avg =     13.58 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        15 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
capb_ngdp_tr |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
capb_ngdp_tr | 
         L1. |      0.690      0.073     9.40    0.00        0.540       0.839 
             | 
      gap_tr |     -0.174      0.063    -2.79    0.01       -0.302      -0.047 
             | 
    debt2gdp | 
         L1. |      0.008      0.004     2.21    0.03        0.001       0.016 
             | 
        infl |      0.022      0.005     4.56    0.00        0.012       0.033 
legelec_dpi1 |     -0.614      0.210    -2.93    0.01       -1.042      -0.187 
  maastricht |      0.572      0.260     2.20    0.04        0.042       1.102 
     corr_wb |      0.383      0.137     2.80    0.01        0.104       0.662 
     dy_2002 |     -0.519      0.393    -1.32    0.20       -1.320       0.282 
     dy_2003 |     -0.091      0.306    -0.30    0.77       -0.714       0.532 
     dy_2004 |      0.029      0.297     0.10    0.92       -0.575       0.633 
     dy_2005 |      0.302      0.287     1.05    0.30       -0.283       0.887 
     dy_2006 |      0.189      0.253     0.75    0.46       -0.327       0.705 
     dy_2007 |      0.703      0.460     1.53    0.14       -0.235       1.640 
     dy_2008 |     -0.849      0.397    -2.14    0.04       -1.657      -0.041 
     dy_2009 |     -1.801      0.440    -4.09    0.00       -2.698      -0.904 
     dy_2010 |     -0.577      0.446    -1.29    0.21       -1.487       0.332 
       _cons |     -0.609      0.231    -2.64    0.01       -1.080      -0.138 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht corr_wb dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 
    dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/3).gap_tr collapsed 
    L(1/2).L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht corr_wb dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 
    dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010 
    _cons 
359 
 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.gap_tr collapsed 
    D.L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.71  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.48  Pr > z =  0.631 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =  21.42  Prob > chi2 =  0.000 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =   2.84  Prob > chi2 =  0.584 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(2)    =   1.30  Prob > chi2 =  0.522 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   1.55  Prob > chi2 =  0.462 
  gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, collapse lag(1 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   0.27  Prob > chi2 =  0.605 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   2.58  Prob > chi2 =  0.462 
  gmm(gap_tr, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   1.47  Prob > chi2 =  0.226 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.38  Prob > chi2 =  0.711 
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Table 3.6 Column 5 
 
xtabond2 capb_ngdp_tr L.capb_ngdp_tr gap_tr L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 
maastricht corr_wb_eu17 corr_wb_nms10 corr_wb_see6 eu17 nms10 see6 dy_2002-
dy_2010 if year>1994 & year<2011 & (eu27==1|see6==1), gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, 
laglimits(1 2) collapse) gmm(gap_tr, laglimits (2 3) collapse)  iv(L.debt2gdp 
infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht corr_wb_eu17 corr_wb_nms10 corr_wb_see6 eu17 nms10 
see6 dy_2002-dy_2010) two robust small nocons 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: country                         Number of obs      =       448 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        33 
Number of instruments = 25                      Obs per group: min =         5 
F(21, 33)     =     90.30                                      avg =     13.58 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        15 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
capb_ngdp_tr |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
capb_ngdp_tr | 
         L1. |      0.656      0.074     8.87    0.00        0.505       0.806 
             | 
      gap_tr |     -0.185      0.061    -3.00    0.01       -0.310      -0.060 
             | 
    debt2gdp | 
         L1. |      0.016      0.006     2.75    0.01        0.004       0.027 
             | 
        infl |      0.023      0.004     5.88    0.00        0.015       0.031 
legelec_dpi1 |     -0.592      0.203    -2.91    0.01       -1.005      -0.178 
  maastricht |      0.501      0.239     2.10    0.04        0.015       0.986 
corr_wb_eu17 |      0.944      0.284     3.33    0.00        0.367       1.521 
corr_wb_n~10 |      0.541      0.393     1.38    0.18       -0.259       1.340 
corr_wb_see6 |      1.859      0.919     2.02    0.05       -0.011       3.729 
        eu17 |     -1.946      0.626    -3.11    0.00       -3.220      -0.672 
       nms10 |     -0.881      0.276    -3.19    0.00       -1.442      -0.320 
        see6 |      0.178      0.514     0.35    0.73       -0.867       1.223 
     dy_2002 |     -0.514      0.379    -1.36    0.18       -1.285       0.257 
     dy_2003 |     -0.160      0.289    -0.55    0.58       -0.749       0.428 
     dy_2004 |     -0.072      0.280    -0.26    0.80       -0.642       0.499 
     dy_2005 |      0.248      0.271     0.92    0.37       -0.302       0.799 
     dy_2006 |      0.133      0.244     0.55    0.59       -0.363       0.630 
     dy_2007 |      0.647      0.444     1.46    0.16       -0.257       1.550 
     dy_2008 |     -0.944      0.404    -2.34    0.03       -1.766      -0.122 
     dy_2009 |     -2.026      0.431    -4.70    0.00       -2.902      -1.149 
     dy_2010 |     -0.874      0.415    -2.11    0.04       -1.718      -0.030 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht corr_wb_eu17 corr_wb_nms10 
    corr_wb_see6 eu17 nms10 see6 dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 
    dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/3).gap_tr collapsed 
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    L(1/2).L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht corr_wb_eu17 corr_wb_nms10 
    corr_wb_see6 eu17 nms10 see6 dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 
    dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.gap_tr collapsed 
    D.L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.68  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.44  Pr > z =  0.662 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =  19.60  Prob > chi2 =  0.001 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =   2.21  Prob > chi2 =  0.697 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(2)    =   1.27  Prob > chi2 =  0.529 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   0.94  Prob > chi2 =  0.625 
  gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, collapse lag(1 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   2.21  Prob > chi2 =  0.529 
  gmm(gap_tr, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   1.45  Prob > chi2 =  0.229 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   0.77  Prob > chi2 =  0.858 
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Table 3.6 Column 6 
 
xtabond2 capb_ngdp_tr L.capb_ngdp_tr gap_tr L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 
maastricht corr_wb democ_pol dy_2002-dy_2010 if year>1994 & year<2011 & 
(eu27==1|see6==1), gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, laglimits(1 2) collapse) gmm(gap_tr, 
laglimits (2 3) collapse)  iv(L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht corr_wb 
democ_pol dy_2002-dy_2010) two robust small 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: country                         Number of obs      =       442 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        32 
Number of instruments = 22                      Obs per group: min =         5 
F(17, 31)     =     53.48                                      avg =     13.81 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        15 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
capb_ngdp_tr |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
capb_ngdp_tr | 
         L1. |      0.692      0.075     9.28    0.00        0.540       0.844 
             | 
      gap_tr |     -0.177      0.065    -2.74    0.01       -0.309      -0.046 
             | 
    debt2gdp | 
         L1. |      0.008      0.004     1.86    0.07       -0.001       0.016 
             | 
        infl |      0.023      0.005     4.74    0.00        0.013       0.032 
legelec_dpi1 |     -0.629      0.214    -2.93    0.01       -1.066      -0.192 
  maastricht |      0.550      0.257     2.14    0.04        0.026       1.074 
     corr_wb |      0.339      0.185     1.84    0.08       -0.038       0.716 
   democ_pol |      0.090      0.159     0.56    0.58       -0.235       0.415 
     dy_2002 |     -0.543      0.389    -1.40    0.17       -1.337       0.250 
     dy_2003 |     -0.130      0.291    -0.45    0.66       -0.724       0.464 
     dy_2004 |     -0.019      0.304    -0.06    0.95       -0.639       0.600 
     dy_2005 |      0.242      0.303     0.80    0.43       -0.376       0.860 
     dy_2006 |      0.124      0.279     0.45    0.66       -0.444       0.692 
     dy_2007 |      0.739      0.491     1.50    0.14       -0.263       1.740 
     dy_2008 |     -0.810      0.397    -2.04    0.05       -1.619      -0.001 
     dy_2009 |     -1.883      0.447    -4.21    0.00       -2.795      -0.971 
     dy_2010 |     -0.632      0.447    -1.41    0.17       -1.544       0.280 
       _cons |     -1.381      1.321    -1.05    0.30       -4.075       1.314 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht corr_wb democ_pol dy_2002 
    dy_2003 dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/3).gap_tr collapsed 
    L(1/2).L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht corr_wb democ_pol dy_2002 dy_2003 
    dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010 
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    _cons 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.gap_tr collapsed 
    D.L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.72  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.65  Pr > z =  0.515 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =  21.73  Prob > chi2 =  0.000 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =   2.80  Prob > chi2 =  0.591 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(2)    =   1.48  Prob > chi2 =  0.476 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   1.32  Prob > chi2 =  0.517 
  gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, collapse lag(1 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   0.13  Prob > chi2 =  0.723 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   2.68  Prob > chi2 =  0.444 
  gmm(gap_tr, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   1.67  Prob > chi2 =  0.196 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.13  Prob > chi2 =  0.770 
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Table 3.6 Column 7 
 
xtabond2 capb_ngdp_tr L.capb_ngdp_tr gap_tr L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 
maastricht corr_wb democ_pol corr_wb_democ_pol dy_2002-dy_2010 if year>1994 & 
year<2011 & (eu27==1|see6==1), gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, laglimits(1 2) collapse) 
gmm(gap_tr, laglimits (2 3) collapse)  iv(L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 
maastricht corr_wb democ_pol corr_wb_democ_pol dy_2002-dy_2010) two robust 
small 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: country                         Number of obs      =       442 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        32 
Number of instruments = 23                      Obs per group: min =         5 
F(18, 31)     =     53.61                                      avg =     13.81 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        15 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
capb_ngdp_tr |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
capb_ngdp_tr | 
         L1. |      0.691      0.075     9.27    0.00        0.539       0.843 
             | 
      gap_tr |     -0.178      0.065    -2.75    0.01       -0.310      -0.046 
             | 
    debt2gdp | 
         L1. |      0.008      0.004     1.98    0.06       -0.000       0.016 
             | 
        infl |      0.023      0.005     4.69    0.00        0.013       0.033 
legelec_dpi1 |     -0.628      0.215    -2.92    0.01       -1.067      -0.189 
  maastricht |      0.545      0.255     2.14    0.04        0.024       1.066 
     corr_wb |      0.408      1.272     0.32    0.75       -2.186       3.002 
   democ_pol |      0.084      0.155     0.54    0.59       -0.233       0.401 
corr_wb_de~l |     -0.007      0.137    -0.05    0.96       -0.286       0.273 
     dy_2002 |     -0.553      0.388    -1.43    0.16       -1.344       0.238 
     dy_2003 |     -0.139      0.287    -0.49    0.63       -0.724       0.445 
     dy_2004 |     -0.024      0.301    -0.08    0.94       -0.637       0.589 
     dy_2005 |      0.238      0.303     0.79    0.44       -0.380       0.856 
     dy_2006 |      0.122      0.280     0.44    0.67       -0.449       0.693 
     dy_2007 |      0.739      0.496     1.49    0.15       -0.273       1.752 
     dy_2008 |     -0.807      0.405    -2.00    0.05       -1.632       0.018 
     dy_2009 |     -1.890      0.444    -4.25    0.00       -2.797      -0.984 
     dy_2010 |     -0.645      0.436    -1.48    0.15       -1.533       0.244 
       _cons |     -1.331      1.276    -1.04    0.30       -3.933       1.271 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht corr_wb democ_pol 
    corr_wb_democ_pol dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 
    dy_2009 dy_2010) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/3).gap_tr collapsed 
    L(1/2).L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
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  Standard 
    L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht corr_wb democ_pol 
    corr_wb_democ_pol dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 
    dy_2009 dy_2010 
    _cons 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.gap_tr collapsed 
    D.L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.72  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.65  Pr > z =  0.515 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =  22.22  Prob > chi2 =  0.000 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =   2.83  Prob > chi2 =  0.587 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(2)    =   1.48  Prob > chi2 =  0.476 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   1.35  Prob > chi2 =  0.510 
  gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, collapse lag(1 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   0.10  Prob > chi2 =  0.748 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   2.73  Prob > chi2 =  0.436 
  gmm(gap_tr, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   1.68  Prob > chi2 =  0.194 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.15  Prob > chi2 =  0.766 
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Table 3.7 Column 1 
 
xtabond2 capb_ngdp_tr L.capb_ngdp_tr gap_tr L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 
maastricht dy_2002-dy_2010 if year>1994 & year<2011 & (eu27==1|see6==1), 
gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, laglimits(1 2) collapse) gmm(gap_tr, laglimits(2 3) 
collapse) iv(L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht dy_2002-dy_2010) two 
robust small 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: country                         Number of obs      =       464 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        33 
Number of instruments = 20                      Obs per group: min =         5 
F(15, 32)     =     79.39                                      avg =     14.06 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        16 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
capb_ngdp_tr |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
capb_ngdp_tr | 
         L1. |      0.691      0.074     9.30    0.00        0.539       0.842 
             | 
      gap_tr |     -0.153      0.068    -2.25    0.03       -0.292      -0.015 
             | 
    debt2gdp | 
         L1. |      0.008      0.004     1.90    0.07       -0.001       0.017 
             | 
        infl |      0.017      0.005     3.11    0.00        0.006       0.028 
legelec_dpi1 |     -0.560      0.202    -2.78    0.01       -0.970      -0.149 
  maastricht |      0.665      0.199     3.34    0.00        0.259       1.071 
     dy_2002 |     -0.585      0.402    -1.45    0.16       -1.404       0.235 
     dy_2003 |     -0.107      0.311    -0.34    0.73       -0.740       0.526 
     dy_2004 |     -0.052      0.295    -0.18    0.86       -0.652       0.549 
     dy_2005 |      0.288      0.298     0.97    0.34       -0.319       0.896 
     dy_2006 |      0.035      0.248     0.14    0.89       -0.470       0.539 
     dy_2007 |      0.441      0.449     0.98    0.33       -0.474       1.356 
     dy_2008 |     -1.053      0.413    -2.55    0.02       -1.895      -0.211 
     dy_2009 |     -2.084      0.439    -4.75    0.00       -2.977      -1.191 
     dy_2010 |     -0.679      0.451    -1.51    0.14       -1.597       0.240 
       _cons |     -0.228      0.285    -0.80    0.43       -0.809       0.353 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 dy_2005 
    dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/3).gap_tr collapsed 
    L(1/2).L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 dy_2005 
    dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010 
    _cons 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
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    DL.gap_tr collapsed 
    D.L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.80  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.76  Pr > z =  0.446 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =  17.45  Prob > chi2 =  0.002 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =   2.23  Prob > chi2 =  0.694 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(2)    =   1.74  Prob > chi2 =  0.419 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   0.49  Prob > chi2 =  0.783 
  gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, collapse lag(1 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   0.95  Prob > chi2 =  0.331 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.28  Prob > chi2 =  0.733 
  gmm(gap_tr, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   1.86  Prob > chi2 =  0.173 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   0.37  Prob > chi2 =  0.946 
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Table 3.7 Column 2 
 
xtabond2 capb_ngdp_tr L.capb_ngdp_tr gap_tr L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 
maastricht dy_2002-dy_2009 if year>1994 & year<2010 & (eu27==1), 
gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, laglimits(1 2) collapse) gmm(gap_tr, laglimits (2 3) 
collapse)  iv(L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht dy_2002-dy_2009) two 
robust small 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: country                         Number of obs      =       387 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        27 
Number of instruments = 19                      Obs per group: min =         9 
F(14, 26)     =     61.55                                      avg =     14.33 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        15 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
capb_ngdp_tr |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
capb_ngdp_tr | 
         L1. |      0.676      0.111     6.08    0.00        0.447       0.904 
             | 
      gap_tr |     -0.167      0.062    -2.70    0.01       -0.294      -0.040 
             | 
    debt2gdp | 
         L1. |      0.011      0.007     1.60    0.12       -0.003       0.025 
             | 
        infl |      0.015      0.006     2.40    0.02        0.002       0.028 
legelec_dpi1 |     -0.631      0.228    -2.76    0.01       -1.100      -0.161 
  maastricht |      0.485      0.187     2.59    0.02        0.100       0.869 
     dy_2002 |     -0.752      0.369    -2.04    0.05       -1.511       0.007 
     dy_2003 |     -0.317      0.232    -1.37    0.18       -0.793       0.160 
     dy_2004 |     -0.142      0.361    -0.39    0.70       -0.884       0.600 
     dy_2005 |      0.079      0.326     0.24    0.81       -0.592       0.749 
     dy_2006 |      0.107      0.291     0.37    0.72       -0.493       0.706 
     dy_2007 |      0.441      0.499     0.88    0.38       -0.585       1.467 
     dy_2008 |     -0.952      0.322    -2.95    0.01       -1.615      -0.289 
     dy_2009 |     -2.629      0.541    -4.86    0.00       -3.741      -1.516 
       _cons |     -0.203      0.436    -0.47    0.65       -1.098       0.693 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 dy_2005 
    dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/3).gap_tr collapsed 
    L(1/2).L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 dy_2005 
    dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 
    _cons 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.gap_tr collapsed 
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    D.L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.11  Pr > z =  0.002 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   1.19  Pr > z =  0.234 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =  18.59  Prob > chi2 =  0.001 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =   3.54  Prob > chi2 =  0.473 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(2)    =   2.86  Prob > chi2 =  0.240 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   0.68  Prob > chi2 =  0.713 
  gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, collapse lag(1 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =  0.962 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   3.53  Prob > chi2 =  0.317 
  gmm(gap_tr, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   3.50  Prob > chi2 =  0.061 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   0.03  Prob > chi2 =  0.999 
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Table 3.7 Column 3 
 
xtabond2 capb_ngdp_tr L.capb_ngdp_tr gap_tr L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 
maastricht govparty dy_2002-dy_2009 if year>1994 & year<2010 & (eu27==1), 
gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, laglimits(1 2) collapse) gmm(gap_tr, laglimits (2 3) 
collapse)  iv(L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht govparty dy_2002-dy_2009) 
two robust small 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: country                         Number of obs      =       386 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        27 
Number of instruments = 20                      Obs per group: min =         9 
F(15, 26)     =     66.39                                      avg =     14.30 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        15 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
capb_ngdp_tr |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
capb_ngdp_tr | 
         L1. |      0.680      0.112     6.06    0.00        0.449       0.910 
             | 
      gap_tr |     -0.168      0.063    -2.68    0.01       -0.296      -0.039 
             | 
    debt2gdp | 
         L1. |      0.011      0.007     1.67    0.11       -0.003       0.024 
             | 
        infl |      0.015      0.006     2.36    0.03        0.002       0.028 
legelec_dpi1 |     -0.623      0.228    -2.74    0.01       -1.091      -0.155 
  maastricht |      0.480      0.191     2.50    0.02        0.086       0.873 
    govparty |     -0.027      0.068    -0.39    0.70       -0.167       0.114 
     dy_2002 |     -0.763      0.370    -2.06    0.05       -1.523      -0.003 
     dy_2003 |     -0.329      0.242    -1.36    0.19       -0.828       0.169 
     dy_2004 |     -0.155      0.365    -0.42    0.67       -0.905       0.595 
     dy_2005 |      0.066      0.329     0.20    0.84       -0.611       0.743 
     dy_2006 |      0.106      0.292     0.36    0.72       -0.494       0.705 
     dy_2007 |      0.461      0.507     0.91    0.37       -0.582       1.503 
     dy_2008 |     -0.928      0.323    -2.87    0.01       -1.593      -0.264 
     dy_2009 |     -2.602      0.553    -4.70    0.00       -3.739      -1.465 
       _cons |     -0.134      0.504    -0.27    0.79       -1.169       0.901 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht govparty dy_2002 dy_2003 
    dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/3).gap_tr collapsed 
    L(1/2).L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht govparty dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 
    dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 
    _cons 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
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    DL.gap_tr collapsed 
    D.L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.14  Pr > z =  0.002 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   1.18  Pr > z =  0.239 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =  17.05  Prob > chi2 =  0.002 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =   3.37  Prob > chi2 =  0.497 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(2)    =   2.88  Prob > chi2 =  0.237 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   0.50  Prob > chi2 =  0.780 
  gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, collapse lag(1 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =  0.975 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   3.37  Prob > chi2 =  0.338 
  gmm(gap_tr, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   3.33  Prob > chi2 =  0.068 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   0.04  Prob > chi2 =  0.998 
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Table 3.7 Column 4 
 
xtabond2 capb_ngdp_tr L.capb_ngdp_tr gap_tr L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 
maastricht govparty_eu17 govparty_nms10 eu17 nms10 dy_2002-dy_2009 if year>1994 
& year<2010 & (eu27==1), gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, laglimits(1 2) collapse) 
gmm(gap_tr, laglimits (2 3) collapse)  iv(L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 
maastricht govparty_eu17 govparty_nms10 eu17 nms10 dy_2002-dy_2009) two robust 
small nocons 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: country                         Number of obs      =       386 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        27 
Number of instruments = 22                      Obs per group: min =         9 
F(18, 27)     =     66.77                                      avg =     14.30 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        15 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
capb_ngdp_tr |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
capb_ngdp_tr | 
         L1. |      0.680      0.110     6.20    0.00        0.455       0.905 
             | 
      gap_tr |     -0.170      0.059    -2.88    0.01       -0.292      -0.049 
             | 
    debt2gdp | 
         L1. |      0.007      0.007     1.03    0.31       -0.007       0.022 
             | 
        infl |      0.019      0.006     3.34    0.00        0.007       0.030 
legelec_dpi1 |     -0.633      0.228    -2.77    0.01       -1.101      -0.164 
  maastricht |      0.407      0.196     2.07    0.05        0.004       0.809 
govparty_e~6 |     -0.119      0.054    -2.19    0.04       -0.229      -0.008 
govparty_n~0 |      0.261      0.168     1.55    0.13       -0.084       0.605 
        eu17 |      0.478      0.583     0.82    0.42       -0.719       1.674 
       nms10 |     -0.988      0.594    -1.66    0.11       -2.207       0.231 
     dy_2002 |     -0.865      0.352    -2.46    0.02       -1.587      -0.144 
     dy_2003 |     -0.426      0.232    -1.84    0.08       -0.902       0.049 
     dy_2004 |     -0.202      0.383    -0.53    0.60       -0.988       0.585 
     dy_2005 |      0.011      0.326     0.03    0.97       -0.658       0.680 
     dy_2006 |      0.038      0.325     0.12    0.91       -0.628       0.704 
     dy_2007 |      0.472      0.492     0.96    0.35       -0.536       1.481 
     dy_2008 |     -0.924      0.308    -3.00    0.01       -1.556      -0.291 
     dy_2009 |     -2.507      0.516    -4.86    0.00       -3.566      -1.449 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht govparty_eu17 govparty_nms10 
    eu17 nms10 dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 
    dy_2009) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/3).gap_tr collapsed 
    L(1/2).L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
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    L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht govparty_eu17 govparty_nms10 eu17 
    nms10 dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.gap_tr collapsed 
    D.L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.18  Pr > z =  0.001 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   1.12  Pr > z =  0.261 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =  16.14  Prob > chi2 =  0.003 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =   3.33  Prob > chi2 =  0.504 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(2)    =   2.91  Prob > chi2 =  0.234 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   0.42  Prob > chi2 =  0.810 
  gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, collapse lag(1 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =  0.977 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   3.33  Prob > chi2 =  0.344 
  gmm(gap_tr, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   2.75  Prob > chi2 =  0.097 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   0.58  Prob > chi2 =  0.901 
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Table 3.7 Column 5 
 
xtabond2 capb_ngdp_tr L.capb_ngdp_tr gap_tr L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 
maastricht gov_new dy_2002-dy_2009 if year>1994 & year<2010 & (eu27==1), 
gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, laglimits(1 2) collapse) gmm(gap_tr, laglimits (2 3) 
collapse)  iv(L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht gov_new dy_2002-dy_2009) 
two robust small 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: country                         Number of obs      =       387 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        27 
Number of instruments = 20                      Obs per group: min =         9 
F(15, 26)     =     57.14                                      avg =     14.33 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        15 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
capb_ngdp_tr |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
capb_ngdp_tr | 
         L1. |      0.678      0.114     5.96    0.00        0.444       0.913 
             | 
      gap_tr |     -0.164      0.062    -2.65    0.01       -0.291      -0.037 
             | 
    debt2gdp | 
         L1. |      0.011      0.007     1.63    0.11       -0.003       0.025 
             | 
        infl |      0.014      0.006     2.29    0.03        0.001       0.027 
legelec_dpi1 |     -0.650      0.244    -2.66    0.01       -1.152      -0.147 
  maastricht |      0.476      0.192     2.48    0.02        0.082       0.871 
     gov_new |      0.163      0.258     0.63    0.53       -0.366       0.693 
     dy_2002 |     -0.762      0.381    -2.00    0.06       -1.545       0.020 
     dy_2003 |     -0.308      0.232    -1.33    0.19       -0.785       0.168 
     dy_2004 |     -0.125      0.361    -0.35    0.73       -0.867       0.617 
     dy_2005 |      0.058      0.330     0.18    0.86       -0.620       0.736 
     dy_2006 |      0.092      0.293     0.31    0.76       -0.511       0.695 
     dy_2007 |      0.393      0.490     0.80    0.43       -0.614       1.401 
     dy_2008 |     -0.961      0.324    -2.96    0.01       -1.628      -0.295 
     dy_2009 |     -2.643      0.538    -4.91    0.00       -3.748      -1.537 
       _cons |     -0.253      0.436    -0.58    0.57       -1.150       0.643 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht gov_new dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 
    dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/3).gap_tr collapsed 
    L(1/2).L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht gov_new dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 
    dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 
    _cons 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
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    DL.gap_tr collapsed 
    D.L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.07  Pr > z =  0.002 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   1.16  Pr > z =  0.246 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =  18.60  Prob > chi2 =  0.001 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =   3.57  Prob > chi2 =  0.468 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(2)    =   2.75  Prob > chi2 =  0.252 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   0.81  Prob > chi2 =  0.666 
  gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, collapse lag(1 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   0.01  Prob > chi2 =  0.929 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   3.56  Prob > chi2 =  0.313 
  gmm(gap_tr, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   3.49  Prob > chi2 =  0.062 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   0.08  Prob > chi2 =  0.995 
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Table 3.7 Column 6 
 
xtabond2 capb_ngdp_tr L.capb_ngdp_tr gap_tr L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 
maastricht gov_new_eu17 gov_new_nms10 eu17 nms10 dy_2002-dy_2009 if year>1994 & 
year<2010 & (eu27==1), gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, laglimits(1 2) collapse) gmm(gap_tr, 
laglimits (2 3) collapse)  iv(L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht 
gov_new_eu17 gov_new_nms10  eu17 nms10 dy_2002-dy_2009) two robust small nocons 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: country                         Number of obs      =       387 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        27 
Number of instruments = 22                      Obs per group: min =         9 
F(18, 27)     =     59.10                                      avg =     14.33 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        15 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
capb_ngdp_tr |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
capb_ngdp_tr | 
         L1. |      0.682      0.114     5.99    0.00        0.448       0.916 
             | 
      gap_tr |     -0.168      0.058    -2.88    0.01       -0.288      -0.049 
             | 
    debt2gdp | 
         L1. |      0.007      0.008     0.97    0.34       -0.008       0.023 
             | 
        infl |      0.017      0.006     2.81    0.01        0.005       0.029 
legelec_dpi1 |     -0.645      0.247    -2.62    0.01       -1.152      -0.139 
  maastricht |      0.401      0.181     2.21    0.04        0.029       0.772 
gov_new_eu17 |      0.171      0.210     0.81    0.42       -0.260       0.602 
gov_new_n~10 |      0.119      0.497     0.24    0.81       -0.901       1.138 
        eu17 |      0.102      0.606     0.17    0.87       -1.142       1.345 
       nms10 |     -0.325      0.385    -0.84    0.41       -1.116       0.466 
     dy_2002 |     -0.793      0.367    -2.16    0.04       -1.547      -0.039 
     dy_2003 |     -0.358      0.240    -1.49    0.15       -0.850       0.134 
     dy_2004 |     -0.147      0.378    -0.39    0.70       -0.922       0.629 
     dy_2005 |      0.051      0.329     0.15    0.88       -0.624       0.725 
     dy_2006 |      0.062      0.289     0.21    0.83       -0.531       0.655 
     dy_2007 |      0.431      0.453     0.95    0.35       -0.499       1.360 
     dy_2008 |     -0.918      0.293    -3.13    0.00       -1.519      -0.317 
     dy_2009 |     -2.542      0.542    -4.69    0.00       -3.653      -1.430 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht gov_new_eu17 gov_new_nms10 eu17 
    nms10 dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/3).gap_tr collapsed 
    L(1/2).L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht gov_new_eu17 gov_new_nms10 eu17 
    nms10 dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 
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  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.gap_tr collapsed 
    D.L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -2.99  Pr > z =  0.003 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   1.15  Pr > z =  0.251 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =  17.10  Prob > chi2 =  0.002 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =   3.28  Prob > chi2 =  0.513 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(2)    =   2.92  Prob > chi2 =  0.232 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   0.35  Prob > chi2 =  0.839 
  gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, collapse lag(1 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =  0.962 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   3.27  Prob > chi2 =  0.351 
  gmm(gap_tr, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   3.02  Prob > chi2 =  0.082 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   0.26  Prob > chi2 =  0.968 
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Table 3.7 Column 7 
 
xtabond2 capb_ngdp_tr L.capb_ngdp_tr gap_tr L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 
maastricht gov_gap dy_2002-dy_2009 if year>1994 & year<2010 & (eu27==1), 
gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, laglimits(1 2) collapse) gmm(gap_tr, laglimits(2 3) 
collapse)  iv(L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht gov_gap dy_2002-dy_2009) 
two robust small 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: country                         Number of obs      =       385 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        27 
Number of instruments = 20                      Obs per group: min =         9 
F(15, 26)     =     68.03                                      avg =     14.26 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        15 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
capb_ngdp_tr |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
capb_ngdp_tr | 
         L1. |      0.679      0.114     5.98    0.00        0.446       0.913 
             | 
      gap_tr |     -0.169      0.065    -2.61    0.01       -0.302      -0.036 
             | 
    debt2gdp | 
         L1. |      0.011      0.007     1.55    0.13       -0.004       0.025 
             | 
        infl |      0.016      0.007     2.32    0.03        0.002       0.030 
legelec_dpi1 |     -0.615      0.227    -2.71    0.01       -1.081      -0.149 
  maastricht |      0.453      0.178     2.54    0.02        0.086       0.820 
     gov_gap |      0.049      0.214     0.23    0.82       -0.391       0.489 
     dy_2002 |     -0.738      0.383    -1.93    0.06       -1.525       0.049 
     dy_2003 |     -0.305      0.241    -1.27    0.22       -0.799       0.190 
     dy_2004 |     -0.143      0.361    -0.40    0.70       -0.885       0.599 
     dy_2005 |      0.065      0.321     0.20    0.84       -0.594       0.724 
     dy_2006 |      0.104      0.305     0.34    0.74       -0.523       0.730 
     dy_2007 |      0.467      0.536     0.87    0.39       -0.634       1.568 
     dy_2008 |     -0.909      0.337    -2.70    0.01       -1.603      -0.216 
     dy_2009 |     -2.584      0.535    -4.83    0.00       -3.684      -1.483 
       _cons |     -0.204      0.445    -0.46    0.65       -1.120       0.711 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht gov_gap dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 
    dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/3).gap_tr collapsed 
    L(1/2).L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht gov_gap dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 
    dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 
    _cons 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
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    DL.gap_tr collapsed 
    D.L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.20  Pr > z =  0.001 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   1.16  Pr > z =  0.248 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =  16.44  Prob > chi2 =  0.002 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =   3.28  Prob > chi2 =  0.512 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(2)    =   2.84  Prob > chi2 =  0.242 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   0.44  Prob > chi2 =  0.802 
  gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, collapse lag(1 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   0.01  Prob > chi2 =  0.909 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   3.27  Prob > chi2 =  0.352 
  gmm(gap_tr, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   3.17  Prob > chi2 =  0.075 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   0.11  Prob > chi2 =  0.991 
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Table 3.7 Column 8 
 
xtabond2 capb_ngdp_tr L.capb_ngdp_tr gap_tr L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 
maastricht gov_gap_eu17 gov_gap_nms10 eu17 nms10 dy_2002-dy_2009 if year>1994 & 
year<2010 & (eu27==1), gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, laglimits(1 2) collapse) gmm(gap_tr, 
laglimits (2 3) collapse)  iv(L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht 
gov_gap_eu17 gov_gap_nms10  eu17 nms10 dy_2002-dy_2009) two robust small nocons 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: country                         Number of obs      =       385 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        27 
Number of instruments = 22                      Obs per group: min =         9 
F(18, 27)     =     81.30                                      avg =     14.26 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        15 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
capb_ngdp_tr |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
capb_ngdp_tr | 
         L1. |      0.693      0.117     5.94    0.00        0.454       0.932 
             | 
      gap_tr |     -0.175      0.060    -2.91    0.01       -0.298      -0.051 
             | 
    debt2gdp | 
         L1. |      0.006      0.007     0.88    0.39       -0.008       0.021 
             | 
        infl |      0.025      0.007     3.47    0.00        0.010       0.040 
legelec_dpi1 |     -0.663      0.214    -3.10    0.00       -1.101      -0.225 
  maastricht |      0.494      0.211     2.35    0.03        0.062       0.926 
gov_gap_eu17 |     -0.274      0.114    -2.40    0.02       -0.509      -0.040 
gov_gap_n~10 |      0.629      0.411     1.53    0.14       -0.214       1.471 
        eu17 |      0.114      0.563     0.20    0.84       -1.041       1.269 
       nms10 |     -0.348      0.379    -0.92    0.37       -1.127       0.430 
     dy_2002 |     -0.870      0.352    -2.47    0.02       -1.593      -0.148 
     dy_2003 |     -0.314      0.228    -1.38    0.18       -0.783       0.154 
     dy_2004 |     -0.034      0.398    -0.09    0.93       -0.850       0.782 
     dy_2005 |      0.168      0.336     0.50    0.62       -0.521       0.857 
     dy_2006 |      0.181      0.322     0.56    0.58       -0.478       0.841 
     dy_2007 |      0.583      0.458     1.27    0.21       -0.357       1.523 
     dy_2008 |     -0.789      0.293    -2.69    0.01       -1.391      -0.187 
     dy_2009 |     -2.285      0.530    -4.31    0.00       -3.372      -1.198 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht gov_gap_eu17 gov_gap_nms10 eu17 
    nms10 dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/3).gap_tr collapsed 
    L(1/2).L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht gov_gap_eu17 gov_gap_nms10 eu17 
    nms10 dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 
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  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.gap_tr collapsed 
    D.L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.26  Pr > z =  0.001 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.96  Pr > z =  0.339 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =  16.17  Prob > chi2 =  0.003 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =   3.55  Prob > chi2 =  0.470 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(2)    =   2.84  Prob > chi2 =  0.242 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   0.71  Prob > chi2 =  0.701 
  gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, collapse lag(1 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   0.01  Prob > chi2 =  0.915 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   3.54  Prob > chi2 =  0.316 
  gmm(gap_tr, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   2.61  Prob > chi2 =  0.106 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   0.94  Prob > chi2 =  0.815 
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Table 3.8 Column 1 
 
xtabond2 capb_ngdp_tr L.capb_ngdp_tr gap_tr L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 
maastricht dy_2002-dy_2010 if year>1994 & year<2011 & (eu27==1|see6==1), 
gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, laglimits(1 2) collapse) gmm(gap_tr, laglimits(2 3) 
collapse)  iv(L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht dy_2002-dy_2010) two 
robust small 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: country                         Number of obs      =       464 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        33 
Number of instruments = 20                      Obs per group: min =         5 
F(15, 32)     =     79.39                                      avg =     14.06 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        16 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
capb_ngdp_tr |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
capb_ngdp_tr | 
         L1. |      0.691      0.074     9.30    0.00        0.539       0.842 
             | 
      gap_tr |     -0.153      0.068    -2.25    0.03       -0.292      -0.015 
             | 
    debt2gdp | 
         L1. |      0.008      0.004     1.90    0.07       -0.001       0.017 
             | 
        infl |      0.017      0.005     3.11    0.00        0.006       0.028 
legelec_dpi1 |     -0.560      0.202    -2.78    0.01       -0.970      -0.149 
  maastricht |      0.665      0.199     3.34    0.00        0.259       1.071 
     dy_2002 |     -0.585      0.402    -1.45    0.16       -1.404       0.235 
     dy_2003 |     -0.107      0.311    -0.34    0.73       -0.740       0.526 
     dy_2004 |     -0.052      0.295    -0.18    0.86       -0.652       0.549 
     dy_2005 |      0.288      0.298     0.97    0.34       -0.319       0.896 
     dy_2006 |      0.035      0.248     0.14    0.89       -0.470       0.539 
     dy_2007 |      0.441      0.449     0.98    0.33       -0.474       1.356 
     dy_2008 |     -1.053      0.413    -2.55    0.02       -1.895      -0.211 
     dy_2009 |     -2.084      0.439    -4.75    0.00       -2.977      -1.191 
     dy_2010 |     -0.679      0.451    -1.51    0.14       -1.597       0.240 
       _cons |     -0.228      0.285    -0.80    0.43       -0.809       0.353 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 dy_2005 
    dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/3).gap_tr collapsed 
    L(1/2).L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 dy_2005 
    dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010 
    _cons 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
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    DL.gap_tr collapsed 
    D.L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.80  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.76  Pr > z =  0.446 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =  17.45  Prob > chi2 =  0.002 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =   2.23  Prob > chi2 =  0.694 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(2)    =   1.74  Prob > chi2 =  0.419 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   0.49  Prob > chi2 =  0.783 
  gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, collapse lag(1 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   0.95  Prob > chi2 =  0.331 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.28  Prob > chi2 =  0.733 
  gmm(gap_tr, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   1.86  Prob > chi2 =  0.173 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   0.37  Prob > chi2 =  0.946 
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Table 3.8 Column 2 
 
xtabond2 capb_ngdp_tr L.capb_ngdp_tr gap_tr L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 
maastricht prog_prgf_imf dy_2002-dy_2010 if year>1994 & year<2011 & 
(eu27==1|see6==1), gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, laglimits(1 2) collapse) gmm(gap_tr, 
laglimits (2 3) collapse)  iv(L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht 
prog_prgf_imf dy_2002-dy_2010) two robust small 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: country                         Number of obs      =       464 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        33 
Number of instruments = 21                      Obs per group: min =         5 
F(16, 32)     =     64.54                                      avg =     14.06 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        16 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
capb_ngdp_tr |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
capb_ngdp_tr | 
         L1. |      0.695      0.072     9.71    0.00        0.549       0.841 
             | 
      gap_tr |     -0.159      0.064    -2.50    0.02       -0.289      -0.029 
             | 
    debt2gdp | 
         L1. |      0.007      0.004     1.65    0.11       -0.002       0.016 
             | 
        infl |      0.018      0.006     3.13    0.00        0.006       0.030 
legelec_dpi1 |     -0.557      0.196    -2.84    0.01       -0.956      -0.158 
  maastricht |      0.635      0.190     3.34    0.00        0.248       1.022 
prog_prgf_~f |     -0.205      0.472    -0.44    0.67       -1.166       0.756 
     dy_2002 |     -0.562      0.387    -1.45    0.16       -1.351       0.227 
     dy_2003 |     -0.092      0.304    -0.30    0.76       -0.711       0.527 
     dy_2004 |     -0.041      0.300    -0.14    0.89       -0.651       0.569 
     dy_2005 |      0.310      0.295     1.05    0.30       -0.292       0.911 
     dy_2006 |      0.069      0.248     0.28    0.78       -0.436       0.573 
     dy_2007 |      0.443      0.425     1.04    0.31       -0.424       1.309 
     dy_2008 |     -1.035      0.392    -2.64    0.01       -1.833      -0.236 
     dy_2009 |     -2.061      0.448    -4.60    0.00       -2.973      -1.149 
     dy_2010 |     -0.697      0.456    -1.53    0.14       -1.627       0.232 
       _cons |     -0.148      0.311    -0.48    0.64       -0.781       0.485 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht prog_prgf_imf dy_2002 dy_2003 
    dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/3).gap_tr collapsed 
    L(1/2).L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht prog_prgf_imf dy_2002 dy_2003 
    dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010 
    _cons 
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  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.gap_tr collapsed 
    D.L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.74  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.76  Pr > z =  0.448 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =  16.05  Prob > chi2 =  0.003 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =   2.12  Prob > chi2 =  0.713 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(2)    =   1.58  Prob > chi2 =  0.454 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   0.54  Prob > chi2 =  0.762 
  gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, collapse lag(1 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   0.55  Prob > chi2 =  0.459 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.57  Prob > chi2 =  0.665 
  gmm(gap_tr, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   1.80  Prob > chi2 =  0.179 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   0.32  Prob > chi2 =  0.957 
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Table 3.8 Column 3 
 
xtabond2 capb_ngdp_tr L.capb_ngdp_tr gap_tr L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 
maastricht prog_prgf_imf_eu17 prog_prgf_imf_nms10 prog_prgf_imf_see6 eu17 nms10 
see6 dy_2002-dy_2010 if year>1994 & year<2011 & (eu27==1|see6==1), 
gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, laglimits(1 2) collapse) gmm(gap_tr, laglimits (2 3) 
collapse)  iv(L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht prog_prgf_imf_eu17 
prog_prgf_imf_nms10 prog_prgf_imf_see6 eu17 nms10 see6 dy_2002-dy_2010) two 
robust small nocons 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: country                         Number of obs      =       464 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        33 
Number of instruments = 25                      Obs per group: min =         5 
F(21, 33)     =    756.29                                      avg =     14.06 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        16 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
capb_ngdp_tr |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
capb_ngdp_tr | 
         L1. |      0.710      0.073     9.66    0.00        0.560       0.859 
             | 
      gap_tr |     -0.145      0.060    -2.42    0.02       -0.268      -0.023 
             | 
    debt2gdp | 
         L1. |      0.007      0.007     1.01    0.32       -0.007       0.020 
             | 
        infl |      0.021      0.005     4.02    0.00        0.010       0.032 
legelec_dpi1 |     -0.584      0.197    -2.96    0.01       -0.985      -0.183 
  maastricht |      0.572      0.196     2.92    0.01        0.173       0.970 
prog_prgf~17 |     -7.463     14.328    -0.52    0.61       -36.614      21.689 
prog_prgf~10 |     -0.086      0.657    -0.13    0.90       -1.422       1.251 
prog_prgf~e6 |     -0.487      0.484    -1.01    0.32       -1.473       0.498 
        eu17 |     -0.033      0.505    -0.07    0.95       -1.061       0.994 
       nms10 |     -0.424      0.399    -1.06    0.30       -1.235       0.387 
        see6 |      0.094      0.464     0.20    0.84       -0.850       1.038 
     dy_2002 |     -0.546      0.381    -1.43    0.16       -1.321       0.228 
     dy_2003 |      0.004      0.314     0.01    0.99       -0.634       0.642 
     dy_2004 |      0.028      0.327     0.09    0.93       -0.637       0.694 
     dy_2005 |      0.304      0.287     1.06    0.30       -0.279       0.888 
     dy_2006 |      0.083      0.258     0.32    0.75       -0.443       0.608 
     dy_2007 |      0.373      0.394     0.95    0.35       -0.428       1.174 
     dy_2008 |     -1.122      0.396    -2.83    0.01       -1.928      -0.315 
     dy_2009 |     -1.954      0.463    -4.22    0.00       -2.896      -1.013 
     dy_2010 |     -0.653      0.414    -1.58    0.12       -1.496       0.190 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht prog_prgf_imf_eu17 
    prog_prgf_imf_nms10 prog_prgf_imf_see6 eu17 nms10 see6 dy_2002 dy_2003 
    dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
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    L(2/3).gap_tr collapsed 
    L(1/2).L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht prog_prgf_imf_eu17 
    prog_prgf_imf_nms10 prog_prgf_imf_see6 eu17 nms10 see6 dy_2002 dy_2003 
    dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.gap_tr collapsed 
    D.L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.85  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.61  Pr > z =  0.542 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =   7.77  Prob > chi2 =  0.100 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =   1.88  Prob > chi2 =  0.757 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(2)    =   1.44  Prob > chi2 =  0.487 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   0.44  Prob > chi2 =  0.801 
  gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, collapse lag(1 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   0.06  Prob > chi2 =  0.807 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.82  Prob > chi2 =  0.610 
  gmm(gap_tr, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   1.37  Prob > chi2 =  0.242 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   0.52  Prob > chi2 =  0.915 
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Table 3.8 Column 4 
 
xtabond2 capb_ngdp_tr L.capb_ngdp_tr gap_tr L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 
maastricht pur_loan2ngdp dy_2002-dy_2010 if year>1994 & year<2011 & 
(eu27==1|see6==1), gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, laglimits(1 2) collapse) gmm(gap_tr, 
laglimits (2 3) collapse)  iv(L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht 
pur_loan2ngdp dy_2002-dy_2010) two robust small 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: country                         Number of obs      =       464 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        33 
Number of instruments = 21                      Obs per group: min =         5 
F(16, 32)     =     62.38                                      avg =     14.06 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        16 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
capb_ngdp_tr |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
capb_ngdp_tr | 
         L1. |      0.693      0.080     8.61    0.00        0.529       0.856 
             | 
      gap_tr |     -0.143      0.078    -1.82    0.08       -0.302       0.017 
             | 
    debt2gdp | 
         L1. |      0.008      0.005     1.48    0.15       -0.003       0.019 
             | 
        infl |      0.015      0.005     2.76    0.01        0.004       0.025 
legelec_dpi1 |     -0.513      0.224    -2.30    0.03       -0.969      -0.058 
  maastricht |      0.664      0.216     3.08    0.00        0.225       1.103 
pur_loan2n~p |      0.483      0.181     2.68    0.01        0.115       0.851 
     dy_2002 |     -0.580      0.428    -1.35    0.19       -1.452       0.293 
     dy_2003 |     -0.144      0.338    -0.43    0.67       -0.832       0.544 
     dy_2004 |     -0.070      0.319    -0.22    0.83       -0.719       0.579 
     dy_2005 |      0.322      0.327     0.99    0.33       -0.343       0.988 
     dy_2006 |      0.003      0.288     0.01    0.99       -0.584       0.589 
     dy_2007 |      0.308      0.468     0.66    0.52       -0.646       1.261 
     dy_2008 |     -1.255      0.464    -2.71    0.01       -2.200      -0.311 
     dy_2009 |     -2.439      0.478    -5.11    0.00       -3.412      -1.466 
     dy_2010 |     -0.930      0.451    -2.06    0.05       -1.848      -0.012 
       _cons |     -0.228      0.331    -0.69    0.50       -0.902       0.447 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht pur_loan2ngdp dy_2002 dy_2003 
    dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/3).gap_tr collapsed 
    L(1/2).L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht pur_loan2ngdp dy_2002 dy_2003 
    dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010 
    _cons 
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  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.gap_tr collapsed 
    D.L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.72  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.68  Pr > z =  0.498 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =  22.83  Prob > chi2 =  0.000 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =   3.82  Prob > chi2 =  0.430 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(2)    =   2.26  Prob > chi2 =  0.323 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   1.56  Prob > chi2 =  0.458 
  gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, collapse lag(1 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   1.63  Prob > chi2 =  0.202 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   2.20  Prob > chi2 =  0.532 
  gmm(gap_tr, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   2.37  Prob > chi2 =  0.124 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.45  Prob > chi2 =  0.693 
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Table 3.8 Column 5 
 
xtabond2 capb_ngdp_tr L.capb_ngdp_tr gap_tr L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 
maastricht pur_loan2ngdp_eu17 pur_loan2ngdp_nms10 pur_loan2ngdp_see6 eu17 nms10 
see6 dy_2002-dy_2010 if year>1994 & year<2011 & (eu27==1|see6==1), 
gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, laglimits(1 2) collapse) gmm(gap_tr, laglimits (2 3) 
collapse)  iv(L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht pur_loan2ngdp_eu17 
pur_loan2ngdp_nms10 pur_loan2ngdp_see6 eu17 nms10 see6 dy_2002-dy_2010) two 
robust small nocons 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: country                         Number of obs      =       464 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        33 
Number of instruments = 25                      Obs per group: min =         5 
F(21, 33)     =     72.03                                      avg =     14.06 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        16 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
capb_ngdp_tr |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
capb_ngdp_tr | 
         L1. |      0.696      0.085     8.20    0.00        0.524       0.869 
             | 
      gap_tr |     -0.150      0.079    -1.89    0.07       -0.311       0.012 
             | 
    debt2gdp | 
         L1. |      0.003      0.008     0.35    0.73       -0.013       0.018 
             | 
        infl |      0.018      0.005     3.63    0.00        0.008       0.027 
legelec_dpi1 |     -0.479      0.229    -2.09    0.04       -0.945      -0.012 
  maastricht |      0.525      0.230     2.28    0.03        0.056       0.994 
pur_l~p_eu17 |      1.125      0.297     3.79    0.00        0.521       1.730 
pur_~p_nms10 |      0.301      0.165     1.82    0.08       -0.035       0.636 
pur_l~p_see6 |      0.660      0.184     3.59    0.00        0.285       1.034 
        eu17 |      0.272      0.479     0.57    0.57       -0.702       1.247 
       nms10 |     -0.369      0.352    -1.05    0.30       -1.086       0.348 
        see6 |     -0.024      0.404    -0.06    0.95       -0.847       0.798 
     dy_2002 |     -0.603      0.434    -1.39    0.17       -1.485       0.279 
     dy_2003 |     -0.140      0.344    -0.41    0.69       -0.839       0.559 
     dy_2004 |     -0.048      0.330    -0.14    0.89       -0.719       0.624 
     dy_2005 |      0.317      0.330     0.96    0.34       -0.355       0.989 
     dy_2006 |      0.029      0.304     0.10    0.92       -0.588       0.647 
     dy_2007 |      0.289      0.475     0.61    0.55       -0.677       1.255 
     dy_2008 |     -1.202      0.490    -2.45    0.02       -2.199      -0.206 
     dy_2009 |     -2.420      0.494    -4.90    0.00       -3.424      -1.415 
     dy_2010 |     -0.982      0.457    -2.15    0.04       -1.911      -0.053 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht pur_loan2ngdp_eu17 
    pur_loan2ngdp_nms10 pur_loan2ngdp_see6 eu17 nms10 see6 dy_2002 dy_2003 
    dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
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    L(2/3).gap_tr collapsed 
    L(1/2).L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht pur_loan2ngdp_eu17 
    pur_loan2ngdp_nms10 pur_loan2ngdp_see6 eu17 nms10 see6 dy_2002 dy_2003 
    dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.gap_tr collapsed 
    D.L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.70  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.73  Pr > z =  0.466 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =  28.10  Prob > chi2 =  0.000 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =   4.43  Prob > chi2 =  0.351 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(2)    =   2.31  Prob > chi2 =  0.315 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   2.12  Prob > chi2 =  0.347 
  gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, collapse lag(1 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   2.29  Prob > chi2 =  0.130 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   2.14  Prob > chi2 =  0.545 
  gmm(gap_tr, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   2.50  Prob > chi2 =  0.114 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.93  Prob > chi2 =  0.587 
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Table 3.8 Column 6 
 
xtabond2 capb_ngdp_tr L.capb_ngdp_tr gap_tr L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 
maastricht pur_loan2ngdp_eu17 pur_loan2ngdp_nms10 pur_loan2ngdp_see6 eu17 nms10 
see6 dy_2002-dy_2010 if year>1994 & year<2011 & dv_grc_2010==1 & 
(eu27==1|see6==1), gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, laglimits(1 2) collapse) gmm(gap_tr, 
laglimits (2 3) collapse)  iv(L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht 
pur_loan2ngdp_eu17 pur_loan2ngdp_nms10 pur_loan2ngdp_see6 eu17 nms10 see6 
dy_2002-dy_2010) two robust small nocons 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
pur_loan2ngdp_eu17 dropped due to collinearity 
Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. 
Using a generalized inverse to calculate optimal weighting matrix for two-step 
estimation. 
Difference-in-Sargan/Hansen statistics may be negative. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: country                         Number of obs      =       463 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        33 
Number of instruments = 24                      Obs per group: min =         5 
F(20, 33)     =     78.74                                      avg =     14.03 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        16 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
capb_ngdp_tr |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
capb_ngdp_tr | 
         L1. |      0.697      0.086     8.08    0.00        0.521       0.872 
             | 
      gap_tr |     -0.144      0.079    -1.82    0.08       -0.305       0.017 
             | 
    debt2gdp | 
         L1. |      0.005      0.008     0.59    0.56       -0.011       0.020 
             | 
        infl |      0.018      0.005     3.73    0.00        0.008       0.028 
legelec_dpi1 |     -0.481      0.231    -2.08    0.04       -0.951      -0.011 
  maastricht |      0.509      0.236     2.16    0.04        0.030       0.989 
pur_~p_nms10 |      0.286      0.165     1.73    0.09       -0.050       0.622 
pur_l~p_see6 |      0.643      0.189     3.40    0.00        0.258       1.027 
        eu17 |      0.181      0.473     0.38    0.70       -0.782       1.144 
       nms10 |     -0.443      0.345    -1.28    0.21       -1.145       0.259 
        see6 |     -0.137      0.412    -0.33    0.74       -0.975       0.701 
     dy_2002 |     -0.595      0.439    -1.36    0.18       -1.488       0.298 
     dy_2003 |     -0.113      0.348    -0.32    0.75       -0.820       0.595 
     dy_2004 |     -0.006      0.333    -0.02    0.99       -0.683       0.671 
     dy_2005 |      0.305      0.334     0.91    0.37       -0.375       0.985 
     dy_2006 |      0.050      0.314     0.16    0.87       -0.588       0.688 
     dy_2007 |      0.283      0.507     0.56    0.58       -0.748       1.315 
     dy_2008 |     -1.188      0.510    -2.33    0.03       -2.227      -0.150 
     dy_2009 |     -2.333      0.516    -4.53    0.00       -3.382      -1.284 
     dy_2010 |     -0.946      0.465    -2.03    0.05       -1.891      -0.000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
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    D.(L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht pur_loan2ngdp_eu17 
    pur_loan2ngdp_nms10 pur_loan2ngdp_see6 eu17 nms10 see6 dy_2002 dy_2003 
    dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/3).gap_tr collapsed 
    L(1/2).L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht pur_loan2ngdp_eu17 
    pur_loan2ngdp_nms10 pur_loan2ngdp_see6 eu17 nms10 see6 dy_2002 dy_2003 
    dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.gap_tr collapsed 
    D.L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.68  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.75  Pr > z =  0.453 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =  29.04  Prob > chi2 =  0.000 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =   4.91  Prob > chi2 =  0.296 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(2)    =   2.32  Prob > chi2 =  0.314 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   2.60  Prob > chi2 =  0.273 
  gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, collapse lag(1 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   2.37  Prob > chi2 =  0.124 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   2.55  Prob > chi2 =  0.467 
  gmm(gap_tr, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   2.57  Prob > chi2 =  0.109 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   2.34  Prob > chi2 =  0.505 
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Table 3.8 Column 7 
 
xtabond2 capb_ngdp_tr L.capb_ngdp_tr gap_tr gap_tr_pur_loan2ngdp_dv L.debt2gdp 
infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht pur_loan2ngdp_dv dy_2002-dy_2010 if year>1994 & 
year<2011 & dv_grc_2010==1 & (eu27==1|see6==1), gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, laglimits(1 
2) collapse) gmm(gap_tr, laglimits (2 3) collapse) gmm(gap_tr_pur_loan2ngdp_dv,  
> laglimits (2 3) collapse) iv(L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht 
pur_loan2ngdp_dv dy_2002-dy_2010) two robust small 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: country                         Number of obs      =       463 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        33 
Number of instruments = 24                      Obs per group: min =         5 
F(17, 32)     =     56.66                                      avg =     14.03 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        16 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
capb_ngdp_tr |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
capb_ngdp_tr | 
         L1. |      0.722      0.079     9.09    0.00        0.560       0.884 
             | 
      gap_tr |     -0.316      0.122    -2.59    0.01       -0.564      -0.067 
gap_tr_pur~v |      0.620      0.231     2.68    0.01        0.149       1.091 
             | 
    debt2gdp | 
         L1. |      0.004      0.006     0.77    0.45       -0.007       0.016 
             | 
        infl |      0.016      0.011     1.51    0.14       -0.006       0.038 
legelec_dpi1 |     -0.485      0.253    -1.91    0.06       -1.001       0.031 
  maastricht |      0.363      0.313     1.16    0.25       -0.273       1.000 
pur_loan2n~v |      0.117      0.871     0.13    0.89       -1.657       1.891 
     dy_2002 |     -0.783      0.429    -1.83    0.08       -1.658       0.091 
     dy_2003 |     -0.355      0.436    -0.82    0.42       -1.243       0.532 
     dy_2004 |     -0.224      0.371    -0.60    0.55       -0.980       0.531 
     dy_2005 |      0.494      0.346     1.43    0.16       -0.211       1.198 
     dy_2006 |      0.430      0.430     1.00    0.32       -0.446       1.307 
     dy_2007 |      1.377      0.790     1.74    0.09       -0.233       2.987 
     dy_2008 |     -0.646      0.486    -1.33    0.19       -1.636       0.343 
     dy_2009 |     -2.252      0.663    -3.39    0.00       -3.604      -0.901 
     dy_2010 |     -1.192      0.596    -2.00    0.05       -2.407       0.023 
       _cons |      0.003      0.368     0.01    0.99       -0.746       0.752 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht pur_loan2ngdp_dv dy_2002 
    dy_2003 dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/3).gap_tr_pur_loan2ngdp_dv collapsed 
    L(2/3).gap_tr collapsed 
    L(1/2).L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
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    L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht pur_loan2ngdp_dv dy_2002 dy_2003 
    dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010 
    _cons 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.gap_tr_pur_loan2ngdp_dv collapsed 
    DL.gap_tr collapsed 
    D.L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.75  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   1.31  Pr > z =  0.189 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(6)    =  19.81  Prob > chi2 =  0.003 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(6)    =   7.15  Prob > chi2 =  0.307 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(3)    =   5.11  Prob > chi2 =  0.164 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   2.04  Prob > chi2 =  0.565 
  gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, collapse lag(1 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(3)    =   1.66  Prob > chi2 =  0.647 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   5.49  Prob > chi2 =  0.139 
  gmm(gap_tr, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(3)    =   2.43  Prob > chi2 =  0.488 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   4.72  Prob > chi2 =  0.194 
  gmm(gap_tr_pur_loan2ngdp_dv, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(3)    =   2.81  Prob > chi2 =  0.421 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   4.33  Prob > chi2 =  0.228 
  
396 
 
Table 3.8 Column 8 
 
xtabond2 capb_ngdp_tr L.capb_ngdp_tr gap_tr L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 
maastricht regime_imf dy_2002-dy_2010 if year>1994 & year<2011 & 
(eu27==1|see6==1), gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, laglimits(1 2) collapse) gmm(gap_tr, 
laglimits (2 3) collapse)  iv(L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht 
regime_imf dy_2002-dy_2010) two robust small 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: country                         Number of obs      =       464 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        33 
Number of instruments = 21                      Obs per group: min =         5 
F(16, 32)     =     79.57                                      avg =     14.06 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        16 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
capb_ngdp_tr |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
capb_ngdp_tr | 
         L1. |      0.714      0.074     9.61    0.00        0.563       0.866 
             | 
      gap_tr |     -0.155      0.072    -2.15    0.04       -0.302      -0.008 
             | 
    debt2gdp | 
         L1. |      0.007      0.004     1.69    0.10       -0.001       0.016 
             | 
        infl |      0.018      0.005     3.81    0.00        0.008       0.028 
legelec_dpi1 |     -0.575      0.211    -2.73    0.01       -1.004      -0.145 
  maastricht |      0.683      0.192     3.56    0.00        0.293       1.074 
  regime_imf |     -0.019      0.048    -0.40    0.69       -0.117       0.078 
     dy_2002 |     -0.581      0.409    -1.42    0.16       -1.413       0.251 
     dy_2003 |     -0.081      0.311    -0.26    0.80       -0.714       0.553 
     dy_2004 |     -0.031      0.292    -0.11    0.92       -0.627       0.564 
     dy_2005 |      0.313      0.301     1.04    0.31       -0.301       0.926 
     dy_2006 |      0.058      0.248     0.23    0.82       -0.447       0.563 
     dy_2007 |      0.476      0.462     1.03    0.31       -0.465       1.417 
     dy_2008 |     -1.033      0.423    -2.44    0.02       -1.895      -0.172 
     dy_2009 |     -2.003      0.443    -4.52    0.00       -2.904      -1.101 
     dy_2010 |     -0.646      0.461    -1.40    0.17       -1.584       0.293 
       _cons |     -0.141      0.363    -0.39    0.70       -0.881       0.600 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht regime_imf dy_2002 dy_2003 
    dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/3).gap_tr collapsed 
    L(1/2).L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht regime_imf dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 
    dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010 
    _cons 
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  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.gap_tr collapsed 
    D.L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.80  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.62  Pr > z =  0.534 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =  15.82  Prob > chi2 =  0.003 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =   2.22  Prob > chi2 =  0.695 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(2)    =   1.87  Prob > chi2 =  0.393 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   0.36  Prob > chi2 =  0.837 
  gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, collapse lag(1 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   0.76  Prob > chi2 =  0.385 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.47  Prob > chi2 =  0.690 
  gmm(gap_tr, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   1.87  Prob > chi2 =  0.172 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   0.35  Prob > chi2 =  0.950 
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Table 3.8 Column 9 
 
xtabond2 capb_ngdp_tr L.capb_ngdp_tr gap_tr L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 
maastricht regime_imf_eu17 regime_imf_nms10 regime_imf_see6 eu17 nms10 see6 
dy_2002-dy_2010 if year>1994 & year<2011 & (eu27==1|see6==1), 
gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, laglimits(1 2) collapse) gmm(gap_tr, laglimits (2 3) 
collapse)  iv(L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht  regime_imf_eu17 
regime_imf_nms10 regime_imf_see6 eu17 nms10 see6 dy_2002-dy_2010) two robust 
small nocons 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: country                         Number of obs      =       464 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        33 
Number of instruments = 25                      Obs per group: min =         5 
F(21, 33)     =    128.88                                      avg =     14.06 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        16 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
capb_ngdp_tr |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
capb_ngdp_tr | 
         L1. |      0.719      0.074     9.67    0.00        0.568       0.871 
             | 
      gap_tr |     -0.158      0.071    -2.23    0.03       -0.302      -0.014 
             | 
    debt2gdp | 
         L1. |      0.005      0.005     1.03    0.31       -0.005       0.015 
             | 
        infl |      0.022      0.004     5.76    0.00        0.014       0.029 
legelec_dpi1 |     -0.570      0.211    -2.70    0.01       -0.999      -0.140 
  maastricht |      0.436      0.267     1.63    0.11       -0.107       0.980 
regim~f_eu17 |      0.054      0.076     0.71    0.48       -0.101       0.209 
regi~f_nms10 |     -0.052      0.075    -0.70    0.49       -0.205       0.100 
regim~f_see6 |     -0.047      0.043    -1.08    0.29       -0.134       0.041 
        eu17 |     -0.093      0.456    -0.20    0.84       -1.020       0.834 
       nms10 |     -0.152      0.438    -0.35    0.73       -1.043       0.739 
        see6 |      0.151      0.273     0.55    0.58       -0.404       0.707 
     dy_2002 |     -0.581      0.408    -1.43    0.16       -1.411       0.248 
     dy_2003 |     -0.085      0.310    -0.27    0.79       -0.716       0.547 
     dy_2004 |     -0.038      0.293    -0.13    0.90       -0.634       0.557 
     dy_2005 |      0.305      0.300     1.01    0.32       -0.306       0.916 
     dy_2006 |      0.048      0.249     0.19    0.85       -0.459       0.554 
     dy_2007 |      0.469      0.464     1.01    0.32       -0.475       1.414 
     dy_2008 |     -1.035      0.437    -2.37    0.02       -1.924      -0.146 
     dy_2009 |     -1.991      0.443    -4.49    0.00       -2.893      -1.089 
     dy_2010 |     -0.632      0.464    -1.36    0.18       -1.575       0.311 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht regime_imf_eu17 
    regime_imf_nms10 regime_imf_see6 eu17 nms10 see6 dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 
    dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
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    L(2/3).gap_tr collapsed 
    L(1/2).L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht regime_imf_eu17 regime_imf_nms10 
    regime_imf_see6 eu17 nms10 see6 dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 
    dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.gap_tr collapsed 
    D.L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.81  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.62  Pr > z =  0.534 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =  15.69  Prob > chi2 =  0.003 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =   2.17  Prob > chi2 =  0.705 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(2)    =   1.84  Prob > chi2 =  0.399 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   0.33  Prob > chi2 =  0.847 
  gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, collapse lag(1 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   0.73  Prob > chi2 =  0.394 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.44  Prob > chi2 =  0.696 
  gmm(gap_tr, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   1.81  Prob > chi2 =  0.179 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   0.36  Prob > chi2 =  0.948 
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Table 3.9 Column 1 
 
xtabond2 capb_ngdp_tr L.capb_ngdp_tr gap_tr L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 
maastricht dy_2002-dy_2010 if year>1994 & year<2011 & (eu27==1|see6==1), 
gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, laglimits(1 2) collapse) gmm(gap_tr, laglimits(2 3) 
collapse)  iv(L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht dy_2002-dy_2010) two 
robust small 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: country                         Number of obs      =       464 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        33 
Number of instruments = 20                      Obs per group: min =         5 
F(15, 32)     =     79.39                                      avg =     14.06 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        16 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
capb_ngdp_tr |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
capb_ngdp_tr | 
         L1. |      0.691      0.074     9.30    0.00        0.539       0.842 
             | 
      gap_tr |     -0.153      0.068    -2.25    0.03       -0.292      -0.015 
             | 
    debt2gdp | 
         L1. |      0.008      0.004     1.90    0.07       -0.001       0.017 
             | 
        infl |      0.017      0.005     3.11    0.00        0.006       0.028 
legelec_dpi1 |     -0.560      0.202    -2.78    0.01       -0.970      -0.149 
  maastricht |      0.665      0.199     3.34    0.00        0.259       1.071 
     dy_2002 |     -0.585      0.402    -1.45    0.16       -1.404       0.235 
     dy_2003 |     -0.107      0.311    -0.34    0.73       -0.740       0.526 
     dy_2004 |     -0.052      0.295    -0.18    0.86       -0.652       0.549 
     dy_2005 |      0.288      0.298     0.97    0.34       -0.319       0.896 
     dy_2006 |      0.035      0.248     0.14    0.89       -0.470       0.539 
     dy_2007 |      0.441      0.449     0.98    0.33       -0.474       1.356 
     dy_2008 |     -1.053      0.413    -2.55    0.02       -1.895      -0.211 
     dy_2009 |     -2.084      0.439    -4.75    0.00       -2.977      -1.191 
     dy_2010 |     -0.679      0.451    -1.51    0.14       -1.597       0.240 
       _cons |     -0.228      0.285    -0.80    0.43       -0.809       0.353 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 dy_2005 
    dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/3).gap_tr collapsed 
    L(1/2).L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 dy_2005 
    dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010 
    _cons 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
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    DL.gap_tr collapsed 
    D.L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.80  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.76  Pr > z =  0.446 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =  17.45  Prob > chi2 =  0.002 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =   2.23  Prob > chi2 =  0.694 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(2)    =   1.74  Prob > chi2 =  0.419 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   0.49  Prob > chi2 =  0.783 
  gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, collapse lag(1 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   0.95  Prob > chi2 =  0.331 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.28  Prob > chi2 =  0.733 
  gmm(gap_tr, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   1.86  Prob > chi2 =  0.173 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   0.37  Prob > chi2 =  0.946 
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Table 3.9 Column 2 
 
xtabond2 capb_ngdp_tr L.capb_ngdp_tr gap_tr L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 
maastricht dy_2002-dy_2010 if year>1994 & year<2011 & (eu27==1), 
gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, laglimits(1 2) collapse) gmm(gap_tr, laglimits (2 3) 
collapse)  iv(L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht dy_2002-dy_2010) two 
robust small 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: country                         Number of obs      =       414 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        27 
Number of instruments = 20                      Obs per group: min =        10 
F(15, 26)     =    220.37                                      avg =     15.33 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        16 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
capb_ngdp_tr |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
capb_ngdp_tr | 
         L1. |      0.698      0.089     7.82    0.00        0.515       0.882 
             | 
      gap_tr |     -0.157      0.058    -2.73    0.01       -0.276      -0.039 
             | 
    debt2gdp | 
         L1. |      0.011      0.004     2.74    0.01        0.003       0.020 
             | 
        infl |      0.019      0.005     3.68    0.00        0.008       0.029 
legelec_dpi1 |     -0.602      0.249    -2.42    0.02       -1.115      -0.090 
  maastricht |      0.467      0.176     2.65    0.01        0.105       0.829 
     dy_2002 |     -0.898      0.384    -2.34    0.03       -1.686      -0.109 
     dy_2003 |     -0.401      0.249    -1.61    0.12       -0.913       0.111 
     dy_2004 |     -0.229      0.339    -0.67    0.51       -0.927       0.469 
     dy_2005 |      0.015      0.308     0.05    0.96       -0.618       0.649 
     dy_2006 |     -0.045      0.202    -0.22    0.82       -0.460       0.369 
     dy_2007 |      0.497      0.416     1.20    0.24       -0.358       1.352 
     dy_2008 |     -0.835      0.339    -2.46    0.02       -1.532      -0.137 
     dy_2009 |     -2.642      0.502    -5.27    0.00       -3.673      -1.611 
     dy_2010 |     -1.050      0.473    -2.22    0.04       -2.022      -0.078 
       _cons |     -0.267      0.296    -0.90    0.38       -0.876       0.342 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 dy_2005 
    dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/3).gap_tr collapsed 
    L(1/2).L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 dy_2005 
    dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010 
    _cons 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
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    DL.gap_tr collapsed 
    D.L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.50  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   1.32  Pr > z =  0.188 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =  22.83  Prob > chi2 =  0.000 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =   3.55  Prob > chi2 =  0.470 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(2)    =   2.99  Prob > chi2 =  0.224 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   0.56  Prob > chi2 =  0.757 
  gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, collapse lag(1 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   1.52  Prob > chi2 =  0.217 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   2.03  Prob > chi2 =  0.567 
  gmm(gap_tr, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   2.56  Prob > chi2 =  0.109 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   0.99  Prob > chi2 =  0.805 
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Table 3.9 Column 3 
 
xtabond2 capb_ngdp_tr L.capb_ngdp_tr gap_tr L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 
maastricht rules dy_2002-dy_2010 if year>1994 & year<2011 & (eu27==1), 
gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, laglimits(1 2) collapse) gmm(gap_tr, laglimits(2 3) 
collapse)  iv(L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht rules dy_2002-dy_2010) 
two robust small 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: country                         Number of obs      =       414 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        27 
Number of instruments = 21                      Obs per group: min =        10 
F(16, 26)     =    156.92                                      avg =     15.33 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        16 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
capb_ngdp_tr |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
capb_ngdp_tr | 
         L1. |      0.703      0.091     7.75    0.00        0.517       0.890 
             | 
      gap_tr |     -0.168      0.059    -2.82    0.01       -0.290      -0.045 
             | 
    debt2gdp | 
         L1. |      0.017      0.005     3.64    0.00        0.007       0.026 
             | 
        infl |      0.025      0.005     4.62    0.00        0.014       0.036 
legelec_dpi1 |     -0.656      0.255    -2.57    0.02       -1.181      -0.131 
  maastricht |      0.482      0.198     2.43    0.02        0.075       0.890 
       rules |      0.550      0.129     4.27    0.00        0.285       0.815 
     dy_2002 |     -1.016      0.383    -2.66    0.01       -1.802      -0.230 
     dy_2003 |     -0.587      0.226    -2.60    0.02       -1.051      -0.123 
     dy_2004 |     -0.414      0.350    -1.18    0.25       -1.132       0.305 
     dy_2005 |     -0.139      0.337    -0.41    0.68       -0.832       0.554 
     dy_2006 |     -0.212      0.216    -0.98    0.33       -0.655       0.231 
     dy_2007 |      0.330      0.424     0.78    0.44       -0.541       1.201 
     dy_2008 |     -1.038      0.350    -2.96    0.01       -1.758      -0.318 
     dy_2009 |     -2.808      0.524    -5.36    0.00       -3.885      -1.731 
     dy_2010 |     -1.396      0.580    -2.41    0.02       -2.587      -0.205 
       _cons |     -0.604      0.270    -2.24    0.03       -1.159      -0.049 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht rules dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 
    dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/3).gap_tr collapsed 
    L(1/2).L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht rules dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 
    dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010 
    _cons 
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  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.gap_tr collapsed 
    D.L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.40  Pr > z =  0.001 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   1.14  Pr > z =  0.254 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =  23.68  Prob > chi2 =  0.000 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =   3.28  Prob > chi2 =  0.513 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(2)    =   2.82  Prob > chi2 =  0.245 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   0.46  Prob > chi2 =  0.795 
  gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, collapse lag(1 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   1.02  Prob > chi2 =  0.312 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   2.25  Prob > chi2 =  0.522 
  gmm(gap_tr, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   2.56  Prob > chi2 =  0.110 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   0.72  Prob > chi2 =  0.870 
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Table 3.9 Column 4 
 
xtabond2 capb_ngdp_tr L.capb_ngdp_tr gap_tr L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 
maastricht rules_eu17 rules_nms10 eu17 nms10 dy_2002-dy_2010 if year>1994 & 
year<2011 & (eu27==1), gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, laglimits(1 2) collapse) gmm(gap_tr, 
laglimits (2 3) collapse)  iv(L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht 
rules_eu17 rules_nms10 eu17 nms10 dy_2002-dy_2010) two robust small nocons 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: country                         Number of obs      =       414 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        27 
Number of instruments = 23                      Obs per group: min =        10 
F(19, 27)     =    425.73                                      avg =     15.33 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        16 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
capb_ngdp_tr |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
capb_ngdp_tr | 
         L1. |      0.705      0.085     8.28    0.00        0.531       0.880 
             | 
      gap_tr |     -0.171      0.059    -2.89    0.01       -0.293      -0.050 
             | 
    debt2gdp | 
         L1. |      0.015      0.005     2.91    0.01        0.005       0.026 
             | 
        infl |      0.026      0.005     5.54    0.00        0.016       0.035 
legelec_dpi1 |     -0.651      0.253    -2.57    0.02       -1.170      -0.132 
  maastricht |      0.441      0.219     2.01    0.05       -0.009       0.891 
  rules_eu17 |      0.518      0.126     4.12    0.00        0.260       0.776 
 rules_nms10 |      0.610      0.217     2.81    0.01        0.165       1.055 
        eu17 |     -0.476      0.399    -1.19    0.24       -1.294       0.342 
       nms10 |     -0.632      0.283    -2.23    0.03       -1.213      -0.052 
     dy_2002 |     -1.017      0.376    -2.70    0.01       -1.789      -0.244 
     dy_2003 |     -0.593      0.231    -2.57    0.02       -1.065      -0.120 
     dy_2004 |     -0.419      0.340    -1.23    0.23       -1.117       0.280 
     dy_2005 |     -0.148      0.339    -0.44    0.66       -0.844       0.547 
     dy_2006 |     -0.213      0.221    -0.96    0.34       -0.667       0.241 
     dy_2007 |      0.337      0.416     0.81    0.42       -0.516       1.191 
     dy_2008 |     -1.034      0.341    -3.03    0.01       -1.734      -0.334 
     dy_2009 |     -2.811      0.507    -5.55    0.00       -3.850      -1.771 
     dy_2010 |     -1.386      0.543    -2.55    0.02       -2.499      -0.272 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht rules_eu17 rules_nms10 eu17 
    nms10 dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 
    dy_2010) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/3).gap_tr collapsed 
    L(1/2).L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
407 
 
    L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht rules_eu17 rules_nms10 eu17 nms10 
    dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.gap_tr collapsed 
    D.L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.40  Pr > z =  0.001 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   1.15  Pr > z =  0.250 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =  24.56  Prob > chi2 =  0.000 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =   3.30  Prob > chi2 =  0.509 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(2)    =   2.89  Prob > chi2 =  0.236 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   0.41  Prob > chi2 =  0.814 
  gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, collapse lag(1 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   1.05  Prob > chi2 =  0.307 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   2.26  Prob > chi2 =  0.521 
  gmm(gap_tr, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   2.62  Prob > chi2 =  0.105 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   0.68  Prob > chi2 =  0.879 
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Table 3.9 Column 5 
 
xtabond2 capb_ngdp_tr L.capb_ngdp_tr gap_tr gap_tr_rules L.debt2gdp infl 
legelec_dpi1 rules maastricht dy_2002-dy_2010 if year>1994 & year<2011 & 
(eu27==1), gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, laglimits(1 2) collapse) gmm(gap_tr, laglimits 
(2 3) collapse) gmm(gap_tr_rules, laglimits (2 3) collapse)  iv(L.debt2gdp infl 
legelec_dpi1 rules maastricht dy_2002-dy_2010) two robust small 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: country                         Number of obs      =       414 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        27 
Number of instruments = 24                      Obs per group: min =        10 
F(17, 26)     =    267.16                                      avg =     15.33 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        16 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
capb_ngdp_tr |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
capb_ngdp_tr | 
         L1. |      0.785      0.076    10.33    0.00        0.629       0.941 
             | 
      gap_tr |     -0.141      0.037    -3.80    0.00       -0.217      -0.065 
gap_tr_rules |     -0.019      0.088    -0.21    0.83       -0.199       0.162 
             | 
    debt2gdp | 
         L1. |      0.014      0.005     2.89    0.01        0.004       0.024 
             | 
        infl |      0.027      0.004     6.54    0.00        0.019       0.036 
legelec_dpi1 |     -0.748      0.257    -2.91    0.01       -1.278      -0.219 
       rules |      0.469      0.117     4.00    0.00        0.228       0.709 
  maastricht |      0.488      0.176     2.77    0.01        0.126       0.850 
     dy_2002 |     -0.853      0.389    -2.19    0.04       -1.652      -0.054 
     dy_2003 |     -0.617      0.228    -2.70    0.01       -1.086      -0.148 
     dy_2004 |     -0.258      0.342    -0.76    0.46       -0.961       0.444 
     dy_2005 |     -0.016      0.331    -0.05    0.96       -0.696       0.665 
     dy_2006 |     -0.178      0.246    -0.72    0.48       -0.684       0.329 
     dy_2007 |      0.278      0.357     0.78    0.44       -0.456       1.013 
     dy_2008 |     -0.996      0.371    -2.68    0.01       -1.759      -0.233 
     dy_2009 |     -2.483      0.500    -4.96    0.00       -3.511      -1.454 
     dy_2010 |     -1.091      0.639    -1.71    0.10       -2.405       0.223 
       _cons |     -0.545      0.274    -1.99    0.06       -1.108       0.017 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 rules maastricht dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 
    dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/3).gap_tr_rules collapsed 
    L(2/3).gap_tr collapsed 
    L(1/2).L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 rules maastricht dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 
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    dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010 
    _cons 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.gap_tr_rules collapsed 
    DL.gap_tr collapsed 
    D.L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.28  Pr > z =  0.001 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   1.01  Pr > z =  0.310 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(6)    =  25.01  Prob > chi2 =  0.000 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(6)    =   5.05  Prob > chi2 =  0.537 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(3)    =   3.71  Prob > chi2 =  0.294 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.34  Prob > chi2 =  0.720 
  gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, collapse lag(1 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(3)    =   2.49  Prob > chi2 =  0.478 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   2.57  Prob > chi2 =  0.464 
  gmm(gap_tr, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(3)    =   3.60  Prob > chi2 =  0.308 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.45  Prob > chi2 =  0.693 
  gmm(gap_tr_rules, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(3)    =   3.27  Prob > chi2 =  0.352 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.78  Prob > chi2 =  0.619 
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Table 3.9 Column 6 
 
xtabond2 capb_ngdp_tr L.capb_ngdp_tr gap_tr L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 deleg 
contr1 maastricht dy_2002-dy_2007 if year>1994 & year<2008 & (eu27==1), 
gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, laglimits(1 2) collapse) gmm(gap_tr, laglimits (2 3) 
collapse)  iv(L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 deleg contr1 maastricht dy_2002-
dy_2007) two robust small 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: country                         Number of obs      =       291 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        25 
Number of instruments = 19                      Obs per group: min =         7 
F(14, 24)     =     35.92                                      avg =     11.64 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        13 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
capb_ngdp_tr |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
capb_ngdp_tr | 
         L1. |      0.534      0.100     5.34    0.00        0.327       0.740 
             | 
      gap_tr |     -0.118      0.049    -2.43    0.02       -0.219      -0.018 
             | 
    debt2gdp | 
         L1. |      0.008      0.007     1.11    0.28       -0.007       0.023 
             | 
        infl |      0.000      0.023     0.01    0.99       -0.048       0.048 
legelec_dpi1 |     -0.450      0.166    -2.71    0.01       -0.791      -0.108 
       deleg |     -0.986      0.766    -1.29    0.21       -2.566       0.594 
      contr1 |      1.582      0.501     3.16    0.00        0.548       2.617 
  maastricht |      0.466      0.200     2.33    0.03        0.054       0.879 
     dy_2002 |     -0.870      0.371    -2.35    0.03       -1.637      -0.104 
     dy_2003 |     -0.895      0.375    -2.39    0.03       -1.670      -0.121 
     dy_2004 |     -0.887      0.433    -2.05    0.05       -1.782       0.007 
     dy_2005 |     -0.888      0.435    -2.04    0.05       -1.786       0.009 
     dy_2006 |     -1.006      0.477    -2.11    0.05       -1.990      -0.023 
     dy_2007 |     -0.894      0.599    -1.49    0.15       -2.130       0.342 
       _cons |      0.082      0.662     0.12    0.90       -1.284       1.447 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 deleg contr1 maastricht dy_2002 dy_2003 
    dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/3).gap_tr collapsed 
    L(1/2).L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 deleg contr1 maastricht dy_2002 dy_2003 
    dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 
    _cons 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.gap_tr collapsed 
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    D.L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.18  Pr > z =  0.001 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.94  Pr > z =  0.349 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =   3.28  Prob > chi2 =  0.512 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =   2.56  Prob > chi2 =  0.634 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(2)    =   0.51  Prob > chi2 =  0.773 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   2.04  Prob > chi2 =  0.360 
  gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, collapse lag(1 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   0.48  Prob > chi2 =  0.489 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   2.08  Prob > chi2 =  0.556 
  gmm(gap_tr, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   0.01  Prob > chi2 =  0.917 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   2.55  Prob > chi2 =  0.467 
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Table 3.9 Column 7 
 
xtabond2 capb_ngdp_tr L.capb_ngdp_tr gap_tr L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 
deleg_eu17 deleg_nms10 contr1_eu17 contr1_nms10 eu17 nms10 maastricht dy_2002-
dy_2007 if year>1994 & year<2008 & (eu27==1), gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, laglimits(1 
2) collapse) gmm(gap_tr, laglimits (2 3) collapse)  iv(L.debt2gdp infl 
legelec_dpi1 maastricht deleg_eu17 deleg_nms10 contr1_eu17 contr1_nms10 eu17 
nms10 dy_2002-dy_2007) two robust small nocons 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: country                         Number of obs      =       291 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        25 
Number of instruments = 22                      Obs per group: min =         7 
F(18, 25)     =     64.38                                      avg =     11.64 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        13 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
capb_ngdp_tr |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
capb_ngdp_tr | 
         L1. |      0.479      0.114     4.18    0.00        0.243       0.714 
             | 
      gap_tr |     -0.113      0.067    -1.69    0.10       -0.251       0.025 
             | 
    debt2gdp | 
         L1. |      0.002      0.007     0.33    0.75       -0.013       0.018 
             | 
        infl |      0.028      0.017     1.67    0.11       -0.006       0.062 
legelec_dpi1 |     -0.359      0.168    -2.13    0.04       -0.706      -0.012 
  deleg_eu17 |     -2.489      1.039    -2.40    0.02       -4.630      -0.349 
 deleg_nms10 |      0.950      1.142     0.83    0.41       -1.401       3.301 
 contr1_eu17 |      0.574      0.374     1.53    0.14       -0.197       1.345 
contr1_nms10 |      1.831      0.842     2.18    0.04        0.098       3.565 
        eu17 |      2.240      1.130     1.98    0.06       -0.088       4.567 
       nms10 |     -1.168      0.778    -1.50    0.15       -2.770       0.434 
  maastricht |      0.012      0.228     0.05    0.96       -0.458       0.483 
     dy_2002 |     -0.559      0.333    -1.68    0.11       -1.244       0.127 
     dy_2003 |     -0.836      0.336    -2.49    0.02       -1.528      -0.144 
     dy_2004 |     -0.850      0.448    -1.90    0.07       -1.773       0.073 
     dy_2005 |     -0.753      0.459    -1.64    0.11       -1.697       0.192 
     dy_2006 |     -0.925      0.465    -1.99    0.06       -1.883       0.034 
     dy_2007 |     -0.997      0.577    -1.73    0.10       -2.186       0.192 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht deleg_eu17 deleg_nms10 
    contr1_eu17 contr1_nms10 eu17 nms10 dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 dy_2005 
    dy_2006 dy_2007) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/3).gap_tr collapsed 
    L(1/2).L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
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    L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht deleg_eu17 deleg_nms10 contr1_eu17 
    contr1_nms10 eu17 nms10 dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.gap_tr collapsed 
    D.L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.11  Pr > z =  0.002 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.82  Pr > z =  0.414 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =   3.94  Prob > chi2 =  0.414 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =   4.45  Prob > chi2 =  0.349 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(2)    =   0.72  Prob > chi2 =  0.698 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   3.73  Prob > chi2 =  0.155 
  gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, collapse lag(1 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   0.44  Prob > chi2 =  0.508 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   4.01  Prob > chi2 =  0.261 
  gmm(gap_tr, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   0.27  Prob > chi2 =  0.604 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   4.18  Prob > chi2 =  0.243 
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Table 3.10 Column 1 
 
xtabond2 capb_ngdp_tr L.capb_ngdp_tr gap_tr L.debt2gdp legelec_dpi1 maastricht 
infl dy_2002-dy_2010 if year>1994 & year<2011 & (eu27==1|see6==1), 
gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, laglimits(1 2) collapse) gmm(gap_tr, laglimits(2 3) 
collapse) iv(L.debt2gdp legelec_dpi1 maastricht infl dy_2002-dy_2010) two 
robust small 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: country                         Number of obs      =       464 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        33 
Number of instruments = 20                      Obs per group: min =         5 
F(15, 32)     =     79.39                                      avg =     14.06 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        16 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
capb_ngdp_tr |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
capb_ngdp_tr | 
         L1. |      0.691      0.074     9.30    0.00        0.539       0.842 
             | 
      gap_tr |     -0.153      0.068    -2.25    0.03       -0.292      -0.015 
             | 
    debt2gdp | 
         L1. |      0.008      0.004     1.90    0.07       -0.001       0.017 
             | 
legelec_dpi1 |     -0.560      0.202    -2.78    0.01       -0.970      -0.149 
  maastricht |      0.665      0.199     3.34    0.00        0.259       1.071 
        infl |      0.017      0.005     3.11    0.00        0.006       0.028 
     dy_2002 |     -0.585      0.402    -1.45    0.16       -1.404       0.235 
     dy_2003 |     -0.107      0.311    -0.34    0.73       -0.740       0.526 
     dy_2004 |     -0.052      0.295    -0.18    0.86       -0.652       0.549 
     dy_2005 |      0.288      0.298     0.97    0.34       -0.319       0.896 
     dy_2006 |      0.035      0.248     0.14    0.89       -0.470       0.539 
     dy_2007 |      0.441      0.449     0.98    0.33       -0.474       1.356 
     dy_2008 |     -1.053      0.413    -2.55    0.02       -1.895      -0.211 
     dy_2009 |     -2.084      0.439    -4.75    0.00       -2.977      -1.191 
     dy_2010 |     -0.679      0.451    -1.51    0.14       -1.597       0.240 
       _cons |     -0.228      0.285    -0.80    0.43       -0.809       0.353 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(L.debt2gdp legelec_dpi1 maastricht infl dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 dy_2005 
    dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/3).gap_tr collapsed 
    L(1/2).L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    L.debt2gdp legelec_dpi1 maastricht infl dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 dy_2005 
    dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010 
    _cons 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
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    DL.gap_tr collapsed 
    D.L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.80  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.76  Pr > z =  0.446 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =  17.45  Prob > chi2 =  0.002 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =   2.23  Prob > chi2 =  0.694 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(2)    =   1.74  Prob > chi2 =  0.419 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   0.49  Prob > chi2 =  0.783 
  gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, collapse lag(1 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   0.95  Prob > chi2 =  0.331 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.28  Prob > chi2 =  0.733 
  gmm(gap_tr, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   1.86  Prob > chi2 =  0.173 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   0.37  Prob > chi2 =  0.946 
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Table 3.10 Column 2 
 
xtabond2 carev_ngdp_tr L.carev_ngdp_tr gap_tr L.debt2gdp legelec_dpi1 
maastricht infl dy_2002-dy_2010 if year>1994 & year<2011 & (eu27==1|see6==1), 
gmm(L.carev_ngdp_tr, laglimits(1 4) collapse) gmm(gap_tr, laglimits (2 3) 
collapse) iv(L.debt2gdp legelec_dpi1 maastricht infl dy_2002-dy_2010) two 
robust small 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: country                         Number of obs      =       484 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        33 
Number of instruments = 22                      Obs per group: min =         8 
F(15, 32)     =     34.19                                      avg =     14.67 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        16 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
carev_ngdp~r |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
carev_ngdp~r | 
         L1. |      0.553      0.296     1.87    0.07       -0.051       1.156 
             | 
      gap_tr |     -0.187      0.116    -1.61    0.12       -0.424       0.049 
             | 
    debt2gdp | 
         L1. |      0.024      0.022     1.11    0.28       -0.020       0.068 
             | 
legelec_dpi1 |     -0.322      0.147    -2.20    0.04       -0.621      -0.024 
  maastricht |      0.776      0.737     1.05    0.30       -0.725       2.276 
        infl |     -0.063      0.031    -2.01    0.05       -0.127       0.001 
     dy_2002 |      0.024      0.432     0.06    0.96       -0.856       0.905 
     dy_2003 |      0.209      0.418     0.50    0.62       -0.643       1.060 
     dy_2004 |     -0.294      0.341    -0.86    0.39       -0.987       0.400 
     dy_2005 |      0.183      0.350     0.52    0.61       -0.531       0.896 
     dy_2006 |      0.159      0.560     0.28    0.78       -0.980       1.299 
     dy_2007 |      0.461      0.740     0.62    0.54       -1.046       1.969 
     dy_2008 |      0.589      0.444     1.33    0.19       -0.315       1.492 
     dy_2009 |      0.986      0.767     1.29    0.21       -0.576       2.548 
     dy_2010 |     -0.397      0.377    -1.05    0.30       -1.164       0.371 
       _cons |     17.715     11.452     1.55    0.13       -5.613      41.042 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(L.debt2gdp legelec_dpi1 maastricht infl dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 dy_2005 
    dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/3).gap_tr collapsed 
    L(1/4).L.carev_ngdp_tr collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    L.debt2gdp legelec_dpi1 maastricht infl dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 dy_2005 
    dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010 
    _cons 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
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    DL.gap_tr collapsed 
    D.L.carev_ngdp_tr collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -2.02  Pr > z =  0.044 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -0.93  Pr > z =  0.353 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(6)    =  40.83  Prob > chi2 =  0.000 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(6)    =   9.26  Prob > chi2 =  0.159 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(4)    =   5.26  Prob > chi2 =  0.262 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   4.01  Prob > chi2 =  0.135 
  gmm(L.carev_ngdp_tr, collapse lag(1 4)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   3.85  Prob > chi2 =  0.050 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(5)    =   5.42  Prob > chi2 =  0.367 
  gmm(gap_tr, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(3)    =   4.14  Prob > chi2 =  0.246 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   5.12  Prob > chi2 =  0.163 
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Table 3.10 Column 3 
 
xtabond2 caprexp_ngdp_tr L.caprexp_ngdp_tr gap_tr L.debt2gdp legelec_dpi1 
maastricht infl dy_2002-dy_2010 if year>1994 & year<2011 & (eu27==1|see6==1), 
gmm(L.caprexp_ngdp_tr, laglimits(1 2) collapse) gmm(gap_tr, laglimits (2 3) 
collapse)  iv(L.debt2gdp legelec_dpi1 maastricht infl dy_2002-dy_2010) two 
robust small 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: country                         Number of obs      =       465 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        33 
Number of instruments = 20                      Obs per group: min =         5 
F(15, 32)     =    130.49                                      avg =     14.09 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        16 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
caprexp_ng~r |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
caprexp_ng~r | 
         L1. |      0.739      0.260     2.84    0.01        0.210       1.268 
             | 
      gap_tr |     -0.063      0.089    -0.70    0.49       -0.244       0.119 
             | 
    debt2gdp | 
         L1. |      0.012      0.010     1.12    0.27       -0.010       0.033 
             | 
legelec_dpi1 |      0.425      0.153     2.78    0.01        0.113       0.736 
  maastricht |     -0.193      0.730    -0.26    0.79       -1.681       1.295 
        infl |     -0.028      0.021    -1.36    0.18       -0.071       0.014 
     dy_2002 |      0.642      0.291     2.21    0.03        0.049       1.235 
     dy_2003 |      0.845      0.427     1.98    0.06       -0.023       1.714 
     dy_2004 |     -0.212      0.456    -0.46    0.65       -1.141       0.718 
     dy_2005 |      0.386      0.315     1.22    0.23       -0.256       1.027 
     dy_2006 |      0.628      0.375     1.67    0.10       -0.136       1.392 
     dy_2007 |      0.490      0.633     0.77    0.44       -0.800       1.780 
     dy_2008 |      2.406      0.516     4.66    0.00        1.354       3.458 
     dy_2009 |      3.737      0.546     6.85    0.00        2.625       4.848 
     dy_2010 |      1.147      0.905     1.27    0.21       -0.696       2.990 
       _cons |     10.124     10.399     0.97    0.34       -11.058      31.306 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(L.debt2gdp legelec_dpi1 maastricht infl dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 dy_2005 
    dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/3).gap_tr collapsed 
    L(1/2).L.caprexp_ngdp_tr collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    L.debt2gdp legelec_dpi1 maastricht infl dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 dy_2005 
    dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010 
    _cons 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
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    DL.gap_tr collapsed 
    D.L.caprexp_ngdp_tr collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -2.02  Pr > z =  0.043 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.44  Pr > z =  0.660 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =   8.40  Prob > chi2 =  0.078 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =   4.60  Prob > chi2 =  0.331 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(2)    =   1.83  Prob > chi2 =  0.401 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   2.77  Prob > chi2 =  0.251 
  gmm(L.caprexp_ngdp_tr, collapse lag(1 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   0.03  Prob > chi2 =  0.874 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   4.57  Prob > chi2 =  0.206 
  gmm(gap_tr, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   0.07  Prob > chi2 =  0.786 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   4.52  Prob > chi2 =  0.210 
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Table 3.10 Column 4 
 
xtabond2 capb_ngdp_tr L.capb_ngdp_tr gap_tr_eu17 gap_tr_nms10 gap_tr_see6 eu17 
nms10 see6 L.debt2gdp legelec_dpi1 maastricht infl  dy_2002-dy_2010 if 
year>1994 & year<2011 & (eu27==1|see6==1), gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, laglimits(1 2) 
collapse) gmm(gap_tr_eu17, laglimits (2 3) collapse) gmm(gap_tr_nms10, 
laglimits (2 3) collapse)  gmm(gap_tr_see6, laglimits (2 3) collapse)  
iv(L.debt2gdp legelec_dpi1 maastricht infl eu17 nms10 see6 dy_2002-dy_2010) two 
robust small nocons 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: country                         Number of obs      =       464 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        33 
Number of instruments = 28                      Obs per group: min =         5 
F(20, 33)     =    444.89                                      avg =     14.06 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        16 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
capb_ngdp_tr |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
capb_ngdp_tr | 
         L1. |      0.698      0.066    10.61    0.00        0.564       0.832 
             | 
 gap_tr_eu17 |      0.020      0.120     0.17    0.87       -0.223       0.263 
gap_tr_nms10 |     -0.180      0.043    -4.20    0.00       -0.267      -0.093 
 gap_tr_see6 |     -0.270      0.061    -4.44    0.00       -0.393      -0.146 
        eu17 |      0.213      0.477     0.45    0.66       -0.757       1.183 
       nms10 |     -0.174      0.253    -0.69    0.50       -0.687       0.340 
        see6 |      0.369      0.291     1.27    0.21       -0.222       0.960 
             | 
    debt2gdp | 
         L1. |      0.002      0.006     0.36    0.72       -0.009       0.013 
             | 
legelec_dpi1 |     -0.489      0.190    -2.58    0.01       -0.875      -0.104 
  maastricht |      0.832      0.352     2.36    0.02        0.116       1.547 
        infl |      0.020      0.004     5.37    0.00        0.012       0.027 
     dy_2002 |     -0.624      0.375    -1.66    0.11       -1.387       0.139 
     dy_2003 |     -0.228      0.262    -0.87    0.39       -0.760       0.304 
     dy_2004 |     -0.135      0.310    -0.43    0.67       -0.766       0.496 
     dy_2005 |      0.192      0.314     0.61    0.54       -0.446       0.831 
     dy_2006 |     -0.169      0.253    -0.67    0.51       -0.684       0.346 
     dy_2007 |      0.133      0.441     0.30    0.76       -0.764       1.031 
     dy_2008 |     -1.295      0.415    -3.12    0.00       -2.138      -0.451 
     dy_2009 |     -2.151      0.455    -4.73    0.00       -3.076      -1.226 
     dy_2010 |     -0.582      0.337    -1.73    0.09       -1.267       0.103 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(L.debt2gdp legelec_dpi1 maastricht infl eu17 nms10 see6 dy_2002 dy_2003 
    dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/3).gap_tr_see6 collapsed 
    L(2/3).gap_tr_nms10 collapsed 
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    L(2/3).gap_tr_eu17 collapsed 
    L(1/2).L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    L.debt2gdp legelec_dpi1 maastricht infl eu17 nms10 see6 dy_2002 dy_2003 
    dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.gap_tr_see6 collapsed 
    DL.gap_tr_nms10 collapsed 
    DL.gap_tr_eu17 collapsed 
    D.L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.84  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.48  Pr > z =  0.628 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(8)    =  33.36  Prob > chi2 =  0.000 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(8)    =   4.04  Prob > chi2 =  0.854 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(4)    =   2.86  Prob > chi2 =  0.582 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(4)    =   1.18  Prob > chi2 =  0.882 
  gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, collapse lag(1 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(5)    =   2.57  Prob > chi2 =  0.766 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.46  Prob > chi2 =  0.691 
  gmm(gap_tr_eu17, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(5)    =   2.48  Prob > chi2 =  0.780 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.56  Prob > chi2 =  0.668 
  gmm(gap_tr_nms10, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(5)    =   3.72  Prob > chi2 =  0.590 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   0.31  Prob > chi2 =  0.957 
  gmm(gap_tr_see6, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(5)    =   2.83  Prob > chi2 =  0.726 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.21  Prob > chi2 =  0.752 
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Table 3.10 Column 5 
 
xtabond2 carev_ngdp_tr L.carev_ngdp_tr gap_tr_eu17 gap_tr_nms10 gap_tr_see6 
eu17 nms10 see6 L.debt2gdp legelec_dpi1 maastricht infl  dy_2002-dy_2010 if 
year>1994 & year<2011 & (eu27==1|see6==1), gmm(L.carev_ngdp_tr, laglimits(1 4) 
collapse) gmm(gap_tr_eu17, laglimits (2 3) collapse) gmm(gap_tr_nms10, 
laglimits (2 3) collapse)  gmm(gap_tr_see6, laglimits (2 3) collapse)  
iv(L.debt2gdp legelec_dpi1 maastricht infl eu17 nms10 see6 dy_2002-dy_2010) two 
robust small nocons 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: country                         Number of obs      =       484 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        33 
Number of instruments = 30                      Obs per group: min =         8 
F(20, 33)     =  17215.54                                      avg =     14.67 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        16 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
carev_ngdp~r |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
carev_ngdp~r | 
         L1. |      0.889      0.163     5.45    0.00        0.557       1.221 
             | 
 gap_tr_eu17 |     -0.200      0.065    -3.07    0.00       -0.333      -0.067 
gap_tr_nms10 |     -0.167      0.060    -2.79    0.01       -0.288      -0.045 
 gap_tr_see6 |     -0.121      0.517    -0.23    0.82       -1.174       0.932 
        eu17 |      4.636      6.871     0.67    0.50       -9.343      18.614 
       nms10 |      4.042      6.279     0.64    0.52       -8.734      16.817 
        see6 |      3.723      5.903     0.63    0.53       -8.287      15.734 
             | 
    debt2gdp | 
         L1. |      0.002      0.009     0.19    0.85       -0.017       0.021 
             | 
legelec_dpi1 |     -0.226      0.201    -1.12    0.27       -0.636       0.183 
  maastricht |     -0.098      0.329    -0.30    0.77       -0.767       0.570 
        infl |      0.001      0.021     0.04    0.97       -0.042       0.043 
     dy_2002 |      0.240      0.457     0.52    0.60       -0.690       1.170 
     dy_2003 |      0.341      0.290     1.18    0.25       -0.248       0.930 
     dy_2004 |     -0.187      0.377    -0.50    0.62       -0.954       0.579 
     dy_2005 |      0.510      0.290     1.76    0.09       -0.081       1.101 
     dy_2006 |      0.391      0.517     0.75    0.46       -0.662       1.443 
     dy_2007 |      0.743      0.589     1.26    0.22       -0.455       1.941 
     dy_2008 |      0.832      0.805     1.03    0.31       -0.807       2.471 
     dy_2009 |      1.591      0.780     2.04    0.05        0.003       3.179 
     dy_2010 |     -0.085      0.303    -0.28    0.78       -0.702       0.532 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(L.debt2gdp legelec_dpi1 maastricht infl eu17 nms10 see6 dy_2002 dy_2003 
    dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/3).gap_tr_see6 collapsed 
    L(2/3).gap_tr_nms10 collapsed 
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    L(2/3).gap_tr_eu17 collapsed 
    L(1/4).L.carev_ngdp_tr collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    L.debt2gdp legelec_dpi1 maastricht infl eu17 nms10 see6 dy_2002 dy_2003 
    dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.gap_tr_see6 collapsed 
    DL.gap_tr_nms10 collapsed 
    DL.gap_tr_eu17 collapsed 
    D.L.carev_ngdp_tr collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.60  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -1.13  Pr > z =  0.257 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(10)   =  57.76  Prob > chi2 =  0.000 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(10)   =  13.71  Prob > chi2 =  0.187 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(6)    =   6.80  Prob > chi2 =  0.340 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(4)    =   6.91  Prob > chi2 =  0.141 
  gmm(L.carev_ngdp_tr, collapse lag(1 4)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(5)    =  12.02  Prob > chi2 =  0.034 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(5)    =   1.69  Prob > chi2 =  0.890 
  gmm(gap_tr_eu17, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(7)    =  10.11  Prob > chi2 =  0.182 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   3.60  Prob > chi2 =  0.309 
  gmm(gap_tr_nms10, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(7)    =   7.98  Prob > chi2 =  0.334 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   5.73  Prob > chi2 =  0.126 
  gmm(gap_tr_see6, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(7)    =   6.23  Prob > chi2 =  0.513 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   7.48  Prob > chi2 =  0.058 
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Table 3.10 Column 6 
 
xtabond2 caprexp_ngdp_tr L.caprexp_ngdp_tr gap_tr_eu17 gap_tr_nms10 gap_tr_see6 
eu17 nms10 see6 L.debt2gdp legelec_dpi1 maastricht infl  dy_2002-dy_2010 if 
year>1994 & year<2011 & (eu27==1|see6==1), gmm(L.caprexp_ngdp_tr, laglimits(1 
2) collapse) gmm(gap_tr_eu17, laglimits (2 3) collapse) gmm(gap_tr_nms10, 
laglimits(2 3) collapse)  gmm(gap_tr_see6, laglimits (2 3) collapse)  
iv(L.debt2gdp legelec_dpi1 maastricht infl eu17 nms10 see6 dy_2002-dy_2010) two 
robust small nocons 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: country                         Number of obs      =       465 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        33 
Number of instruments = 28                      Obs per group: min =         5 
F(20, 33)     =   4644.31                                      avg =     14.09 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        16 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
caprexp_ng~r |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
caprexp_ng~r | 
         L1. |      0.594      0.149     3.98    0.00        0.290       0.898 
             | 
 gap_tr_eu17 |     -0.410      0.121    -3.39    0.00       -0.656      -0.164 
gap_tr_nms10 |     -0.123      0.080    -1.54    0.13       -0.285       0.039 
 gap_tr_see6 |      0.210      0.142     1.48    0.15       -0.078       0.499 
        eu17 |     16.972      5.856     2.90    0.01        5.057      28.886 
       nms10 |     15.488      5.830     2.66    0.01        3.627      27.349 
        see6 |     13.109      5.032     2.61    0.01        2.871      23.346 
             | 
    debt2gdp | 
         L1. |      0.005      0.008     0.70    0.49       -0.010       0.021 
             | 
legelec_dpi1 |      0.496      0.168     2.96    0.01        0.154       0.837 
  maastricht |     -0.518      0.468    -1.11    0.28       -1.470       0.434 
        infl |     -0.028      0.009    -2.96    0.01       -0.047      -0.009 
     dy_2002 |      0.497      0.343     1.45    0.16       -0.201       1.195 
     dy_2003 |      0.536      0.500     1.07    0.29       -0.482       1.554 
     dy_2004 |      0.161      0.442     0.36    0.72       -0.738       1.060 
     dy_2005 |      0.570      0.414     1.37    0.18       -0.273       1.413 
     dy_2006 |      1.139      0.476     2.39    0.02        0.171       2.107 
     dy_2007 |      1.469      0.650     2.26    0.03        0.146       2.791 
     dy_2008 |      2.774      0.619     4.48    0.00        1.515       4.034 
     dy_2009 |      3.436      0.716     4.80    0.00        1.978       4.893 
     dy_2010 |      1.240      0.874     1.42    0.17       -0.538       3.019 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(L.debt2gdp legelec_dpi1 maastricht infl eu17 nms10 see6 dy_2002 dy_2003 
    dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/3).gap_tr_see6 collapsed 
    L(2/3).gap_tr_nms10 collapsed 
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    L(2/3).gap_tr_eu17 collapsed 
    L(1/2).L.caprexp_ngdp_tr collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    L.debt2gdp legelec_dpi1 maastricht infl eu17 nms10 see6 dy_2002 dy_2003 
    dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.gap_tr_see6 collapsed 
    DL.gap_tr_nms10 collapsed 
    DL.gap_tr_eu17 collapsed 
    D.L.caprexp_ngdp_tr collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -2.21  Pr > z =  0.027 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.36  Pr > z =  0.715 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(8)    =  25.30  Prob > chi2 =  0.001 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(8)    =   6.92  Prob > chi2 =  0.545 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(4)    =   6.03  Prob > chi2 =  0.197 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(4)    =   0.90  Prob > chi2 =  0.925 
  gmm(L.caprexp_ngdp_tr, collapse lag(1 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(5)    =   6.56  Prob > chi2 =  0.255 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   0.36  Prob > chi2 =  0.949 
  gmm(gap_tr_eu17, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(5)    =   6.47  Prob > chi2 =  0.263 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   0.46  Prob > chi2 =  0.928 
  gmm(gap_tr_nms10, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(5)    =   4.51  Prob > chi2 =  0.478 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   2.41  Prob > chi2 =  0.492 
  gmm(gap_tr_see6, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(5)    =   5.62  Prob > chi2 =  0.345 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.30  Prob > chi2 =  0.728 
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Table 3.10 Column 7 
 
xtabond2 carev_ngdp_tr L.carev_ngdp_tr gap_tr L.debt2gdp legelec_dpi1_eu17 
legelec_dpi1_nms10 legelec_dpi1_see6 eu17 nms10 see6 maastricht infl dy_2002-
dy_2010 if year>1994 & year<2011 & (eu27==1|see6==1), gmm(L.carev_ngdp_tr, 
laglimits(1 4) collapse) gmm(gap_tr, laglimits (2 3) collapse)  iv(L.debt2gdp 
legelec_dpi1_eu17 legelec_dpi1_nms10 legelec_dpi1_see6 eu17 nms10 see6  
maastricht infl dy_2002-dy_2010) two robust small nocons 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: country                         Number of obs      =       484 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        33 
Number of instruments = 26                      Obs per group: min =         8 
F(20, 33)     =   1058.13                                      avg =     14.67 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        16 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
carev_ngdp~r |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
carev_ngdp~r | 
         L1. |      0.329      0.316     1.04    0.31       -0.313       0.971 
             | 
      gap_tr |     -0.260      0.106    -2.45    0.02       -0.476      -0.044 
             | 
    debt2gdp | 
         L1. |      0.020      0.017     1.17    0.25       -0.015       0.054 
             | 
legelec_d~17 |     -0.246      0.128    -1.92    0.06       -0.506       0.015 
legelec_d~10 |     -0.356      0.312    -1.14    0.26       -0.990       0.279 
legelec_d~e6 |     -0.422      0.629    -0.67    0.51       -1.701       0.857 
        eu17 |     28.518     13.428     2.12    0.04        1.198      55.838 
       nms10 |     25.466     11.667     2.18    0.04        1.729      49.202 
        see6 |     25.223     11.739     2.15    0.04        1.340      49.107 
  maastricht |      0.975      0.726     1.34    0.19       -0.502       2.452 
        infl |     -0.044      0.019    -2.36    0.02       -0.082      -0.006 
     dy_2002 |     -0.163      0.370    -0.44    0.66       -0.916       0.590 
     dy_2003 |      0.139      0.468     0.30    0.77       -0.813       1.091 
     dy_2004 |     -0.164      0.356    -0.46    0.65       -0.890       0.561 
     dy_2005 |      0.224      0.417     0.54    0.60       -0.625       1.073 
     dy_2006 |      0.263      0.563     0.47    0.64       -0.883       1.409 
     dy_2007 |      0.669      0.647     1.03    0.31       -0.646       1.985 
     dy_2008 |      0.654      0.453     1.44    0.16       -0.267       1.576 
     dy_2009 |      0.618      0.886     0.70    0.49       -1.185       2.421 
     dy_2010 |     -0.209      0.450    -0.46    0.65       -1.124       0.706 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(L.debt2gdp legelec_dpi1_eu17 legelec_dpi1_nms10 legelec_dpi1_see6 eu17 
    nms10 see6 maastricht infl dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 
    dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/3).gap_tr collapsed 
    L(1/4).L.carev_ngdp_tr collapsed 
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Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    L.debt2gdp legelec_dpi1_eu17 legelec_dpi1_nms10 legelec_dpi1_see6 eu17 
    nms10 see6 maastricht infl dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 
    dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.gap_tr collapsed 
    D.L.carev_ngdp_tr collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -1.16  Pr > z =  0.246 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -0.79  Pr > z =  0.432 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(6)    =  31.90  Prob > chi2 =  0.000 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(6)    =   6.14  Prob > chi2 =  0.408 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(4)    =   5.09  Prob > chi2 =  0.279 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   1.05  Prob > chi2 =  0.592 
  gmm(L.carev_ngdp_tr, collapse lag(1 4)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   1.92  Prob > chi2 =  0.165 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(5)    =   4.21  Prob > chi2 =  0.519 
  gmm(gap_tr, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(3)    =   2.69  Prob > chi2 =  0.441 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   3.44  Prob > chi2 =  0.328 
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Table 3.10 Column 8 
 
xtabond2 caprexp_ngdp_tr L.caprexp_ngdp_tr gap_tr L.debt2gdp legelec_dpi1_eu17 
legelec_dpi1_nms10 legelec_dpi1_see6 eu17 nms10 see6 maastricht infl dy_2002-
dy_2010 if year>1994 & year<2011 & (eu27==1|see6==1), gmm(L.caprexp_ngdp_tr, 
laglimits(1 4) collapse) gmm(gap_tr, laglimits (2 3) collapse)  iv(L.debt2gdp 
legelec_dpi1_eu17 legelec_dpi1_nms10 legelec_dpi1_see6 eu17 nms10 see6  
maastricht infl dy_2002-dy_2010) two robust small nocons 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: country                         Number of obs      =       465 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        33 
Number of instruments = 26                      Obs per group: min =         5 
F(20, 33)     =   4198.06                                      avg =     14.09 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        16 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
caprexp_ng~r |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
caprexp_ng~r | 
         L1. |      0.695      0.221     3.15    0.00        0.245       1.145 
             | 
      gap_tr |     -0.108      0.084    -1.28    0.21       -0.278       0.063 
             | 
    debt2gdp | 
         L1. |      0.000      0.008     0.05    0.96       -0.015       0.016 
             | 
legelec_d~17 |      0.498      0.109     4.56    0.00        0.276       0.721 
legelec_d~10 |      0.252      0.591     0.43    0.67       -0.951       1.455 
legelec_d~e6 |      0.428      0.425     1.01    0.32       -0.437       1.293 
        eu17 |     12.679      9.147     1.39    0.17       -5.929      31.288 
       nms10 |     11.675      8.786     1.33    0.19       -6.201      29.551 
        see6 |     10.472      8.227     1.27    0.21       -6.266      27.209 
  maastricht |     -0.030      0.621    -0.05    0.96       -1.293       1.234 
        infl |     -0.022      0.013    -1.68    0.10       -0.048       0.005 
     dy_2002 |      0.526      0.336     1.57    0.13       -0.157       1.209 
     dy_2003 |      0.891      0.523     1.70    0.10       -0.174       1.956 
     dy_2004 |     -0.021      0.403    -0.05    0.96       -0.841       0.799 
     dy_2005 |      0.491      0.350     1.40    0.17       -0.221       1.202 
     dy_2006 |      0.885      0.340     2.60    0.01        0.194       1.576 
     dy_2007 |      0.880      0.560     1.57    0.13       -0.259       2.020 
     dy_2008 |      2.619      0.502     5.21    0.00        1.597       3.641 
     dy_2009 |      3.644      0.585     6.23    0.00        2.455       4.834 
     dy_2010 |      0.993      0.822     1.21    0.24       -0.680       2.666 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(L.debt2gdp legelec_dpi1_eu17 legelec_dpi1_nms10 legelec_dpi1_see6 eu17 
    nms10 see6 maastricht infl dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 
    dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/3).gap_tr collapsed 
    L(1/4).L.caprexp_ngdp_tr collapsed 
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Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    L.debt2gdp legelec_dpi1_eu17 legelec_dpi1_nms10 legelec_dpi1_see6 eu17 
    nms10 see6 maastricht infl dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 
    dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.gap_tr collapsed 
    D.L.caprexp_ngdp_tr collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -2.11  Pr > z =  0.035 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.42  Pr > z =  0.677 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(6)    =   7.46  Prob > chi2 =  0.280 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(6)    =   6.42  Prob > chi2 =  0.378 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(4)    =   4.47  Prob > chi2 =  0.346 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   1.94  Prob > chi2 =  0.378 
  gmm(L.caprexp_ngdp_tr, collapse lag(1 4)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   0.64  Prob > chi2 =  0.422 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(5)    =   5.77  Prob > chi2 =  0.329 
  gmm(gap_tr, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(3)    =   0.27  Prob > chi2 =  0.966 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   6.15  Prob > chi2 =  0.105 
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Table 3.11 Column 1 
 
xtabond2 capb_ngdp_tr L.capb_ngdp_tr gap_tr L.debt2gdp legelec_dpi1 maastricht 
infl dy_2002-dy_2010 if year>1994 & year<2011 & (eu27==1|see6==1), 
gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, laglimits(1 2) collapse) gmm(gap_tr, laglimits (2 3) 
collapse)  iv(L.debt2gdp legelec_dpi1 maastricht infl dy_2002-dy_2010) two 
robust small 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: country                         Number of obs      =       464 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        33 
Number of instruments = 20                      Obs per group: min =         5 
F(15, 32)     =     79.39                                      avg =     14.06 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        16 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
capb_ngdp_tr |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
capb_ngdp_tr | 
         L1. |      0.691      0.074     9.30    0.00        0.539       0.842 
             | 
      gap_tr |     -0.153      0.068    -2.25    0.03       -0.292      -0.015 
             | 
    debt2gdp | 
         L1. |      0.008      0.004     1.90    0.07       -0.001       0.017 
             | 
legelec_dpi1 |     -0.560      0.202    -2.78    0.01       -0.970      -0.149 
  maastricht |      0.665      0.199     3.34    0.00        0.259       1.071 
        infl |      0.017      0.005     3.11    0.00        0.006       0.028 
     dy_2002 |     -0.585      0.402    -1.45    0.16       -1.404       0.235 
     dy_2003 |     -0.107      0.311    -0.34    0.73       -0.740       0.526 
     dy_2004 |     -0.052      0.295    -0.18    0.86       -0.652       0.549 
     dy_2005 |      0.288      0.298     0.97    0.34       -0.319       0.896 
     dy_2006 |      0.035      0.248     0.14    0.89       -0.470       0.539 
     dy_2007 |      0.441      0.449     0.98    0.33       -0.474       1.356 
     dy_2008 |     -1.053      0.413    -2.55    0.02       -1.895      -0.211 
     dy_2009 |     -2.084      0.439    -4.75    0.00       -2.977      -1.191 
     dy_2010 |     -0.679      0.451    -1.51    0.14       -1.597       0.240 
       _cons |     -0.228      0.285    -0.80    0.43       -0.809       0.353 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(L.debt2gdp legelec_dpi1 maastricht infl dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 dy_2005 
    dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/3).gap_tr collapsed 
    L(1/2).L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    L.debt2gdp legelec_dpi1 maastricht infl dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 dy_2005 
    dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010 
    _cons 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
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    DL.gap_tr collapsed 
    D.L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.80  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.76  Pr > z =  0.446 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =  17.45  Prob > chi2 =  0.002 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =   2.23  Prob > chi2 =  0.694 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(2)    =   1.74  Prob > chi2 =  0.419 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   0.49  Prob > chi2 =  0.783 
  gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, collapse lag(1 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   0.95  Prob > chi2 =  0.331 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.28  Prob > chi2 =  0.733 
  gmm(gap_tr, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   1.86  Prob > chi2 =  0.173 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   0.37  Prob > chi2 =  0.946 
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Table 3.11 Column 2 
 
xtabond2 capb_ngdp_tr L.capb_ngdp_tr gap_tr_good gap_tr_bad good bad L.debt2gdp 
legelec_dpi1 maastricht infl dy_2002-dy_2010 if year>1994 & year<2011 & 
(eu27==1|see6==1), gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, laglimits(1 2) collapse) 
gmm(gap_tr_good, laglimits (2 3) collapse) gmm(gap_tr_bad, laglimits (2 3) 
collapse)  iv(L.debt2gdp legelec_dpi1 maastricht infl good bad dy_2002-dy_2010) 
two robust small nocons 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: country                         Number of obs      =       464 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        33 
Number of instruments = 24                      Obs per group: min =         5 
F(18, 33)     =     98.40                                      avg =     14.06 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        16 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
capb_ngdp_tr |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
capb_ngdp_tr | 
         L1. |      0.717      0.076     9.48    0.00        0.563       0.871 
             | 
 gap_tr_good |     -0.538      0.132    -4.08    0.00       -0.807      -0.270 
  gap_tr_bad |      0.135      0.250     0.54    0.59       -0.374       0.643 
        good |      1.053      0.488     2.16    0.04        0.059       2.047 
         bad |      0.782      0.664     1.18    0.25       -0.568       2.132 
             | 
    debt2gdp | 
         L1. |     -0.001      0.006    -0.14    0.89       -0.012       0.011 
             | 
legelec_dpi1 |     -0.614      0.219    -2.81    0.01       -1.059      -0.169 
  maastricht |      0.649      0.236     2.75    0.01        0.169       1.129 
        infl |      0.016      0.006     2.54    0.02        0.003       0.029 
     dy_2002 |     -0.905      0.401    -2.25    0.03       -1.722      -0.088 
     dy_2003 |     -0.429      0.257    -1.67    0.10       -0.951       0.093 
     dy_2004 |     -0.270      0.373    -0.72    0.47       -1.030       0.489 
     dy_2005 |      0.242      0.317     0.76    0.45       -0.403       0.887 
     dy_2006 |      0.432      0.248     1.74    0.09       -0.072       0.936 
     dy_2007 |      1.782      0.543     3.28    0.00        0.676       2.887 
     dy_2008 |      0.227      0.524     0.43    0.67       -0.838       1.293 
     dy_2009 |     -1.921      0.496    -3.87    0.00       -2.929      -0.912 
     dy_2010 |     -0.834      0.415    -2.01    0.05       -1.678       0.010 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(L.debt2gdp legelec_dpi1 maastricht infl good bad dy_2002 dy_2003 
    dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/3).gap_tr_bad collapsed 
    L(2/3).gap_tr_good collapsed 
    L(1/2).L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
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    L.debt2gdp legelec_dpi1 maastricht infl good bad dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 
    dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.gap_tr_bad collapsed 
    DL.gap_tr_good collapsed 
    D.L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.71  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.58  Pr > z =  0.559 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(6)    =  14.66  Prob > chi2 =  0.023 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(6)    =   4.15  Prob > chi2 =  0.656 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(3)    =   2.95  Prob > chi2 =  0.400 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.21  Prob > chi2 =  0.752 
  gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, collapse lag(1 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(3)    =   1.47  Prob > chi2 =  0.688 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   2.68  Prob > chi2 =  0.444 
  gmm(gap_tr_good, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(3)    =   1.98  Prob > chi2 =  0.577 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   2.18  Prob > chi2 =  0.537 
  gmm(gap_tr_bad, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(3)    =   2.23  Prob > chi2 =  0.526 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.92  Prob > chi2 =  0.589  
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Table 3.11 Column 3 
 
xtabond2 carev_ngdp_tr L.carev_ngdp_tr gap_tr_good gap_tr_bad good bad 
L.debt2gdp legelec_dpi1 maastricht infl dy_2002-dy_2010 if year>1994 & 
year<2011 & (eu27==1|see6==1), gmm(L.carev_ngdp_tr, laglimits(1 4) collapse) 
gmm(gap_tr_good, laglimits (2 3) collapse) gmm(gap_tr_bad, laglimits (2 3) 
collapse)  iv(L.debt2gdp legelec_dpi1 maastricht infl good bad dy_2002-dy_2010) 
two robust small nocons 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: country                         Number of obs      =       484 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        33 
Number of instruments = 26                      Obs per group: min =         8 
F(18, 33)     =   4232.69                                      avg =     14.67 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        16 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
carev_ngdp~r |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
carev_ngdp~r | 
         L1. |      0.486      0.284     1.71    0.10       -0.093       1.065 
             | 
 gap_tr_good |     -0.074      0.144    -0.51    0.61       -0.368       0.220 
  gap_tr_bad |     -0.349      0.270    -1.29    0.21       -0.899       0.201 
        good |     19.831     10.465     1.89    0.07       -1.461      41.123 
         bad |     19.844     10.131     1.96    0.06       -0.768      40.455 
             | 
    debt2gdp | 
         L1. |      0.030      0.027     1.12    0.27       -0.024       0.084 
             | 
legelec_dpi1 |     -0.353      0.156    -2.26    0.03       -0.671      -0.035 
  maastricht |      0.894      0.804     1.11    0.27       -0.741       2.529 
        infl |     -0.061      0.022    -2.79    0.01       -0.105      -0.017 
     dy_2002 |      0.045      0.328     0.14    0.89       -0.621       0.712 
     dy_2003 |      0.218      0.390     0.56    0.58       -0.575       1.011 
     dy_2004 |     -0.221      0.378    -0.58    0.56       -0.990       0.548 
     dy_2005 |      0.215      0.348     0.62    0.54       -0.494       0.924 
     dy_2006 |      0.100      0.579     0.17    0.86       -1.077       1.278 
     dy_2007 |      0.138      0.904     0.15    0.88       -1.702       1.977 
     dy_2008 |      0.184      0.778     0.24    0.81       -1.399       1.768 
     dy_2009 |      0.763      0.700     1.09    0.28       -0.661       2.187 
     dy_2010 |     -0.440      0.386    -1.14    0.26       -1.226       0.346 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(L.debt2gdp legelec_dpi1 maastricht infl good bad dy_2002 dy_2003 
    dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/3).gap_tr_bad collapsed 
    L(2/3).gap_tr_good collapsed 
    L(1/4).L.carev_ngdp_tr collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
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    L.debt2gdp legelec_dpi1 maastricht infl good bad dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 
    dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.gap_tr_bad collapsed 
    DL.gap_tr_good collapsed 
    D.L.carev_ngdp_tr collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -2.05  Pr > z =  0.041 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -0.76  Pr > z =  0.447 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(8)    =  42.55  Prob > chi2 =  0.000 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(8)    =  10.09  Prob > chi2 =  0.259 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(5)    =   6.11  Prob > chi2 =  0.295 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   3.98  Prob > chi2 =  0.264 
  gmm(L.carev_ngdp_tr, collapse lag(1 4)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(3)    =   4.29  Prob > chi2 =  0.232 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(5)    =   5.80  Prob > chi2 =  0.326 
  gmm(gap_tr_good, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(5)    =   8.56  Prob > chi2 =  0.128 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.53  Prob > chi2 =  0.675 
  gmm(gap_tr_bad, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(5)    =   8.57  Prob > chi2 =  0.128 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.52  Prob > chi2 =  0.677 
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Table 3.11 Column 4 
 
xtabond2 caprexp_ngdp_tr L.caprexp_ngdp_tr gap_tr_good gap_tr_bad good bad 
L.debt2gdp legelec_dpi1 maastricht infl dy_2002-dy_2010 if year>1994 & 
year<2011 & (eu27==1|see6==1), gmm(L.caprexp_ngdp_tr, laglimits (1 2) collapse) 
gmm(gap_tr_good, laglimits (2 3) collapse) gmm(gap_tr_bad, laglimits (2 3) 
collapse)  iv(L.debt2gdp legelec_dpi1 maastricht infl good bad dy_2002-dy_2010) 
two robust small nocons 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: country                         Number of obs      =       465 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        33 
Number of instruments = 24                      Obs per group: min =         5 
F(18, 33)     =   1702.08                                      avg =     14.09 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        16 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
caprexp_ng~r |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
caprexp_ng~r | 
         L1. |      0.432      0.325     1.33    0.19       -0.228       1.093 
             | 
 gap_tr_good |      0.302      0.150     2.02    0.05       -0.003       0.606 
  gap_tr_bad |     -0.486      0.301    -1.62    0.12       -1.099       0.126 
        good |     20.921     12.573     1.66    0.11       -4.660      46.501 
         bad |     21.144     12.422     1.70    0.10       -4.129      46.417 
             | 
    debt2gdp | 
         L1. |      0.030      0.015     2.03    0.05       -0.000       0.059 
             | 
legelec_dpi1 |      0.443      0.152     2.92    0.01        0.134       0.752 
  maastricht |      0.366      1.055     0.35    0.73       -1.780       2.512 
        infl |     -0.051      0.032    -1.60    0.12       -0.117       0.014 
     dy_2002 |      0.848      0.296     2.86    0.01        0.245       1.450 
     dy_2003 |      1.041      0.448     2.33    0.03        0.131       1.952 
     dy_2004 |      0.335      0.574     0.58    0.56       -0.834       1.504 
     dy_2005 |      0.585      0.401     1.46    0.15       -0.230       1.401 
     dy_2006 |      0.293      0.425     0.69    0.50       -0.572       1.158 
     dy_2007 |     -0.427      0.627    -0.68    0.50       -1.703       0.850 
     dy_2008 |      1.527      0.725     2.10    0.04        0.051       3.002 
     dy_2009 |      3.854      0.686     5.61    0.00        2.457       5.250 
     dy_2010 |      2.126      1.377     1.54    0.13       -0.675       4.927 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(L.debt2gdp legelec_dpi1 maastricht infl good bad dy_2002 dy_2003 
    dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/3).gap_tr_bad collapsed 
    L(2/3).gap_tr_good collapsed 
    L(1/2).L.caprexp_ngdp_tr collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
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    L.debt2gdp legelec_dpi1 maastricht infl good bad dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 
    dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.gap_tr_bad collapsed 
    DL.gap_tr_good collapsed 
    D.L.caprexp_ngdp_tr collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -1.72  Pr > z =  0.085 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.42  Pr > z =  0.672 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(6)    =   7.67  Prob > chi2 =  0.263 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(6)    =   4.16  Prob > chi2 =  0.655 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(3)    =   2.90  Prob > chi2 =  0.408 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.26  Prob > chi2 =  0.738 
  gmm(L.caprexp_ngdp_tr, collapse lag(1 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(3)    =   2.13  Prob > chi2 =  0.546 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   2.03  Prob > chi2 =  0.566 
  gmm(gap_tr_good, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(3)    =   1.06  Prob > chi2 =  0.786 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   3.09  Prob > chi2 =  0.378 
  gmm(gap_tr_bad, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(3)    =   1.70  Prob > chi2 =  0.636 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   2.45  Prob > chi2 =  0.484 
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Table 3.12 Column 1 
 
xtabond2 capb_ngdp_tr L.capb_ngdp_tr gap_tr L.debt2gdp legelec_dpi1 maastricht 
infl dy_2002-dy_2010 if year>1994 & year<2011 & (eu27==1|see6==1), 
gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, laglimits(1 2) collapse) gmm(gap_tr, laglimits(2 3) 
collapse)  iv(L.debt2gdp legelec_dpi1 maastricht infl dy_2002-dy_2010) two 
robust small 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: country                         Number of obs      =       464 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        33 
Number of instruments = 20                      Obs per group: min =         5 
F(15, 32)     =     79.39                                      avg =     14.06 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        16 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
capb_ngdp_tr |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
capb_ngdp_tr | 
         L1. |      0.691      0.074     9.30    0.00        0.539       0.842 
             | 
      gap_tr |     -0.153      0.068    -2.25    0.03       -0.292      -0.015 
             | 
    debt2gdp | 
         L1. |      0.008      0.004     1.90    0.07       -0.001       0.017 
             | 
legelec_dpi1 |     -0.560      0.202    -2.78    0.01       -0.970      -0.149 
  maastricht |      0.665      0.199     3.34    0.00        0.259       1.071 
        infl |      0.017      0.005     3.11    0.00        0.006       0.028 
     dy_2002 |     -0.585      0.402    -1.45    0.16       -1.404       0.235 
     dy_2003 |     -0.107      0.311    -0.34    0.73       -0.740       0.526 
     dy_2004 |     -0.052      0.295    -0.18    0.86       -0.652       0.549 
     dy_2005 |      0.288      0.298     0.97    0.34       -0.319       0.896 
     dy_2006 |      0.035      0.248     0.14    0.89       -0.470       0.539 
     dy_2007 |      0.441      0.449     0.98    0.33       -0.474       1.356 
     dy_2008 |     -1.053      0.413    -2.55    0.02       -1.895      -0.211 
     dy_2009 |     -2.084      0.439    -4.75    0.00       -2.977      -1.191 
     dy_2010 |     -0.679      0.451    -1.51    0.14       -1.597       0.240 
       _cons |     -0.228      0.285    -0.80    0.43       -0.809       0.353 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(L.debt2gdp legelec_dpi1 maastricht infl dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 dy_2005 
    dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/3).gap_tr collapsed 
    L(1/2).L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    L.debt2gdp legelec_dpi1 maastricht infl dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 dy_2005 
    dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010 
    _cons 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
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    DL.gap_tr collapsed 
    D.L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.80  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.76  Pr > z =  0.446 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =  17.45  Prob > chi2 =  0.002 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =   2.23  Prob > chi2 =  0.694 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(2)    =   1.74  Prob > chi2 =  0.419 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   0.49  Prob > chi2 =  0.783 
  gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, collapse lag(1 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   0.95  Prob > chi2 =  0.331 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.28  Prob > chi2 =  0.733 
  gmm(gap_tr, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   1.86  Prob > chi2 =  0.173 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   0.37  Prob > chi2 =  0.946 
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Table 3.12 Column 2 
 
xtabond2 capb_ngdp_tr L.capb_ngdp_tr gap_tr L.debt2gdp legelec_dpi1 infl 
dy_2002-dy_2010 if year>1998 & year<2011 & (eu27==1|see6==1), 
gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, laglimits(1 2) collapse) gmm(gap_tr, laglimits (2 3) 
collapse)  iv(L.debt2gdp legelec_dpi1 infl dy_2002-dy_2010) two robust small 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: country                         Number of obs      =       372 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        33 
Number of instruments = 19                      Obs per group: min =         5 
F(14, 32)     =     44.03                                      avg =     11.27 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        12 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
capb_ngdp_tr |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
capb_ngdp_tr | 
         L1. |      0.710      0.089     7.94    0.00        0.528       0.892 
             | 
      gap_tr |     -0.166      0.061    -2.72    0.01       -0.290      -0.042 
             | 
    debt2gdp | 
         L1. |      0.004      0.004     1.05    0.30       -0.004       0.013 
             | 
legelec_dpi1 |     -0.689      0.201    -3.42    0.00       -1.099      -0.278 
        infl |     -0.017      0.022    -0.75    0.46       -0.062       0.029 
     dy_2002 |     -0.599      0.436    -1.37    0.18       -1.488       0.289 
     dy_2003 |     -0.236      0.339    -0.70    0.49       -0.926       0.454 
     dy_2004 |     -0.098      0.310    -0.32    0.75       -0.729       0.533 
     dy_2005 |      0.152      0.295     0.51    0.61       -0.449       0.752 
     dy_2006 |      0.015      0.230     0.06    0.95       -0.453       0.482 
     dy_2007 |      0.464      0.442     1.05    0.30       -0.436       1.364 
     dy_2008 |     -0.935      0.421    -2.22    0.03       -1.793      -0.077 
     dy_2009 |     -2.060      0.514    -4.01    0.00       -3.106      -1.014 
     dy_2010 |     -0.721      0.585    -1.23    0.23       -1.913       0.471 
       _cons |      0.184      0.334     0.55    0.59       -0.496       0.864 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(L.debt2gdp legelec_dpi1 infl dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 
    dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/3).gap_tr collapsed 
    L(1/2).L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    L.debt2gdp legelec_dpi1 infl dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 
    dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010 
    _cons 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.gap_tr collapsed 
    D.L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
441 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -4.06  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.72  Pr > z =  0.469 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =  10.88  Prob > chi2 =  0.028 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =   1.61  Prob > chi2 =  0.807 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(2)    =   0.69  Prob > chi2 =  0.709 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   0.93  Prob > chi2 =  0.630 
  gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, collapse lag(1 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   0.01  Prob > chi2 =  0.908 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.60  Prob > chi2 =  0.660 
  gmm(gap_tr, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   0.13  Prob > chi2 =  0.723 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.49  Prob > chi2 =  0.685 
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Table 3.12 Column 3 
 
xtabond2 capb_ngdp_tr L.capb_ngdp_tr gap_tr_eu17 gap_tr_nms10 gap_tr_see6 eu17 
nms10 see6 L.debt2gdp legelec_dpi1 maastricht infl  dy_2002-dy_2010 if 
year>1994 & year<2011 & (eu27==1|see6==1), gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, laglimits(1 2) 
collapse) gmm(gap_tr_eu17, laglimits (2 3) collapse) gmm(gap_tr_nms10, 
laglimits (2 3) collapse)  gmm(gap_tr_see6, laglimits (2 3) collapse)  
iv(L.debt2gdp legelec_dpi1 maastricht infl eu17 nms10 see6 dy_2002-dy_2010) two 
robust small nocons 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: country                         Number of obs      =       464 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        33 
Number of instruments = 28                      Obs per group: min =         5 
F(20, 33)     =    444.89                                      avg =     14.06 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        16 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
capb_ngdp_tr |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
capb_ngdp_tr | 
         L1. |      0.698      0.066    10.61    0.00        0.564       0.832 
             | 
 gap_tr_eu17 |      0.020      0.120     0.17    0.87       -0.223       0.263 
gap_tr_nms10 |     -0.180      0.043    -4.20    0.00       -0.267      -0.093 
 gap_tr_see6 |     -0.270      0.061    -4.44    0.00       -0.393      -0.146 
        eu17 |      0.213      0.477     0.45    0.66       -0.757       1.183 
       nms10 |     -0.174      0.253    -0.69    0.50       -0.687       0.340 
        see6 |      0.369      0.291     1.27    0.21       -0.222       0.960 
             | 
    debt2gdp | 
         L1. |      0.002      0.006     0.36    0.72       -0.009       0.013 
             | 
legelec_dpi1 |     -0.489      0.190    -2.58    0.01       -0.875      -0.104 
  maastricht |      0.832      0.352     2.36    0.02        0.116       1.547 
        infl |      0.020      0.004     5.37    0.00        0.012       0.027 
     dy_2002 |     -0.624      0.375    -1.66    0.11       -1.387       0.139 
     dy_2003 |     -0.228      0.262    -0.87    0.39       -0.760       0.304 
     dy_2004 |     -0.135      0.310    -0.43    0.67       -0.766       0.496 
     dy_2005 |      0.192      0.314     0.61    0.54       -0.446       0.831 
     dy_2006 |     -0.169      0.253    -0.67    0.51       -0.684       0.346 
     dy_2007 |      0.133      0.441     0.30    0.76       -0.764       1.031 
     dy_2008 |     -1.295      0.415    -3.12    0.00       -2.138      -0.451 
     dy_2009 |     -2.151      0.455    -4.73    0.00       -3.076      -1.226 
     dy_2010 |     -0.582      0.337    -1.73    0.09       -1.267       0.103 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(L.debt2gdp legelec_dpi1 maastricht infl eu17 nms10 see6 dy_2002 dy_2003 
    dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/3).gap_tr_see6 collapsed 
    L(2/3).gap_tr_nms10 collapsed 
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    L(2/3).gap_tr_eu17 collapsed 
    L(1/2).L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    L.debt2gdp legelec_dpi1 maastricht infl eu17 nms10 see6 dy_2002 dy_2003 
    dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.gap_tr_see6 collapsed 
    DL.gap_tr_nms10 collapsed 
    DL.gap_tr_eu17 collapsed 
    D.L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.84  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.48  Pr > z =  0.628 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(8)    =  33.36  Prob > chi2 =  0.000 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(8)    =   4.04  Prob > chi2 =  0.854 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(4)    =   2.86  Prob > chi2 =  0.582 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(4)    =   1.18  Prob > chi2 =  0.882 
  gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, collapse lag(1 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(5)    =   2.57  Prob > chi2 =  0.766 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.46  Prob > chi2 =  0.691 
  gmm(gap_tr_eu17, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(5)    =   2.48  Prob > chi2 =  0.780 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.56  Prob > chi2 =  0.668 
  gmm(gap_tr_nms10, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(5)    =   3.72  Prob > chi2 =  0.590 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   0.31  Prob > chi2 =  0.957 
  gmm(gap_tr_see6, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(5)    =   2.83  Prob > chi2 =  0.726 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.21  Prob > chi2 =  0.752 
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Table 3.12 Column 4 
 
xtabond2 capb_ngdp_tr L.capb_ngdp_tr gap_tr_eu17 gap_tr_nms10 gap_tr_see6 eu17 
nms10 see6 L.debt2gdp legelec_dpi1 maastricht infl dy_1995-dy_2003 if year>1994 
& year<2004 & (eu27==1|see6==1), gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, laglimits(1 2) collapse) 
gmm(gap_tr_eu17, laglimits (2 3) collapse) gmm(gap_tr_nms10, laglimits (2 3) 
collapse)  gmm(gap_tr_see6, laglimits (2 3) collapse)  iv(L.debt2gdp 
legelec_dpi1  maastricht infl dy_1995-dy_2003 eu17 nms10 see6) two robust small 
nocons 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: country                         Number of obs      =       236 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        31 
Number of instruments = 28                      Obs per group: min =         1 
F(19, 31)     =     44.91                                      avg =      7.61 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =         9 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
capb_ngdp_tr |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
capb_ngdp_tr | 
         L1. |      0.556      0.121     4.61    0.00        0.310       0.802 
             | 
 gap_tr_eu17 |     -0.030      0.095    -0.32    0.75       -0.225       0.164 
gap_tr_nms10 |     -0.018      0.123    -0.15    0.88       -0.270       0.233 
 gap_tr_see6 |     -0.656      0.264    -2.49    0.02       -1.194      -0.118 
        eu17 |     -0.598      1.014    -0.59    0.56       -2.666       1.471 
       nms10 |     -1.283      0.964    -1.33    0.19       -3.249       0.684 
        see6 |     -2.216      1.339    -1.66    0.11       -4.947       0.515 
             | 
    debt2gdp | 
         L1. |      0.007      0.009     0.78    0.44       -0.011       0.025 
             | 
legelec_dpi1 |     -0.297      0.277    -1.07    0.29       -0.862       0.267 
  maastricht |      1.306      0.725     1.80    0.08       -0.173       2.785 
        infl |      0.021      0.006     3.42    0.00        0.009       0.034 
     dy_1995 |     -0.319      0.429    -0.74    0.46       -1.195       0.557 
     dy_1996 |      0.667      0.406     1.64    0.11       -0.161       1.495 
     dy_1997 |      0.425      0.590     0.72    0.48       -0.778       1.628 
     dy_1998 |      0.506      0.544     0.93    0.36       -0.603       1.615 
     dy_1999 |      1.181      0.877     1.35    0.19       -0.608       2.971 
     dy_2000 |      1.688      0.855     1.97    0.06       -0.056       3.431 
     dy_2001 |      0.760      0.880     0.86    0.39       -1.035       2.554 
     dy_2002 |      0.242      0.928     0.26    0.80       -1.650       2.135 
     dy_2003 |      0.565      0.740     0.76    0.45       -0.944       2.075 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(L.debt2gdp legelec_dpi1 maastricht infl dy_1995 dy_1996 dy_1997 dy_1998 
    dy_1999 dy_2000 dy_2001 dy_2002 dy_2003 eu17 nms10 see6) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/3).gap_tr_see6 collapsed 
    L(2/3).gap_tr_nms10 collapsed 
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    L(2/3).gap_tr_eu17 collapsed 
    L(1/2).L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    L.debt2gdp legelec_dpi1 maastricht infl dy_1995 dy_1996 dy_1997 dy_1998 
    dy_1999 dy_2000 dy_2001 dy_2002 dy_2003 eu17 nms10 see6 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.gap_tr_see6 collapsed 
    DL.gap_tr_nms10 collapsed 
    DL.gap_tr_eu17 collapsed 
    D.L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -2.55  Pr > z =  0.011 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.32  Pr > z =  0.751 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(8)    =  10.61  Prob > chi2 =  0.225 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(8)    =   7.33  Prob > chi2 =  0.502 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(4)    =   3.88  Prob > chi2 =  0.423 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(4)    =   3.45  Prob > chi2 =  0.485 
  gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, collapse lag(1 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(5)    =   4.05  Prob > chi2 =  0.542 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   3.28  Prob > chi2 =  0.351 
  gmm(gap_tr_eu17, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(5)    =   2.88  Prob > chi2 =  0.719 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   4.45  Prob > chi2 =  0.217 
  gmm(gap_tr_nms10, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(5)    =   5.71  Prob > chi2 =  0.336 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.62  Prob > chi2 =  0.654 
  gmm(gap_tr_see6, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(5)    =   5.94  Prob > chi2 =  0.313 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.39  Prob > chi2 =  0.707 
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Table 3.12 Column 5 
 
xtabond2 capb_ngdp_tr L.capb_ngdp_tr gap_tr_eu17 gap_tr_nms10 gap_tr_see6 eu17 
nms10 see6 L.debt2gdp legelec_dpi1 infl dy_2004-dy_2010 if year>2003 & 
year<2011 & (eu27==1|see6==1), gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, laglimits(1 2) collapse) 
gmm(gap_tr_eu17, laglimits (2 3) collapse) gmm(gap_tr_nms10, laglimits (2 3) 
collapse)  gmm(gap_tr_see6, laglimits (2 3) collapse)  iv(L.debt2gdp 
legelec_dpi1 infl dy_2004-dy_2010 eu17 nms10 see6) two robust small nocons 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: country                         Number of obs      =       228 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        33 
Number of instruments = 25                      Obs per group: min =         5 
F(16, 33)     =    153.44                                      avg =      6.91 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =         7 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
capb_ngdp_tr |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
capb_ngdp_tr | 
         L1. |      0.754      0.068    11.03    0.00        0.615       0.893 
             | 
 gap_tr_eu17 |      0.030      0.172     0.17    0.86       -0.321       0.381 
gap_tr_nms10 |     -0.273      0.067    -4.11    0.00       -0.409      -0.138 
 gap_tr_see6 |     -0.478      0.121    -3.96    0.00       -0.724      -0.233 
        eu17 |     -0.488      0.680    -0.72    0.48       -1.873       0.896 
       nms10 |     -0.334      0.528    -0.63    0.53       -1.409       0.740 
        see6 |      0.229      0.542     0.42    0.68       -0.873       1.332 
             | 
    debt2gdp | 
         L1. |      0.001      0.007     0.18    0.86       -0.013       0.015 
             | 
legelec_dpi1 |     -0.405      0.306    -1.32    0.19       -1.028       0.218 
        infl |      0.072      0.073     1.00    0.33       -0.075       0.220 
     dy_2004 |      0.227      0.464     0.49    0.63       -0.717       1.171 
     dy_2005 |      0.541      0.435     1.24    0.22       -0.344       1.426 
     dy_2006 |      0.469      0.518     0.91    0.37       -0.584       1.522 
     dy_2007 |      1.076      0.900     1.20    0.24       -0.755       2.906 
     dy_2008 |     -0.590      0.712    -0.83    0.41       -2.037       0.858 
     dy_2009 |     -1.321      0.599    -2.21    0.03       -2.540      -0.102 
     dy_2010 |     -0.504      0.387    -1.30    0.20       -1.292       0.285 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(L.debt2gdp legelec_dpi1 infl dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 
    dy_2009 dy_2010 eu17 nms10 see6) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/3).gap_tr_see6 collapsed 
    L(2/3).gap_tr_nms10 collapsed 
    L(2/3).gap_tr_eu17 collapsed 
    L(1/2).L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
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    L.debt2gdp legelec_dpi1 infl dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 
    dy_2009 dy_2010 eu17 nms10 see6 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.gap_tr_see6 collapsed 
    DL.gap_tr_nms10 collapsed 
    DL.gap_tr_eu17 collapsed 
    D.L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.54  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.24  Pr > z =  0.812 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(8)    =  23.44  Prob > chi2 =  0.003 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(8)    =   5.22  Prob > chi2 =  0.734 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(4)    =   4.81  Prob > chi2 =  0.307 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(4)    =   0.41  Prob > chi2 =  0.981 
  gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, collapse lag(1 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(5)    =   3.11  Prob > chi2 =  0.682 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   2.11  Prob > chi2 =  0.550 
  gmm(gap_tr_eu17, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(5)    =   1.90  Prob > chi2 =  0.863 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   3.33  Prob > chi2 =  0.344 
  gmm(gap_tr_nms10, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(5)    =   4.92  Prob > chi2 =  0.426 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   0.30  Prob > chi2 =  0.959 
  gmm(gap_tr_see6, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(5)    =   2.55  Prob > chi2 =  0.769 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   2.67  Prob > chi2 =  0.445 
  
448 
 
Table 3.13 Column 1 
 
xtabond2 capb_ngdp_tr L.capb_ngdp_tr gap_tr_eu17 gap_tr_nms10 gap_tr_see6 eu17 
nms10 see6 L.debt2gdp legelec_dpi1 maastricht infl  dy_2002-dy_2010 if 
year>1994 & year<2011 & (eu27==1|see6==1), gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, laglimits(1 2) 
collapse) gmm(gap_tr_eu17, laglimits (2 3) collapse) gmm(gap_tr_nms10, 
laglimits (2 3) collapse)  gmm(gap_tr_see6, laglimits (2 3) collapse)  
iv(L.debt2gdp legelec_dpi1 maastricht infl eu17 nms10 see6 dy_2002-dy_2010) two 
robust small nocons 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: country                         Number of obs      =       464 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        33 
Number of instruments = 28                      Obs per group: min =         5 
F(20, 33)     =    444.89                                      avg =     14.06 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        16 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
capb_ngdp_tr |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
capb_ngdp_tr | 
         L1. |      0.698      0.066    10.61    0.00        0.564       0.832 
             | 
 gap_tr_eu17 |      0.020      0.120     0.17    0.87       -0.223       0.263 
gap_tr_nms10 |     -0.180      0.043    -4.20    0.00       -0.267      -0.093 
 gap_tr_see6 |     -0.270      0.061    -4.44    0.00       -0.393      -0.146 
        eu17 |      0.213      0.477     0.45    0.66       -0.757       1.183 
       nms10 |     -0.174      0.253    -0.69    0.50       -0.687       0.340 
        see6 |      0.369      0.291     1.27    0.21       -0.222       0.960 
             | 
    debt2gdp | 
         L1. |      0.002      0.006     0.36    0.72       -0.009       0.013 
             | 
legelec_dpi1 |     -0.489      0.190    -2.58    0.01       -0.875      -0.104 
  maastricht |      0.832      0.352     2.36    0.02        0.116       1.547 
        infl |      0.020      0.004     5.37    0.00        0.012       0.027 
     dy_2002 |     -0.624      0.375    -1.66    0.11       -1.387       0.139 
     dy_2003 |     -0.228      0.262    -0.87    0.39       -0.760       0.304 
     dy_2004 |     -0.135      0.310    -0.43    0.67       -0.766       0.496 
     dy_2005 |      0.192      0.314     0.61    0.54       -0.446       0.831 
     dy_2006 |     -0.169      0.253    -0.67    0.51       -0.684       0.346 
     dy_2007 |      0.133      0.441     0.30    0.76       -0.764       1.031 
     dy_2008 |     -1.295      0.415    -3.12    0.00       -2.138      -0.451 
     dy_2009 |     -2.151      0.455    -4.73    0.00       -3.076      -1.226 
     dy_2010 |     -0.582      0.337    -1.73    0.09       -1.267       0.103 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(L.debt2gdp legelec_dpi1 maastricht infl eu17 nms10 see6 dy_2002 dy_2003 
    dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/3).gap_tr_see6 collapsed 
    L(2/3).gap_tr_nms10 collapsed 
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    L(2/3).gap_tr_eu17 collapsed 
    L(1/2).L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    L.debt2gdp legelec_dpi1 maastricht infl eu17 nms10 see6 dy_2002 dy_2003 
    dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.gap_tr_see6 collapsed 
    DL.gap_tr_nms10 collapsed 
    DL.gap_tr_eu17 collapsed 
    D.L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.84  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.48  Pr > z =  0.628 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(8)    =  33.36  Prob > chi2 =  0.000 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(8)    =   4.04  Prob > chi2 =  0.854 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(4)    =   2.86  Prob > chi2 =  0.582 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(4)    =   1.18  Prob > chi2 =  0.882 
  gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, collapse lag(1 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(5)    =   2.57  Prob > chi2 =  0.766 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.46  Prob > chi2 =  0.691 
  gmm(gap_tr_eu17, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(5)    =   2.48  Prob > chi2 =  0.780 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.56  Prob > chi2 =  0.668 
  gmm(gap_tr_nms10, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(5)    =   3.72  Prob > chi2 =  0.590 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   0.31  Prob > chi2 =  0.957 
  gmm(gap_tr_see6, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(5)    =   2.83  Prob > chi2 =  0.726 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.21  Prob > chi2 =  0.752 
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Table 3.13 Column 2 
 
xtabond2 bal_pr2gdp L.bal_pr2gdp gap_tr_eu17 gap_tr_nms10 gap_tr_see6 eu17 
nms10 see6 L.debt2gdp legelec_dpi1 maastricht infl  dy_2002-dy_2010 if 
year>1994 & year<2011 & (eu27==1|see6==1), gmm(L.bal_pr2gdp, laglimits(1 2) 
collapse) gmm(gap_tr_eu17, laglimits (2 3) collapse) gmm(gap_tr_nms10, 
laglimits (2 3) collapse)  gmm(gap_tr_see6, laglimits (2 3) collapse)  
iv(L.debt2gdp legelec_dpi1 maastricht infl eu17 nms10 see6 dy_2002-dy_2010) two 
robust small nocons 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: country                         Number of obs      =       467 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        33 
Number of instruments = 28                      Obs per group: min =         5 
F(20, 33)     =    139.35                                      avg =     14.15 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        16 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
  bal_pr2gdp |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  bal_pr2gdp | 
         L1. |      0.724      0.083     8.72    0.00        0.555       0.893 
             | 
 gap_tr_eu17 |      0.185      0.134     1.38    0.18       -0.087       0.457 
gap_tr_nms10 |     -0.020      0.044    -0.45    0.65       -0.110       0.070 
 gap_tr_see6 |      0.007      0.055     0.12    0.91       -0.106       0.119 
        eu17 |      0.467      0.563     0.83    0.41       -0.679       1.612 
       nms10 |      0.161      0.346     0.46    0.65       -0.544       0.866 
        see6 |      0.531      0.334     1.59    0.12       -0.149       1.211 
             | 
    debt2gdp | 
         L1. |     -0.000      0.007    -0.02    0.98       -0.013       0.013 
             | 
legelec_dpi1 |     -0.506      0.222    -2.27    0.03       -0.958      -0.053 
  maastricht |      0.852      0.395     2.16    0.04        0.049       1.655 
        infl |      0.008      0.003     2.53    0.02        0.002       0.015 
     dy_2002 |     -0.688      0.390    -1.77    0.09       -1.481       0.105 
     dy_2003 |     -0.442      0.278    -1.59    0.12       -1.008       0.123 
     dy_2004 |     -0.067      0.322    -0.21    0.84       -0.723       0.589 
     dy_2005 |      0.266      0.360     0.74    0.46       -0.466       0.999 
     dy_2006 |      0.052      0.263     0.20    0.84       -0.483       0.588 
     dy_2007 |      0.171      0.466     0.37    0.72       -0.777       1.118 
     dy_2008 |     -2.095      0.414    -5.06    0.00       -2.937      -1.252 
     dy_2009 |     -4.304      0.456    -9.44    0.00       -5.231      -3.376 
     dy_2010 |     -0.426      0.565    -0.75    0.46       -1.575       0.722 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(L.debt2gdp legelec_dpi1 maastricht infl eu17 nms10 see6 dy_2002 dy_2003 
    dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/3).gap_tr_see6 collapsed 
    L(2/3).gap_tr_nms10 collapsed 
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    L(2/3).gap_tr_eu17 collapsed 
    L(1/2).L.bal_pr2gdp collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    L.debt2gdp legelec_dpi1 maastricht infl eu17 nms10 see6 dy_2002 dy_2003 
    dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.gap_tr_see6 collapsed 
    DL.gap_tr_nms10 collapsed 
    DL.gap_tr_eu17 collapsed 
    D.L.bal_pr2gdp collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.72  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.61  Pr > z =  0.539 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(8)    =  37.89  Prob > chi2 =  0.000 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(8)    =   6.56  Prob > chi2 =  0.585 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(4)    =   4.93  Prob > chi2 =  0.295 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(4)    =   1.63  Prob > chi2 =  0.803 
  gmm(L.bal_pr2gdp, collapse lag(1 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(5)    =   4.65  Prob > chi2 =  0.460 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.91  Prob > chi2 =  0.591 
  gmm(gap_tr_eu17, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(5)    =   5.08  Prob > chi2 =  0.406 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.48  Prob > chi2 =  0.686 
  gmm(gap_tr_nms10, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(5)    =   4.90  Prob > chi2 =  0.428 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.66  Prob > chi2 =  0.646 
  gmm(gap_tr_see6, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(5)    =   5.16  Prob > chi2 =  0.396 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.40  Prob > chi2 =  0.707 
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Table 3.13 Column 3 
 
xtabond2 capb_ngdp_tr L.capb_ngdp_tr gap_tr_eu17 gap_tr_nms10 gap_tr_see6 eu17 
nms10 see6 L.debt2gdp legelec_dpi1 maastricht infl  dy_2002-dy_2008 if 
year>1994 & year<2009 & (eu27==1|see6==1), gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, laglimits(1 2) 
collapse) gmm(gap_tr_eu17, laglimits (2 3) collapse) gmm(gap_tr_nms10, 
laglimits (2 3) collapse)  gmm(gap_tr_see6, laglimits (2 3) collapse)  
iv(L.debt2gdp legelec_dpi1 maastricht infl eu17 nms10 see6 dy_2002-dy_2008) two 
robust small nocons 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: country                         Number of obs      =       399 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        33 
Number of instruments = 26                      Obs per group: min =         3 
F(18, 33)     =     36.44                                      avg =     12.09 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        14 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
capb_ngdp_tr |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
capb_ngdp_tr | 
         L1. |      0.662      0.089     7.44    0.00        0.481       0.843 
             | 
 gap_tr_eu17 |      0.132      0.116     1.14    0.26       -0.104       0.368 
gap_tr_nms10 |     -0.130      0.046    -2.81    0.01       -0.224      -0.036 
 gap_tr_see6 |     -0.377      0.105    -3.61    0.00       -0.590      -0.165 
        eu17 |      0.078      0.687     0.11    0.91       -1.319       1.476 
       nms10 |     -0.417      0.423    -0.99    0.33       -1.278       0.443 
        see6 |      0.234      0.755     0.31    0.76       -1.302       1.770 
             | 
    debt2gdp | 
         L1. |      0.006      0.011     0.58    0.57       -0.015       0.028 
             | 
legelec_dpi1 |     -0.392      0.209    -1.88    0.07       -0.816       0.032 
  maastricht |      0.834      0.343     2.43    0.02        0.136       1.531 
        infl |      0.016      0.003     5.27    0.00        0.010       0.023 
     dy_2002 |     -0.430      0.440    -0.98    0.33       -1.325       0.464 
     dy_2003 |     -0.128      0.384    -0.33    0.74       -0.910       0.654 
     dy_2004 |     -0.085      0.481    -0.18    0.86       -1.064       0.894 
     dy_2005 |      0.240      0.402     0.60    0.56       -0.578       1.057 
     dy_2006 |     -0.162      0.399    -0.41    0.69       -0.974       0.651 
     dy_2007 |     -0.151      0.572    -0.26    0.79       -1.315       1.013 
     dy_2008 |     -1.455      0.474    -3.07    0.00       -2.420      -0.490 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(L.debt2gdp legelec_dpi1 maastricht infl eu17 nms10 see6 dy_2002 dy_2003 
    dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/3).gap_tr_see6 collapsed 
    L(2/3).gap_tr_nms10 collapsed 
    L(2/3).gap_tr_eu17 collapsed 
    L(1/2).L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
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Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    L.debt2gdp legelec_dpi1 maastricht infl eu17 nms10 see6 dy_2002 dy_2003 
    dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.gap_tr_see6 collapsed 
    DL.gap_tr_nms10 collapsed 
    DL.gap_tr_eu17 collapsed 
    D.L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.33  Pr > z =  0.001 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.09  Pr > z =  0.931 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(8)    =  24.60  Prob > chi2 =  0.002 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(8)    =  11.84  Prob > chi2 =  0.159 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(4)    =   6.65  Prob > chi2 =  0.156 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(4)    =   5.19  Prob > chi2 =  0.268 
  gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, collapse lag(1 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(5)    =   6.15  Prob > chi2 =  0.292 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   5.68  Prob > chi2 =  0.128 
  gmm(gap_tr_eu17, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(5)    =   5.39  Prob > chi2 =  0.371 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   6.45  Prob > chi2 =  0.092 
  gmm(gap_tr_nms10, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(5)    =   6.04  Prob > chi2 =  0.303 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   5.80  Prob > chi2 =  0.122 
  gmm(gap_tr_see6, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(5)    =   6.71  Prob > chi2 =  0.243 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   5.13  Prob > chi2 =  0.163 
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Table 3.13 Column 4 
 
xtabond2 bal_pr2gdp L.bal_pr2gdp gap_tr_eu17 gap_tr_nms10 gap_tr_see6 eu17 
nms10 see6 L.debt2gdp legelec_dpi1 maastricht infl  dy_2002-dy_2008 if 
year>1994 & year<2009 & (eu27==1|see6==1), gmm(L.bal_pr2gdp, laglimits(1 2) 
collapse) gmm(gap_tr_eu17, laglimits (2 3) collapse) gmm(gap_tr_nms10, 
laglimits (2 3) collapse) gmm(gap_tr_see6, laglimits (2 3) collapse)  
iv(L.debt2gdp legelec_dpi1 maastricht infl eu17 nms10 see6 dy_2002-dy_2008) two 
robust small nocons 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: country                         Number of obs      =       402 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        33 
Number of instruments = 26                      Obs per group: min =         3 
F(18, 33)     =     12.32                                      avg =     12.18 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        14 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
  bal_pr2gdp |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  bal_pr2gdp | 
         L1. |      0.630      0.143     4.42    0.00        0.340       0.920 
             | 
 gap_tr_eu17 |      0.432      0.174     2.49    0.02        0.079       0.786 
gap_tr_nms10 |      0.031      0.054     0.56    0.58       -0.080       0.141 
 gap_tr_see6 |     -0.118      0.120    -0.99    0.33       -0.362       0.125 
        eu17 |      0.073      0.832     0.09    0.93       -1.620       1.766 
       nms10 |     -0.307      0.521    -0.59    0.56       -1.366       0.753 
        see6 |      0.133      0.964     0.14    0.89       -1.829       2.095 
             | 
    debt2gdp | 
         L1. |      0.009      0.012     0.73    0.47       -0.015       0.032 
             | 
legelec_dpi1 |     -0.459      0.226    -2.04    0.05       -0.918      -0.000 
  maastricht |      1.025      0.370     2.77    0.01        0.273       1.778 
        infl |      0.009      0.003     3.18    0.00        0.003       0.015 
     dy_2002 |     -0.628      0.473    -1.33    0.19       -1.591       0.334 
     dy_2003 |     -0.282      0.445    -0.63    0.53       -1.187       0.623 
     dy_2004 |      0.109      0.524     0.21    0.84       -0.958       1.176 
     dy_2005 |      0.307      0.479     0.64    0.53       -0.667       1.281 
     dy_2006 |      0.076      0.443     0.17    0.86       -0.824       0.977 
     dy_2007 |      0.041      0.632     0.06    0.95       -1.245       1.326 
     dy_2008 |     -1.948      0.648    -3.01    0.01       -3.266      -0.630 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(L.debt2gdp legelec_dpi1 maastricht infl eu17 nms10 see6 dy_2002 dy_2003 
    dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/3).gap_tr_see6 collapsed 
    L(2/3).gap_tr_nms10 collapsed 
    L(2/3).gap_tr_eu17 collapsed 
    L(1/2).L.bal_pr2gdp collapsed 
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Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    L.debt2gdp legelec_dpi1 maastricht infl eu17 nms10 see6 dy_2002 dy_2003 
    dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.gap_tr_see6 collapsed 
    DL.gap_tr_nms10 collapsed 
    DL.gap_tr_eu17 collapsed 
    D.L.bal_pr2gdp collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.24  Pr > z =  0.001 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.34  Pr > z =  0.736 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(8)    =  30.09  Prob > chi2 =  0.000 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(8)    =  13.15  Prob > chi2 =  0.107 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(4)    =   7.21  Prob > chi2 =  0.125 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(4)    =   5.94  Prob > chi2 =  0.203 
  gmm(L.bal_pr2gdp, collapse lag(1 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(5)    =  11.06  Prob > chi2 =  0.050 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   2.10  Prob > chi2 =  0.552 
  gmm(gap_tr_eu17, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(5)    =   6.33  Prob > chi2 =  0.275 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   6.82  Prob > chi2 =  0.078 
  gmm(gap_tr_nms10, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(5)    =   5.43  Prob > chi2 =  0.366 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   7.73  Prob > chi2 =  0.052 
  gmm(gap_tr_see6, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(5)    =   7.03  Prob > chi2 =  0.218 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   6.12  Prob > chi2 =  0.106 
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Table 3.14 Column 1 
 
xtabond2 capb_ngdp_tr L.capb_ngdp_tr gap_tr L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 
maastricht dy_2002-dy_2010 if year>1994 & year<2011 & (eu27==1|see6==1), 
gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, laglimits(1 2) collapse) gmm(gap_tr, laglimits(2 3) 
collapse)  iv(L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht dy_2002-dy_2010) two 
robust small 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: country                         Number of obs      =       464 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        33 
Number of instruments = 20                      Obs per group: min =         5 
F(15, 32)     =     79.39                                      avg =     14.06 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        16 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
capb_ngdp_tr |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
capb_ngdp_tr | 
         L1. |      0.691      0.074     9.30    0.00        0.539       0.842 
             | 
      gap_tr |     -0.153      0.068    -2.25    0.03       -0.292      -0.015 
             | 
    debt2gdp | 
         L1. |      0.008      0.004     1.90    0.07       -0.001       0.017 
             | 
        infl |      0.017      0.005     3.11    0.00        0.006       0.028 
legelec_dpi1 |     -0.560      0.202    -2.78    0.01       -0.970      -0.149 
  maastricht |      0.665      0.199     3.34    0.00        0.259       1.071 
     dy_2002 |     -0.585      0.402    -1.45    0.16       -1.404       0.235 
     dy_2003 |     -0.107      0.311    -0.34    0.73       -0.740       0.526 
     dy_2004 |     -0.052      0.295    -0.18    0.86       -0.652       0.549 
     dy_2005 |      0.288      0.298     0.97    0.34       -0.319       0.896 
     dy_2006 |      0.035      0.248     0.14    0.89       -0.470       0.539 
     dy_2007 |      0.441      0.449     0.98    0.33       -0.474       1.356 
     dy_2008 |     -1.053      0.413    -2.55    0.02       -1.895      -0.211 
     dy_2009 |     -2.084      0.439    -4.75    0.00       -2.977      -1.191 
     dy_2010 |     -0.679      0.451    -1.51    0.14       -1.597       0.240 
       _cons |     -0.228      0.285    -0.80    0.43       -0.809       0.353 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 dy_2005 
    dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/3).gap_tr collapsed 
    L(1/2).L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 dy_2005 
    dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010 
    _cons 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
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    DL.gap_tr collapsed 
    D.L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.80  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.76  Pr > z =  0.446 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =  17.45  Prob > chi2 =  0.002 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =   2.23  Prob > chi2 =  0.694 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(2)    =   1.74  Prob > chi2 =  0.419 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   0.49  Prob > chi2 =  0.783 
  gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, collapse lag(1 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   0.95  Prob > chi2 =  0.331 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.28  Prob > chi2 =  0.733 
  gmm(gap_tr, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   1.86  Prob > chi2 =  0.173 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   0.37  Prob > chi2 =  0.946 
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Table 3.14 Column 2 
 
jackknife _b _se, cluster(country) : xtabond2 capb_ngdp_tr L.capb_ngdp_tr 
gap_tr L.debt2gdp legelec_dpi1 maastricht infl dy_2002-dy_2010 if year>1994 & 
year<2011 & (eu27==1|see6==1), gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, laglimits(1 2) collapse) 
gmm(gap_tr, laglimits (2 3) collapse)  iv(L.debt2gdp legelec_dpi1 maastricht 
infl dy_2002-dy_2010) two small robust 
(running xtabond2 on estimation sample) 
 
Jackknife replications (33) 
----+--- 1 ---+--- 2 ---+--- 3 ---+--- 4 ---+--- 5  
................................. 
 
Jackknife results                               Number of obs      =       464 
                                                Replications       =        33 
 
                                (Replications based on 33 clusters in country) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Jackknife 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
b            | 
capb_ngdp_tr | 
         L1. |      0.691      0.082     8.43    0.00        0.524       0.858 
             | 
      gap_tr |     -0.153      0.069    -2.22    0.03       -0.294      -0.012 
             | 
    debt2gdp | 
         L1. |      0.008      0.006     1.30    0.20       -0.004       0.020 
             | 
legelec_dpi1 |     -0.560      0.208    -2.69    0.01       -0.983      -0.137 
  maastricht |      0.665      0.242     2.75    0.01        0.172       1.158 
        infl |      0.017      0.007     2.58    0.01        0.004       0.031 
     dy_2002 |     -0.585      0.497    -1.18    0.25       -1.597       0.428 
     dy_2003 |     -0.107      0.383    -0.28    0.78       -0.888       0.674 
     dy_2004 |     -0.052      0.309    -0.17    0.87       -0.681       0.578 
     dy_2005 |      0.288      0.338     0.85    0.40       -0.400       0.977 
     dy_2006 |      0.035      0.289     0.12    0.91       -0.554       0.623 
     dy_2007 |      0.441      0.497     0.89    0.38       -0.571       1.452 
     dy_2008 |     -1.053      0.418    -2.52    0.02       -1.905      -0.202 
     dy_2009 |     -2.084      0.477    -4.37    0.00       -3.055      -1.113 
     dy_2010 |     -0.679      0.455    -1.49    0.15       -1.607       0.249 
       _cons |     -0.228      0.372    -0.61    0.54       -0.987       0.531 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
se           | 
capb_ngdp_tr | 
         L1. |      0.074      0.027     2.75    0.01        0.019       0.129 
             | 
      gap_tr |      0.068      0.043     1.57    0.13       -0.020       0.156 
             | 
    debt2gdp | 
         L1. |      0.004      0.002     2.59    0.01        0.001       0.007 
             | 
legelec_dpi1 |      0.202      0.067     3.03    0.00        0.066       0.337 
  maastricht |      0.199      0.052     3.81    0.00        0.093       0.306 
        infl |      0.005      0.036     0.15    0.88       -0.068       0.079 
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     dy_2002 |      0.402      0.067     5.97    0.00        0.265       0.539 
     dy_2003 |      0.311      0.100     3.10    0.00        0.106       0.515 
     dy_2004 |      0.295      0.092     3.21    0.00        0.108       0.482 
     dy_2005 |      0.298      0.053     5.60    0.00        0.190       0.407 
     dy_2006 |      0.248      0.064     3.85    0.00        0.117       0.379 
     dy_2007 |      0.449      0.126     3.58    0.00        0.193       0.705 
     dy_2008 |      0.413      0.134     3.08    0.00        0.140       0.687 
     dy_2009 |      0.439      0.097     4.54    0.00        0.242       0.635 
     dy_2010 |      0.451      0.171     2.64    0.01        0.103       0.799 
       _cons |      0.285      0.144     1.98    0.06       -0.009       0.579 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Table 3.14 Column 3 
 
xtabond2 capb_ngdp_tr L.capb_ngdp_tr gap_tr_eu17 gap_tr_nms10 gap_tr_see6 eu17 
nms10 see6 L.debt2gdp legelec_dpi1 maastricht infl  dy_2002-dy_2010 if 
year>1994 & year<2011 & (eu27==1|see6==1), gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, laglimits(1 2) 
collapse) gmm(gap_tr_eu17, laglimits (2 3) collapse) gmm(gap_tr_nms10, 
laglimits (2 3) collapse)  gmm(gap_tr_see6, laglimits (2 3) collapse)  
iv(L.debt2gdp legelec_dpi1 maastricht infl eu17 nms10 see6 dy_2002-dy_2010) two 
robust small nocons 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: country                         Number of obs      =       464 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        33 
Number of instruments = 28                      Obs per group: min =         5 
F(20, 33)     =    444.89                                      avg =     14.06 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        16 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
capb_ngdp_tr |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
capb_ngdp_tr | 
         L1. |      0.698      0.066    10.61    0.00        0.564       0.832 
             | 
 gap_tr_eu17 |      0.020      0.120     0.17    0.87       -0.223       0.263 
gap_tr_nms10 |     -0.180      0.043    -4.20    0.00       -0.267      -0.093 
 gap_tr_see6 |     -0.270      0.061    -4.44    0.00       -0.393      -0.146 
        eu17 |      0.213      0.477     0.45    0.66       -0.757       1.183 
       nms10 |     -0.174      0.253    -0.69    0.50       -0.687       0.340 
        see6 |      0.369      0.291     1.27    0.21       -0.222       0.960 
             | 
    debt2gdp | 
         L1. |      0.002      0.006     0.36    0.72       -0.009       0.013 
             | 
legelec_dpi1 |     -0.489      0.190    -2.58    0.01       -0.875      -0.104 
  maastricht |      0.832      0.352     2.36    0.02        0.116       1.547 
        infl |      0.020      0.004     5.37    0.00        0.012       0.027 
     dy_2002 |     -0.624      0.375    -1.66    0.11       -1.387       0.139 
     dy_2003 |     -0.228      0.262    -0.87    0.39       -0.760       0.304 
     dy_2004 |     -0.135      0.310    -0.43    0.67       -0.766       0.496 
     dy_2005 |      0.192      0.314     0.61    0.54       -0.446       0.831 
     dy_2006 |     -0.169      0.253    -0.67    0.51       -0.684       0.346 
     dy_2007 |      0.133      0.441     0.30    0.76       -0.764       1.031 
     dy_2008 |     -1.295      0.415    -3.12    0.00       -2.138      -0.451 
     dy_2009 |     -2.151      0.455    -4.73    0.00       -3.076      -1.226 
     dy_2010 |     -0.582      0.337    -1.73    0.09       -1.267       0.103 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(L.debt2gdp legelec_dpi1 maastricht infl eu17 nms10 see6 dy_2002 dy_2003 
    dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/3).gap_tr_see6 collapsed 
    L(2/3).gap_tr_nms10 collapsed 
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    L(2/3).gap_tr_eu17 collapsed 
    L(1/2).L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    L.debt2gdp legelec_dpi1 maastricht infl eu17 nms10 see6 dy_2002 dy_2003 
    dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.gap_tr_see6 collapsed 
    DL.gap_tr_nms10 collapsed 
    DL.gap_tr_eu17 collapsed 
    D.L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.84  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.48  Pr > z =  0.628 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(8)    =  33.36  Prob > chi2 =  0.000 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(8)    =   4.04  Prob > chi2 =  0.854 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(4)    =   2.86  Prob > chi2 =  0.582 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(4)    =   1.18  Prob > chi2 =  0.882 
  gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, collapse lag(1 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(5)    =   2.57  Prob > chi2 =  0.766 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.46  Prob > chi2 =  0.691 
  gmm(gap_tr_eu17, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(5)    =   2.48  Prob > chi2 =  0.780 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.56  Prob > chi2 =  0.668 
  gmm(gap_tr_nms10, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(5)    =   3.72  Prob > chi2 =  0.590 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   0.31  Prob > chi2 =  0.957 
  gmm(gap_tr_see6, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(5)    =   2.83  Prob > chi2 =  0.726 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.21  Prob > chi2 =  0.752 
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Table 3.14 Column 4 
 
jackknife _b _se, cluster(country) : xtabond2 capb_ngdp_tr L.capb_ngdp_tr 
gap_tr_eu17 gap_tr_nms10 gap_tr_see6 eu17 nms10 see6 L.debt2gdp legelec_dpi1 
maastricht infl  dy_2002-dy_2010 if year>1994 & year<2011 & (eu27==1|see6==1), 
gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, laglimits(1 2) collapse) gmm(gap_tr_eu17, laglimits (2 3) 
collapse) gmm(gap_tr_nms10, laglimits (2 3) collapse)  gmm(gap_tr_see6, 
laglimits (2 3) collapse)  iv(L.debt2gdp legelec_dpi1 maastricht infl eu17 
nms10 see6 dy_2002-dy_2010) two robust small nocons 
(running xtabond2 on estimation sample) 
 
Jackknife replications (33) 
----+--- 1 ---+--- 2 ---+--- 3 ---+--- 4 ---+--- 5  
................................. 
 
Jackknife results                               Number of obs      =       464 
                                                Replications       =        33 
 
                                (Replications based on 33 clusters in country) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Jackknife 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
b            | 
capb_ngdp_tr | 
         L1. |      0.698      0.100     6.95    0.00        0.493       0.902 
             | 
 gap_tr_eu17 |      0.020      0.228     0.09    0.93       -0.445       0.485 
gap_tr_nms10 |     -0.180      0.067    -2.67    0.01       -0.317      -0.043 
 gap_tr_see6 |     -0.270      0.097    -2.77    0.01       -0.468      -0.071 
        eu17 |      0.213      0.641     0.33    0.74       -1.092       1.518 
       nms10 |     -0.174      0.333    -0.52    0.61       -0.853       0.505 
        see6 |      0.369      0.373     0.99    0.33       -0.392       1.129 
             | 
    debt2gdp | 
         L1. |      0.002      0.007     0.27    0.79       -0.013       0.017 
             | 
legelec_dpi1 |     -0.489      0.259    -1.89    0.07       -1.017       0.038 
  maastricht |      0.832      0.455     1.83    0.08       -0.096       1.759 
        infl |      0.020      0.041     0.48    0.63       -0.063       0.102 
     dy_2002 |     -0.624      0.525    -1.19    0.24       -1.693       0.445 
     dy_2003 |     -0.228      0.388    -0.59    0.56       -1.019       0.563 
     dy_2004 |     -0.135      0.338    -0.40    0.69       -0.824       0.554 
     dy_2005 |      0.192      0.356     0.54    0.59       -0.532       0.917 
     dy_2006 |     -0.169      0.291    -0.58    0.57       -0.763       0.424 
     dy_2007 |      0.133      0.598     0.22    0.83       -1.085       1.351 
     dy_2008 |     -1.295      0.592    -2.19    0.04       -2.500      -0.089 
     dy_2009 |     -2.151      0.660    -3.26    0.00       -3.496      -0.806 
     dy_2010 |     -0.582      0.544    -1.07    0.29       -1.689       0.526 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
se           | 
capb_ngdp_tr | 
         L1. |      0.066      0.031     2.15    0.04        0.003       0.128 
             | 
 gap_tr_eu17 |      0.120      0.057     2.08    0.05        0.002       0.237 
gap_tr_nms10 |      0.043      0.023     1.88    0.07       -0.004       0.089 
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 gap_tr_see6 |      0.061      0.022     2.71    0.01        0.015       0.106 
        eu17 |      0.477      0.203     2.34    0.03        0.062       0.891 
       nms10 |      0.253      0.126     2.01    0.05       -0.004       0.509 
        see6 |      0.291      0.160     1.81    0.08       -0.036       0.617 
             | 
    debt2gdp | 
         L1. |      0.006      0.003     1.88    0.07       -0.000       0.012 
             | 
legelec_dpi1 |      0.190      0.065     2.92    0.01        0.058       0.322 
  maastricht |      0.352      0.157     2.24    0.03        0.033       0.671 
        infl |      0.004      0.043     0.09    0.93       -0.084       0.091 
     dy_2002 |      0.375      0.092     4.10    0.00        0.189       0.561 
     dy_2003 |      0.262      0.061     4.31    0.00        0.138       0.385 
     dy_2004 |      0.310      0.129     2.40    0.02        0.047       0.574 
     dy_2005 |      0.314      0.085     3.70    0.00        0.141       0.487 
     dy_2006 |      0.253      0.079     3.21    0.00        0.093       0.414 
     dy_2007 |      0.441      0.116     3.81    0.00        0.205       0.677 
     dy_2008 |      0.415      0.121     3.44    0.00        0.169       0.660 
     dy_2009 |      0.455      0.175     2.60    0.01        0.099       0.811 
     dy_2010 |      0.337      0.135     2.50    0.02        0.062       0.611 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Appendix 3.4 - Stata printouts for additional tests related to Chapter 3 
 
 
 
 
The effects of revenue decentralisation on fiscal outcomes in all EU member 
states (EU27) 
 
 
xtabond2 capb_ngdp_tr L.capb_ngdp_tr gap_tr L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 
maastricht dec_rev dy_2002-dy_2010 if year>1994 & year<2011 & 
(eu27==1|see6==1), gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, laglimits(1 2) collapse) gmm(gap_tr, 
laglimits (2 3) collapse)  iv(L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht dec_rev 
dy_2002-dy_2010) two robust small 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: country                         Number of obs      =       414 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        27 
Number of instruments = 21                      Obs per group: min =        10 
F(16, 26)     =    213.63                                      avg =     15.33 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        16 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
capb_ngdp_tr |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
capb_ngdp_tr | 
         L1. |      0.708      0.089     7.91    0.00        0.524       0.892 
             | 
      gap_tr |     -0.161      0.057    -2.84    0.01       -0.277      -0.044 
             | 
    debt2gdp | 
         L1. |      0.010      0.004     2.42    0.02        0.002       0.019 
             | 
        infl |      0.020      0.005     4.03    0.00        0.010       0.030 
legelec_dpi1 |     -0.603      0.249    -2.42    0.02       -1.114      -0.091 
  maastricht |      0.409      0.175     2.34    0.03        0.050       0.768 
     dec_rev |      0.013      0.008     1.55    0.13       -0.004       0.030 
     dy_2002 |     -0.900      0.381    -2.36    0.03       -1.684      -0.117 
     dy_2003 |     -0.414      0.232    -1.78    0.09       -0.892       0.063 
     dy_2004 |     -0.241      0.332    -0.72    0.48       -0.924       0.442 
     dy_2005 |      0.013      0.307     0.04    0.97       -0.617       0.644 
     dy_2006 |     -0.041      0.198    -0.21    0.84       -0.448       0.365 
     dy_2007 |      0.500      0.411     1.22    0.23       -0.344       1.345 
     dy_2008 |     -0.861      0.331    -2.60    0.02       -1.542      -0.181 
     dy_2009 |     -2.663      0.517    -5.15    0.00       -3.726      -1.600 
     dy_2010 |     -1.102      0.496    -2.22    0.04       -2.121      -0.084 
       _cons |     -0.600      0.411    -1.46    0.16       -1.443       0.244 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht dec_rev dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 
    dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010) 
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  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/3).gap_tr collapsed 
    L(1/2).L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht dec_rev dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 
    dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 dy_2010 
    _cons 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.gap_tr collapsed 
    D.L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.52  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   1.16  Pr > z =  0.245 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =  20.66  Prob > chi2 =  0.000 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =   3.36  Prob > chi2 =  0.500 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(2)    =   2.91  Prob > chi2 =  0.234 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   0.45  Prob > chi2 =  0.800 
  gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, collapse lag(1 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   1.02  Prob > chi2 =  0.312 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   2.33  Prob > chi2 =  0.506 
  gmm(gap_tr, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   2.57  Prob > chi2 =  0.109 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   0.78  Prob > chi2 =  0.853 
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The effects of revenue decentralisation on fiscal outcomes in old and new EU 
member states (EU17 and NMS10) 
 
xtabond2 capb_ngdp_tr L.capb_ngdp_tr gap_tr L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 
maastricht dec_rev_eu17 dec_rev_nms10 eu17 nms10 dy_2002-dy_2010 if year>1994 & 
year<2011 & (eu27==1|see6==1), gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, laglimits(1 2) collapse) 
gmm(gap_tr, laglimits (2 3) collapse)  iv(L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 
maastricht dec_rev_eu17 dec_rev_nms10 eu17 nms10 dy_2002-dy_2010) two robust 
small nocons 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: country                         Number of obs      =       414 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        27 
Number of instruments = 23                      Obs per group: min =        10 
F(19, 27)     =    844.49                                      avg =     15.33 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        16 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
capb_ngdp_tr |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
capb_ngdp_tr | 
         L1. |      0.716      0.086     8.31    0.00        0.539       0.893 
             | 
      gap_tr |     -0.164      0.055    -3.00    0.01       -0.277      -0.052 
             | 
    debt2gdp | 
         L1. |      0.007      0.005     1.42    0.17       -0.003       0.018 
             | 
        infl |      0.022      0.005     4.11    0.00        0.011       0.032 
legelec_dpi1 |     -0.599      0.248    -2.42    0.02       -1.107      -0.090 
  maastricht |      0.347      0.177     1.96    0.06       -0.016       0.710 
dec_rev_eu17 |      0.012      0.009     1.34    0.19       -0.006       0.029 
dec_rev_n~10 |      0.012      0.035     0.34    0.73       -0.060       0.084 
        eu17 |     -0.307      0.470    -0.65    0.52       -1.272       0.658 
       nms10 |     -0.658      1.088    -0.60    0.55       -2.891       1.574 
     dy_2002 |     -0.886      0.379    -2.34    0.03       -1.664      -0.108 
     dy_2003 |     -0.407      0.223    -1.83    0.08       -0.864       0.050 
     dy_2004 |     -0.226      0.331    -0.68    0.50       -0.906       0.454 
     dy_2005 |      0.026      0.309     0.08    0.93       -0.607       0.660 
     dy_2006 |     -0.016      0.200    -0.08    0.94       -0.426       0.394 
     dy_2007 |      0.524      0.409     1.28    0.21       -0.315       1.364 
     dy_2008 |     -0.854      0.336    -2.54    0.02       -1.544      -0.164 
     dy_2009 |     -2.635      0.513    -5.13    0.00       -3.689      -1.582 
     dy_2010 |     -1.067      0.487    -2.19    0.04       -2.066      -0.068 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht dec_rev_eu17 dec_rev_nms10 eu17 
    nms10 dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 
    dy_2010) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/3).gap_tr collapsed 
    L(1/2).L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
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Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    L.debt2gdp infl legelec_dpi1 maastricht dec_rev_eu17 dec_rev_nms10 eu17 
    nms10 dy_2002 dy_2003 dy_2004 dy_2005 dy_2006 dy_2007 dy_2008 dy_2009 
    dy_2010 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.gap_tr collapsed 
    D.L.capb_ngdp_tr collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.57  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   1.17  Pr > z =  0.241 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =  20.59  Prob > chi2 =  0.000 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =   3.35  Prob > chi2 =  0.502 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(2)    =   3.02  Prob > chi2 =  0.221 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   0.33  Prob > chi2 =  0.850 
  gmm(L.capb_ngdp_tr, collapse lag(1 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   0.87  Prob > chi2 =  0.351 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   2.47  Prob > chi2 =  0.480 
  gmm(gap_tr, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   2.62  Prob > chi2 =  0.105 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   0.72  Prob > chi2 =  0.868 
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Appendix 5.1 - Data sources and definitions for Chapter 5 
 
 
In the construction of data for Chapter 5 (particularly fiscal data), we follow 
arguments and definitions in Alesina et al. (2002), Caldara and Kamps (2008) and 
particularly Beetsma et al. (2006), Beetsma and Giuliodori (2011) and Suyker (1999). 
We also rely on discussions regarding the calculation of output gaps and the cyclical 
adjustment of fiscal data in Chapter 2 and the application in Chapter 3 (including 
references therein).   
In order to facilitate the exposition of formulas, here we first present variable names 
alongside their description and sources, and then the formulas to calculate the 
variables that are used in the empirical investigation in Chapter 5. For ease of 
exposition, here we abstract from the functional form in which variables enter in our 
empirical work, since this is already discussed in Chapter 5.  
 
 
Variable names, description and source 
Notes: unless noted otherwise, absolute amounts are in nominal terms; variables 
actually used in estimation in Chapter 5 are in bold; "ca" refers to cyclically-adjusted 
variables using trend GDP based on the Hodrick-Prescott filter; AMECO refers to the 
AMECO Database of the European Commission (May 2013).  
 
 
Variable name Variable description (Original titles for variables 
not calculated by formula) 
Source 
ca_gov_nt_real Real cyclically-adjusted net-taxes Formula 
ca_gov_rev Cyclically-adjusted government revenues Formula 
ca_gov_rev_real Real cyclically-adjusted government revenues Formula 
ca_gov_tran Cyclically-adjusted government transfers Formula 
ca_gov_tran_real Real cyclically-adjusted government transfers Formula 
cit_dir Share of corporate income tax in direct taxes  Formula 
comp_avg Nominal compensation per employee: total economy  AMECO 
comp_avg_real Real wages  Formula 
comp_gg Compensation of employees: general government :- ESA 
1995  
AMECO 
comp_gg_cons Real government wage bill Formula 
debt General government consolidated gross debt :- Excessive 
deficit procedure (based on ESA 1995) and former 
definition (linked series)  
AMECO 
debt/ngdp Debt/GDP ratio Formula 
def_gc Price deflator total final consumption expenditure of 
general government, 2005=100  
AMECO 
def_gdp GDP deflator (Price deflator gross domestic product at 
market prices, 2005=100)  
AMECO 
def_gfcf Price deflator gross fixed capital formation: total economy, 
2005=100  
AMECO 
el_cit Elasticity of corporate income tax with respect to the output 
gap  
EC, 2005) 
el_dir Elasticity of direct taxes with respect to the output gap  EC, 2005) 
el_ind Elasticity of indirect taxes with respect to the output gap EC, 2005) 
el_pit Elasticity of personal income tax with respect to the output 
gap  
EC, 2005) 
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el_prexp Elasticity of current primary expenditures with respect to 
the output gap 
EC, 2005) 
el_soc Elasticity of social contributions with respect to the output 
gap 
EC, 2005) 
empl Employment (Employees, persons: all domestic 
industries; National accounts) 
AMECO 
expend_curr Total current expenditure: general government :- ESA 1995  AMECO 
expend_curr_pr Current primary expenditures Formula 
gc Final consumption expenditure of general government at 
current prices  
AMECO 
gc_cons Real government consumption Formula 
gc_nw_cons Real government non-wage consumption Formula 
gdp_cons Real GDP (Gross domestic product at 2005 market 
prices)  
AMECO 
gdp_trend Trend gross domestic product at 2005 market prices (based 
on the Hodrick-Prescott filter)  
AMECO 
gfcf_gg Gross fixed capital formation at current prices: general 
government  
AMECO 
gfcf_gg_cons Real government investment Formula 
gfcf_priv Gross fixed capital formation at current prices: private 
sector  
AMECO 
gfcf_priv_cons Real private investments Formula 
gov_spend_real Real government spending Formula 
gov_tran Government transfers Formula 
inter Interest : general government :- ESA 1995  AMECO 
ir_st Nominal short-term interest rates  
(Note: The series corresponds to nominal 3-month 
money market interest rates. It is used in decimal form, 
for easier interpretation: e.g. 0.045, not 4.5%) 
AMECO 
(IMF IFS 
for a few 
early years 
for some 
EU new 
member 
states) 
ir_st_real Real short-term interest rates   Formula 
m Imports of goods and services at current prices (National 
accounts)  
AMECO 
m_cons Real imports (Imports of goods and services at 2005 
prices)  
AMECO 
ngdp Nominal GDP (Gross domestic product at current market 
prices)  
AMECO 
nx/gdp_cons Real net-exports/GDP Formula 
open Trade openness  Formula 
pc_cons Real private consumption (Private final consumption 
expenditure at 2005 prices)  
AMECO 
pit_dir Share of personal income tax in direct taxes  EC, 2005) 
prop_paid Property income, payable Eurostat 
prop_rec Property income, receivable Eurostat 
reer Real effective exchange rate (deflator: consumer price 
indices - 42 trading partners; 2005=100) 
Eurostat 
rev_curr Total current revenue: general government :- ESA 1995  AMECO 
soc_ben_paid Social benefits other than social transfers in kind: general 
government :- ESA 1995  
AMECO 
soc_rec  Social contributions received: general government :- ESA 
1995  
AMECO 
subs Subsidies: general government :- ESA 1995  AMECO 
tax_dir Current taxes on income and wealth (direct taxes): general 
government :- ESA 1995  
AMECO 
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tax_ind Taxes linked to imports and production (indirect taxes): 
general government :- ESA 1995  
AMECO 
trpg Other current transfers paid by government Formula 
trrg Other current transfers received by government Formula 
x Exports of goods and services at current prices (National 
accounts)  
AMECO 
x_cons Real exports (Exports of goods and services at 2005 
prices) 
AMECO 
 
 
 
 
Formulas used to calculate variables that are used in Chapter 5  
 
 
Expenditures 
 
gov_spend_real=gc/def_gc*100 + gfcf_gg/def_gfcf*100 
gc_cons = gc/def_gc*100  
gfcf_gg_cons = gfcf_gg/def_gfcf*100 
expend_curr_pr = expend_curr - inter 
 
comp_gg_cons = comp_gg/def_gc*100 
gc_nw_cons = (gc - comp_empl_gg)/def_gc*100 
 
 
 
Revenues ("ca" refers to cyclically-adjusted variables using trend GDP based on the 
Hodrick-Prescott filter) 
 
ca_gov_nt_real =  ca_gov_rev_real -  ca_gov_tran_real 
 
ca_gov_rev_real =  ca_gov_rev/def_gdp*100 
ca_gov_tran_real =  ca_gov_tran/def_gdp*100 
 
ca_gov_rev =  ca_tax_dir +  ca_tax_ind +  ca_soc_rec +  ca_trrg 
ca_tax_dir = tax_dir*(gdp_trend/gdp_cons)^el_dir 
ca_tax_ind = tax_ind*(gdp_trend/gdp_cons)^el_ind 
ca_soc_rec = soc_rec*(gdp_trend/gdp_cons)^el_soc 
ca_trrg = trrg*(gdp_trend/gdp_cons)^(-1*el_prexp*trrg/expend_curr_pr) 
trrg = rev_curr - prop_rec - tax_ind - tax_dir - soc_rec 
 
ca_gov_tran = gov_tran*(gdp_trend/gdp_cons) ^(el_prexp* gov_tran/expend_curr_pr) 
gov_tran = subs + soc_ben_paid + trpg 
trpg =  expend_curr + cons_fix_gg - gc - subs - soc_ben_paid - prop_paid 
 
el_dir = el_pit * (pit_dir) + el_cit * (cit_dir) 
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Other variables  
 
ir_st_real = (1+ir_st)/(1+infl_gdp/100)-1 
infl_gdp = def_gdp/def_gdpt-1 * 100 - 100 
 
gfcf_priv_cons = gfcf_priv/def_gfcf*100 
 
comp_avg_real = comp_avg/def_gdp*100 
 
debt/ngdp = debt/ngdp 
 
nx/gdp_cons = (x_cons-m_cons)/gdp_cons 
 
open = ((x+m)/2)/ngdp 
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Specification details
Sample: EU27 Nr. of countries: 27
Start: 1995 End: 2012
Nr. of years: 18 Lags: 2
Fixed effects: country FE
Common time trend: yes
Responses to a government spending shock equal to 1% of GDP (shock at impact i.e. year zero)
unit At impact After 1 year After 3 years After 5 years
Real gov. spending % 4.21*** 3.80*** 1.78*** 0.42
Real cycl.-adj. net-taxes % 0.91*** -0.30 -0.98** -0.78*
Real GDP % 0.99*** 1.08*** 0.44* -0.07
GDP deflator % 0.26*** 0.45*** 0.45** 0.26
Nominal short-term interest rates p.p. -0.19*** -0.01 0.19* 0.08
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%  and 10%  level, respectively.
Appendix 5.2 - Detailed tables and graphs for Chapter 5 
 
 
Figure 5.1 - Baseline specification 
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Specification details
Sample: EU27 Nr. of countries: 27
Start: 1995 End: 2012
Nr. of years: 18 Lags: 2
Fixed effects: country FE
Common time trend: yes
Responses to a government spending shock equal to 1% of GDP (shock at impact i.e. year zero)
unit At impact After 1 year After 3 years After 5 years
Real gov. spending % 4.21*** 3.80*** 1.78*** 0.42
Real cycl.-adj. net-taxes % 0.91*** -0.30 -0.98** -0.78*
Real GDP % 0.99*** 1.08*** 0.44* -0.07
GDP deflator % 0.26*** 0.45*** 0.45** 0.26
Nominal short-term interest rates p.p. -0.19*** -0.01 0.19* 0.08
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%  and 10%  level, respectively.
Figure 5.2 - Option 'FE + trend' (i.e. baseline specification) 
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Specification details
Sample: EU27 Nr. of countries: 27
Start: 1995 End: 2012
Nr. of years: 18 Lags: 2
Fixed effects: country FE
Common time trend: no
Responses to a government spending shock equal to 1% of GDP (shock at impact i.e. year zero)
unit At impact After 1 year After 3 years After 5 years
Real gov. spending % 4.21*** 3.80*** 1.90*** 0.68**
Real cycl.-adj. net-taxes % 0.95*** -0.27 -0.57 -0.34
Real GDP % 1.00*** 1.09*** 0.58** 0.19
GDP deflator % 0.28*** 0.47*** 0.69*** 0.60***
Nominal short-term interest rates p.p. -0.20*** -0.02 0.13 0.00
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%  and 10%  level, respectively.
 
Figure 5.2 - Option 'FE, no trend' 
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Specification details
Sample: EU27 Nr. of countries: 27
Start: 1995 End: 2012
Nr. of years: 18 Lags: 2
Fixed effects: no
Common time trend: yes
Responses to a government spending shock equal to 1% of GDP (shock at impact i.e. year zero)
unit At impact After 1 year After 3 years After 5 years
Real gov. spending % 4.21*** 4.54*** 3.73*** 3.06***
Real cycl.-adj. net-taxes % 0.91*** -0.23 0.17 0.88**
Real GDP % 1.07*** 1.43*** 1.39*** 1.45***
GDP deflator % 0.38*** 0.61*** 0.68* 0.59
Nominal short-term interest rates p.p. -0.12*** 0.01 0.11 0.04
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%  and 10%  level, respectively.
Figure 5.2 - Option 'trend, no FE' 
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Specification details
Sample: EU27 Nr. of countries: 27
Start: 1995 End: 2012
Nr. of years: 18 Lags: 2
Fixed effects: country FE
Common time trend: yes
Responses to a government spending shock equal to 1% of GDP (shock at impact i.e. year zero)
unit At impact After 1 year After 3 years After 5 years
Real gov. spending % 4.21*** 3.80*** 1.78*** 0.42
Real cycl.-adj. net-taxes % 0.91*** -0.30 -0.98** -0.78*
Real GDP % 0.99*** 1.08*** 0.44* -0.07
GDP deflator % 0.26*** 0.45*** 0.45** 0.26
Nominal short-term interest rates p.p. -0.19*** -0.01 0.19* 0.08
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%  and 10%  level, respectively.
Figure 5.3 - Option '2 lags' (i.e. baseline specification) 
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Specification details
Sample: EU27 Nr. of countries: 27
Start: 1995 End: 2012
Nr. of years: 18 Lags: 1
Fixed effects: country FE
Common time trend: yes
Responses to a government spending shock equal to 1% of GDP (shock at impact i.e. year zero)
unit At impact After 1 year After 3 years After 5 years
Real gov. spending % 4.21*** 3.15*** 1.47*** 0.38*
Real cycl.-adj. net-taxes % 0.70*** -0.26 -1.08*** -1.12***
Real GDP % 1.03*** 0.79*** 0.10 -0.38*
GDP deflator % 0.39*** 0.29*** 0.27 0.18
Nominal short-term interest rates p.p. -0.47*** 0.06 0.22*** 0.09*
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%  and 10%  level, respectively.
Figure 5.3 - Option '1 lag'  
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Specification details
Sample: EU27 Nr. of countries: 27
Start: 1995 End: 2012
Nr. of years: 18 Lags: 3
Fixed effects: country FE
Common time trend: yes
Responses to a government spending shock equal to 1% of GDP (shock at impact i.e. year zero)
unit At impact After 1 year After 3 years After 5 years
Real gov. spending % 4.21*** 3.79*** 1.27*** -0.09
Real cycl.-adj. net-taxes % 0.60*** -0.35 -1.77*** -0.75*
Real GDP % 0.98*** 1.22*** -0.21 -0.49*
GDP deflator % 0.40*** 0.85*** 0.28 -0.23
Nominal short-term interest rates p.p. -0.31*** 0.10 0.17* -0.08
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%  and 10%  level, respectively.
Figure 5.3 - Option '3 lags'  
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Specification details
Sample: EU27 Nr. of countries: 27
Start: 1995 End: 2012
Nr. of years: 18 Lags: 2
Fixed effects: country FE
Common time trend: yes
Responses to a government spending shock equal to 1% of GDP (shock at impact i.e. year zero)
unit At impact After 1 year After 3 years After 5 years
Real gov. spending % 4.21*** 3.80*** 1.78*** 0.42
Real cycl.-adj. net-taxes % 0.91*** -0.30 -0.98** -0.78*
Real GDP % 0.99*** 1.08*** 0.44* -0.07
GDP deflator % 0.26*** 0.45*** 0.45** 0.26
Nominal short-term interest rates p.p. -0.19*** -0.01 0.19* 0.08
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%  and 10%  level, respectively.
Figure 5.4 - Option 'spending first, net-taxes second' (i.e. baseline specification) 
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Specification details
Sample: EU27 Nr. of countries: 27
Start: 1995 End: 2012
Nr. of years: 18 Lags: 2
Fixed effects: country FE
Common time trend: yes
Responses to a government spending shock equal to 1% of GDP (shock at impact i.e. year zero)
unit At impact After 1 year After 3 years After 5 years
Real cycl.-adj. net-taxes % 0.00 -1.10*** -1.39*** -0.93**
Real gov. spending % 4.21*** 3.69*** 1.45*** 0.12
Real GDP % 0.90*** 0.89*** 0.19 -0.25
GDP deflator % 0.22*** 0.38*** 0.33* 0.13
Nominal short-term interest rates p.p. -0.20*** 0.00 0.18* 0.07
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%  and 10%  level, respectively.
Figure 5.4 - Option 'spending second, net-taxes first'  
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Specification details
Sample: EU17 Nr. of countries: 17
Start: 1995 End: 2012
Nr. of years: 18 Lags: 2
Fixed effects: country FE
Common time trend: yes
Responses to a government spending shock equal to 1% of GDP (shock at impact i.e. year zero)
unit At impact After 1 year After 3 years After 5 years
Real gov. spending % 4.19*** 3.64*** 1.49*** 0.20
Real cycl.-adj. net-taxes % -2.00*** -2.61*** -1.92*** -1.67***
Real GDP % 0.63*** 0.98*** 0.60** -0.21
GDP deflator % 0.34*** 0.59*** 0.59*** 0.22
Nominal short-term interest rates p.p. -0.12*** -0.07 0.10 -0.03
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%  and 10%  level, respectively.
Figure 5.5 - Option 'EU17 (17 old EU member states)'  
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Specification details
Sample: NMS10 Nr. of countries: 10
Start: 1995 End: 2012
Nr. of years: 18 Lags: 2
Fixed effects: country FE
Common time trend: yes
Responses to a government spending shock equal to 1% of GDP (shock at impact i.e. year zero)
unit At impact After 1 year After 3 years After 5 years
Real gov. spending % 4.24*** 3.66*** 1.83*** 1.00**
Real cycl.-adj. net-taxes % 2.81*** 1.72*** 1.03* 0.80
Real GDP % 1.28*** 1.36*** 1.04** 0.86
GDP deflator % 0.21*** 0.43* 0.71** 0.76**
Nominal short-term interest rates p.p. -0.22*** 0.01 0.12 0.00
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%  and 10%  level, respectively.
Figure 5.5 - Option 'NMS10 (10 new EU member states)'  
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Specification details
Sample: average public debt/GDP > 60% Nr. of countries: 9
Start: 1995 End: 2012
Nr. of years: 18 Lags: 2
Fixed effects: country FE
Common time trend: yes
Responses to a government spending shock equal to 1% of GDP (shock at impact i.e. year zero)
unit At impact After 1 year After 3 years After 5 years
Real gov. spending % 4.31*** 3.10*** 0.19 -1.04**
Real cycl.-adj. net-taxes % -4.45*** -3.73*** -1.94** -1.53**
Real GDP % 0.60*** 1.13*** 0.25 -0.83*
GDP deflator % -0.14*** -0.20* 0.09 0.01
Nominal short-term interest rates p.p. -0.36*** -0.39*** 0.08 -0.03
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1% , 5%  and 10%  level, respectively.
Figure 5.6 - Option 'high debt (debt/GDP>60%)'  
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Specification details
Sample: average public debt/GDP < 60% Nr. of countries: 18
Start: 1995 End: 2012
Nr. of years: 18 Lags: 2
Fixed effects: country FE
Common time trend: yes
Responses to a government spending shock equal to 1% of GDP (shock at impact i.e. year zero)
unit At impact After 1 year After 3 years After 5 years
Real gov. spending % 4.16*** 3.89*** 2.25*** 1.12***
Real cycl.-adj. net-taxes % 2.20*** 0.63* -0.28 -0.40
Real GDP % 1.05*** 1.06*** 0.53* 0.27
GDP deflator % 0.40*** 0.64*** 0.72*** 0.55**
Nominal short-term interest rates p.p. -0.12*** 0.06 0.08 -0.05
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1% , 5%  and 10%  level, respectively.
Figure 5.6 - Option 'low debt (debt/GDP<60%)'  
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Specification details
Sample: average trade openness > 50% Nr. of countries: 14
Start: 1995 End: 2012
Nr. of years: 18 Lags: 2
Fixed effects: country FE
Common time trend: yes
Responses to a government spending shock equal to 1% of GDP (shock at impact i.e. year zero)
unit At impact After 1 year After 3 years After 5 years
Real gov. spending % 4.24*** 3.63*** 1.20*** -0.18
Real cycl.-adj. net-taxes % 1.54*** 0.19 -1.12* -0.99*
Real GDP % 1.10*** 0.87*** -0.20 -0.57
GDP deflator % 0.57*** 0.74*** 0.34 -0.19
Nominal short-term interest rates p.p. -0.21*** 0.35*** 0.24* -0.03
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%  and 10%  level, respectively.
Figure 5.7 - Option 'more open (openness/GDP>50%)'  
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Specification details
Sample: average trade openness < 50% Nr. of countries: 13
Start: 1995 End: 2012
Nr. of years: 18 Lags: 2
Fixed effects: country FE
Common time trend: yes
Responses to a government spending shock equal to 1% of GDP (shock at impact i.e. year zero)
unit At impact After 1 year After 3 years After 5 years
Real gov. spending % 4.17*** 3.48*** 1.93*** 0.97**
Real cycl.-adj. net-taxes % -0.13*** -1.19** -0.96 -0.60
Real GDP % 0.67*** 1.19*** 0.69** 0.05
GDP deflator % -0.16*** 0.36** 0.31*** 0.16
Nominal short-term interest rates p.p. 0.10*** -0.25 0.22 0.14
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%  and 10%  level, respectively.
Figure 5.7 - Option 'less open (openness/GDP<50%)'  
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Specification details
Sample: EU27 Nr. of countries: 27
Start: 1995 End: 2012
Nr. of years: 18 Lags: 2
Fixed effects: country FE
Common time trend: yes
Responses to a government spending shock equal to 1% of GDP (shock at impact i.e. year zero)
unit At impact After 1 year After 3 years After 5 years
Real gov. spending % 4.21*** 3.80*** 1.78*** 0.42
Real cycl.-adj. net-taxes % 0.91*** -0.30 -0.98** -0.78*
Real GDP % 0.99*** 1.08*** 0.44* -0.07
GDP deflator % 0.26*** 0.45*** 0.45** 0.26
Nominal short-term interest rates p.p. -0.19*** -0.01 0.19* 0.08
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%  and 10%  level, respectively.
Figure 5.8 - Option '1995-2012' (i.e. baseline specification) 
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Specification details
Sample: EU27, pre-crisis Nr. of countries: 27
Start: 1995 End: 2008
Nr. of years: 14 Lags: 2
Fixed effects: country FE
Common time trend: yes
Responses to a government spending shock equal to 1% of GDP (shock at impact i.e. year zero)
unit At impact After 1 year After 3 years After 5 years
Real gov. spending % 4.20*** 3.01*** 1.26*** 0.35
Real cycl.-adj. net-taxes % 0.78*** -0.38 -0.69* -0.59
Real GDP % 0.42*** 0.32** -0.15 -0.37
GDP deflator % 0.08*** 0.43*** 0.56*** 0.33
Nominal short-term interest rates p.p. 0.11*** 0.35** 0.23* 0.02
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%  and 10%  level, respectively.
 
 
Figure 5.8 - Option 'pre-crisis (1995-2008)'  
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Specification details
Sample: EU27 Nr. of countries: 27
Start: 1995 End: 2012
Nr. of years: 18 Lags: 2
Fixed effects: country FE
Common time trend: yes
Responses to a government spending shock equal to 1% of GDP (shock at impact i.e. year zero)
unit At impact After 1 year After 3 years After 5 years
Real gov. spending % 4.21*** 3.73*** 1.63*** 0.25
Real cycl.-adj. net-taxes % 0.89*** -0.40 -1.19*** -0.70*
Real private consumption % 0.93*** 1.15*** -0.05 -0.80**
Real GDP % 0.97*** 1.03*** 0.30 -0.19
GDP deflator % 0.28*** 0.49*** 0.51*** 0.15
Nominal short-term interest rates p.p. -0.17*** 0.04 0.22** -0.02
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%  and 10%  level, respectively.
Figure 5.9 - Option 'baseline PVAR + real private consumption, EU27'  
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Specification details
Sample: EU27 Nr. of countries: 27
Start: 1995 End: 2012
Nr. of years: 18 Lags: 2
Fixed effects: country FE
Common time trend: yes
Responses to a government spending shock equal to 1% of GDP (shock at impact i.e. year zero)
unit At impact After 1 year After 3 years After 5 years
Real gov. spending % 4.21*** 3.79*** 1.90*** 0.47
Real cycl.-adj. net-taxes % 0.99*** -0.16 -1.02** -0.94**
Real private investment % 1.96*** 2.79*** 0.46 -1.25
Real GDP % 1.01*** 1.12*** 0.48* -0.10
GDP deflator % 0.22*** 0.36*** 0.50*** 0.34
Nominal short-term interest rates p.p. -0.26*** -0.08 0.27** 0.11
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%  and 10%  level, respectively.
Figure 5.9 - Option 'baseline PVAR + real private investment, EU27'  
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Specification details
Sample: EU27 Nr. of countries: 27
Start: 1995 End: 2012
Nr. of years: 18 Lags: 2
Fixed effects: country FE
Common time trend: yes
Responses to a government spending shock equal to 1% of GDP (shock at impact i.e. year zero)
unit At impact After 1 year After 3 years After 5 years
Real gov. spending % 4.21*** 3.58*** 1.31*** 0.24
Real cycl.-adj. net-taxes % 0.82*** -0.30 -0.82* -0.37
Real wages % 0.85*** 1.28*** 0.70*** 0.33
Real GDP % 1.07*** 1.24*** 0.69*** 0.31
GDP deflator % 0.28*** 0.47*** 0.50*** 0.35*
Nominal short-term interest rates p.p. -0.20*** -0.10 0.10 -0.01
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%  and 10%  level, respectively.
Figure 5.9 - Option 'baseline PVAR + real wages, EU27'  
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Specification details
Sample: EU27 Nr. of countries: 27
Start: 1995 End: 2012
Nr. of years: 18 Lags: 2
Fixed effects: country FE
Common time trend: yes
Responses to a government spending shock equal to 1% of GDP (shock at impact i.e. year zero)
unit At impact After 1 year After 3 years After 5 years
Real gov. spending % 4.21*** 3.79*** 1.99*** 0.77**
Real cycl.-adj. net-taxes % 1.05*** 0.03 -0.26 -0.33
Employment % 0.54*** 1.05*** 0.82*** 0.34
Real GDP % 1.20*** 1.46*** 0.93*** 0.45*
GDP deflator % 0.21*** 0.41*** 0.46** 0.36*
Nominal short-term interest rates p.p. -0.28*** -0.09 0.12 0.09
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%  and 10%  level, respectively.
Figure 5.9 - Option 'baseline PVAR + employment, EU27'  
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Specification details
Sample: EU17 Nr. of countries: 17
Start: 1995 End: 2012
Nr. of years: 18 Lags: 2
Fixed effects: country FE
Common time trend: yes
Responses to a government spending shock equal to 1% of GDP (shock at impact i.e. year zero)
unit At impact After 1 year After 3 years After 5 years
Real gov. spending % 4.19*** 3.51*** 1.17*** -0.13
Real cycl.-adj. net-taxes % -2.22*** -2.95*** -2.46*** -1.73***
Real private consumption % 0.34*** 0.64*** -0.14 -0.83***
Real GDP % 0.59*** 0.85*** 0.41* -0.38
GDP deflator % 0.31*** 0.51*** 0.41* 0.07
Nominal short-term interest rates p.p. -0.11*** -0.06 0.10 -0.03
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%  and 10%  level, respectively.
Figure 5.10 - Option 'baseline PVAR + real private consumption, EU17 (old EU)'  
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Specification details
Sample: EU17 Nr. of countries: 17
Start: 1995 End: 2012
Nr. of years: 18 Lags: 2
Fixed effects: country FE
Common time trend: yes
Responses to a government spending shock equal to 1% of GDP (shock at impact i.e. year zero)
unit At impact After 1 year After 3 years After 5 years
Real gov. spending % 4.19*** 3.38*** 1.91*** 0.81*
Real cycl.-adj. net-taxes % -1.61*** -1.78*** -2.07*** -2.35***
Real private investment % 0.65*** 3.40*** 1.91* -0.71
Real GDP % 0.60*** 0.90*** 0.79*** 0.10
GDP deflator % 0.26*** 0.39*** 0.58*** 0.47*
Nominal short-term interest rates p.p. -0.13*** -0.06 0.12 -0.01
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%  and 10%  level, respectively.
Figure 5.10 - Option 'baseline PVAR + real private investment, EU17 (old EU)'  
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Specification details
Sample: EU17 Nr. of countries: 17
Start: 1995 End: 2012
Nr. of years: 18 Lags: 2
Fixed effects: country FE
Common time trend: yes
Responses to a government spending shock equal to 1% of GDP (shock at impact i.e. year zero)
unit At impact After 1 year After 3 years After 5 years
Real gov. spending % 4.19*** 3.43*** 0.97*** -0.40
Real cycl.-adj. net-taxes % -2.23*** -2.94*** -2.28*** -1.79***
Real wages % 0.28*** 0.59*** 0.40* 0.14
Real GDP % 0.59*** 0.89*** 0.46* -0.33
GDP deflator % 0.30*** 0.46*** 0.38* -0.03
Nominal short-term interest rates p.p. -0.17*** -0.15* 0.04 -0.07
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%  and 10%  level, respectively.
Figure 5.10 - Option 'baseline PVAR + real wages, EU17 (old EU)'  
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Specification details
Sample: EU17 Nr. of countries: 17
Start: 1995 End: 2012
Nr. of years: 18 Lags: 2
Fixed effects: country FE
Common time trend: yes
Responses to a government spending shock equal to 1% of GDP (shock at impact i.e. year zero)
unit At impact After 1 year After 3 years After 5 years
Real gov. spending % 4.19*** 3.41*** 1.29*** 0.17
Real cycl.-adj. net-taxes % -2.00*** -2.58*** -1.76** -1.16*
Employment % 0.23*** 0.41*** 0.49* 0.26
Real GDP % 0.62*** 0.87*** 0.60** 0.28
GDP deflator % 0.24*** 0.33*** 0.18 0.04
Nominal short-term interest rates p.p. -0.11*** -0.08 -0.11 -0.07
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%  and 10%  level, respectively.
Figure 5.10 - Option 'baseline PVAR + employment, EU17 (old EU)'  
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Specification details
Sample: NMS10 Nr. of countries: 10
Start: 1995 End: 2012
Nr. of years: 18 Lags: 2
Fixed effects: country FE
Common time trend: yes
Responses to a government spending shock equal to 1% of GDP (shock at impact i.e. year zero)
unit At impact After 1 year After 3 years After 5 years
Real gov. spending % 4.24*** 3.60*** 1.54*** 0.77*
Real cycl.-adj. net-taxes % 2.72*** 1.53*** 0.59 0.89*
Real private consumption % 1.23*** 1.29*** -0.06 -0.24
Real GDP % 1.25*** 1.27*** 0.74 0.70
GDP deflator % 0.22*** 0.51** 0.77** 0.37
Nominal short-term interest rates p.p. -0.22*** 0.09 0.12 -0.31**
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%  and 10%  level, respectively.
Figure 5.10 - Option 'baseline PVAR + real private consumption, NMS10 (new EU)'  
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Specification details
Sample: NMS10 Nr. of countries: 10
Start: 1995 End: 2012
Nr. of years: 18 Lags: 2
Fixed effects: country FE
Common time trend: yes
Responses to a government spending shock equal to 1% of GDP (shock at impact i.e. year zero)
unit At impact After 1 year After 3 years After 5 years
Real gov. spending % 4.24*** 3.64*** 1.65*** 0.76*
Real cycl.-adj. net-taxes % 2.90*** 1.74*** 0.82 0.65
Real private investment % 2.69*** 2.94*** 0.62 -0.21
Real GDP % 1.30*** 1.37*** 0.81* 0.56
GDP deflator % 0.31*** 0.54** 0.88*** 0.79**
Nominal short-term interest rates p.p. -0.15*** 0.04 0.29 -0.02
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%  and 10%  level, respectively.
Figure 5.10 - Option 'baseline PVAR + real private investment, NMS10 (new EU)'  
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Specification details
Sample: NMS10 Nr. of countries: 10
Start: 1995 End: 2012
Nr. of years: 18 Lags: 2
Fixed effects: country FE
Common time trend: yes
Responses to a government spending shock equal to 1% of GDP (shock at impact i.e. year zero)
unit At impact After 1 year After 3 years After 5 years
Real gov. spending % 4.24*** 3.43*** 1.59*** 1.10**
Real cycl.-adj. net-taxes % 2.66*** 1.50*** 0.99* 0.94**
Real wages % 1.03*** 1.31*** 0.59 0.52
Real GDP % 1.29*** 1.36*** 1.14** 1.09**
GDP deflator % 0.23*** 0.40* 0.64** 0.74**
Nominal short-term interest rates p.p. -0.18*** -0.17 -0.11 -0.07
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%  and 10%  level, respectively.
Figure 5.10 - Option 'baseline PVAR + real wages, NMS10 (new EU)'  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
500 
 
Specification details
Sample: NMS10 Nr. of countries: 10
Start: 1995 End: 2012
Nr. of years: 18 Lags: 2
Fixed effects: country FE
Common time trend: yes
Responses to a government spending shock equal to 1% of GDP (shock at impact i.e. year zero)
unit At impact After 1 year After 3 years After 5 years
Real gov. spending % 4.24*** 3.66*** 1.96*** 0.80*
Real cycl.-adj. net-taxes % 2.75*** 1.71*** 1.09** 0.30
Employment % 0.61*** 1.25*** 1.02*** 0.51*
Real GDP % 1.38*** 1.55*** 1.01** 0.49
GDP deflator % 0.26*** 0.45** 0.80** 1.00**
Nominal short-term interest rates p.p. -0.21*** -0.06 0.24 0.24
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%  and 10%  level, respectively.
Figure 5.10 - Option 'baseline PVAR + employment, NMS10 (new EU)'  
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Specification details
Sample: EU27 Nr. of countries: 27
Start: 1995 End: 2012
Nr. of years: 18 Lags: 2
Fixed effects: country FE
Common time trend: yes
Responses to a government spending shock equal to 1% of GDP (shock at impact i.e. year zero)
unit At impact After 1 year After 3 years After 5 years
Real gov. spending % 4.21*** 3.80*** 1.78*** 0.42
Real cycl.-adj. net-taxes % 0.91*** -0.30 -0.98** -0.78*
Real GDP % 0.99*** 1.08*** 0.44* -0.07
GDP deflator % 0.26*** 0.45*** 0.45** 0.26
Nominal short-term interest rates p.p. -0.19*** -0.01 0.19* 0.08
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%  and 10%  level, respectively.
Figure 5.11 - Option 'Real government spending shock (i.e. baseline PVAR)'  
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Specification details
Sample: EU27 Nr. of countries: 27
Start: 1995 End: 2012
Nr. of years: 18 Lags: 2
Fixed effects: country FE
Common time trend: yes
Responses to a government consumption shock equal to 1% of GDP (shock at impact i.e. year zero)
unit At impact After 1 year After 3 years After 5 years
Real gov. consumption % 4.83*** 4.09*** 2.97*** 2.05***
Real cycl.-adj. net-taxes % 1.11*** 0.06 -0.47 -0.62
Real GDP % 0.68*** 0.58*** 0.55* 0.42
GDP deflator % 0.10*** -0.19 -0.26 -0.26
Nominal short-term interest rates p.p. -0.05*** -0.16 -0.06 0.02
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%  and 10%  level, respectively.
Figure 5.11 - Option 'Real government consumption shock'  
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Specification details
Sample: EU27 Nr. of countries: 27
Start: 1995 End: 2012
Nr. of years: 18 Lags: 2
Fixed effects: country FE
Common time trend: yes
Responses to a government investment shock equal to 1% of GDP (shock at impact i.e. year zero)
unit At impact After 1 year After 3 years After 5 years
Real gov. investment % 32.77*** 23.95*** 9.32*** 2.05
Real cycl.-adj. net-taxes % 0.81*** -0.87 -1.50** -1.14*
Real GDP % 1.43*** 1.85*** 0.54 -0.42
GDP deflator % 0.64*** 1.68*** 2.11*** 1.49***
Nominal short-term interest rates p.p. -0.48*** 0.17 0.59*** 0.03
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%  and 10%  level, respectively.
 
 
Figure 5.11 - Option 'Real government investment shock'  
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Specification details
Sample: EU27 Nr. of countries: 27
Start: 1995 End: 2012
Nr. of years: 18 Lags: 2
Fixed effects: country FE
Common time trend: yes
Responses to a government wage bill shock equal to 1% of GDP (shock at impact i.e. year zero)
unit At impact After 1 year After 3 years After 5 years
Real gov. wage bill % 8.70*** 7.84*** 4.35*** 1.86***
Real cycl.-adj. net-taxes % -1.32*** -0.38 -1.77** -2.03**
Real GDP % 1.22*** 0.78** 0.09 -0.46
GDP deflator % -1.14*** -0.37 0.00 -0.04
Nominal short-term interest rates p.p. 0.23*** 0.31 0.31 0.20
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%  and 10%  level, respectively.
Figure 5.11 - Option 'Real government wage bill shock'  
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Specification details
Sample: EU27 Nr. of countries: 27
Start: 1995 End: 2012
Nr. of years: 18 Lags: 2
Fixed effects: country FE
Common time trend: yes
Responses to a government non-wage consumption shock equal to 1% of GDP (shock at impact i.e. year zero)
unit At impact After 1 year After 3 years After 5 years
Real gov. non-wage consumption % 10.85*** 6.68*** 4.35*** 2.61***
Real cycl.-adj. net-taxes % 0.89*** -0.18 -0.27 -0.28
Real GDP % 0.19*** 0.24 0.39 0.39
GDP deflator % 0.23*** -0.26 -0.40* -0.38
Nominal short-term interest rates p.p. -0.16*** -0.26 -0.15 -0.01
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%  and 10%  level, respectively.
 
Figure 5.11 - Option 'Real government non-wage consumption shock'  
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Specification details
Sample: EU27 Nr. of countries: 27
Start: 1995 End: 2012
Nr. of years: 18 Lags: 2
Fixed effects: country FE
Common time trend: yes
Responses to a government spending shock equal to 1% of GDP (shock at impact i.e. year zero)
unit At impact After 1 year After 3 years After 5 years
Real gov. spending % 4.21*** 3.82*** 2.12*** 0.72**
Real cycl.-adj. net-taxes % 1.10*** 0.01 -0.64 -0.61
Real priv. consumption % 0.99*** 1.29*** 0.44 -0.37
Real priv. investment % 1.95*** 2.74*** 0.55 -1.14
GDP deflator % 0.21*** 0.35*** 0.47*** 0.26
Nominal short-term interest rates p.p. -0.26*** -0.07 0.22** 0.06
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%  and 10%  level, respectively.
 
 
Figure 5.12 - Option 'Real government spending shock'  
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Specification details
Sample: EU27 Nr. of countries: 27
Start: 1995 End: 2012
Nr. of years: 18 Lags: 2
Fixed effects: country FE
Common time trend: yes
Responses to a government consumption shock equal to 1% of GDP (shock at impact i.e. year zero)
unit At impact After 1 year After 3 years After 5 years
Real gov. consumption % 4.83*** 4.07*** 3.01*** 2.06***
Real cycl.-adj. net-taxes % 1.29*** 0.35 -0.22 -0.42
Real priv. consumption % 0.37*** 0.42* 0.17 -0.19
Real priv. investment % 1.86*** 0.85 0.01 -0.64
GDP deflator % 0.02*** -0.29* -0.23 -0.28
Nominal short-term interest rates p.p. -0.11*** -0.19 -0.01 0.02
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%  and 10%  level, respectively.
 
Figure 5.12 - Option 'Real government consumption shock'  
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Specification details
Sample: EU27 Nr. of countries: 27
Start: 1995 End: 2012
Nr. of years: 18 Lags: 2
Fixed effects: country FE
Common time trend: yes
Responses to a government investment shock equal to 1% of GDP (shock at impact i.e. year zero)
unit At impact After 1 year After 3 years After 5 years
Real gov. investment % 32.77*** 23.74*** 10.67*** 3.70**
Real cycl.-adj. net-taxes % 1.04*** -0.44 -1.02 -1.01
Real priv. consumption % 1.86*** 2.86*** 1.69*** 0.25
Real priv. investment % 2.15*** 5.73*** 2.72** -1.00
GDP deflator % 0.54*** 1.46*** 2.08*** 1.65***
Nominal short-term interest rates p.p. -0.60*** 0.00 0.67*** 0.14
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%  and 10%  level, respectively.
Figure 5.12 - Option 'Real government investment shock'  
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Specification details
Sample: EU27 Nr. of countries: 27
Start: 1995 End: 2012
Nr. of years: 18 Lags: 2
Fixed effects: country FE
Common time trend: yes
Responses to a government wage bill shock equal to 1% of GDP (shock at impact i.e. year zero)
unit At impact After 1 year After 3 years After 5 years
Real gov. wage bill % 8.70*** 7.60*** 4.58*** 2.48***
Real cycl.-adj. net-taxes % -0.95*** 0.39 -0.54 -0.93
Real priv. consumption % 1.35*** 0.72** 0.29 -0.23
Real priv. investment % 1.37*** -0.89 -1.56 -2.05
GDP deflator % -1.41*** -0.81*** -0.41 -0.32
Nominal short-term interest rates p.p. 0.08*** 0.12 0.25 0.21
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%  and 10%  level, respectively.
Figure 5.12 - Option 'Real government wage bill shock'  
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Specification details
Sample: EU27 Nr. of countries: 27
Start: 1995 End: 2012
Nr. of years: 18 Lags: 2
Fixed effects: country FE
Common time trend: yes
Responses to a government non-wage consumption shock equal to 1% of GDP (shock at impact i.e. year zero)
unit At impact After 1 year After 3 years After 5 years
Real gov. non-wage consumption % 10.85*** 6.65*** 4.16*** 2.43***
Real cycl.-adj. net-taxes % 0.87*** -0.27 -0.53 -0.50
Real priv. consumption % -0.20*** -0.12 -0.32 -0.43
Real priv. investment % 0.92*** 0.93 -0.42 -0.79
GDP deflator % 0.26*** -0.19 -0.3 -0.38
Nominal short-term interest rates p.p. -0.14*** -0.18 -0.10 -0.06
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%  and 10%  level, respectively.
Figure 5.12 - Option 'Real government non-wage consumption shock'  
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Specification details
Sample: EU27 Nr. of countries: 27
Start: 1995 End: 2012
Nr. of years: 18 Lags: 2
Fixed effects: country FE
Common time trend: yes
Responses to a government spending shock equal to 1% of GDP (shock at impact i.e. year zero)
unit At impact After 1 year After 3 years After 5 years
Real gov. spending % 4.21*** 3.80*** 1.78*** 0.42
Real cycl.-adj. net-taxes % 0.91*** -0.30 -0.98** -0.78*
Real GDP % 0.99*** 1.08*** 0.44* -0.07
GDP deflator % 0.26*** 0.45*** 0.45** 0.26
Nominal short-term interest rates p.p. -0.19*** -0.01 0.19* 0.08
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%  and 10%  level, respectively.
Figure 5.13 - Option 'Baseline specification, EU27'  
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Specification details
Sample: EU27 Nr. of countries: 27
Start: 1995 End: 2012
Nr. of years: 18 Lags: 2
Fixed effects: country FE
Common time trend: yes
Responses to a government spending shock equal to 1% of GDP (shock at impact i.e. year zero)
unit At impact After 1 year After 3 years After 5 years
Real gov. spending % 4.21*** 3.73*** 1.73*** 0.35
Real cycl.-adj. net-taxes % 1.02*** -0.12 -0.73* -0.47
Real GDP % 0.95*** 1.02*** 0.42 -0.09
GDP deflator % 0.24*** 0.41*** 0.42** 0.21
Nominal short-term interest rates p.p. -0.24*** -0.07 0.15 0.02
Debt/GDP p.p. -0.34*** 0.08 1.49*** 2.30***
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%  and 10%  level, respectively.
Figure 5.13 - Option 'Baseline specification + debt/GDP, EU27'  
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Specification details
Sample: EU17 Nr. of countries: 17
Start: 1995 End: 2012
Nr. of years: 18 Lags: 2
Fixed effects: country FE
Common time trend: yes
Responses to a government spending shock equal to 1% of GDP (shock at impact i.e. year zero)
unit At impact After 1 year After 3 years After 5 years
Real gov. spending % 4.19*** 3.64*** 1.49*** 0.20
Real cycl.-adj. net-taxes % -2.00*** -2.61*** -1.92*** -1.67***
Real GDP % 0.63*** 0.98*** 0.60** -0.21
GDP deflator % 0.34*** 0.59*** 0.59*** 0.22
Nominal short-term interest rates p.p. -0.12*** -0.07 0.10 -0.03
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%  and 10%  level, respectively.
Figure 5.14 - Option 'Baseline specification, EU17 (old EU)'  
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Specification details
Sample: EU17 Nr. of countries: 17
Start: 1995 End: 2012
Nr. of years: 18 Lags: 2
Fixed effects: country FE
Common time trend: yes
Responses to a government spending shock equal to 1% of GDP (shock at impact i.e. year zero)
unit At impact After 1 year After 3 years After 5 years
Real gov. spending % 4.19*** 3.44*** 1.41*** 0.18
Real cycl.-adj. net-taxes % -1.91*** -2.35*** -1.60** -1.38***
Real GDP % 0.47*** 0.72*** 0.65*** -0.21
GDP deflator % 0.27*** 0.53*** 0.61*** 0.25
Nominal short-term interest rates p.p. -0.21*** -0.21** 0.10 -0.05
Debt/GDP p.p. -0.18*** -0.09 1.41** 3.08***
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%  and 10%  level, respectively.
Figure 5.14 - Option 'Baseline specification + debt/GDP, EU17 (old EU)'  
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Specification details
Sample: NMS10 Nr. of countries: 10
Start: 1995 End: 2012
Nr. of years: 18 Lags: 2
Fixed effects: country FE
Common time trend: yes
Responses to a government spending shock equal to 1% of GDP (shock at impact i.e. year zero)
unit At impact After 1 year After 3 years After 5 years
Real gov. spending % 4.24*** 3.66*** 1.83*** 1.00**
Real cycl.-adj. net-taxes % 2.81*** 1.72*** 1.03* 0.80
Real GDP % 1.28*** 1.36*** 1.04** 0.86
GDP deflator % 0.21*** 0.43* 0.71** 0.76**
Nominal short-term interest rates p.p. -0.22*** 0.01 0.12 0.00
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%  and 10%  level, respectively.
Figure 5.14 - Option 'Baseline specification, NMS10 (new EU)'  
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Specification details
Sample: NMS10 Nr. of countries: 10
Start: 1995 End: 2012
Nr. of years: 18 Lags: 2
Fixed effects: country FE
Common time trend: yes
Responses to a government spending shock equal to 1% of GDP (shock at impact i.e. year zero)
unit At impact After 1 year After 3 years After 5 years
Real gov. spending % 4.24*** 3.67*** 1.82*** 1.00**
Real cycl.-adj. net-taxes % 2.86*** 1.76*** 1.06* 0.86**
Real GDP % 1.26*** 1.36*** 1.03** 0.85
GDP deflator % 0.18*** 0.41* 0.67** 0.72*
Nominal short-term interest rates p.p. -0.24*** 0 0.11 -0.02
Debt/GDP p.p. -0.64*** -0.38* 0.11 0.35
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%  and 10%  level, respectively.
Figure 5.14 - Option 'Baseline specification + debt/GDP, NMS10 (new EU)'  
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Specification details
Sample: EU27 Nr. of countries: 27
Start: 1995 End: 2012
Nr. of years: 18 Lags: 2
Fixed effects: country FE
Common time trend: yes
Responses to a government spending shock equal to 1% of GDP (shock at impact i.e. year zero)
unit At impact After 1 year After 3 years After 5 years
Real gov. spending % 4.21*** 3.82*** 2.12*** 0.72**
Real cycl.-adj. net-taxes % 1.10*** 0.01 -0.64 -0.61
Real priv. consumption % 0.99*** 1.29*** 0.44 -0.37
Real priv. investment % 1.95*** 2.74*** 0.55 -1.14
GDP deflator % 0.21*** 0.35*** 0.47*** 0.26
Nominal short-term interest rates p.p. -0.26*** -0.07 0.22** 0.06
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%  and 10%  level, respectively.
Figure 5.15 - Option '6-variable PVAR'  
 
 
 
 
 
518 
 
Specification details
Sample: EU27 Nr. of countries: 27
Start: 1995 End: 2012
Nr. of years: 18 Lags: 2
Fixed effects: country FE
Common time trend: yes
Responses to a government spending shock equal to 1% of GDP (shock at impact i.e. year zero)
unit At impact After 1 year After 3 years After 5 years
Real gov. spending % 4.21*** 3.73*** 2.05*** 0.55*
Real cycl.-adj. net-taxes % 1.13*** 0.07 -0.92** -0.70*
Real priv. consumption % 1.04*** 1.40*** 0.30 -0.53*
Real priv. investment % 2.10*** 3.04*** 0.25 -1.43*
Real exports % 0.49*** -0.18 -0.18 0.12
Real imports % 2.19*** 1.69*** -0.08 -0.74
GDP deflator % 0.25*** 0.45*** 0.56*** 0.29
Nominal short-term interest rates p.p. -0.23*** 0.00 0.24** 0.02
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%  and 10%  level, respectively.
Figure 5.15 - Option '8-variable PVAR'  
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Specification details
Sample: EU27 Nr. of countries: 27
Start: 1995 End: 2012
Nr. of years: 18 Lags: 2
Fixed effects: country FE
Common time trend: yes
Responses to a government spending shock equal to 1% of GDP (shock at impact i.e. year zero)
unit At impact After 1 year After 3 years After 5 years
Real gov. spending % 4.21*** 3.83*** 1.96*** 0.42
Real cycl.-adj. net-taxes % 1.07*** -0.16 -1.04** -0.73*
Real GDP % 1.15*** 1.46*** 0.56** -0.09
Real eff. exchange rate % -0.17*** 0.27 0.44 0.31
Real short-term interest rates p.p. -0.78*** -0.40** 0.31*** 0.14**
Real net-exports/GDP p.p. -1.10*** -1.20*** -0.10 0.49***
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%  and 10%  level, respectively.
Figure 5.16 - Option 'Open economy specification, EU27' 
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Specification details
Sample: EU17 Nr. of countries: 17
Start: 1995 End: 2012
Nr. of years: 18 Lags: 2
Fixed effects: country FE
Common time trend: yes
Responses to a government spending shock equal to 1% of GDP (shock at impact i.e. year zero)
unit At impact After 1 year After 3 years After 5 years
Real gov. spending % 4.19*** 3.70*** 2.01*** 0.41
Real cycl.-adj. net-taxes % -1.43*** -1.66*** -2.26*** -2.24***
Real GDP % 0.63*** 0.96*** 0.55** -0.05
Real eff. exchange rate % -0.03*** 0.44* 0.84*** 0.40
Real short-term interest rates p.p. -0.39*** -0.18 0.14 0.13*
Real net-exports/GDP p.p. -0.59*** -0.91*** -0.26 0.27*
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%  and 10%  level, respectively.
Figure 5.17 - Option 'Open economy specification, EU17 (old EU)' 
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Specification details
Sample: NMS10 Nr. of countries: 10
Start: 1995 End: 2012
Nr. of years: 18 Lags: 2
Fixed effects: country FE
Common time trend: yes
Responses to a government spending shock equal to 1% of GDP (shock at impact i.e. year zero)
unit At impact After 1 year After 3 years After 5 years
Real gov. spending % 4.24*** 3.66*** 1.61*** 0.71*
Real cycl.-adj. net-taxes % 2.91*** 1.54*** 0.71 0.90**
Real GDP % 1.46*** 1.72*** 0.78* 0.44
Real eff. exchange rate % -0.55*** -0.14 -0.06 0.08
Real short-term interest rates p.p. -0.89*** -0.38 0.27 -0.05
Real net-exports/GDP p.p. -1.34*** -1.18*** 0.30 0.65**
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%  and 10%  level, respectively.
Figure 5.17 - Option 'Open economy specification, NMS10 (new EU)' 
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Appendix 5.3 - Additional tests related to Chapter 5 
 
Comparison of impulse responses to a government spending shock of 1% of GDP - 
baseline specification (with common linear time trend) and the specification 
using country-specific linear time trends instead of the common time trend  
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Specification details
Sample: EU27 Nr. of countries: 27
Start: 1995 End: 2012
Nr. of years: 18 Lags: 2
Fixed effects: country FE
Common time trend: yes
Responses to a government spending shock equal to 1% of GDP (shock at impact i.e. year zero)
unit At impact After 1 year After 3 years After 5 years
Real gov. spending % 4.21*** 3.80*** 1.78*** 0.42
Real cycl.-adj. net-taxes % 0.91*** -0.30 -0.98** -0.78*
Real GDP % 0.99*** 1.08*** 0.44* -0.07
GDP deflator % 0.26*** 0.45*** 0.45** 0.26
Nominal short-term interest rates p.p. -0.19*** -0.01 0.19* 0.08
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%  and 10%  level, respectively.
Impulse responses to a government spending shock of 1% of GDP - baseline 
specification (with common linear time trend)  
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Specification details
Sample: EU27 Nr. of countries: 27
Start: 1995 End: 2012
Nr. of years: 18 Lags: 2
Fixed effects: country FE
Common time trend: no, replaced with country-specific time trends
Responses to a government spending shock equal to 1% of GDP (shock at impact i.e. year zero)
unit At impact After 1 year After 3 years After 5 years
Real gov. spending % 4.21*** 3.08*** 0.58** -0.33
Real cycl.-adj. net-taxes % 0.94*** -0.38 -0.92** -0.43
Real GDP % 1.22*** 1.41*** 0.30 -0.38
GDP deflator % 0.40*** 0.81*** 0.81*** 0.35**
Nominal short-term interest rates p.p. -0.06*** 0.21* 0.30*** -0.07
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%  and 10%  level, respectively.
Impulse responses to a government spending shock of 1% of GDP - the 
specification using country-specific linear time trends instead of the common 
time trend 
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Comparison of impulse responses to a government spending shock of 1% of GDP - 
baseline specification (using absolute amounts) and the specification using per 
capita spending, net-taxes and GDP  
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Specification details
Sample: EU27 Nr. of countries: 27
Start: 1995 End: 2012
Nr. of years: 18 Lags: 2
Fixed effects: country FE
Common time trend: yes
Responses to a government spending shock equal to 1% of GDP (shock at impact i.e. year zero)
unit At impact After 1 year After 3 years After 5 years
Real gov. spending % 4.21*** 3.80*** 1.78*** 0.42
Real cycl.-adj. net-taxes % 0.91*** -0.30 -0.98** -0.78*
Real GDP % 0.99*** 1.08*** 0.44* -0.07
GDP deflator % 0.26*** 0.45*** 0.45** 0.26
Nominal short-term interest rates p.p. -0.19*** -0.01 0.19* 0.08
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%  and 10%  level, respectively.
Impulse responses to a government spending shock of 1% of GDP - baseline 
specification (using absolute amounts for spending, net taxes and GDP)  
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Specification details
Sample: EU27 Nr. of countries: 27
Start: 1995 End: 2012
Nr. of years: 18 Lags: 2
Fixed effects: country FE
Common time trend: yes
Responses to a government spending shock equal to 1% of GDP (shock at impact i.e. year zero)
unit At impact After 1 year After 3 years After 5 years
Real gov. spending, per capita % 4.21*** 3.68*** 1.56*** 0.32
Real cycl.-adj. net-taxes, per capita % 0.89*** -0.39 -0.92* -0.63
Real GDP, per capita % 1.00*** 1.07*** 0.51* 0.06
GDP deflator % 0.31*** 0.57*** 0.79*** 0.58***
Nominal short-term interest rates p.p. -0.19*** 0.01 0.27** 0.08
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Impulse responses to a government spending shock of 1% of GDP - the 
specification using per capita spending, net-taxes and GDP 
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